A dramatic population increase coupled with a reduction in per capita investment is producing a “demographic cauldron” in Soviet Central Asia. This was the focus of Professor Lewis's December 7 lecture. In his presentation, Professor Lewis outlined the political, economic and social conditions that frame a grim picture for Central Asia. The region is plagued by an unfavorable convergence of factors: a rapidly growing rural population, especially the indigenous population which is concentrated in rural areas, labor surpluses, relatively little rural or northward out-migration, deteriorating economic conditions especially in rural areas and environmental degradation, along with significant social development and, thus, rising expectations and national awareness. At current growth rates, the indigenous, the rural, the total, and the rural working-age populations will double about every generation or less. Besides, there has been little effort on the part of the central government to shift investment and resource allocation priorities to accommodate the demographic changes.

The unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo in February 2008 catapulted the Western Balkans back to the centre stage of international security concerns. Despite affirmations to the contrary, the recognition of Kosovo's independence by major Western powers is seen as a significant precedent in international law and the way in which self-determination conflicts are handled by the international community. At the same time, it raises major questions for the stability of borders across the Western Balkans region, and possibly beyond. At the centre of many of these questions is the role of the international community—defined by the international and regional organizations present in the region, as well as by their powerful member states—in tackling the complexity of interrelated self-determination conflicts, incomplete democratization processes, growing concerns about the economic viability of the successor states of the former Yugoslavia and an ever-increasing presence of transnational organized crime networks with significant reach beyond the region.

This paper argues that current Western-backed approaches to conflict resolution in Kosovo have failed to alter Serbia's policy toward the region and have contributed to the exacerbation of political tensions between Belgrade and Brussels, while deepening ethnic cleavages between Serb and Albanian communities. While there is no possibility of Kosovo returning to Serbia's control, there is an equal unlikelihood that Serbian-populated regions of Kosovo, especially the north, will submit to Pristina's authority. Most importantly, there is little hope that Kosovo can gain full international recognition and membership in international organizations without a compromise settlement with Serbia. While territorial partition has long been a suggested option, I conclude that the best possible solution for Kosovo, given the positions of all parties involved, is a process of significant decentralization beyond the internationally supported measures in the Ahtisaari Plan. A model of consociational power sharing is one in which Serbian and Albanian municipalities are granted high levels of autonomy similar to arrangements made for Bosnia. While this solution may not be ideal and further weakens central authority, I argue that consociationalism reduces the problems of ethnic conflict, encourages local self-government, and preserves the overall territorial integrity of Kosovo.

The purpose of this study is to throw light on the past economic performance of six members of Comecon — Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland and Romania — and to assess their prospects for the future. Economic problems of Eastern Europe must be placed in a broad historical perspective containing crucial ideological, political, strategic and technological factors affecting economic functions and processes. Interaction of these factors is expressed within the framework of modernization, the forces of which exert a powerful influence on economic activities.

Russia's policy towards the Cossacks may prove detrimental to the development of federalism in Russia. Their rehabilitation is important for the rebirth of Russian culture. Yet, the Cossacks as a social-military institution, may further harm the relations between ethnic Russians and non-Russians in the Caucasus, which may revive the dispute over the preservation of the ethnic principle in Russia's federalism.

Until 1999, Kosovo was a little-known province of Serbia. NATO's intervention, however, changed this. Suddenly, everyone was talking about Kosovo and the plight of the Kosovo Albanians. Today, Kosovo is no longer a major talking point; few authors are now writing about post-independence Kosovo and the many challenges that confront the young state. Particularly striking is the relative absence of scholarly writings that discuss the Gordian knot of northern Kosovo. Seeking to rectify this neglect, this article has three core aims: to provide new empirical insights into the situation on the ground in northern Kosovo, to explore Serb and Albanian viewpoints regarding the status of the north (and in particular to examine Serb fears and concerns) and to discuss possible solutions. It argues that granting the north a special, autonomous status within Kosovo is the ultimate way to resolve the “northern problem,” and indeed this now seems the most likely solution following the recent conclusion of the First Agreement on Principles Governing the Normalization of Relations. This research is based on five weeks of fieldwork in Kosovo in July and August 2012. During this time, the author conducted 56 semi-structured interviews, 29 of which took place in northern Kosovo.

“The history of Russia is the history of a nation that colonized itself.”

Russia's greatest historian has affirmed that the expansion of Russian rule, particularly its method, is of fundamental significance in understanding the course of Russian history, and the establishment of Russian power in the Caucasus has attracted as much scholarly attention as any other region where Russian imperialism spread in the last two centuries. Russia's finest literary figures, scholars of the most divergent bent, Russian participants in the conquest and, of course, native inhabitants themselves have examined geographic, political, military and economic, as well as cultural and other factors that would explain how the many non-Slavic peoples of this strategically critical region were incorporated into the tsarist empire. From such a literature a lengthy list of quite diverse tactics are testimony to the deep concern Russian leaders had about integrating its divergent societies in the Caucasus into the Russian empire. The tsarist ideal was stated in the simplest language when Nicholas I endorsed a report in 1833 that would force the native inhabitants of the Caucasus to “speak, think, and feel Russian.” Not surprisingly, one of the striking qualities of the tsarist, Soviet and, to a great degree, Western literature is that it often focuses, as does this essay, on the frustrations Great Russians experienced while attempting to conquer, pacify and assimilate the multi-ethnic peoples of the Caucasus within the Russian-dominated empire. In addition, while charting the demographic vagaries of the Caucasus most scholars have concentrated on the creeping in-migrations of Cossacks and others from the internal Russian provinces and on the relocation of mountain tribesmen (gortsy) from their inaccessible villages (auly) to valley floors where watchful Russians could “civilize” them. What is strikingly absent from such literature, part of what this essay attempts to provide, is an examination of the policy considerations that led to such decisions, particularly in the post-Crimean War period.

Historically speaking, the self-identification process of Russia has revolved around the West–East axis. However, there has been a considerable asymmetry in the impact of these two poles. In this article I will argue that “the West” was a dominating concept in the self-narration of Russians and “the East” was mostly a function of the interaction between Russia and the West. The difference in the level of attention and emotions which Russia manifests towards the West and the East has been caused by the religious factor, which was crucial for shaping Russia's identity and her sense of uniqueness. While the West and Western Christianity presented a challenge to the Orthodox fundamentals of Russia's self-image, China was neutral in terms of religious identity. The negligible importance of the religious factor added to rationality in Russian policy towards China. In the article I analyze the Chinese factor in Russia's self-identification process in the context of Moscow's attitude towards the West and the East by using two main elements: identity and fear. Comparing the historical pattern with the present one, I attempt to determine the consequences of these two factors for the Russian Federation.