A remarkable phenomenon in the history of Western political and legal thought is the emergence of so-called sixteenth-century Calvinist resistance theory. Groups of intellectuals, committed to the theology of John Calvin and seeing the Reformed churches of their homelands oppressed by hostile monarchs, stepped beyond the rather strict obedience that Calvin commended toward civil authority and advocated various degrees of civil disobedience and even revolution. Two early and famous expressions of Calvinist resistance theory were from the “Marian exiles,” British Calvinists on the continent who fled the persecution of Bloody Mary Tudor in the 1550s, and the French Huguenots who wrote in the aftermath of the St. Bartholomew's Day Massacre of 1572. Scholars have made impressive claims about these writers. Many perceive in their work a major turning point in political and legal theory and identify it as a key source for the development of Western revolutionary thinking and modernization more generally.

Human dignity is the recognition and respect of human need, desire and expectation one individual by another. This recognition is indispensable because no human being survives alone: Human dignity creates the foundation of society and civilization. Our knowledge of history suggests that religious ideas have provided this basic foundation of civilization. Describing the first recognized civilization in history one historian says, “Religion permeated Sumerian civic life.” According to another historian, “Religion dominated, suffused, and inspired all features of Near Eastern society—law, kingship, art, and science.” Based on these observations while defining civilization Samuel Huntington asserts, “Religion is a central defining characteristic of civilizations.”

In Islam, the Qur’an declares that: “We have bestowed dignity on the progeny of Adam.” The verse then continues to remind the whole of mankind of God's special favor unto them with physical and intellectual abilities, natural resources and with superiority over most other creatures in the world. This dignity is bestowed through God's act of creating Adam and breathing into him His Own Spirit. Since all human beings originated from Adam and his spouse, every single human being possesses this dignity regardless of color, race, religion and tribe. The whole of mankind, as khalīfah (vice-resenf) is responsible for establishing peace on earth through divinely ordained values such as amānah (trust), ‘adālah (justice) and shūra (consultation).

This comment on the papers of Father Curry and Professor Firmage is an attempt first, to stress the importance of the history of religious exemptions in America, and second, to suggest some questions relating particularly to the group aspects of that history.

Father Curry argues that two topics “embraced the substance” of church-state discussions: the power of governments to legislate in matters of religion and, more specifically, financial support of clergy. “Through the discussion of these two topics Americans exhibited what they meant by religious freedom.” Father Curry also suggests that other problems existed and that these points (including sabbath legislation or conscientious objection) “became on occasion a hazard for some individuals and groups.” However, he concludes, “these subjects never became the subject of widespread dissent or discussion on church-state matters, nor did they contribute to the clarification of what Americans meant by religious freedom”.

Some scholars, like the New Zealand church historian Peter Lineham, have argued that “church and state have been bound to each other in an unequal co-dependency” throughout New Zealand's history. In this partnership the state has always been the stronger partner, with the church having an increasingly smaller role as time goes on. In other words, the state has become more secular. Such a thesis must, however, be qualified. The church does continue to have an important role in relationship to the state in contemporary New Zealand, especially in the provision of social services. This, in fact, becomes a particularly significant difference from the relationship the church had with the state in the nineteenth and much of the twentieth centuries. State aid for education and even for social services was a sectarian minefield and any support was eschewed by the state. However, while more state support for the church in the second half of the century became a significant qualification to ”secularization theory,” neo-liberalism, rationalist economics and the consequent changes to the New Zealand state since 1984 have now raised questions even about this aspect of state support of churches. This paper explores the various types of government support for the Church in New Zealand this century, how that support has waxed and waned, and how now the future holds for the Church as a new century approaches.

Since the publication of Perry Miller's The New England Mind in 1939, Puritan covenantal thought has received renewed attention from scholars in a number of different fields. Many of these analyses have tended, however, either to ignore the essential theological grounding of this movement in Calvin and in English evangelicalism or to exaggerate the individualistic character of Puritan ethics through failure to give adequate attention to such communal themes as religious and civil covenants, equity, virtue, and the common good.

Thus, Perry Miller, for example, interpreted covenantal (or federal) theology as an attempt to resolve the antinomy in Calvinist doctrine between determinism and human freedom by making salvation dependent upon good works. While the idea of such a conditional covenant was fundamentally inconsistent with the traditional Calvinist doctrine of decrees, Miller argued, it did nevertheless provide a pragmatic albeit unstable means of reconciling human freedom and moral responsibility with the doctrine of decrees. When one examines such early covenantal writers as Perkins, Preston, Sibbes, and Ames, however, one finds that they turned to the imagery of covenant primarily out of the need to provide a basis for assurance of salvation and moral guidance, not to resolve a conflict between predestination and human freedom. The latter conflict had already been largely resolved within the framework of Calvinist doctrine. Not only did Miller's focus upon the problem of decrees cause him to misconstrue the relationship between Calvin and covenantal thought in important respects; it also caused him to neglect the evangelical sources of covenantal theology and ethics.

