This paper examines the relationship between European integration and ethnonational demands with the example of selected regions in the European Union (EU). It follows the theoretical premises of new regionalism and explores the ways in which ethnonational groups use the opportunities and resources of European governance to express their identities, material interests, and political demands. Methodologically, it conducts a plausibility probe of the potential effects of European integration on ethnonationalism by testing for regional differences in identities, interests, and political attitudes. The case studies are drawn from the UK (Wales and Scotland), Belgium (Flanders), Austria (Carinthia and Burgenland), Romania (Northwest and Center regions), and Bulgaria (South-Central and South-Eastern regions) as a representative selection of regional interests in the EU. The paper finds that European integration affects ethnonational groups by reinforcing identity construction in the direction of inclusiveness and diversity. Although regional actors are more supportive of the EU than the European publics in general, they also seek access to representation in the authority structures of the state. Based on these findings, the paper concludes that European integration facilitates a growing public acceptance of its resources, in parallel with persisting allegiances to the nation-state, the community, and ethnoregional distinctiveness.

In determining what Gorbachev's policies are, I consider the topic of law a very congenial one because he is a lawyer. While he is no longer a practitioner, he attended the same law school as I did long ago. His attitude towards law is as an implementation of policy, and, therefore, I believe that by reading the law, we can, through what is sometimes called reverse engineering, determine what his policies are in the matter of national minority concerns as well as on other matters. We can look upon what is seen on the surface as an indication of what is more deeply enshrined in his thinking. I always remember that Lenin said (and I was taught this my first day of school over there) that law was a political instrument, and I think Gorbachev is very much influenced by Lenin and Leninism. Consequently, I believe he accepts the position that law is indeed a political instrument. He would never accept what is now so popular in Europe: the theories of Lumans, who said that law has a life of its own, not because of its natural-law base, but because of what Lumans states, biological analogy.

With the recent attention given to the breakup of Yugoslavia, it is important to emphasize that the Serbs of Croatia and Hungary have always feared, rightly or wrongly, for their cultural, economic, and physical existence. The most prominent Serbian political parties in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in the Habsburg monarchy staked their reputations on their ability to defend the Serbian nation from cultural assimilation. The parties examined in this article were no exception. They believed that their primary task was to assure the continued existence of a Serbian nationality in Croatia and Hungary. In this article, the politics surrounding the Serbian Orthodox church in the Habsburg monarchy will provide the framework for an analysis and comparison of the political strategies of the two largest Serbian parties in Croatia and Hungary, the Independent and Radical parties.

This paper contributes to the discussion of links between sports, nationalism, and globalization by focusing on the political aspects of the preparation of Russian national teams for sports mega-events staged in Russia. By analyzing the cases of the XXVII Summer Universiade in Kazan, the XXII Winter Olympics in Sochi, and the XXI FIFA World Cup scheduled to take place in 12 Russian cities, the paper provides a comparative study of the benefits that mega-events provide for the host nation in terms of building national identities. To involve the sports component in the study of the nation-building processes, the paper applies the concept of the “spillover effect” of sporting nationalism which presumes that nationalist sentiment or ideology configured and promoted through sports affects non-sporting political processes, actors, and institutions. The paper argues that the “spillover effect” of sporting nationalism allows for the converting of excellence in sports mega-events – the centerpiece of global sports – into political excellence and displays the strengths of the nation to both the global and domestic public. Therefore, showing excellence as the host nation is the main objective that Russian political actors pursue in both their rhetoric and course of action.

The wave of Colour Revolutions, which started in Serbia in the year 2000, and spread to Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan, has changed the existing concepts on how transformation would take form in countries exiting from “really existing socialism.” In the early years following the collapse of the Soviet state, the dominant concepts were that of “transition” or slow, top-down reforms that would transform the existing political systems from ruling-party dictatorships to parliamentary democracies, and planned economies to market-based ones. Yet in the late 1990s there was a growing fatigue and pessimism towards the basic thesis of transition: the transition paradigm was formulated as a reaction to the perceived causes of the Soviet failure: a totalitarian state which monopolized the political space proved itself unable to provide either economic well-being or political legitimacy. The task in the early 1990s was to shrink the state apparatus, to make space for a multi-party political pluralism. Even though some argued that the main objective of transition was to achieve democracy,1 for transition theories and even more so for its translation into actual political choices the economic aspect of transition was perceived to be more immediate than the political one. Democracy needed a certain material context, and here too decreasing the role of the state was thought to liberate the market and provide material stability to the new democracies. It was necessary to create a new middle class by way of mass privatization of the former state properties to create a social demand for democracy. Those ideas reflected not only an ideological victory of the one side of the Cold War over the Eastern camp, but also very practical needs: the huge Soviet state sector was neither sustainable nor necessary after the fall of one-party rule, and it had to be radically transformed. At the time, this transition was thought to be an easy task: to take off the oppressing lid of the party-state and let democracy and market economies emerge naturally. Yet in the conception of transition there was a certain tension between the economic and political sides of the imagined reforms, between mass privatization with its dire social consequences of unemployment and fall in the standard of living, and the political goals of democratization where people who were being “restructured” were simultaneously promised to receive the right to change their rulers by casting their ballots. Would people who are threatened with job loss and lower living standards vote for the reformers? And in the event of a negative answer, how would the reforms proceed? Should economic reforms come before political ones; that is, first privatization and in a second stage freedom of political choice through parliamentary elections? These are some of the dilemma that the new republics of the Soviet Union and the former socialist countries of Eastern Europe were facing in the early 1990s. At the time, the answer was clear: the economy came first; it was more important to reform the economic sector, to privatize massively, and stabilize the economy as soon as possible. The economy came before politics, in the sense that restructuring of the property structure through mass privatization was supposed to create the material means for the creation of democracy. It was believed that once the middle class was created as a result of mass privatization, the democratic institutions, such as free elections, multi-party system, independent media, an active civil society, in a word, all the attributes of democracy, would evolve naturally.

