A legal analyses of Grotius’s ideas on sovereignty in De jure belli ac pacis shows that political power is in fact the natural right of the political association to defend its rights and foster its well-being, transferred to one (monarchy), a few (aristocracy) of many (popular government). The power transferred from the association to the ruler can be absolute or conditional, complete or partial, perpetual or temporary, and the ruler can hold the right to rule in property, or have a usufructuary or precarious right to it. Notwithstanding the people’s right to resist their ruler(s) in some well-described cases of abuse of power, Grotius regards the ruler with a property or usufructuary right in political power as supreme (‘sovereign’), even if his power is limited. According to Grotius, power is supreme if the ruler’s actions are not subject to the legal control of another. Abuse of power beyond its limits is not an act of the political ruler, but of someone infringing on another’s rights.

The late eighteenth century in France saw the publication of an unambiguously explicit, self-assured, and systematic atheism in the works of Paul Henry Thiry (baron) d’Holbach, Jacques-André Naigeon, and, posthumously, Denis Diderot. In the early eighteenth century, several clandestine manuscripts circulated (in France and elsewhere) about whose atheistic status scholars argue, but all students agree that one of these manuscripts, the posthumously discovered Testament of Jean Meslier, a country Catholic priest, was an expression of intensely and fully atheistic views (Benítez 1996; 2012).

The chapter uncovers the role that Grotius’ philosophy of virtues plays in defining and renegotiating the sphere of law in peace; its distinct roles during and after war; the conditions in which Grotius used virtues as a benchmark to correct and evolve law; and the conditions in which he thought that law can rightfully ignore the calls of virtue. Grotius’ function for virtue in law is then compared to conventional roles assigned to religion in correcting and stimulating law. The chapter brings out the coherence of Grotius’ theory of virtue and law as he applied it to diverse real-life problems and themes, ranging from Iberian-Dutch encounters through his justification of free trade to the doctrinal minimalism that Grotius regarded as the best chance of saving the United Provinces from religious strife. The distinctive rights and duties of sovereigns, magistrates, soldiers, slaves, citizens and Christians are finally explained in light of Grotius’ virtue - law dynamic.

Grotius drew mainly upon the Catholic moral theologians, but his theory of contract law is set in the different perspective of his ‘secular’ natural law system.

In Frederick Douglass’ second autobiography, My Bondage and My Freedom, published in 1855, he notes that his religious views during the course of his life “pass[ed] over the whole scale and circle of belief and unbelief, from faith in the overruling Providence of God, to the blackest atheism” (Blassingame et al. 2003). Just three years earlier, in what is perhaps his most well-known speech, Douglass likewise noted that rather than embrace a pro-slavery gospel or a gospel indifferent to the institution of slavery, “I would say welcome infidelity! Welcome atheism! Welcome anything! In preference to the gospel, as preached by those Divines!” (Douglass 1852) While his 1852 speech, “What to the slave is the fourth of July,” is more well known for its harsh denunciations of American republicanism, his critique of Christian Churches and ministers occupies just as prominent a role and, when combined with insights from his autobiographies and other sources, marks him as one of the earliest black intellectuals to embrace secularism.

This chapter examines how the title of founder of the law of nations was bestowed upon Grotius and how the liberal internationalist interpretation of the existence of a Grotian tradition in international law came into being. It also reviews the extent to which both historical constructs have been challenged by new historical research and contemporary re-interpretations of Grotius’ works and figure. The first part accompanies the reception of Grotius by international lawyers from the discovery of his De Jure Praedae in 1864 to the establishment of the Grotius Society during WWI. The second part examines the revivals of Grotius among international lawyers in the aftermaths of both world wars and considers a number of Grotius-related historiographical developments during the Cold War period. The third part examines how, in recent decades, on the one hand Grotius has become further institutionalised as a global symbol of international law while on the other hand his reputation has suffered from him being labelled a handmaiden of European colonialism and exploitation. The conclusion reflects on the lasting fame of the ‘miracle of Holland’ among international lawyers and suggests that the history of international law as a research field should take a break from Hugo Grotius.

Connecting sociability with arguments about self-interest and natural law, Grotius adopted an account of moral knowledge and motivation for justice that he found in Cicero.For Grotius, sociability serves as a counter to Epicurean views of moral motivation, but it does not by itself provide the grounds of validity of natural law, nor does it alone ground the obligatory force of natural law.Rather, sociability represents an appeal to a basis in human nature for cooperation in the state of nature.Human beings according to Grotius can be motivated to cooperate and adhere to the rules of natural law, but they are not necessarily so motivated.Importantly, Grotius appreciates that sociability creates its own problems, which Grotius believes can be solved by reason alone.For Grotius, the basis of sociability in human nature is not merely instinctual, but also rational; sociability is ultimately based on a respect for the rights to ‘first things’ such as private property, a respect which itself is motivated by right reason.The notion of sociability was to have an important future in the works of later thinkers such as Hobbes, Pufendorf, Shaftesbury, Mandeville, Hutcheson, Hume, Smith and Kant.