The last decade of the 20th century has brought ferment and change in the American constitutional law concerning religious liberty. Change has come on several fronts. Throughout the 1990s, the U.S. Supreme Court and the Congress have battled over the scope of the right to free exercise of religion. First the Court narrowed the right dramatically, then Congress responded with a statute “restoring” the previous broader standard, only to see the Court invalidate the statute within four years. In addition, the prospect of full-blown government aid to religiously affiliated schools and other institutions came much closer to reality by 2000, as the Supreme Court grew more approving of such aid and as cities and states dissatisfied with the performance of public schools and government welfare agencies turned to assisting private and “faith-based” organizations as alternatives.

Religious issues and clergy played a prominent and now largely forgotten role in the defeat of President Franklin D. Roosevelt's controversial 1937 proposal to add six Justices to the U.S. Supreme Court. Although many prominent Protestant, Roman Catholic, and Jewish clergy and lay persons shared Roosevelt's frustration with the Court's obstruction of legislation to ameliorate the ravages of the Great Depression and reform the nation's economic system, many of the New Deal's most ardent supporters feared that Roosevelt's plan threatened religious liberty by making the Court vulnerable to political pressure. Opposition to Court-packing among clerics and lay persons, who warned that it could subject religious minorities to majoritarian tyranny, may have contributed heavily to the plan's defeat. The prevalence of these fears that diminution of judicial independence would threaten religious freedom helps to demonstrate that the Supreme Court already was widely regarded as an important guardian of personal liberty on the eve of the Court's transition from its long-time role as a defender of property rights to its modern role as a protector of personal rights.

Hidden in plain sight in hundreds of judicial opinions is an extraordinary principle—love your neighbor as yourself. At first blush the idea of its application to our legal relations seems odd: This is a matter of morality, not legality. But the biblical command to love neighbor as self has exerted an important influence upon the decisions of American courts. While more frequently excluded from application, the love command has found expression in a wide range of cases. From criminal to civil procedure, from torts to contracts, from employment to family disputes, neighbor-love has been a vital part of American jurisprudence.

This article will highlight the application of the love command to legal disputes by courts, as well as provide a brief overview of the biblical texts and scholarly legal commentary dealing with the love command. Its main purpose is descriptive—pointing out what we haven't noticed—but it is also normative—we have missed something important—neighbor-love is not out of place in the courtroom. It has been, and should continue to be, applied to legal relationships by our courts.

I count it a privilege to be asked to address you today. I have never been more consciously grateful for the priceless heritage of freedom, and particularly of religious freedom, that we enjoy. I am deeply aware of the occasion and the setting of this bicentennial celebration, and of the untiring work of many of you on behalf of religious liberty.

I have just arrived from the Soviet Union where it was my privilege to participate in the 1000 year celebration of Christianity in Russia. I was a guest of the Orthodox Church, and had the privilege of speaking a number of times not only in the celebrations, but preaching in Orthodox Cathedrals and Baptist Churches.

Just before going to the Soviet Union, my wife and I and several colleagues toured parts of China. I had the privilege of speaking at several universities, several of the newly opened churches, and was the second foreign visitor that Premier Li Peng received after his election as premier. We had many discussions with scholars, political leaders, and religious leaders in which we discussed the very points, to some extent, that concern us here today. Both countries are in the process of forming new laws governing religion; let us hope that they grant much more freedom to religion.

Robert Rodes settled on the metaphor of the pilgrim for his story of the law. For him, pilgrim law is “the jurisprudential manifestation of liberation theology.” To begin my discussion of Rodes and the ongoing story of the law, I begin with a tale of my own pilgrimage to find justice in one place in the world I thought most needed it—when, as Dorothy could have told us from the outset, if it was not in my own back yard, I had never really lost it to begin with. In the mysteries of a Christian life that Rodes emphasizes is rooted in our unknowing, Milovan Djilas figures as central to Rodes's analysis; Djilas himself gave me crucial, but slightly cryptic, wisdom for my journey. Thus I feel haunted by some of the same characters and stories Rodes deems crucial in his pilgrim experience.

Reading the results of the Williamsburg Charter Survey on Religion and Public Life gives me, a rabbi, an opportunity to assess the views of my rabbinic colleagues. While the survey did not test for general Jewish opinion, it did sample one hundred rabbis and contrast them with other religious and professional elites. Rabbinic opinion no doubt differs in degree from general Jewish opinion, but it probably does not differ in kind. We can find, I think, the opinion of many American Jews reflected in their rabbis' answers.

We know from the Gallup polls that of all American religious groups, Jews are the most secular. Their rate of belonging to religious institutions (44 percent) is lowest, as is their rate of frequency of attendance at worship services. This general picture of a highly secular and liberal community is reinforced by the current data. Particularly revealing is the similarity, in many instances, of rabbinic opinion with academic opinion, and the corresponding dissimilarity of rabbinic opinion with the answers of other clergy groups.