This chapter reviews the history and development of Māori and Pasifika Englishes in New Zealand, focusing on both segmental and suprasegmental aspects of their phonetics/phonology. We review evidence that Māori English has higher pitch and more syllable-timed rhythm than Pākehā English, and suggest that a distinctive Māori English voice quality is not yet well understood. L1-type and L2-type varieties of Pasifika English are distinguished, highlighting the role of transfer in the formation of these varieties. The differences between Pākehā, Māori and Pasifika Englishes in New Zealand are a matter of frequency of use, rather than of absolutes, both in terms of the linguistic features and the social variables with which they co-occur. We problematise any straight-forward description of these varieties as revolving solely around ethnicity, given the interconnectedness of ethnic identities in New Zealand.

Maconchy’s elder daughter Anna Dunlop, née LeFanu, provides detailed personal recollections. Maconchy’s childhood, studies, marriage to William LeFanu and early success is covered by memories that she shared with her daughter, including the struggle with tuberculosis.

From the Second World War onwards, Dunlop’s own reminiscences demonstrate that alongside her professional life, Maconchy was an affectionate, caring and maternal figure. She was skilled domestically: cooking and preserving, dress making and gardening. Wartime and evacuation were isolating. However her marriage and family life was a happy and fulfilling one and from the nineteen fifties she once again balanced this successfully with an increasingly busy professional life. Dunlop writes that her mother seldom took a break, but with her husband returned to Ireland for holidays whenever they could.

Dunlop left home for university in 1957, where her reminiscences end. Her conclusion notes that Maconchy was full of energy in all she undertook, for her family and for other composers.

Concerned with Emerson’s aging and the authorial integrity of his later works, critics traditionally discounted the compositions Emerson delivered or published after 1860. Important editorial scholarship, however, has opened new prospects for reconsidering the intellectual vitality of late Emerson, now accessible in The Later Lectures and in the publication of the final volumes of the Collected Works, including Society and Solitude (1870) and Letters and Social Aims (1875). Building upon the critical reconsideration of Emerson’s considerable engagement in aesthetic, cultural, and philosophical matters beyond the 1850s, this chapter identifies Emerson’s rhetoric as a significant concept in, and creative context for, the sometimes collaborative and often iterative “recomposition” of the later work. Three rhetorical figurations of Emerson’s late styles – metonymy, analogy, and translation – are traced across works such as “Eloquence,” “Poetry and Imagination,” “Quotation and Originality,” and the unfinished Natural History of Intellect.

This chapter draws out international laws applicable to ensure the navigational safety of submarines and to establish what laws apply when a submarine is ultimately lost at sea. The discussion is concerned with both military and private submarines during times of peace. To avoid collisions, submarines must account for surface traffic as well as submerged traffic and deploy appropriate signals and sounds. Submarines prompt distinct questions with regards to navigational safety. Where a submarine is in distress and ultimately sinks, consideration is further needed as to international law rules on search and rescue, as well as the law of wrecks and possible salvage. For submarines that have been lost at sea for a long time, safeguarding underwater cultural heritage may become a key consideration. When lost at sea, the relevant laws are comparable to other ships or warships but the difficulty rests in the interaction of those rules.

The use of submarines in World War II and the development of submarine technology into the Cold War had implications for different fields of international law. This chapter addresses the peace negotiations and agreements that were adopted after World War II, which concerned the decommissioning (to varying degrees) of submarines and efforts to revise the Montreux Treaty. International law developments were sometimes slow, as evident in responses to violations of the law of naval warfare. Equally, the chapter highlights the rise of nuclear technology in relation to submarines and the modest advances in international agreements on nuclear tests. Despite the growing strategic importance of submarines in the Cold War, their explicit regulation in the 1958 conference and treaties on the law of the sea was scant. Instead, international laws relating to the passage of warships and military activities on the high seas generally impacted international laws regulating submarine operations.