In many respects, music and atheism might seem to be strange bedfellows, given the religious – or at least metaphysical – language that often shapes accounts of musical experiences. For centuries, music has been attributed with the power to calm and restore order and equilibrium in times of trouble and turmoil. Shakespeare supposed music to be the food of love, while in the nineteenth century, Walter Pater (1919 [1873], 111) asserted that ‘all art constantly aspires towards the condition of music’. This condition of music – its ability to somehow lift spirits and provide a sense of well-being – is reflected in such metaphysical and spiritual language. Moreover, the church paid for a very large proportion of music written by western classical composers, until the late classical period, that once tied music squarely to religion. Masses, requiems, motets, cantatas, and oratorios served religious themes and liturgical purposes.

‘Scientist equals atheist’ seems a truism of popular psychology. The average person on the street appears to expect this equation to be true; scientists, people seem to think, are by necessity atheists. If not, it is cause for astonishment and mostly explained away as an exception to the rule. Conservative religious people see a direct causal relationship, fearing that science leads to atheism; fundamentalists ‘know’ this to be the case, and proponents of the so-called New Atheism agree most fervently (Young 2009).

Intersectionality, which is rooted in black feminist theory, is at the crux of current social justice movements within and beyond atheist communities. Initially theorized and articulated by law professor Kimberle Crenshaw (1989), intersectionality theory asserts that discrimination is multiaxial, not unidimensional, and that holding multiple marginalized identities has a compounding, not additive, effect on life experiences. For example, in the United States, men of color tend to receive harsher prison sentences than white men – with black men receiving even harsher sentences than Hispanic men, and with women receiving more lenient sentences than men overall (Steffensmeier et al. 2016). Thus, prison sentence severity is not a function of any one identity, but rather operates at the nexus of race and gender.

The response of both developed and developing countries to global developments has been first, to shift the tax burden from (mobile) capital to (less mobile) labour, and second, when further increased taxation of labour becomes politically and economically difficult, to cut government services. Thus, globalization and tax competition lead to a fiscal crisis for countries that wish to continue to provide those government services to their citizens, at the same time that demographic factors and increased income inequality, job insecurity and income volatility that result from globalization render such services more necessary. This chapter argues that if government service programs are to be maintained in the face of globalization, and if developing countries are to raise the funds needed to achieve the SDGs, it is necessary to cut the intermediate link by limiting tax competition. However, from both practical and normative considerations, any limits set to tax competition should be congruent with maintaining the ability of democratic states to determine the desirable size of their government.

This chapter deals with the specific role and place of the graphic novel in the contemporary literary field. It first addresses the widely debated analogies and differences between comics and graphic novels, while making a clear plea for the autonomy of the latter. It then studies the history of the graphic novel, with a strong emphasis on questions of publication format and cultural reception. Finally, it also discusses the question of canon formation and the relationships between mainstream and minority cultures in the field.

Rabindranath Tagore’s essay on world literature, Viśvasāhitya (1907), is important not just because of the political and historical circumstances of its production, but because it advocates a method of ‘doing’ world literature that potentially frees us from the conundrums besetting the methods used so far if scholars writing on the essay were to read it for what it actually says. In this paper, the Bengali text of this essay is closely interrogated to arrive at the surprising conclusion that the idea of world literature that he arrives at in this essay, in complete contrast to Goethe’s, is not an addition of the national literatures of the world – that, he says, is a very provincial way of looking at the question. Instead, he posits here a philosophical notion related to an understanding of the self and the other which is predicated upon his inheritance of, and interest in, both Upanishadic high theory as well as popular folk culture. His concept (or anti-concept) was premised upon his advice to find the world in the self, and was one that may, perhaps, be mined for its emphasis on particularity and attention to the individual as it exists in relation to the whole.

The focus of this chapter is the use of international arbitration for BHR disputes. The first part sets out the theoretical framework. It places arbitration within the context of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (“UNGPs”) and the barriers to individuals securing remedies. The merits and limitations of arbitration as an existing mechanism for resolving BHR disputes are discussed. The authors also consider how international arbitration, with appropriate modifications, may be complementary to, and operate in parallel with, both existing state-based judicial mechanisms as well as possible multilateral institutions for resolution of BHR disputes in the future. The second part of the chapter considers the pragmatic angle of arbitration of BHR disputes through: (i) the prism of the experience of the Bangladesh Accord Arbitrations; (ii) the formulation of BHR-specific arbitral procedures in the form of the Hague Rules; and (iii) the potential embrace of BHR arbitration in a range of specific industries, namely fast fashion, mega-sporting events, and commerce at sea.