The European Parliament (EP) adopted, between 2004 and 2009, a series of resolutions calling for recognition of Communist crimes and commemoration of their victims. This article focuses on an overlooked aspect of anti-Communist activism, the awareness-raising activities carried out by some Central European Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) to perpetuate the cause through networks that enable them to exchange institutional credibility, scientific legitimacy, and policy-oriented knowledge with Institutes of National Memory, parts of academia, and victims associations. Although they use the techniques of expertise and scandalization that are often effective in European institutions, these memory entrepreneurs have largely failed to further their claims in the European Union (EU) after 2009. In line with the turn toward “practice” in EU studies and the increased attention paid to agency in memory politics, this article contends that the conditions of production of their narrative of indictment of Communism accounts for this relative lack of success. Because their demands produced a strong polarization inside the EP while colliding with established Western patterns of remembrance, these MEPs’ reach remains limited to their Conservative peers from the former Eastern bloc. This weak national and ideological representativeness hinders their capacity to impose their vision of the socialist period in the European political space.

The collapse of the Soviet Union unleashed a number of violent, usually secessionist ethnic conflicts. These conflicts were typically intensified (or “escalated”) by foreign intervention. Although there is a great deal of consensus about the fundamental forces driving these conflicts and their escalation, there remain considerable theoretical differences about how to understand these factors and assess their relative importance. These differences mirror debates in the broader literature on national identity and its consequences. This article seeks to clarify these debates by elucidating some theoretical distinctions among the factors taken to contribute to the outbreak and escalation of violent ethnic conflicts. These distinctions are then applied to post-Soviet conflicts in Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and Tajikistan. The case studies bear out the relevance of the theoretical distinctions, but also reveal the difficulty of applying them unambiguously in any given case. These examples form the basis for some concluding suggestions. These suggestions aim to maximize the clarity with which theoretically distinct causal factors are empirically distinguished for purposes of testing hypotheses.

The need to handle ethnocultural diversity and the external pressures of Euro-Atlantic integration have led to the development of complex minority rights regimes in Central and Southeast European states. The aim of this paper is to perform a comparative analysis of the political representation dimension of these regimes, and to investigate how the regulations in this domain are related to the more general attitude of states toward diversity recognition and registration. For this purpose, we classify the states according to a series of variables concerning the manner in which ethnocultural diversity is recognized and portrayed, as well as the regulations concerning the representation of minorities, and identify patterns of their incidence. The formal-legal analysis of the constitutions, minority protection laws and of the electoral legislation of the included countries reveals a clear connection between the general attitude of the state toward diversity and the incidence of autonomies, and a less unequivocal, yet strong relationship in the case of minority representation in the national polity.

The Soviet military officer's motto was “I serve the Soviet Union.” He had taken an oath to a state whose leadership constantly stressed the ethnic diversity of its population. When the USSR fell apart, however, only one of its 15 successor states—the Russian Federation—did not declare itself the homeland of one specific ethnic group. The reality of the divorce was difficult to grasp for many people in the former Soviet Union. In Russia, ideas of democracy and hopes for the future of the RSFSR as an independent state were standing strong. Not all the newly independent states would be missed; the Central Asian republics were widely seen as a culturally distant periphery tapping the RSFSR of resources. However, shedding off Kazakhstan, Belarus, and above all, Ukraine was a completely different story.

The final declaration of the Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe has affirmed the duty of the various signatory states to observe the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief for all without distinction to race, language or religion.

It is a truism that without clear cut historical terminology and determination of historical periodization, which reflect the multi-dimensional development of individual nations and states, no effective and objective historical research is possible. Therefore, historians should welcome this session which, in my opinion, can serve as a starting point in the discussion dealing with controversial problems of East European historical terminology and periodization.

This article examines the application of the concepts of minority rights, racism and multiculturalism to the case of Bulgaria. It explores how—if at all—these concepts have been accommodated within the domestic discourse on ethnic relations. Overall, it will be seen that Bulgaria has been slow to face up to its multi-ethnic reality: apart from the cessation of communist assimilation campaigns, hardly any positive minority rights were adopted after 1989. There were, however, clear changes in the discourse on ethnic relations, in particular regarding the notion of the “Bulgarian ethnic model,” which now figures prominently in the discourse of most political parties.

As everybody is well aware, human rights is an extremely broad topic, so what I would like to do is make a few basic points with some illustrations and then sum up with some ideas and discussion. Much of the grand scheme for reforming the Soviet system has touched on issues that fall under the rubric of human rights, broadly construed. Human rights discussions are no longer constrained by the traditional Soviet emphasis on social and economic rights and now encompass a variety of civil and political rights. As I see it, the fundamental issue with respect to human rights is the propping up of the rule of law. The concept of the rule of law has been elevated to previously unknown heights and is extolled as a fundamental underpinning of the entire process of democratization. It lends itself to the reduction of arbitrary actions (or at least it should), it encourages glasnost', and it enhances support for perestroika because it is intrinsic to any process of democratization. This reliance on the rule of law is absolutely essential as a component of any process that is linked to de-Stalinization. The abuses of the Stalin years are routinely excoriated, and the message being conveyed is that constitutionally guaranteed rights of citizens will be upheld, constitutional reform will proceed, and legislation will be enacted to protect a host of rights not addressed by the Constitution.

Interbellum Poland remains an important example of a polyethnic state and society in European history. Its short existence between the wars does not diminish the importance of its many peculiar aspects, nor does the fact that it can be defined as an unsuccessful example in organizing, institutionally and socially, a polyethnic community. The theoretical definition of the Polish experience has puzzled historians in the past. Polish historiography substantially ignored or steadfastly marginalized the nationalities in the Second Republic and in earlier historical times, an attitude echoed by Marxist historians in post-bellum Poland. Now, indirectly, the topic is attracting attention again as a consequence of the new problematic caused by current European historical events both in the East and West.

Now Iam not concerned with definitions. Instead I would like to discuss very briefly the appearance of three organizations in Central Asia that are independent of the state. Everyone knows about the popular fronts in the Baltics; everyone has heard presentations about Ukraine, Belorussia, and Moldavia. I decided, therefore, to take the “hopeless” people, about whom one Soviet diplomat said two years ago: “They are not ready yet for democracy because they have jumped from the feudal system to the socialist system, avoiding your wonderful capitalistic stage when you created democratic institutions.” I want to demonstrate that democratic institutions were indeed created independently from the state in these Central Asian republics.