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In the introduction to their seminal edition of The Holy War (1682) Roger Sharrock and James Forrest identify a softening of Bunyan's attitude in the 1670s concerning 'the terrors that had haunted his conscience' (HW, p. xiv) regarding hell and damnation. They argue that the harsher and more rigidly defined theology of predestination, hitherto predominant in Bunyan's writing, was becoming gentler, being gradually replaced by an inclination towards the 'mercy and relief available to Christians'. An example is provided by the actions of Emanuel in The Holy War, a paragon of goodness and mercy, who constantly forgives the ingratitude of Mansoul's citizens for their disobedience, and lack of constancy and discipline (HW, pp. xiv, xvi). Yet The Holy War is a profoundly violent text where Emanuel's mercy and forgiveness are tempered by his willingness to wage war in a determined and bloody fashion. Violent conflict is everywhere apparent, as a line from the prefatory poem to the text makes clear: 'Mansoul, it was the very seat of war' (HW, p. 4). When the battle for the town of Mansoul takes place between the forces of good and evil, led by Emanuel and Diabolus respectively, the text informs us that 'many were maimed and wounded, and slain' (HW, p. 83). When Emanuel recaptures the town of Mansoul for the first time from the occupying forces of Diabolus, the chief among the ungodly are tried and crucified. In its depiction of armed conflict, and in its characterisation of the warrior for religious truth, Bunyan's narrative closely resembles Milton's in Paradise Lost (1667). Neil Keeble has observed that Bunyan, like Milton, was a 'transgressive and subversive author' whose dissent from the established church was lifelong and pronounced.
For most of his life, John Bunyan was despised. To clergymen of the Church of England he embodied the worst kind of sectarian fanaticism, and he was repeatedly accused of being a tinker, an 'emblem of lower-class vulgarity, drunkenness and promiscuity'. Charges of ignorance, dishonesty, blasphemy, fanaticism and heresy were levelled against him, and when he challenged the Anglican Edward Fowler his writings were compared to the 'brutish barkings' of a dog. There were concerns that the 'Fury' of such an ignorant 'Pestilent Schismatick' might infect the true doctrine of the English Church and Bunyan's right to preach was quickly challenged. He had to contend just as much with the dissenters. His dispute with the Quakers began with his first printed works: Some Gospel-truths Opened (1656) and his response to its critics, A Vindication of . . . Some Gospel-Truths Opened (1657). In the eyes of George Fox, one of his later antagonists, Bunyan was a liar and a false prophet whose principles were inconsistent, just as his judgement was erratic. Bunyan's reputation did not improve in 1659 when he was supposed to have supported, in print, the slanders of a Cambridgeshire woman, Margaret Pryor, who accused a Quaker widow of bewitching her and of changing her into a mare (Bunyan's pamphlet on the matter has not survived, if indeed it was ever written). Pryor was soon exposed as a lewd drunkard, the accused woman was acquitted by a jury in fifteen minutes and the accusation of witchcraft was turned against Bunyan. Even the Baptists thought Bunyan to be a traitor.
In the wake of Barack Obama's nomination as President Elect of the USA in November 2008, tributes poured in from across the world. One, entitled 'Pilgrim's Progress', came from Tolu Ogunlesi, a Nigerian poet. The poem begins by depicting a cacophonous media spectacle, rather like an electronic Vanity Fair. Journalists and media pundits constitute 'an army of voluble blackberries'. Those of a left-wing persuasion translate 'King into textese'; the right comprises a 'Klan of epithet dealers'. Into this noisy arena walks Obama. He belongs to neither camp and is further set apart from the predominant whiteness of the gathering with its 'star-spangled genes'. The poem continues: “He will not be one of them. Nor one of us. / He will simply be the sepia-toned pilgrim . . . / He himself will be naked / To be clothed by all who see or hear of him.” Obama will belong to none, yet all will claim him. He will be the screen on to which everyone will project their own particular desires. To elucidate this process, the poem introduces the figure of Bunyan's pilgrim, another international icon who has been claimed by a range of different publics. Like Obama, the pilgrim has functioned as an empty cipher which audiences could fill with their own agendas. Readers as diverse as Jamaican Baptists and persecuted Christian converts in Madagascar have claimed the text as their own. The text's episodic structure allows readers to select the bits which serve their purposes while its allegorical architecture permits a wide range of interpretations.
