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On June 24-28, 1982 the Conference on Ukrainian Literature in the Twentieth Century took place at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Levis Faculty Center. The conference was sponsored by the Summer Research Laboratory on Russia and Eastern Europe, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign and the Shevchenko Scientific Society, Inc., New York.
There have been attempts to detail the representation of the Romani community with a focus on both the domestic and transnational political context; however, less is known about how Roma create organizing structures of representation and the role of these structures within the broader social movement. This article seeks to add to this growing research by analysing Roma representation in the transnational political context, as well as unpacking the relationship between ethnic group identity and shared interests. By understanding that ethnic group identity and shared interests are intertwined in the case of Roma, we can begin to understand the numerous challenges faced by the Roma social movement, particularly those relating to political participation and adequate representation.
The political changes which started in Central and Eastern Europe in 1989 have exposed the real ethnic faces of these societies. It has become obvious that the population of these countries were not homogeneous “socialist nations.” During the post-repressive period some ethnic prejudice re-appeared—both between nations and between ethnic groups within these countries.
Among the nationalist revolutions that spread across Eastern Europe in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Latvia seceded from the Soviet Union through a relatively benign process marked by the virtual absence of violent conflict. Several issues were conflated in this movement. Latvia's independence was about democracy, historical redress, and national autonomy. Yet, each of these areas included an ethnic component. Would a Latvian democracy make room for Russians? Would Latvians seek revenge against Russians for the Soviet annexation of the Baltic republics? In the event of conflict between Moscow and Riga, whom would Russophone residents of Latvia support? The demographic situation of Latvia—featuring a near balance of Latvians and mostly Russophone non-Latvians at the time of independence—suggested the potential for ethnic conflict. The forecast of conflict, though, oversimplified the roles that ethnicity and national identity play in affecting political actions. The potential for conflict was predicated on the assumption that individuals naturally identify primarily with others within their ethnic group and act competitively against members of the ethnic “other.” The fact, then, that Latvians and Russians did not clash violently during Latvia's “Singing Revolution” begs the question why inter-ethnic conflict did not occur in this case. This article explains this lack of conflict by focusing on the formation of Latvian identity in the period immediately preceding independence. I argue that individuals in nationalizing states intentionally act with reference to their national identity, and this sense of national identity is not some fixed, exogenous variable. Instead, it is socially constructed. We cannot hope to explain ethnic conflict processes without first understanding the factors that drive ethnic and national identity during chaotic times of change.
One of the most important sources of demographic data concerning the Soviet nationalities is the official Soviet census reports. Considering the sensitivity of the nationality problem in the USSR today, however, how thorough and dependable are the published results of the Soviet censuses regarding the more than 100 Soviet nationalities? In January 1980, a preliminary and partial report on the 1979 enumeration was issued, and until the full reports are published, probably in a year or two, it is the best source of information concerning the current numbers and distribution of the Soviet nationalities. These figures have already been and will be used for comparisons with the 1970 census reports and projections, as well as for other analyses and computations. But how reliable are these most recent statistics? Can they be taken on face value as accurate, thorough reflections of the ethnic scene in the USSR in January 1979, when the count was taken?
This article presents a study of Islamic religious symbols involved in maintaining the special status of the Tatars in post-Soviet Tatarstan. It explores how regional ethnic elites in Tatarstan use Islam (the discourse of the history of Islam in the region and Islamic symbols in the representation of the region) as a tool for legitimizing their privileged positions in the region. In addition, the article examines how Islamic culture enters into the everyday life and public space of the region, thereby, in a sense enforcing social borders between different ethnic groups. This study has two aims: a theoretical analysis of religious symbols’ role in the struggle for status in the ethnic hierarchy and the practical application of the developed theoretical framework to the case of post-Soviet Tatarstan. The author concludes that after the system of ethnic federalism was abolished in Russia, Tatars have retained their special status by appealing to Islam.