Scholars frequently describe American religious disestablishment using commercial analogies, reckoning that states “privatized” religion or subjected churches to “free-market competition” by making them more like commercial businesses, yet this article demonstrates in part how churches pioneered many of the corporate devices that came to define American enterprise after the Civil War. Such descriptions are thus anachronistic. Antebellum jurists were not concerned about the similarity of churches to businesses, but rather their similarity to states, and the republican fear that churches could be rival sovereign states at first structured the law of disestablishment and incorporation. In most states, churches gained rights of general incorporation but faced significant limitations on their corporate governance and property holdings. In Dartmouth College, the Marshall Court reimagined religious societies as private owners who, instead of governing as rival sovereignties, administered property in trust under their charters. But with the vague charters of general incorporation, state judges were left without a definite source of law to adjudicate church disputes. This article argues that courts thus allowed trust law to function as a conflict of laws analysis: Judges treated religious doctrine as a foreign legal system with rules that could be ascertained and accorded respect in American courts. Such a move created a positive, corporate right of religious liberty that becomes obscured if one conceives of religious freedom only as an individual right to be asserted against the state.

There is growing evidence about the influence of chemical exposures on specific molecular systems and mechanisms involved in cognitive and mental function. Evidence is also emerging about the negative impact of these chemical exposures on mental health, including depression, suicide, and other risks. Despite the growing appreciation of these factors, however, little attention has been paid to the ethical and social implications of their interactions. Drawing on recent work that argues for an environmental neuroethics approach that explicitly brings together ethics, environment, and conditions of the central nervous system, this article focuses on these critical issues for pesticides specifically.

Suppose that a colleague proposed a fantastic experiment: to introduce human stem cells into a neonatal mouse so that its entire brain developed into “human-like” neuronal structures. The colleague claimed it would still be a mouse, and that its chimeric brain would be nothing like a “human” one. It would not, as a result, have a moral status beyond its nonhuman animal origins. Thus, the “human neuron mouse” would allow scientists to tinker with human-like neurology in ways that would be precluded if it were a human being, and that would promise to lead to substantial understanding of the destructive and incurable brain diseases that befall humanity. The colleague does admit, however, that for reasons of comparative fidelity, experiments in human patients would be scientifically preferable, although in this case, neither ethically justified nor legally permitted. For that reason, it might be desirable to create a human brain in a nonhuman primate, where it would be more likely that significant human-like neuronal development would occur, but still could not become a person. This article explores the significance of a “human neuron chimpanzee,” and suggests that contradictions in the design of the experiment make it unethical to proceed in either murine or primate models.

Brain–computer interfaces (BCIs) can enable communication for persons in severe paralysis including locked-in syndrome (LIS); that is, being unable to move or speak while aware. In cases of complete loss of muscle control, termed “complete locked-in syndrome,” a BCI may be the only viable solution to restore communication. However, a widespread ignorance regarding quality of life in LIS, current BCIs, and their potential as an assistive technology for persons in LIS, needlessly causes a harmful situation for this cohort. In addition to their medical condition, these persons also face social barriers often perceived as more impairing than their physical condition. Through social exclusion, stigmatization, and frequently being underestimated in their abilities, these persons are being locked out in addition to being locked-in. In this article, we (1) show how persons in LIS are being locked out, including how key issues addressed in the existing literature on ethics, LIS, and BCIs for communication, such as autonomy, quality of life, and advance directives, may reinforce these confinements; (2) show how these practices violate the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, and suggest that we have a moral responsibility to prevent and stop this exclusion; and (3) discuss the role of BCIs for communication as one means to this end and suggest that a novel approach to BCI research is necessary to acknowledge the moral responsibility toward the end users and avoid violating the human rights of persons in LIS.

This article addresses questions surrounding the minimally conscious state (MCS) from the perspective of adult clinical ethics. It describes the background of the MCS diagnosis, analyzes phenomenological ambiguities inherent in the nature of MCS, and raises epistemological concerns surrounding its diagnosis. It argues that in many cases, the burdens of prolonging treatment for people who have sustained certain severe brain injuries (SBI) outweigh the benefits, even if they are in or have the prospect of entering into MCS. It also argues that often such long-term measures are problematic from the perspective of patient preferences and stewardship of resources. Consequently, it suggests that the delineation of MCS as a distinct neurological state, along with research that seeks to expand how MCS is diagnosed, poses ethical difficulties for families and providers making decisions for affected patients.