From the end of the eighteenth century until the Revolution of 1917, the Jewish communities of Vilna (Vilnius), Odessa, and Warsaw stood out as the prominent intellectual and cultural centers of Russian and Polish Jewry. In the period immediately following the Partitions of Poland, the preeminence of the northern region and Vilna, its major city, was acknowledged by all. Characterized by the rich Talmudical tradition associated with Elijah ben Solomon (1720-1797), the famous Gaon [Sage] of Vilna, and his disciples, Vilna signified then, and to a great extent continues today to signify, the values of intensive traditional learning combined with deep religious piety. In fact, in the literature on Russian Jewry, Vilna is often referred to as the Jerusalem of the North, indicating its special character and place in the history of East European Jewry. However, while Vilna symbolized the traditional world, over the course of the nineteenth century, the Jewish community of Russia was moving in a different direction. The political, economic, social and especially demographic forces of the modern period significantly altered the basic character of the Jewish community of the Russian Empire.

Elections are one of the major ways in which democratic governments maintain legitimacy. Do elections serve the same functions in transitioning, non-democratic, or semi-democratic systems? Perhaps the relationship between elections and legitimacy is different in systems that are not fully democratic? And what of the media? Is their role the same or is the role they play dependent upon the type of system in which they exist? The Republic of Georgia offers an interesting case in which to look at these relationships. I would posit that in transitioning, non-democratic, and semi-democratic systems, elections serve a different function than in a fully democratic society and the media are one tool that leaders in such systems can use to enhance their legitimacy. When non-democratic leaders enjoy popularity, there is no need to finesse the media since positive coverage is easy to come by when you are popular. But if your popularity is waning and democratic habits are not well ingrained, the temptation to overtly or covertly subvert the media can be quite intense. So instead of maintaining legitimacy, elections may serve to create legitimacy or at least the appearance of legitimacy when legitimacy is lacking. To that end, regimes and leaders cannot afford to lose, and moreover need to win, elections by large margins if their legitimacy is questionable. Therefore, control over the media is more important when this is the case. In fact, there may be an inverse relationship between media freedom and regime insecurity, as the insecurity of the regime goes up, the freedom of the media goes down. Couple this tendency with the fact that the media in these transitioning systems have not fully become a “fourth estate” that is strong, independent, and can hold the government and political leaders accountable and you have a climate in which the media are harassed, biased, and often co-opted. Georgia, through the 2000 presidential election, is such a political system.

Scholars had already suggested the relationship of some Finno-Ugrian languages in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, but the linguistic affinity of the Finno-Ugrian languages was proven only at the end of the eighteenth century by two Hungarian pioneers of comparative linguistics, János Sajnovics and Sámuel Gyarmathi. Henrik Gabriel Porthan (1739-1804), professor of rhetoric and a great humanist, brought their ideas to Finland. He was strongly influenced by August Ludwig Schlözer, author of a comprehensive and critical survey of the history of the Finno-Ugrian peoples. Having studied Sajnovics' work in Göttingen, Porthan published an extensive account of it in a Finnish newspaper in 1779, demolishing previous ideas about the kinship between Finnish and Hebrew. Porthan urged Finnish scholars to investigate the Finno-Ugrian languages of Russia, of which very little was then known (some lists of words and short grammars were all that was available).

This article tells the story of the construction of Turkish national identity in the early republican era by addressing two canonical novels about occupied İstanbul: Sodom ve Gomore (“Sodom and Gomorrah”) by Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu and Biz İnsanlar (“We People”) by Peyami Safa. Following the establishment of the Turkish Republic, Turkish nationalist intellectuals attempted to offer certain formulations and implemented various mechanisms to create a national self. The study aims to focus on the ways in which Karaosmanoğlu and Safa create the new Turkish national identity and deals with the questions of how occupied İstanbul was perceived by these intellectuals and how the memory of the Allied occupation of İstanbul, the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, and the National Liberation Struggle shaped Turkish elites' self-identification as well as their formulation of the national identity.

