At 08:46 on the morning of 11 September 2001, terrorist hijackers flew a passenger plane (flight AA11) into the north tower of the World Trade Center in Manhattan, New York, killing hundreds on impact. Approximately 17 minutes later, at 09:02, another hijacked plane (flight UA175) exploded into the south tower, watched by horrified local onlookers and broadcast on live television around the world. Both skyscrapers (104 floors) collapsed shortly thereafter. Terrorists also flew a third plane (flight AA77) into the Pentagon (the headquarters of the US military) in Arlington, Virginia at 09:37. Another aircraft, flight UA93, which investigators later determined was destined for the White House or the US Capitol Building, was brought down by the passengers on board, crashing into a field in Pennsylvania at 10:03. Intelligence agencies quickly determined that the 19 terrorist hijackers (15 of them were from Saudi Arabia, two from United Arab Emirates and the others from Egypt and Lebanon) were members of the international militant Islamist group al- Qaeda, led by Osama bin Laden. Known simply as “9/ 11”, these tragic events killed nearly 3,000 people (citizens of 78 countries), injured over 6,000 more and caused major economic destruction (the immediate damage was estimated at over $10 billion). It was the largest terrorist incident in history and the deadliest attack on American soil since Pearl Harbor (in which fewer people were killed: 2,400). According to the cover of The Economist (2001 ), it was “the day the world changed”.

In response, the US declared war. Initially, this would involve operations against transnational militant Islamist armed groups, mainly al- Qaeda, as well as the governments that gave them sanctuary – most prominently the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. The US went on to target affiliated jihadist organizations waging insurgencies in various countries, such as Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines, Islamic Jihad in Egypt and the Islamic Movement in Uzbekistan, among many others. As the conflict broadened, the US insisted it would combat terrorism on a worldwide scale, wherever it appeared. From Southeast Asia to the Andean region of South America, numerous localized insurgen-cies and campaigns were subsumed to this singular, overarching war, which profoundly impacted not only US foreign (and domestic) policy but the wider international political agenda.

There is a tension in this book's treatment of the G/WOT as a historical artefact. In recent years, when politicians and commentators have discussed terrorist violence, references to the WOT have been virtually nonexistent. From a certain vantage, the G/ WOT is indeed a thing of the past. Among some audiences, mention of the WOT may evoke nostalgia for an era of global politics that has been superseded by the many impactful events of the past 20 years or so. That said, the US continues to deploy military resources to combat transitional terrorist networks and non- state armed groups around the world. Washington sees jihadist violence as an ongoing national security concern and a persistent threat to its interests in the international arena. Counterterrorism remains a crucial component of US strategy, even if it has been eclipsed by other objectives, including the management of rivalries with great powers such as China and Russia.

It would be irresponsible to proclaim categorically that the G/WOT has ended. Returning to the various conceptualizations outlined in the Introduction, if it is understood purely as a set of defensive policies designed to enhance the security of the homeland and protect allied governments, it is important to note that many of these policies remain in place. Between 2021 and 2023, the US carried out counterterrorism operations in 78 countries, including ground combat in at least nine of these 78 cases (Savell 2023 ). As noted in Chapter 2 , the legal authorization enabling these actions, formulated in September 2001, remains on the books. But this is not to suggest that this mix of actions and behaviours on the part of the US government looks just as it did in the early 2000s; nor is it to imply that US strategy in this area has been static. Indeed, the material across Chapters 3 , 4 and 5 shows just the opposite: that the G/ WOT has always been a work in progress and that it has never stood still. However steadfast its globalized, militarized character, it has nonetheless featured various attempts at reform and recalibration. Many of the changes within the G/WOT were implemented to make it more sustainable. It should not come as a surprise that it is with us more than two decades after its proclamation.

Following the raid that killed Osama bin Laden in 2011, the WOT seemed like it could be nearing an end point. Coming on the heels of the Arab Spring uprisings, the politics of the Middle East entered a new phase, which held uncertainty as well as the possibility of positive change. Within a few years, however, the rise of ISIS dashed hopes for a peaceful regional status quo. This took place as the US was increasingly looking for more “indirect” ways to conduct the GWOT, as addressed in Chapter 4 . Extending our discussion on the evolution of the GWOT, this chapter focuses on the instruments of what became known as “remote warfare”, after the tool most closely associated with this approach: UAVs or drones.

Born out of the chaos of the Iraq War, as an offshoot of AQI, ISIS uti¬lized a highly sensationalized and gruesome form of violence to usher in a new wave of conflict. The tumult associated with the anti- dictatorial uprisings of the “Arab Spring” in the Middle East and North Africa cre¬ated conditions that would be exploited by the group, particularly in Syria and Libya. As ISIS conquered territory in Iraq and Syria, it also struck out at the “far enemy”, conducting a series of high- profile attacks in Europe, the US and elsewhere from 2015 to 2017. It adopted a fran¬chise model to spread its influence in Asia and Africa. Measuring trends via the number of deaths, attacks or estimated terrorist fighters, the situ¬ation in the 2010s was markedly worse than in the 2000s when the G/ WOT was first launched (Institute for Economics and Peace 2020 ). In 2014, the US and its coalition partners initiated a new campaign against ISIS, eventually named “Operation Inherent Resolve”, which primarily relied on local partners and aerial strikes, reflecting a shift away from “boots on the ground” that characterized the interventions in 2003– 11. By 2017, ISIS had lost the vast majority of its previous territorial hold¬ings, although its fighters remained active in the Syrian civil war.

