Based on the case report of Nathan Goldstein et al., “But I have a pacer…there is no point in engaging in hypothetical scenarios”: A Non-imminently Dying Patient’s Request for Pacemaker Deactivation, it is reasonable to conclude that it was, all-things-considered, ethically appropriate to grant the patient’s request to deactivate her pacemaker. Philosophically, and as a clinical ethicist, I support the team’s decision to honor the patient’s request for pacemaker deactivation. However, it is worth exploring a bit further whether the distress on the part of the outside hospital’s ethics committee and providers—who declined to honor the patient’s request for pacemaker deactivation—may actually track something of moral significance. In this commentary, I argue that there are reasonable grounds for holding that deactivation of a ‘biofixture’ such as a pacemaker may be more analogous in moral terms to medical aid in dying than it is to standard cases of withdrawal of life support at the end of a patient’s life.

Migrant residential concentration areas have been a significant focus for research, but academic attention has primarily centered on their effects rather than how they form. There is some research considering the discrete factors of such areas’ emergence, but these factors are rarely fused into a comprehensive explanation with a description of specific mechanisms in operation. Even less is known about the formation of migrant residential concentration areas in postsocialist cities. The few studies in existence leave the impression that such areas emerge around bazaars by default. In this article, based on a multicase study (N = 37) conducted in the 15 largest Russian cities, we argue that although there is a pattern of migrant residential concentration areas’ emergence in postsocialist cities, this process takes place only in the presence of a combination of seven factors. The article presents these factors and describes an ideal type of a migrant residential concentration area in a Russian city and mechanisms of its emergence. The article concludes with the comparison of the postsocialist pattern with other types of migrant residential concentration and hypothesizing on how the Russian case differs from the other postsocialist cases in Central and Eastern Europe.

Consider a simple argument that worshipping God is wrong. This world is not a nice place. Not only do humans persecute and inflict other evils on each other, but millions of people suffer and die every year from preventable poverty-related causes, and it seems that few, if any, deserve their plights. It is unclear that we should want to be associated with, never mind worship, a being with the capacity to make the world a much better place but whose beneficence (or knowledge) permits things to go on in the ways that they do. At first blush, contempt is a more fitting response to God than worship. But, assuming God exists, perhaps we have reason to accept, if not worship, him in any case. Humans are comparably limited. We do evil unto each other, and, insofar as millions of deaths are preventable, our failure to prevent them is a failure of humans as well as of God. If we could (and should) have saved many lives and have not, our moral failings present us with our own, human, problem of evil and suffering. So, if we should reject God because so many people suffer, then we should reject ourselves when we could avoid evil and help others too. However, this article argues that we have practical, moral, and epistemic reasons to accept rather than reject ourselves, and similarly we have reasons to accept God. And if we have reason to accept God, then we have some reason to worship God. Worship is a way of acknowledging our own limitations and can help us survive, flourish, and help others in the face of the problems of human evil and suffering.

The terminology of “lives not worth living,” “worthwhile lives,” and “unworthwhile lives,” used by John Harris and many others, has become an accepted linguistic convention in bioethical discussions. These terms are used to distinguish lives of overwhelming negative experience from lives that are or are expected to be of overall positive value. As such, this terminology seems helpful in discussions around resource allocation, end-of-life decision making and questions of when it might be acceptable (and unacceptable) to reproduce. This paper argues that there is, however, a problematic ambiguity inherent in these general terms that is particularly evident when it comes to discussing reproductive choices. It is suggested that in this context, this ambiguity can conceal authoritarian eugenic motivations that are difficult to justify and that many using these terms would not adhere to. As a result, it is argued that we should replace these terms with the terms “intrinsically valuable” and “intrinsically harmful.” This would make it more explicit what exactly is meant and would allow these matters to be debated with greater clarity.