The southern counties along the Danube, Sava, Tisa (Tisza) and Tamis (Temes) rivers, including Srem (Szerém, Sirmium) had been the richest, most developed and purely Hungarian inhabited part of the Hungarian Kingdom in the Middle Ages. The Ottoman conquest brought about a dramatic population shift between the fifteenth and seventeenth centuries, when the Hungarians were either massacred or forced to flee the area. The demographic vacuum was filled by Serbian immigration. The Serbs acquired a privileged status as frontier guards of the Habsburg realm, with full territorial, religious and cultural autonomy up to the middle of the eighteenth century.

The Basilica of Our Lady of Licheń, located near Konin in the Greater Poland Voivodeship, provides a unique insight into a nationalistic discourse in contemporary Poland. It was created not only as a Catholic shrine but also as a place of patriotic indoctrination. This paper examines not only the architecture and design of the Church and the surrounding Sanctuary, but also the ideas of Rev. Eugeniusz Makulski, the site's founder, and Barbara Bielecka, its architect, in order to understand one of the important currents in a debate on the Polish post-Communist identity. A close analysis of this religious shrine is intended not only to understand this particular site but also to examine how national identity is (re)defined in architecture. As this paper shows, the employment of symbolic devices allows the creation of a coherent story of the Polish nation as a religious community with a history intrinsically linked to the Catholic Church. However, the annexation of the lay sphere (nation) by the sacred one (religion) leads to problematic results when it comes to the universality of the religion and the “nationalization” of the Catholic Church itself.

This paper examines the legacy of the Duchy of Courland's overseas colony of Tobago as it relates to present-day Latvian national identity using the ethno-symbolist approach of Anthony D. Smith and comparative cases. As Latvia is a small nation that has been an independent nation-state for only two short periods, national legitimacy and pride pose particular problems for Latvians. To this end, Latvian historians have worked to reinterpret the Baltic German-dominated Duchy of Courland as a positive period of Latvian national history and have sought to emphasize ethnic Latvian involvement in the Duchy's colonial endeavors, especially on the island of Tobago. Their efforts have then filtered into the general Latvian consciousness through books, film, plays, and place names. Since Latvia's independence from the USSR, the former colony of Tobago has gained renewed importance for Latvians who are experiencing a widely perceived notion of postcolonialism. This paper concludes that the appropriated colony of Tobago will continue to rise in importance as a component of Latvian national identity.

The impact of modernization is seen by scholars as one of the main problems met by minority communities. Essentially, it is similar to the main problem of ecology, which deals with the impact of modern means on natural environment, whereas the former studies the impact of such means on traditional cultures, which should be preserved for the future. Case studies are interesting here, as these problems have many sides, and new description may open new views or confirm old ones. This is all the more true if we are lucky enough to have quantitative data.

By the end of 1920 the Soviet government achieved victories over all its external enemies. The white Russian armies were pushed out of their stronghold — Crimea. The Ukrainian army, in war against Soviet Russia, was also interned by its former ally — Poland. While external enemies ceased to represent any real menace to the Soviet government the situation on the internal front was far from satisfactory. Disillusioned workers and dissatisfied peasants presented quite a problem for the victorious but weak Soviet government. But an even worse situation existed in Ukraine which, it was hoped, would provide food for the major Russian cities. Although Ukraine was conquered by the Russian Red Army, it was not entirely subdued. It was aflame through numerous uprisings of nationally conscious elements who struggled for Ukrainian independence. The forcible requisition of food products in Ukrainian villages alienated the Ukrainian peasantry and turned its sympathies to the Ukrainian guerillas. Many of the young and able-bodied men joined the underground forces hoping that the tide may yet turn in their favor.