This study aims to identify the attempts to form a Jordanian national identity from the establishment of the Jordanian state in 1921 to date. This study reviews the efforts of the Jordanian state, which was subject to internal, external, political, social, economic, and cultural circumstances, and variables that led to change the Jordanian national identity to incorporate religious, national, regional, ethnic, and tribal aspects. The regime has been unable to address and resolve the issue of national identity; instead, it has tried several means to circumvent the problem of national identity. The identity card is a means that the regime has used to achieve its goals. These policies led to the state's failure to define, establish, and maintain a comprehensive national identity for its citizens. The formation of a national identity has been a dilemma for Jordan since the establishment of the state; there is almost no known national identity. This situation calls for the construction of the Jordanian national identity on a fixed and clear basis to prevent its disintegration, to facilitate the process of social integration, and to build a final national identity that is both inclusive and representative. Without this identity, division and conflict may prevail in Jordanian society.

In June 1996, the newly reconstructed waterfront in Cheboksary, the capital of the Chuvash Republic, was officially opened with a formal ceremony led by the President of the Republic, Nikolai Fedorov, and attended by the Patriarch of All Russia, Alexei II. “We have built a road to the temple,” the President declared. In a literal sense, he was referring to the construction of an embankment leading to one of the city's oldest Orthodox churches. But his phrase had a symbolic meaning as well. Metaphorically the phrase equated the physical reconstruction of the capital city with the cultural and spiritual revival of the Chuvash nation.

Bosnia and Herzegovina is politically fragmented, and so is the memory landscape within the country. Narratives of the 1992–1995 war, the Second World War, Tito's Yugoslavia, and earlier historical periods form highly disputed patterns in a memory competition involving representatives of the three “constituent peoples” of Bosnia and Herzegovina - Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks – but also non-nationalist actors within BiH, as well as the international community. By looking especially at political declarations and the practices of commemoration and monument building, the article gives an overview of the fragmented memory landscape in Bosnia and Herzegovina, pointing out the different existing memory narratives and policies and the competition between them in the public sphere, and analyzing the conflicting memory narratives as a central part of the highly disputed political identity construction processes in postwar Bosnia and Herzegovina. The paper also discusses the question whether an “Europeanization” of Bosnian memory cultures could be an alternative to the current fragmentation and nationalist domination of the memory landscape in BiH.

The genesis of “National Communism” is often traced to the Yugoslav dictator Tito, but in reality the only novel aspect about Titoism is that it has succeeded. The ideology of National Communism was manifested in Ukraine in the early 1920's and its pre-eminent leader was Mykola O. Skrypnyk. It was a reaction to the strong centrist policies of the Bolshevik Party, which had many leaders who were committed to a belief in Russian superiority, a belief which was carried over from the Tsarist regime. At the Eighth Party Congress in 1919, Lenin remarked: “Scratch many a Communist and you will find a Great Russian chauvinist.” The traditionalist utterances made by several highly placed Bolsheviks during the first years of the Revolution were certainly indiscrete. Thus did George Piatakov, a Russian Communist, tell a meeting of the Party held in Kyiv on June 17, 1917:

One of the most frequently heard phrases in Communist Poland was the notorious nie ma “there is not, is not available, is out of stock,” reflecting the permanent shortage—of virtually everything—that was so characteristic of what was labeled “real socialism.” The phrase disappeared shortly after the introduction of a market economy overnight filled the hitherto empty shelves with an abundance of goods which had been unheard of throughout the postwar decades. The phrase became almost forgotten—only to make a sudden and seemingly unexpected (although foreseen by some) comeback, when the “post-Communists” were returned to power by the September 1993 parliamentary elections. It may not (yet?) concern Warsaw, which devours an unfair share of what the country can produce, and it may not (yet?) concern other larger Polish cities, but across the countryside chronic shortage is often felt only too bitterly. In spite of this most alarming development, however, the strong opinion prevails that there can be no return to the old centrally steered socialist economy. The changes have gone too far, enabling the people to resist attempts at revising the impressive economic, social and political reforms in Poland.

October 1819 was a key month in the history of relations between the Slavs. Alexander I spent the early part of it in Warsaw, drawing on the contitution of the Congress Kingdom of Poland and putting the finishing touches to his project for a pan-imperial constitutional charter. In Tsarskoe Selo the conservative historian N. M. Karamzin reacted with horror to the tsar's concurrent plan for the revivification of Poland. On 9 October, in the hope of securing official support for his archaeological and ethnographic studies, the Pole Zorian Dolega Chodakowski arrived in St. Petersburg. His first publication in Russian, which appeared later in the month in Moscow, argued that before the coming of Christianity the Slavonic peoples were ‘everywhere and in all respects’ identical. Behind these three events — Alexander's charter, Karamzin's sense of outrage, Chodakowski's arrival — lay three approaches to the bringing-together of the Slavs: the federal, the Russifying, and what I shall call the cultural. In various hands, these approaches were long-lived in pre-revolutionary Russia. Chodakowski's significance lay in the impetus he gave to the third of them.