Since independence in 1991, Central Asian countries have put great effort into creating their respective national narratives, which are often based on an ethnic imagination. In Tajikistan this included the idea of shaping society via the family unit. Increasingly, motherhood became the focus of attention, which was made possible by merging two concepts. On the one hand, women are considered as “cultured” and educated people who the Soviet Union freed from “backward” traditions. On the other hand, traditions were reinvented such that the woman is considered the ultimate mother of the nation and the backbone of tradition. This article examines the changing status of motherhood in society and politics through efforts to create a sound family and a healthy nation.

Yugoslavia's socialism was always a special case when compared with other states in the eastern part of Europe, and so was its religious policy. In the 1960s, Yugoslavia adopted a rather liberal stance towards its religious communities. The state interfered less in the internal affairs of the churches than it did in most states in the Warsaw Pact. Even Croat Cardinal Franjo Kuharić, who was otherwise very critical towards Tito's Yugoslavia, had to admit in 1987,

The Albanians are divided between three religions: the Catholics, the Orthodox, and the Muslims. The religious groups participated in the national development of the Albanians around 1900 each in its own way and in proportion to its own strength. As the majority group, the Muslims (70–80%) played the most important role. Most of the Muslims wanted to remain within the Ottoman Empire as long as their traditional rights were maintained, in spite of a strong desire for local self-government, but, as the Ottoman Empire declined, radical Albanian leaders stressing cultural and linguistic unity rather than religious unity were to gain the upper hand. The Albanian language, culture, and feeling of common blood played the most important roles in Albanian nationalism. The Albanian language in particular gave Albanians the feeling of belonging to the same nation.

In May 1989, two series of demonstrations in Turkish villages of northeast Bulgaria was followed by a massive gathering of more than 50,000 Muslim Turks in the town of Shumnu in the same area. The Turks had converged to Shumnu from the surrounding villages and smaller towns in order to protest the forced changes of names and the bulgarization imposed by the government of Todor Zhivkov, then undisputed ruler of Bulgaria. The demonstration was put down in the usual brutal Bulgarian way; some twenty to thirty-five demonstrators were killed and hundreds were injured. However, the Turks had made their point; they were not going to give up, however fierce the official terror, their Islamic identity and culture.

Communism in the Soviet Union has long served officially as religion's surrogate. It has offered an organized and compelling belief system with which to rationalize the misfortunes of the past, establish codes of behavior to manage the present, and conceptualize the future. Although communist theory categorically rejects religion, it actively promotes, and is itself predicated on, institutions of “faith” in the abstract sense. The herculean industrialization and literacy campaigns of the early decades of Soviet rule that forever transformed the USSR's largely illiterate, agricultural society vividly illustrate the power and popular legitimacy of communist institutions of “faith” such as the Party and the Komsomol. Trusting that earthly sacrifice will bring future rewards has been as much the basis of Soviet communism as it has been of the Abrahamic tradition of religion addressed in this issue.

The outbreak of civil war and the disintegration of the “second Yugoslavia” was caused by many factors; however the impact of the debilitating conflict within the Yugoslav political elite, into which the ordinary citizens also were “drawn,” was crucial. This article will seek to support this hypothesis.

Uncovering the importance of Islam in Chechen national identity is not necessarily difficult. Alexei Malashenko has noted that Chechen identity today cannot be considered outside the context of Islamic tradition. Chechnya today is not an independent Muslim state. Its embracing of Islam came about during a time of colonization, when Chechens were struggling to halt Russian encroachment on their lands. Many works pertaining to Islam in Chechnya suggest that, at the time of Russian advancement in the eighteenth century, most Chechens were “nominally” Muslim. This has been attributed to the geographic isolation of the Caucasus. While the rugged mountainous landscape and thick forests which cover the region provided protection from invaders, it also hindered interaction among the various mountain peoples as well as the strength of outside religious influence. Soon after their defeat to the tsarist Russians, the Bolshevik Revolution occurred and Chechens spent the following 80 years under Soviet rule. After the fall of the Soviet Union, the Republic of Chechnya declared independence alongside the full-fledged Soviet Socialist Republics, though their independence was not recognized by the UN. The Chechen victory over the Russian Federation in the first war in 1994–1996 has been considered a remarkable military defeat. However, a weak economy, high unemployment, and criminality caused the young nation to fall into a state of lawlessness and radicalism, eventually causing it to suffer a defeat to the Russians in the second war, which began in 1999. The present day is characterized by exhaustion and a desire for peace, a desire that ultimately has meant deference to Russian rule.

Die Stadt Lublin war in den letzten Jahren das Objekt umfassenderer Arbeiten. Wenn aber selbst die allgemeine Geschichte Lublins in der Zwischenkriegszeit im Unterschied zur historiographischen Würdigung der Zeit bis zum Eersten Weltkrieg ein “unbeschriebenes Blatt” ist, dann gilt dies umso mehr für die Geschichte der Lubliner Juden und ihr Verhältnis zur nicht-jüdischen Bevölkerung. Regionalbezogene Untersuchungen fehlen völlig. Dies liegt an der Komplexität des Themas, aber auch an der lange Zeit ungenügenden Bereitschaft polnischer amtlicher Stellen, Archivalien frei zugänglich zu machen.

What are the chances for peace and stability in the Transcaucasus—a region that has been plagued by decades of exploitation and colonization and has recently been the setting for a violent conflict between neighboring nationalities? Nadir Mekhtiev, Chairman of the Human Rights Commission of the Azerbaijani Supreme Soviet and Chairman of the Azerbaijani Helsinki Committee, offered some thoughts and impressions on this matter.

This article investigates gendered nationalist ideologies and their attendant myths and narratives in present-day Kyrgyzstan through an investigation of clothing items and practices. Clothes “speak volumes,” revealing tensions between gendered narratives of nationhood and various interpretations of what “proper” Kyrgyz femininities and masculinities should be. Clothing thus becomes both a sign and a site of the politics of identity, inscribing power relations and individual strategies of Kyrgyz men and women onto their bodies. Individual clothing choices and strategies take place within the general context of discursive struggles over what authentic and appropriate representations of Kyrgyzness should be. Thus, such clothing items as ak kalpak (conical felt hats) and the practice of Muslim women covering their head (hijab) acquire social and political meanings that stand for wider processes of identity contestations in the country.