The Moscow Teatr “Romen,” dating back to 1931, is famous throughout the Soviet Union, and its performers have been some of the country's best-known. The Teatr “Romen” connects Roma from all over the country, and many who work there are related; three generations of a family may appear on the stage at one time. These families, along with Roma working as professionals, make up an lite within the Romani community in Moscow. They are the most outwardly assimilated (wearing European dress, etc.), most fluent and literate in Russian as well as Romani. These families usually move in different spheres than do Roma who live in villages around Moscow and work in cooperatives or as independent merchants, although extended family networks may include Roma of all spheres. Most studies of Gypsies (including those of non-Roma, such as Irish Travellers in the United Kingdom) assume a certain homogeneity of culture and of class:

The Teatr “Romen” is a case that demands such acknowledgment. Yet, in a sense, these élite performers are doubly marginal, both as performers and as ethnic outsiders who “threaten the rhetoric and narratives of nationalism.” Currently in the USSR, such narratives are in flux, as many national minorities demand greater cultural and political autonomy. Roma, however, are not demanding their own republic, and requests for schools and radio shows are often tempered by the assertion that, “this country has been kind to Gypsies.” Roma élites are also in a peculiar position: charged with representing Roma to outsiders, they are also concerned about maintaining the integrity of the urban community as Roma. Because of this, they must negotiate the interstitial area between cultures.

As Pussy Riot has changed the face of political protest in Russia, to the south, Ukraine has seen the emergence of Femen, famous for their topless protests against everything from sex tourism and trafficking to hot water shut-offs in Kyiv to sexism in the Ukrainian government to Putin's visits to Ukraine. Their concurrent appearance in the post-Soviet sphere encourages a discussion around the mobilization of sexuality as protest in the region. Both groups appropriate sexual language and imagery as well as physical sexuality in protest of their current regimes. This article engages the question of similarities between the two groups' efforts and considers what differences structure their political goals and philosophies. What potential does the global visibility of these groups have to influence an emerging women's movement, and, more generally, how can sexuality be harnessed as a unifying force in anti-government activism in post-socialist Russia and Ukraine?

This article explores the interplay of religion, anti-Semitism, and personal rivalries in building the ultra-nationalist movement in 1930s Romania, using the career of Nichifor Crainic as a case study. As a theologian, Crainic created and taught a synthesis of nationalism and Romanian Orthodoxy which was broadly accepted by most ultra-nationalists in interwar Romania. As a journalist, Crainic directed several newspapers which spearheaded acrimonious attacks on democratic and ultra-nationalist politicians alike. As a politician, he joined and left both Corneliu Zelea Codreanu's Legion of the Archangel Michael and A.C. Cuza's National Christian Defense League before attempting to form his own Christian Workers’ Party. Crainic's writings ultimately earned him a place as a minister in two governments and membership of the Romanian Academy. His career reveals an ultra-nationalist movement rife with division and bickering but united around a vaguely defined ideology of religious nationalism, xenophobia, and anti-Semitism.

This article sheds light on the Euro-Atlantic discourse in Georgia by situating it in a wider frame. It provides an analysis of its Euro-Atlantic orientation by presenting it as a continuation of past efforts to involve European powers in Georgian affairs and highlights changing trends in this aspect of contemporary foreign policy. Far from determining whether or not the Georgians are European, the different arguments that have been used to support Georgian “Europeanness” are evaluated to assess its role in the national identity construction process. Focusing primarily on the United National Movement government led by Mikheil Saakashvili, we demonstrate how the Euro-Atlantic discourse has been employed domestically by the political elite as a legitimacy management strategy and explore its function in seeking Western patronage, a key foreign policy goal.

Let us now have a closer look at the Kharkiv-Belgorod (potential) cross-border region as a case study of Ukrainian-Russian cross-border cooperation. Not only is the case of Kharkiv-Belgorod special because of the historical and cultural specificity of the region, which provides additional symbolic resources for its “reinvention” as a borderland (this will be discussed in the last section of the paper); it also represents an interesting combination of (remaining) cultural closeness and (growing) social and economic differences between the two bordering territories; significantly, these two administrative units became the initiators of the cross-border cooperation between Ukraine and Russia and see themselves as pioneers whose experience can be used for the other parts of the border.