On the economic scene, 1990 has brought several new developments. There is a new law regulating center-periphery economic relations published on April 10, 1990. Unfortunately, it does not fit well with the notion of a loose confederation in the Soviet Union. Thus, there will be some interesting questions regarding the fit between the new union treaty and this new law on center-republic economic relations.

It is no secret to us history instructors that for some years now there has been a growing sense of uneasiness in our discipline on the part of pupils and students and of helplessness on the part of teachers. Pupils and students repeatedly ask what, after all, is history good for, whether what they are learning is really relevant to their lives, and whether the study of history should not be more than memorizing sterile facts for the purpose of getting grades. Paradoxically, teachers can discern a continuing and in fact ever increasing interest in history. At the same time, we cannot help but notice that the mode of questioning by the younger generation has become different as have the problems that have come with social change.

In 1762 and 1763, manifestos were issued by Catherine II, and later were extended further by her son Paul I, inviting foreign artisans and others to settle in far-flung rural areas of the Russian Empire in order to help strengthen the economy. Under a policy somewhat similar to the later US Homestead Act, under the manifestos German and other foreign-national settlers and their descendants were offered Russian citizenship, land ownership after three years, religious tolerance (including, in the case of Germans, German clergy and German-language churches), and exemption from the military draft—although by the end of the nineteenth century the last of these had been rescinded. The call was not restricted to Germans, but Germans comprised the largest group to take advantage of it, settling for the most part in Ukraine, Bessarabia, and the mid-Volga region. Those who participated in the migration, known as the Auswanderung, and their descendants are often referred to in English as “Russian Germans” or “Germans from Russia” (rossiiskie nemtsy). A second wave of German immigration occurred in 1894, when some Germans who had settled in Prussia moved across the border into Russia. By 1897, there were over 2 million German immigrants and descendants in the Russian Empire.

There is a tendency here to assume that the market is new, that nations have emerged anew, that civil society has suddenly come about, that all of a sudden people are speaking their native languages and going to school in their native language. I would like to argue that this is not the case at all.

National identity was already the object of scholarly studies by the 1950s and 1960s, e.g. by analysts such as Karl Deutsch and Ernest Hass, to a great extent inspired by the start of European integration and German and French reconciliation. One of the crucial questions has been (and still is) to what extent national identity constitutes a barrier to Europeanization and integration, and to what extent overlapping multiple identities can co-exist.

Discussions about ethnic mobilization in eastern Europe have emphasized efforts of nationalist leaders to demarcate their community from their neighbors in mixed areas where ethnic boundaries and identities were blurred. Demarcation became a common means of defining the community both geographically and culturally, a process which later facilitated the community's mobilization. In the German Empire, however, the Polish-German demarcation was already stark, since it mostly coincided with Catholic-Protestant demarcations. But while the Polish community mobilized quickly and showed great solidarity, the German community did not. Using the Bromberg/Bydgoszcz administrative district as a model, the article argues that the local German community's internal divisions limited its ability to mobilize. Germans agreed on the need for greater German community solidarity, but differed on conceptualizations of its ideal structure and form. Liberal nationalists, envisioning a more egalitarian community defined by a common ethnicity, fought with local conservatives, who were as intent on preserving their prominence within the community as they were on struggling with the Poles. Such divisions crippled local German mobilization on any scale comparable to their Polish neighbors, suggesting that an ethnic community's self-demarcation is necessary but not sufficient to ensure its mobilization.

Repatriates – so-called SpätAussiedler – from republics of the former Soviet Union are one of the most important groups of immigrants in the Federal Republic of Germany. Granted German citizenship based on ethnicity, German policy supposed fast and smooth assimilation. Despite the fact that SpätAussiedler had advantages for structural and social integration into German society compared to immigrants of non-German descent and indications of rather smooth integration, the initial hopes for fast assimilation prove to be exaggerated. Instead, as revealed by a survey and interviews on the ethnic self-identification, cultural habits, and linguistic behavior of SpätAussiedler, a hybrid “Russian-German” identity has emerged amongst many repatriates.

There is unprecedented domestic and international interest in Turkey's political past, accompanied by a societal demand for truth and justice in addressing past human rights violations. This article poses the question: Is Turkey coming to terms with its past? Drawing upon the literature on nationalism, identity, and collective memory, I argue that the Turkish state has recently taken steps to acknowledge and redress some of the past human rights violations. However, these limited and strategic acts of acknowledgment fall short of initiating a more comprehensive process of addressing past wrongs. The emergence of the Justice and Development Party as a dominant political force brings along the possibility that the discarded Kemalist memory framework will be replaced by what I call majoritarian conservatism, a new government-sanctioned shared memory that promotes uncritical and conservative-nationalist interpretations of the past that have popular appeal, while enforcing silence on critical historiographies that challenge this hegemonic memory and identity project. Nonetheless, majoritarian conservatism will probably fail to assert state control over memory and history, even under a dominant government, as unofficial memory initiatives unsettle the hegemonic appropriation of the past.