This chapter explores how national cultural differences between partners involved in a contractual relationship may interfere with the development of trust. This is illustrated through a case study of a management contract signed by a French private company (Promostate) and public Lebanese company (SONAT). Using an ethnographic approach and drawing on a qualitative analysis of field interviews, the author argues that the challenges faced by the French and Lebanese parties in developing a trusting relationship are due to classic issues of personal conflicts, differing organizational cultures and power asymmetries. Because their national cultural backgrounds were different, the parties had different conceptions of what ‘good cooperation’ should be that shaped their expectations of trustworthy behaviour and hindered the process of resolving the difficulties they encountered.
Introduction
Contracts are recognized as universal management mechanisms that provide an efficient solution to the problem of coordinating expectations and interactions between economic actors from different nationalities. However, the impossibility of designing complete, explicit and easily enforceable contracts may restrict their effectiveness as a management mechanism (Macaulay, 1963). Trust is supposed to form a viable alternative or complement to contracts. Trust can reduce uncertainty and lead to more efficiently negotiated agreements (Koenig and van Wijk, 1992).
Research on the development of trust in contractual relationships has focused largely on the question of how trust and formal contracts are related. At the same time, culture has been considered a factor in the trust-development process in many ways.
This chapter examines the dimensions of inter-organizational and interpersonal trust as they are manifested in the consultant–client interaction, viewed within the ‘cultural spheres’ framework (Schneider and Barsoux, 2003). The chapter argues that the alignment or misalignment of culture(s) helps foster or hinder the presence of trust in the consultant–client relationship. We support our argument by demonstrating how culture becomes an important informative resource from which consultants and clients manage their expectations and risk taking. In inter-organizational contexts, trust is developed through artifacts and formal procedures that are shared by both parties. In interpersonal contexts, trust is developed through the mutual sharing of cultural values, as manifested in the interpersonal qualities of integrity and benevolence. Cultural values are not necessarily part of the parent consulting firm but can be unique to the people working in partnership on a project. Examples of behavioural cultural values include forms of communication, constructive criticism, displays of ability, benevolence and integrity and an unhesitating voicing of opinions that can lead to a realignment of attitudes, feelings, motives and objectives.
Introduction
In a service relationship where business advice is consumed over the course of a series of interactions, the presence of ambiguity creates uncertainty (Clark, 1995). Management consulting is an example of a complex service activity whose success is dependent on the nature of the interaction between the actors (Clark, 1995; Fincham, 1999; Lowendahl, 2005; Nachum, 1999).
This chapter reviews theory and evidence regarding the barriers to trust that arise within the context of cross-cultural negotiations. The chapter provides an overview of how trust has been conceptualized in the domain of cross-cultural negotiations. It also provides a discussion of the psychological and social barriers to trust common to cross-cultural negotiations. The chapter then discusses approaches to attenuating or overcoming the deleterious effects of these psychological and social barriers. The chapter concludes by discussing some practical implications of the findings, as well as some directions for future research.
Introduction
A central and recurring question in the study of cross-cultural relations has been how best to resolve the unavoidable conflicts that arise between interdependent groups and nations (Kahn and Zald, 1990; Messick and Mackie, 1989; Pruitt and Rubin, 1986; Stephan and Stephan, 1996; Taylor and Moghaddam, 1987). Given the obvious importance of the problem, it is hardly surprising that a variety of approaches have been proposed for dealing with such conflicts, ranging from complex structural interventions to elaborate procedural remedies (Davis et al., 1990; Mares and Powell, 1990). Despite the numerous creative approaches advanced to deal with this problem, negotiation remains one of the most basic and reliable mechanisms for conflict resolution in cross-cultural contexts (Garling et al., 2006; Gelfand and Brett, 2004; Kahn and Kramer, 2006; Leung, 2006).
Does trust and its development, functions and meaning, differ between people from different national–societal cultures? There is considerable anecdotal evidence and some theoretical argumentation to suggest it does, but are these supported by empirical research? This chapter reviews the available empirical evidence on the effects of national–societal culture on interpersonal trust. It focuses largely on quantitative empirical evidence to consider the extent to which, and the ways in which, interpersonal trust differs across national–societal cultures. In every category of our review we found evidence of cross-cultural differences, particularly on generalized trust, and also evidence of trust universals across cultures. In evaluating these findings, we conclude that trust may operate as a variform universal and variform functional universal. We conclude with two proposed routes for future research, and implications for practice.
