After the collapse of communism in Russia, which is the home of more than 14 million Muslims, there has been an Islamic revival that has been part of the process of political and intellectual liberalization of society. The major Islamic enclaves of the Russian Federation are located in the Volga-Urals, the North Caucasus, and central Russia. Russian Muslims are concentrated in the eight autonomous republics of Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Adyghea, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachay-Cherkessia, Ingushetia, Dagestan, and Chechnya. Most Muslims belong to the Hanafi madhhab (the juridical school) of Sunni Islam, although Dagestani and Chechen Muslims adhere to the Shafii madhhab of Sunni Islam. There is also a small Shia community in southern Dagestan. A large number of Dagestanis, as well as Chechens and Ingushes, profess Sufism—a mystical form of Islam, which is also known as parallel Islam.

This article examines the impact of nationalism theory, and specifically the theory of national awakening, on Kurdish historiography. Kurdish experts cite several famous nationalism theorists, but seem most impressed by Anthony Smith's model of a singular transformation in which a not-yet-national community becomes a proper nation. Kurdish experts do not always use Smith's terminology, however, and often invoke other scholars in support of the singular transformation model. Kurdish historiography disagrees what the singular transformation entails, and different thresholds of nationalism imply wildly different dates for the birth of Kurdish nationalism. Stage theories of national awakening have had little impact, and ought to be reconsidered.

If those interested in Soviet affairs were to confine their reading to the official Soviet press, they would perhaps conclude that all is quiet behind the Soviet front. However since a large body of underground literature has reached the West in recent years, observers have learned of numerous protest activities against the Soviet regime by various groups in the USSR. We know, for example, that liberal intellectuals are criticizing the Soviet leadership for its rigid control over the literary and scientific life of the country. Various religious groups are protesting against the closure of churches, imprisonment of believers, and restrictions on baptisms, proselyting, and religious instruction of the young. Similarly, certain members of national minorities are demanding more linguistic, educational, and cultural autonomy for their nations. Some of these minority nationalities, such as the Jews, Volga Germans, and Meskhi, have formed repatriation movements in order to obtain permission to settle in those areas which they regard as their homelands.

The collapse of the three great multi-national and multi-ethnic empires—the Czarist Russian, the Ottoman Turkish and the Austro-Hungarian—was an immediate consequence of World War I and the ensuing revolutions. Of these three, only the empire of the Habsburgs was really considered to be an integral part of nineteenth-century European developments. Although historians and contemporaries may have questioned its modernity and viability, few would have challenged its credentials as part of Europe. Yet its demise was rooted—as for the other empires—in the unresolved nationality questions which still bedevil the region in our own time.

The relationship between Orthodox Christianity and national identity has been one of the most contended issues in modern nationalism. The dominant religion in the Balkans, Orthodoxy has transported the identity of ethnic groups into the modern era and political leaders have employed religious institutions according to their own political agendas in the construction of “imagined communities.” Orthodoxy has a particular perception of the political field. Based on the concept of symphonia, which dates back to the Byzantine Empire, the Church claims that religious and political offices are equal and have similar responsibilities. Religious and political rulers have the mission to guide the people and the Church and state should collaborate harmoniously in fostering identity. Political leaders refer to the nationalist discourse of the Church in order to induce national cohesion. From this perspective, the relationship between religion and the construction of the nation in the Orthodox space differs from that in the Catholic or Protestant world where Churches are supranational or sub-national institutions.

Worldwide, ethnopolitics takes on various shapes. Yet, while politics involving ethnicity can be either conflictual, competitive, or cooperative, analysts typically focus either on instances of conflict or ignore the multiethnicity of states by sticking to “the comfortable integrationist presumptions of the 1950s.” All too rarely does one find analyses of policies that work in difficult situations. This global trend is intensified in the case of Eastern Europe. As this region has suffered instances of ethnic politics gone wrong—most recently in the former Yugoslavia—many analysts assume that constructive approaches to ethnic relations are impossible, even though they are needed more than ever. Here, I outline a model of ethnopolitics which is both democratic and constructive, has been used in East Central Europe in the past, and has potential for the future. In presenting the case for ethnopluralism, I outline a promising alternative to ethnic conflict or neglect.

For nearly a century, the contrast between a cultural and a political form of nationalism has been upheld. In the early twentieth century, Fredrich Meinecke made a distinction between the political nation, or Staatsnation, based on a common political history and a shared constitution, and the cultural nation, Kulturnation, based on a shared cultural heritage. The most important distinction between the two is that while membership in the former is voluntary, membership in the cultural nation is a matter not of choice, but of common objective identity. Meinecke maintained that political nationalism derived from the spirit of 1789, i.e. from the idea of the self-determination and sovereignty of the nation. Cultural nationalism, in contrast, was a striving for national individuality, characteristic of anti-Enlightenment German thought.

Historically there was a long-standing competition to control Estonian territory, primarily between Russia, Germany, Poland, Sweden, and Denmark, until 1710 when this area was conquered and ruled for two centuries by Imperial Russia. In the twentieth century, the only rival to Russia's (USSR's) domination over Estonia has been Germany. A Norwegian security analyst, Olav Knudsen, says correctly that the Baltic states “fall outside all other geographical and political contexts than the Russian and to some extent the German one.” As is known, Estonia was occupied by Germany in the course of the World Wars in 1918 and 1941–44. Generally speaking, the pre-1991 history of Estonia is a good case to prove that the survival of small states as independent powers is precarious, “depending on a multitude of factors over which they have little influence.”

This article examines Yugoslav national programs of ruling political elites and its concrete implementation in education policy in interwar Yugoslavia. It is argued that at the beginning of the period Yugoslavism was not inherently incompatible with or subordinate to Serbian, Croatian or to a lesser degree Slovenian national ideas. However, the concrete ways in which Yugoslavism was formulated and adopted by ruling elites discredited the Yugoslav national idea and resulted in increasing delineation and polarization in the continuum of national ideas available in Yugoslavia. Throughout the three consecutive periods of political rule under scrutiny, ruling elites failed to reach a wider consensus regarding the Yugoslav national idea or to create a framework within which a constructive elaboration of Yugoslav national identity could take place. By the end of the interwar period, the Yugoslav national idea had become linked exclusively to conservatism, centralism, authoritarianism and, for non-Serbian elites at least, Serbian hegemony. Other national ideas gained significance as ideas providing viable alternatives for the regime's Yugoslavism.

A number of general summaries have been written on the history of the Jewish Antifascist Committee in the Soviet Union, the single major Jewish structure in the Ussr during the following the Second World War. The Jewish Antifascist Committee (JAC) constituted a special phenomenon when compared with similar Soviet organizations. It started as an ordinary instrument of Soviet wartime propaganda, but prevailing circumstances transformed it into a meaningful Jewish structure. Following a few introductory remarks, I would like to discuss one specific aspect of this Committee, namely the nature of its membership. Most of the existing studies treat the JAC in a chronological manner. The purpose of this article is to examine the inner dynamics of the Committee and evaluate it as an elite leadership group of Soviet Jewry.