Tuberculosis (TB) is an ancient disease of humans shown to be infectious by Robert Koch in 1882. It primarily affects the lungs and has been a major cause of human morbidity and mortality throughout history. When Elizabeth Maconchey developed TB in 1932, in the pre-drug era, Britain had developed an approach to treatment of which the core was hygiene therapy: this involved a healthy climate, strict rest and improved nutrition. Such care was provided in sanatoria, but could also be carried out in the home with supervision by a tuberculosis dispensary. Maconchey left London, Britain’s centre of musical life, to improve her environment and began a program of rest with slowly progressive exercise and nutrition. The management of TB evolved to include vaccination with BCG, mass screening using skin tests (tuberculin) and x-rays, surgical therapies (artificial pneumothorax, thoracoplasty) until replaced by effective, curative drug therapy in the 1950s.

Since ancient times, at least at the level of theory, there has existed in the world a very basic idea of the rights and obligations of any two groups fighting against each other. The legislatures of Ancient Greece had formulated the law that those killed in war must be buried. They prohibited killing people from the losing side who took refuge in places of worship. They also proscribed killing sportsmen and the servants of places of worship. However, firstly, these laws did not apply to international wars [bayn al millī]. The lawmakers had introduced these laws to regulate their internal strife and battles. Secondly, seen from a practical perspective, it transpires that the empires of that time neither accepted these injunctions as laws nor implemented them. The Roman empire, in particular, did not accept the legal status of any non-Roman country, and had no concept of dealing with them on the basis of any rights and obligations. The same was the case with the Persian empire. They considered non-Persian [ghair Iranī] nations barbaric. To them, the non-Persian empires were in fact traitors who had rebelled against the Persian empire. Therefore, when at war with any such nation, the Persians did not feel any ethical obligations binding on them.

This chapter outlines the development of pidgin and creole varieties of English worldwide. The foundational assumption is that creole languages emerge from pidginized varieties or at least ones strongly shaped by second-language acquisition. As such, the Australian and Oceanic languages such as Tok Pisin and Australian Aboriginal English will be treated as creolizations of initial pidgins (rather than as “pidgins” themselves, as they often have been), as will the West African languages often called “pidgins” such as Nigerian and Cameroonian “Pidgin” English. The chapter will also treat the creoles of the Caribbean and surrounding area along with the aforementioned West African varieties as sister languages born of an ancestral pidgin. Hawaiian “Pidgin” English, including controversy over its origins, will also be covered, as well as Chinese Pidgin English and Pitkern/Norf’k.

Illusionist theories, such as the attention schema theory (AST) and the sensorimotor theory of phenomenal consciousness (SMT), are radically different from the above theories by proposing that consciousness is an illusion and, hence, the only thing to explain is why people believe that consciousness entails something inherently ineffable and mysterious. We discuss whether the challenges presented in previous chapters also apply to this category of theories.

Drawing on my research on assisted reproductive technologies in India and the US over the past fifteen years, this chapter explores the relationship between race and reproduction, calling attention to the ways in which histories of race, notions of identity, and ideas of human difference influence reproductive practices in the context of science and reproductive medicine. I emphasize how racialization processes in the context of assisted reproduction serve to bolster understandings of race that reinforce biogenetic underpinnings and exacerbate social hierarchies. Reproductive technologies are thus deeply influenced by broader systems of racial formation and capitalism, which construct different futures for racialized minorities and have long been central to xenophobia and racial discrimination in the United States and around the globe.

The first clause of the law upon which stands the foundation of human civilization is that human life and blood are sacred. The first civil [tamaddunī] right of mankind is the right to live, while the first and foremost civil duty is to allow others to live. The moral principle of honour of self has definitely existed in all the sharias and civilized laws in the world. A religion or a law that does not recognize this right can neither be declared the law or religion of civilized people nor enable any human population to live a peaceful life under it, and thus it cannot flourish. Every person’s intellect is aware that if human life does not carry any value, lacks respect and has no arrangement for its security, then how can people live together, engage in mutual trade, attain a sense of peace and security, or attain the state of collectivity devoid of fear which is necessary for trade, manufacturing, agriculture, money-making, building homes, travelling and living a civilized life? In addition, if we disregard needs and consider this from a purely humanist [insāniyyat] perspective, killing another human life, even if it is for personal gains or enmity, symbolizes the worst form of tyranny and hard-heartedness, the existence of which not only fail to support moral development but also make it impossible for an individual to retain the status of a human being.