Since 2019, Ethiopia has embarked on a new “national project of peace and unity”. The government’s official discourse has been characterised by an uptake in the use of Pan-African and Pan-Ethiopian rhetoric. Strategically invoking visions of a united Africa and shared continental prosperity, the Abiy administration seeks to enhance its international reputation and rally African support for its domestic agenda. To overcome the pervasive ethnofractionalist tendencies in Ethiopia’s political landscape and consolidate the Ethiopian state within its present boundaries, the current government is selectively borrowing political strategies from previous administrations. This has produced a unique, new form of Pan-Ethiopian governance ideals. So far, the repercussions of this government discourse on political tensions in Ethiopia and the Ethiopian diaspora has received no scholarly attention. This academic article analyses the implications of the current Ethiopian government’s deployment of Pan-Africanist and Pan-Ethiopianist rhetoric on Ethiopia’s current political crises. This article argues that these Pan-Africanist and Pan-Ethiopianist rhetoric and ideals are paradoxically perpetuating divisive identity politics in Ethiopia’s domestic and diasporic political realm. This, in turn, exacerbates the most serious threat to Ethiopia’s national unity.

The cosmological argument for the existence of God seems to have significant intuitive resonance. According to a familiar version of the cosmological argument, there must be some explanation for why the universe exists, and God provides the explanation. This argument seems to depend on the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR), according to which, if something exists, there must be an explanation for why it exists. As we detail, recent evidence indicates that people presuppose something like the PSR in their explanatory outlook. However, the other key part of the cosmological argument is that God is supposed to be self-explanatory – God’s existence is necessary. We examine this empirically and find that people do not generally think that the existence of God is necessary in the sense relevant for the cosmological argument.

Migrant protest activity has been often analyzed from the perspectives of the protest nature and issues it addressed. A comparison of protest behaviour before and after migration is largely missing. It remains unclear whether people who were actively protesting in their home country continue to be engaged in protests after migration and why. This article addresses this gap in the literature and aims to explain what made the Ukrainian migrants protest before leaving their home country and in Turkey as a host country. The analysis uses individual data from an original survey conducted in May 2023 among 935 Ukrainian migrants living in Turkey. The findings show that there are different migrants who participate in the protests organized in the two countries, and the strongest predictor for political protest is civic engagement. Protest in Ukraine is rooted in the orientation towards domestic politics, while protests abroad are driven by identitarian dimensions.

Within bioethics, two issues dominate the discourse on suffering: its nature (who can suffer and how) and whether suffering is ever grounds for providing, withholding, or discontinuing interventions. The discussion has focused on the subjective experience of suffering in acute settings or persistent suffering that is the result of terminal, chronic illness. The bioethics literature on suffering, then, is silent about a crucial piece of the moral picture: agents’ intersubjectivity. This paper argues that an account of the intersubjective effects of suffering on caregivers could enrich theories of suffering in two ways: first, by clarifying the scope of suffering beyond the individual at the epicenter, i.e., by providing a fuller account of the effects of suffering (good or bad). Second, by drawing attention to how and why, in clinical contexts, the intersubjective dimensions of suffering are sometimes as important, if not more important, than whether an individual is suffering or not.

In this article, we examine the extent to which Christians and Muslims endorse divine foreknowledge for neutral, good, and bad actions. If they do, the problem of theological fatalism is not a mere (albeit important) philosophical difficulty, but a problem rooted in lay believers’ intuitive understanding of God.

This article focuses on the problem of the categorization of the adverb sans doute as an epistemico-modal marker or an evidential marker. Starting from a critical appraisal of an analysis proposed by Bourmayan et Ashino, in which sans doute is considered fundamentally epistemico-modal, three hypotheses are presented, which depart from theirs. First, sans doute has as its main lexical element an inferential evidential value: it signals that the content qualified by the adverb is the result of a defeasible type of inference from clues/premises. Second, due to the defeasibility of the inference, the statement containing the adverb takes on, invariably, a pragmatic value of non-certainty, not lexically coded, however. Sans doute is thus not an epistemico-modal marker by itself in contemporary French. Third, the adverb combines these values with an epistemic value of what we call “posture of certainty”. Different from epistemic modality, which refers to an evaluation in terms of certainty, and/or to the epistemic cognitive state linked to that, posture of certainty refers to what can be called the tone or epistemic behavior of confidence the speaker shows. Sans doute therefore indicates without contradiction, a defeasible and, thus, uncertain hypothesis, presented with a tone of full confidence.

