The article explores the development of football in interwar Romania, stressing its role in the dissemination and grounding of Romanian nationalism. I show how, due to its modular form, the game of football was deeply involved in the efforts of centralizing, territorializing and naturalizing the Romanian nation-state of the interwar period. The founding of the leading Romanian sports club at the University of Cluj and the selection of the national representative for the Paris Olympics of 1924, in conjunction with the institutional infrastructure developed to nationally regulate and control the game, are used to present the acute tensions between local/regional and national aspirations and projects, with a strong ethnic component, that have shaped the history of the game in Romania. I argue that the increasing calls for the full Romanianization of football in the 1930s have their immediate roots in these tensions and frictions.

Why would elites or masses in an ethnically distinct region ever opt for “alien rule” over national independence? While separatist movements tend to create the most drama and make the most headlines, mass media and most scholarly accounts pay far less attention to ethnic groups opting to stay in a union state dominated by other groups. Yet such unionist groups are surely more numerous than the separatist ones. Indeed, in the neighborhood of almost every separatist region in a given multi-ethnic state, one can find one or more unionist groups, such as the Yoruba during Nigeria's Biafran Civil War, the Ingush as Chechnya battled the Russian Federation, and the Kannadigas at the peak of Kashmir's struggle for independence from India. Sometimes, unionist groups advocate political integration despite seeming to have every reason to seek secession. Such groups are neglected by analysts only at great cost, because it is precisely these groups that are likely to hold the key to understanding how distinct groups can come to live together in peace.

In the early nineteenth century, several Slavic intellectuals believed in a single Slavic nation speaking a single language, though positing various taxonomies of the nation's component “tribes” and the language's component “dialects.” Nevertheless, recent scholars, both historians and linguists, prove so extraordinarily unwilling to acknowledge the existence of Panslavism that several falsify the historical record so as to make historical figures conform to modern national and linguistic thinking. This paper discusses Jan Kollár, Ljudevit Gaj, and L'udovít Štúr as three sample Panslavs, documents the misrepresentation of their ideas in recent historiography, and explores why so many scholars seek to erase Panslavism from the historical record.

By analysing two commemorative events organized shortly before and after the 2010 parliamentary elections in Slovakia, this article demonstrates how the Prime Minister Robert Fico and his collaborators exploited these ceremonies to promote a more inclusive definition of political community than their right-wing counterparts. Although commentators have interpreted the continuous political success of the political party Smer-SD in terms of negatively connotated nationalism and national populism, Fico's discursive framework allows him to address those who have been stigmatized by post-1989 neoliberalism, especially former communists and people unable or unwilling to adapt to the rapid changes brought about by post-socialist social, economic, political as well as cultural transition(s). Instead of backwardness, Fico's anti-elitist and anti-capitalist rhetoric opened a new symbolic universe to these groups. The history narratives that formed an important part of this universe were not used to exclude the Other, but rather to create a meaningful future for those who have been ignored by (neo-)liberal ideals. This paper argues for an interpretation of post-socialist populist parties that would take into account culturally relevant symbolic structures advanced by these parties.

National identity is everywhere constructed through a process of negotiation with other categories of identity—local, regional, class, confessional, and gender. In borderlands, however, there is another element in this negotiation process—the sharing of public space with another national group, an element that further complicates identity formation. Here categories can change and/or function differently than in the interior of a country. In many respects, the construction of Germanness in the province of Poznania [German: Posen; Polish: Poznań] proceeded along similar lines as in the rest of the German Empire. German nationalists, both in the eastern provinces and in the rest of the Reich, produced publications and organized lectures about and celebrations of German history and German culture in an effort to mobilize national loyalties in support of policies that would consolidate Germandom both within and without. However, the presence of a Polish challenge in Poznania—the defining problem of the province—complicated constructions of German national identity.

Pessimism and skepticism dominate this most recent work by Martha Brill Olcott, one of the leading scholars of Central Asia and the Eurasian realm. Her central theme is that, even with abundant natural resources, an educated population, and a situation between East and West, Kazakhstan's seemingly bright future and promised prosperity failed to materialize. In short, political and economic corruption has dominated the transition from Soviet dependency to post-Soviet independence.

The huge Russian diaspora created in the wake of the Soviet Union's collapse creates a great challenge to nation builders throughout the “near abroad.” Especially in Lithuania, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Ukraine, by virtue of their size, Russian populations must be integrated into new political communities where they now have minority status. The building of cohesive, unified nation states requires that the identities and loyalties of these Russians be directed toward their new states. If Russians can identify with the broader community dominated by the titular ethnic group and simultaneously maintain a strong ethnic consciousness and loyalty toward the Russian Federation, then national integration can proceed in a relatively straightforward manner. But if creating a state-wide, national identity entails the weakening of Russian ethnic identity and the breaking of emotional and physical attachments to Russia, then national integration will be a much more conflictual and difficult process. Unfortunately, social scientists have paid little theoretical and empirical attention to the question of whether ethnic and national identities complement one another or compete with one another. Likewise, we do not know how a diaspora's relations with its homeland affects its ability to adopt loyalties to its host state. And if scholars are uncertain about these issues, then so likely are ethnic groups themselves; logically the political consequences of this uncertainty also merit study.