The first known record of the Manchu origin myth is found in Qing documents dating from 1636. These documents provide an official account of the origin of the Aisin Gioro lineage, including the story of the ancestor Bukūri Yongšon, who is depicted as the Manchu primogenitor, from his birth to his ascension to the throne. This article argues that the Manchu origin myth reflected the dynamics of Manchu identity, which shifted from constructing a Manchu group to securing Manchu rule during the period from the seventeenth to the eighteenth centuries. By tracing the development of this myth from its earliest version in the seventeenth century to four different versions that appeared by the mid-eighteenth century, written in both Manchu and Chinese, this article endeavors to shed new light on how the Manchus saw themselves, their ancestor, and their empire.

The unpublished work of Heinrich Schenker (1868–1935) has long fascinated scholars interested in the origins and development of his analytic method. Most of his unpublished papers can be found in two archives: the Oster Collection, housed in the New York Public Library, and the Oswald Jonas Memorial Collection, located at the University of California at Riverside.1 .

Neuroscience and neurotechnology are increasingly being employed to assess and alter cognition, emotions, and behaviors, and the knowledge and implications of neuroscience have the potential to radically affect, if not redefine, notions of what constitutes humanity, the human condition, and the “self.” Such capability renders neuroscience a compelling theme that is becoming ubiquitous in literary and cinematic fiction. Such neuro-SciFi (or “NeuroS/F”) may be seen as eidolá: a created likeness that can either accurately—or superficially, in a limited way—represent that which it depicts. Such eidolá assume discursive properties implicitly, as emotionally salient references for responding to cultural events and technological objects reminiscent of fictional portrayal; and explicitly, through characters and plots that consider the influence of neurotechnological advances from various perspectives. We argue that in this way, neuroS/F eidolá serve as allegorical discourse on sociopolitical or cultural phenomena, have power to restructure technological constructs, and thereby alter the trajectory of technological development. This fosters neuroethical responsibility for monitoring neuroS/F eidolá and the sociocultural context from which—and into which—the ideas of eidolá are projected. We propose three approaches to this: evaluating reciprocal effects of imaginary depictions on real-world neurotechnological development; tracking changing sociocultural expectations of neuroscience and its uses; and analyzing the actual process of social interpretation of neuroscience to reveal shifts in heuristics, ideas, and attitudes. Neuroethicists are further obliged to engage with other discourse actors about neuroS/F interpretations to ensure that meanings assigned to neuroscientific advances are well communicated and more fully appreciated.

The field of Security Studies traditionally focused on military threats to states' survival, however, since the end of the Cold War the concept of security has widened and individuals and communities have gradually become viewed as appropriate referent objects of security: Multifaceted challenges facing communities at the sub-state level are increasingly regarded as security threats, including their potential to cause instability for the larger society, thus affecting states’ security. In the Arctic region, a central challenge is that inhabitants are exposed to multiple non-traditional and non-military threats resulting from environmental, economic, and societal changes, which can be understood as threats to human security. We argue that a comprehensive approach to human security overlaps with the concept of societal security, and must therefore consider threats to collective identity and the essential conditions necessary for the maintenance and preservation of a distinct society. We see the human security framework as a suitable analytical tool to study the specific challenges that threaten the Arctic population, and in turn the well-being of Arctic societies. Therefore, we argue that utilising the concept of human security can promote societal security in the context of the Arctic, and in particular, its sub-regions, for example, the Barents region.

Drawing on stele inscriptions in a Yuan-period ancestral graveyard, this article aims to shed light on the emergence and evolution of a Chinese office-holding family in North China under Mongol rule (thirteenth- to fourteenth century). Tracing the family's connections with Mongols, it argues that adaptation to the Mongolian patronage system was essential to obtaining and maintaining political status during the Yuan, and that the kin group was stratified with the patronized descent line monopolizing political privilege. In doing so, the article highlights the value of stone inscriptions in clarifying official status, patronage, and inheritance rights in North China during the Yuan period.

One question left unanswered by the 2015 Paris Agreement is exactly how the world will meet the daunting technological challenges that lie ahead. This article proposes a global strategy to build up human capital oriented towards two bodies of knowledge: alternative, non-fossil systems of energy generation, delivery and consumption; and a deeper understanding of climate systems that might be geoengineered to reduce atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases. Simply committing funding to climate technology is insufficient; a global climate technology policy must take into account the unique growth properties of human capital, and the conditions under which it can grow.

Human capital should be the focus of an international climate agreement for three reasons. Firstly, the wrong kind of human capital (attached to fossil fuel-related methods of energy generation and consumption) has helped to create an unfavourable political economy for climate policy. Secondly, the right kind of human capital (broader, and building on fundamental understandings of energy systems and climate systems) can create a more favourable political economy for climate policy. Thirdly, the technological changes needed for both mitigation and geoengineering technologies are so profound that a human capital stock must be developed with a conscious focus on radical technological change that can be delivered quickly. While individual countries may pursue an enlightened human capital policy on their own, cooperation at the international level would maximize the scale economies of inventive effort.