Since achieving independence in December 1991, Kazakhstan has made cautious progress in assuring political rights and freedoms for all its citizens by stressing, among other things, the equality of the different ethnic groups in society, and the equality of individuals before the law. However, an observable outflow of the non-Kazakh population2 from the territory of Kazakhstan has caused a certain hesitation about this. It has received a fairly consistent international response in the scholarly literature and press.3 In almost all cases, the emphasis is on emerging Kazakh nationalism as the most obvious reason for the emigration of the non-native population. It has also been suggested that the Kazakhs would have little to gain from it, given the allegedly dominant economic role of Russians, in particular, within the country, and given also their external dependence on Russia.

How relevant is nationality in global economic behavior? The aim of this paper is to scrutinize the relevance of nationality affiliations and nationality conceptions in cross-border economic transactions, using the case of foreign investment exchanges. In particular, I examine how nationality affiliations may shape the types of commitments that actors will want to realize through foreign investment transactions, and how nationality categorizations influence the evaluation of potential partners in economic transactions. I also stipulate when nationality affiliations and categorizations play a more- or less-salient role. To develop these propositions I use illustrations from cases of foreign investment attempts in which investors from the West try to acquire firms in post-socialist Slovenia. The analysis is grounded in economic sociology and advances a relational understanding of nationality, seen as interpretive codes embedded in actors’ cultural repertoires, situationally invoked, and made relevant (or not) in interactions.

Ruling elites can use the symbolism of major dams to gain legitimacy and bolster a sense of national identity and patriotism. The Rogun Dam in Tajikistan is a gigantic hydraulic infrastructure that if and when finished will be the tallest in the world, allowing the country to gain energy self-sufficiency. Furthermore, by projecting an image of progress and success, such a structure can contribute to creating and strengthening a nationalistic discourse even before its completion. This paper begins by introducing the concept of nation-building in relation to the Central Asian setting and then connects it with the literature exploring the interplay between water and power. Subsequently, the focus moves to the Rogun project, illustrating the main traits of the Rogun ideology and outlining the rhetorical legitimation strategies used by the Tajik government to frame the dam as a nationally cohesive and patriotic project.

The 1970 census returns of the Soviet Union provided scholars with additional information about a hitherto little studied ethnic group, the Soviet-Germans. These figures not only broke the Germans down according to the regions and republics in which they lived, but also revealed how many still claimed German as their native language. A comparison of figures for 1959, 1970 and 1979 indicated the number making this claim had decreased considerably.

This article examines how rebel Serbs in Croatia reinterpreted narratives of World War Two to justify their uprising against the democratically elected Croatian government in 1990 and gain domestic and international legitimacy for the Republika Srpska Krajina (RSK) parastate. While scholars have written about the strategies nationalist elites used regarding controversial symbols and the rehabilitation of World War Two collaborators in Croatia and other Yugoslav successor states, the RSK's “culture of memory” has received little attention. Based on documents captured after the RSK's defeat in 1995, this article shows that it was not only the government of Franjo Tudjman that rejected the Partisan narratives of “Brotherhood and Unity,” but a parallel process took place among the leadership in the Krajina. Ultimately the decision to base the historical foundations of the Croatian Serbs’ political goals on a chauvinist and extremist interpretation of the past resulted in a criminalized entity that ended tragically for both Serbs and Croats living on the territory of the RSK.

The topic of international cooperation between national movements before the end of World War I (WWI) has still not received sufficient scholarly attention. It is common for national historiographies to concentrate on the case of their own nation. When it comes to international relations, however, connections with neighboring nations and national movements - chief adversaries in the achievement of national goals - are usually prioritized. Nevertheless, even before and especially during the war there was a vibrant scene where non-dominant nationalities could practice international diplomacy, conduct discussions, share experiences, build coalitions, and so on. This article explores one of such examples of international relations conducted between the representatives of two nations - the Catalans and the Lithuanians. They came in contact before the war at the Paris-based Union des Nationalités (the Union of Nationalities), an organization that was designed to unite and support non-dominant national movements. Despite being located on the opposite sides of Europe and having no apparent direct connections, the Lithuanians and the Catalans established common ground for cooperation, which especially peaked during WWI.

The Russian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) is a highly visible institution in Russia, and arguably the most prominent and influential religious or cultural body. The Orthodox Church figures prominently in various discussions as the driving force behind Russia's post-Soviet renewal and recovery. Surveys show that Russians trust the Orthodox Church more than any other public institution, including law courts, trade unions, mass media, the military, the police and the government. Estimates of the number of self-identified Orthodox adherents range from 50 million, which amounts to slightly more than one-third of Russia's population, to 70 million, or roughly one half of the population. A leading newspaper consistently ranks Patriarch Aleksii II, head of the Moscow Patriarchate, the governing body of the Orthodox Church, in the top 15 of the country's most influential political figures. These indicators confirm that the Orthodox Church has a significant role in Russia's post-Soviet development. This is widely accepted by commentators both within and without the Orthodox Church, and within and without Russia.

This article draws upon ethnographic research which was conducted among young Cossacks (members of officially registered and informal Cossack clubs) in southern Russia. It presents young people's participation in the Cossack “nativism” as a physical and material mode of socialization into the mnemonic community. The research puts forward an argument that such corporal and sensorial experiences is effective in recruiting some young members to the Cossack movement. At the same time, the performative character of neo-Cossack identity destabilizes contemporary Cossacks' claims of authenticity related to the status of the legitimate heirs of historical Cossackdom. At the more general level of discussion this paper juxtaposes bodily activities, social memory, and revivalist discourses.