Urban popular movements that organize illegal land invasion communities present an intriguing puzzle. When most invasion organizations acquire land titles, their participation levels plummet and their agendas stagnate; yet some neighborhoods achieve land titles, sustain high participation, and acquire other services, such as piped-in water. Why do these organizations achieve movement resilience? The more typical trajectory of movement collapse is explained by the disappearance of the key selective incentive, property security. Some organizations, however, evade this “security trap” through mixed motives: their basic material agenda is supplemented by a nonmaterial and often altruistic agenda, which sustains participation in the face of reduced selective incentives. Examining three neighborhood case studies in Lima and Quito, this article argues that a new, “innovator” type of invasion organization is more likely to exhibit sustained participation and movement resilience due to tactical innovation, democratic governance, and mixed motives.

How does the state ensure the implementation of national policies in a context of decentralized political authority? This article identifies a new strategy utilized by national bureaucrats to regulate the behavior of subnational politicians: mobilizing civil society as government watchdog and political advocate. In the context of decentralized governance, in which local politicians administer most social sector programs, reform-minded bureaucrats often find that they have little control over the implementation of their progressive policies. In Brazil’s AIDS policy sector, however, bureaucrats have ensured the successful implementation of their policies by developing allies outside government. These state actors—here called activist bureaucrats—have been largely overlooked in the English-language literature, yet they form a new layer of politics in Latin America.

For social movements, coverage in the media is a mixed blessing; but like many movements, the Brazilian Landless Farmworkers' Movement (MST) actively seeks it out. Treatment of the MST in the Brazilian media is analyzed here using the concept of frame. That treatment is determined by a complex interaction between media producers and movement activists. The frames adopted by those on each side influence public perception of the movement. This study identifies five such underlying frames (mostly in print media but with attention to a television soap opera based on the MST's activities) and examines the images of the movement that they present. Though the coverage often presents the MST in a favorable light, it does not necessarily encourage the goal of mobilization that the movement seeks to promote.

This article extends the analysis of political parties in electorally volatile and organizationally weak party systems by evaluating two implications centered on legislative voting behavior. First, it examines whether disunity prevails where weakness of programmatic and electoral commonalities abound. Second, it analyzes whether inchoate party systems weaken the ability of government parties to control the congressional agenda. The empirical analysis centers on Peru, a classic example of a weakly institutionalized party system, and how its legislative parties compare to those of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and the United States. The results lend support to the view that lower unity characterizes weakly institutionalized settings. The agenda-setting power of government parties, however, appears to be influenced more by the majority status of the government than by the level of party system institutionalization.

Does the conventional wisdom about the relationships between economic, cultural, and political party variables and democracy stand up in the Latin American experience of the 1990s? This study, utilizing new data sets for the region, finds that some traditional hypotheses are upheld better than others. It sustains the conventional wisdom that economic development, economic growth, democratic values, and (with a two-year lead) education correlate positively with the level of democracy. Surprisingly, however, neither social trust nor the number of political parties is significantly correlated with the level of democracy. The study suggests various possible explanations for the weak or nonexistent relationships for social trust and number of parties, in the hope that these surprising results will stimulate further research.

Chile's military government replaced the country's universalistic social policy system with a set of market-oriented social policies. Taking evidence from three areas (pensions, education, and health care), this study seeks to explain why the military advanced a policy of deep retrenchment and why reform of health care was less thorough than it was in pensions and education. The radical transformation of policy relates to the breadth of power concentration enjoyed by General Pinochet and his economic team, the policymakers' ideological positions, and the role of veto players. The more limited reform of health care is linked to the actions of a powerful veto player, the professional association of physicians.

The Catholic Charismatic Renewal (CCR), the Latin American church's largest and most dynamic lay movement, demands scholarly attention for its extraordinary appeal among Catholic laity and its unanimous approval by national episcopacies. If the church is finally using mass media and other Protestant techniques for evangelization, it is because of the Charismatics, whose missionary zeal rivals that of their chief competitors, the Pentecostals. This study uses the tools of religious economy to analyze the reasons for the Renewal's rapid growth and acceptance. In attempting to explicate the CCR's success, the study also examines the major ecclesial trends during the movement's three decades in Latin America.

Current explanations of taxation levels have identified a host of factors, such as levels of economic development and GDP per capita, tax handles, tax morale, and political regimes. But none of them can account for Argentina's exceptionalism. Using a “transaction cost politics” approach and the case of Brazil for comparison, this article argues that the key to explaining low taxation in Argentina is political instability. Systemic instability affects the tax behavior of governments. Facing an uncertain future, incumbent governments choose to extract resources from society through inflation rather than normal taxation. This article argues that political institutions, particularly federalism, contribute to instability and thereby reduce the discount rates of government policymakers.