Karol Cardinal Wojtyla's encounters with Marxism-Leninism, the official ideology of the Polish state run by the Communist party, have taken place on two levels: theoretical-philosophical and political-practical. As a person living in the country ruled by the Marxist-Leninists, the Cardinal had to be concerned with the reality of his own situation as well as the power structure of the Party-state. As a priest he had to deal with the concept of alienation that is at the center of Marxist anthropology, realizing that the fundamental precondition for abolition of alienation is not abundance of material goods, but an internal improvement of people. As a philosopher Wojtyla had to cope with Marxist concepts of man, nature, society, economics and culture. A neo-Thomist scholar, the present pope believes in human liberty and rejects deterministic philosophies such as Marxism.

While some groups are discovering new opportunities in the shifting political and economic structures of the former Soviet Union, others are finding that their paths towards upward social mobility have become less clear or blocked. There are also growing regional differences in benefits and losses. Although privileges in the old system often translate into advantages in the new, a contracting economy and the redrawing of political boundaries are altering the social order.

All of the sociological surveys of Estonians carried out after the Second World War have highlighted family life and children as the main values for Estonians. Family and children were also the values that survived the transition from the Soviet to the post-Soviet system, becoming even higher ranked in Estonians’ value priorities. Other rising values during the transitional period were health, close friends, self-education, and a pollution-free environment. Among those aspects suffering considerable decline were participation in social as well as in cultural activities (visiting cultural institutions, reading books, etc.), professional work, and taking care of one's own physical well-being. The rural lifestyle together with Lutheran religious values, which emphasize the family and a “good mother,” have been the main cultural orientations handed down through generations of Estonian families. Even the Soviet period with its forced industrialization, collectivization and political terror did not break this value-system but, quite the opposite, often meant that the family became a place that provided “refuge, and temporary escape” from these pressures, thereby preserving important elements of an earlier cultural orientation. Through its ideologically restricted social studies and deformed official statistics, which left people without reliable information about reality, the Soviet system managed to preserve the relatively strong impact of cultural traditions on people's behavior.

The main research problem addressed in this article is the pattern of reacting to stigma based on ethnic origin expressed by the representatives of different generations of Belarusian and Ukrainian minorities in Poland living under different political and ideological conditions before and after 1989. This paper is based on a qualitative empirical study that comprised 22 in-depth biographical interviews with representatives of Belarusian and Ukrainian minorities, who varied in age. The research found that while the elderly see their minority identity in terms of danger or threat, the middle generation perceives it as an obstacle in fulfilling their life aspirations in a society fully dominated by the Polish majority. The youngest interviewees seem to be the most willing to perceive their minority characteristics positively in terms of uniqueness as well as particular competences, especially bilingualism, which may give them an advantage in the labor market.

As Ukraine approaches its tenth year of independence, it seems an appropriate moment to ask what type of nation it has become. The process by which Ukrainians determine the boundaries and characteristics of their national identity is dynamic, and has been the source of debate at many levels of Ukrainian society. The education system can illustrate several aspects of this process of identity formation: what the dominant elite choose to teach to the next generation about nation and citizenship, whether that material is accepted or transformed in its presentation to pupils, and to what extent the pupils internalize what they have been taught. This article begins to analyze the historical narrative and underlying values that together help to define a collective understanding of “nation” through a discussion of the education system in Ukraine. In particular, it focuses on the textbook used for the introductory Ukrainian history course as an example of the values and narrative fostered by the Ministry of Education. Although the analysis focuses on a single textbook, the article also attempts to place the arguments in a broader perspective by paying attention to the context within which the textbook curriculum is created and implemented and by discussing several factors that may affect its presentation to and reception by pupils.

This article surveys the official narrative on representation of Estonian identity and Estonianness through the tourism strategy implemented by Estonia from 2007 to 2015. Gathering material from brochures and documents targeting foreigners produced by the Estonian Institute and “Enterprise Estonia” (EAS) and analyzing the logic behind the interior design of Tallinn Airport, we engage with current debates on identity construction in post-Soviet spaces. In particular, we suggest that along with an established body of literature looking at the role of state actors in the construction of identity, studies should consider the role of nontraditional or non-state actors in identifying and promoting identity markers.