Introduction
To an ever-increasing extent, ‘work’ involves close interaction and cooperation with people who come from a national–societal cultural background different from one's own. This emerging reality of work can be attributed to a number of factors. First, with the unrelenting advance of globalization, more and more organizations are taking a global approach to operations, including the operation of overseas international joint ventures and alliances, working with offshore suppliers and customers, and conducting global searches for talent. Second, the advance of communication technologies such as e-mail and videoconferencing has fostered a movement toward global virtual teams involving individuals from a variety of different cultural backgrounds.
This chapter examines the processes of building cooperation in a context of sparse public-sector regulation. The Nigerian and Ghanaian food sectors are characterized by a highly dispersed and fragmented system of micro-entrepreneurs from diverse ethnic groups who both compete and cooperate in order to flourish. Drawing on ethnographic research, we consider the relationships and contracts that require an element of cross-cultural trust, how personal social relations and institutional forms are used to ensure trust and the role of cultural norms. Our empirical findings indicate that individuals draw on both personalized social relations and institutional forms of trust that are underpinned by culture-specific norms. Through personalized trust, traders have been able to operate across cultural boundaries, building common norms of behaviour over centuries, and shaping these into what are perceived essentially as professional, albeit personalized, codes of conduct and semi-formal institutional forms (such as associations) that function in parallel to the state.
Introduction
The Nigerian and Ghanaian food sectors are characterized by a highly dispersed and fragmented system of micro-entrepreneurs from a range of ethnic groups who both compete and cooperate in order to survive and grow. The fragmented nature of the sector necessitates a range of cooperative forms in order for the enterprises to gain access to information, finance, quality products and market spaces. The traders involved are found to have a number of different types of bilateral relations (joint ventures and informal reciprocal arrangements) both within cultural groups and crossing cultural boundaries.
In this chapter we argue that one way of better understanding how people make sense of trust across cultures is by framing it as a social construction. This recognizes the fluidity and unevenness of trust, thereby questioning any notion of trust being fixed or static. Although trust as a social construction has been recognized before, we argue that the fuller consequences of this have not been explored adequately. Within this chapter we aim to address this, conceptualizing trust as constituted within cultural contexts that are themselves ongoing social constructions. We also discuss how actors construct social phenomena and focus on the role of narrative in this process, leading us to conceptualize trust as a narrative process. Subsequently we discuss a possible research agenda to improve our knowledge of trusting across cultures, and propose research questions to help achieve this.
Introduction
This chapter presents an argument that one way of understanding better how people make sense of trust is by framing it as a social construction. By doing this the fluidity and unevenness of trust is recognized, which questions any notion of trust being fixed or static. This leads us to advocate an understanding of trust in its verb form. Trust as a social construction has been recognized before (e.g. Child and Möllering, 2003; Lewis and Weigert, 1985), but we believe the fuller consequences of this have not been adequately explored. We do this and conceptualize trust as constituted within cultural contexts that are themselves ongoing social constructions.
The aim of this chapter is to provide new insight into how chief executive officers of family businesses (who are themselves family members) create trust with the firm's owners. I argue that, in the family firm, three interacting subcultures (family, business and ownership) influence chief executive officer (CEO) and owner behaviour in keeping with their governance roles. Because of distinct values and norms of behaviour, the interactions of these three subcultures are often a source of interpersonal conflict, and often undermine relationships of trust built up over generations. Through an exploratory case study and application of the Economies of Worth Model, this chapter examines and illustrates how CEOs of family firms enhance their legitimacy and thus build, maintain, and repair trust.
Introduction
Around the world, family firms dominate the economic landscape (Chrisman et al., 2005; Morck and Yeung, 2004). Family businesses are those where ownership and management are concentrated within a family unit, and where its members work to achieve or maintain intra-organizational family-based relatedness (Litz, 1995). Their corporate governance structure may be composed of the same people, or at least people from the same family (Gersick et al.. 1997; Wortman, 1994). This overlap of ownership and management influences the relationships between the CEO, the board of directors and the owners, as well as the strategy of the family firm (Melin, 2001; Nordqvist, 2005). Indeed, their relationships are founded on three interacting subcultures (family, business and ownership) that may conflict.