The article analyses how Russian state-controlled media adapt narratives across their language versions to speak to specific national audiences. These media support the Kremlin by echoing its strategic narratives in the international arena. Our article stems from the assumption that the media tailor the narratives and do not deliver homogenous news. Texts published since the initial days of the Russian invasion of Ukraine were analyzed from Sputnik Czech Republic, Germany, and Sputnik World, known to spread the Russian regime’s propaganda. The central question was how the Russian regime depicted and explained the invasion of Ukraine in 2022 in the chosen languages. Qualitative coding based on a predefined codebook, modified with codes inductively acquired during the analysis, was used to deeply understand strategic narratives and identify key differences among the Russian regime’s influence campaigns in various national contexts. Some narratives were found to differ based on the national contexts, strengthening the initial assumption. However, analyzed texts also consistently depict Russia as a victim and the West as a threat across the language versions.

The translation of bedside experience to pedagogical content presents a unique challenge for the field of bioethics. The contributions are multidisciplinary, the practices are heterogeneous, and the work product is characteristically nuanced. While academic bioethics education programs have proliferated, developing content and pedagogy sufficient to teach clinical ethics effectively remains a longstanding challenge. The authors identify three reasons why progress towards this goal has been slow. First, there is a lack of robust, empirical knowledge for education focused on praxis. Second, the methods employed in academic education tend to focus on traditional didactic approaches rather than engendering competency through interaction and practice—the principle means by which clinical ethicists work. Third, the data practitioners have captured has not been presented in a medium educators and students can most meaningfully interact with.

In this paper, the authors describe a novel pedagogical tool: the Armstrong Clinical Ethics Coding System (ACECS) and interactive visual analytics dashboard. Together, these components comprise an educational platform that utilizes the empirical data collected by the institution’s ethics service. The tool offers four advantages. First, it aids with the identification of ethical issues that present during a consultation at that specific institution or medical unit by making use of a lingua franca comprehensible to both ethicists and non-ethicists. Second, content is centered on issue frequency, type, and relation to other issues. Iterating through cases, requestors, or hospital units allows one to understand cases typologically and through metanarratives that reveal relationships and subtle patterns. Third, the use of interactive data visualizations and data storytelling aids comprehension and retention. Fourth, the process of using the system necessitates understanding the manifold ways each case can be understood, accommodating a wide range of perspectives and ethical lenses, enhancing case analysis and self-reflection conducive to life-long learning.

R.J. (Bob) Morris’ contribution to debates around the history of class, associational culture and urban governance have underpinned numerous publications across the decades. This article extends the appreciation of Bob’s work to reflect on how his approach to documenting, demystifying and disseminating the history and heritage of cities and industrial places – including through his use of photography – made a notable impact at the interface between urban and public history and has had a lasting impact on future generations of urban historians’ approach to understanding the historic built environment.

Increased interest in suffering has given rise to different accounts of what suffering is. This paper focuses the debate between experientialists and non-experientialists about suffering. The former hold that suffering is necessarily experiential—for instance, because it is necessarily unpleasant or painful; the latter deny this—for instance, because one can suffer when and because one’s objective properties are damaged, even if one does not experience this. After surveying how the two accounts fare on a range of issues, the paper presents a decisive argument in favor of experientialism. The central claim is that non-experientialist accounts cannot accommodate cases of suffering that are virtuous and that directly contribute to some objective good.