The G/WOT that followed 9/11 has often been presented as a “new” era in US foreign policy. Many described this war as “unprecedented”. It is also now commonplace to segment the history of US foreign policy into distinct periods: Cold War, the post- Cold War 1990s and post- 9/11. However, many of the principles and practices of contemporary US counterterrorism and counterinsurgency have an extended history that cuts across these historical divisions. During the Cold War, US military leaders and policy- makers honed many of the practices later employed in the G/ WOT. Similarly, a militarized “war” against “terrorism” has a historical context.

In addition, the events of 9/11 prompted many Americans to ask: why do they hate us? There was a lot of confusion among the American public and the US government as to who al- Qaeda were, what drove them to commit these terrible acts and what their objectives were. People struggled to understand why anyone would be compelled to inflict so much damage on innocent Americans. Subsequently, many commentators depicted al- Qaeda as a religiously inspired and fanatical terrorist group that was intent on causing mass casualties, including using weapons of mass destruction if they could just get their hands on them (Gunaratna 2002 ). This was part and parcel of policy and academic debates over an allegedly “new” form of “religious terrorism” (Laqueur 1999 ; Duyvesteyn 2004 ). Yet transnational groups such as al- Qaeda did not simply appear on 11 September 2001. The jihadi Islamist ideologies that inspired them have a long history.

This chapter contextualizes the GWOT. First, it provides a brief overview of the development and evolution of counterterrorism within American domestic politics and foreign policy. We begin our analysis from US efforts against anarchist violence at home. We then pay particular attention to the development of counterterrorism during the Cold War. We outline how some policies and practices in the GWOT evolved out of the development of the Reagan administration's “war on terrorism” during the 1980s, much of which was oriented towards thwarting leftist insurgencies in Latin America.

From its inception, the WOT was an international, transnational and global undertaking. Insofar as it can be traced to the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 attacks, however, it becomes necessary to look at the domestic level of analysis to understand the origins of this wide- ranging war. The G/ WOT, as a set of foreign policy actions, was shaped by factors within the US and the US government, including the agendas of those in elected office at the time of the attacks. In addition, the domestic WOT within the US had profound implications for American society, the rule of law and civil liberties. This chapter offers insight into the domestic influences on the US- led GWOT (i.e. foreign policy) and the impacts of the WOT “at home”. In recounting the decisions taken in the months and years following the September 2001 attacks, it emphasizes those changes to policy and law that proved most durable, including on matters of surveillance and presidential authority.

The debates that shaped the early post- 9/ 11 period were wrapped up in a host of complex cultural meanings and identity- based constructions, as displayed in narratives of American exceptionalism, religion, security and global leadership. In some ways, the discourses of American foreign policy were predisposed to accommodate the contingent and highly aggressive approach taken by the George W. Bush administration. Officials used bellicose rhetoric to pursue certain outcomes in domestic and foreign policy- making. The nature of the threat was framed in a manner that facilitated a deeply militarized posture not only towards al- Qaeda (and other non- state terrorist organizations) but towards adversarial states in the Middle East and elsewhere. Bush's rhetoric was generally understood as Manichean: blunt, moralizing and hostile to nuance. This had obvious applications to foreign policy but it also aided in the formation of new institutional structures in the American homeland. The presence of the security state became a sali-ent feature of national life for US citizens in a manner that would have seemed unthinkable before 9/ 11.

In Chapter 2 we outlined homeland defence, but the WOT was primarily a foreign policy undertaking, driven by a transnational counterterror-ism strategy with a truly global reach. The US sometimes emphasized taking a “whole of government” strategy, epitomized by the “3D” approach, combining defence, development and diplomatic efforts to tackle terrorist groups around the world. At other times, the US gov-ernment emphasized a “whole of nation” initiative, where government agencies cooperated and coordinated with civil society organizations, non governmental organizations (NGOs) and other private sector actors towards counterterrorism objectives. This meant that the WOT comprised a variety of military practices, from asymmetric irregular warfare and counterinsurgency to various non military counterterror-ism tactics that included anti money laundering initiatives, intelligence gathering and economic aid and community outreach. It also had the consequence of subsuming many US foreign policy initiatives into a broader counterterrorism agenda. For example, much of US foreign developmental aid was refashioned for counterterrorism purposes. This expansive approach required coordination, from the strategic level down to tactical implementation.

What is counterterrorism? What activities comprised US counterter-rorism in the GWOT? How can we categorize the strategies and practices involved in the GWOT? This chapter introduces US counterterrorism strategy in the GWOT. It explains how the disparate sets of practices and activities subsumed to the GWOT were related. This chapter also explores some transnational counterterrorism practices, such as intel-ligence gathering and the global network of rendition and torture, and identifies a variety of political, legal and ethical issues associated with these. Finally, in addressing the strategic frameworks and policies of the Bush, Obama and Trump administrations, this chapter provides context for debates around discontinuity/ continuity in the WOT over time.

Counterterrorism strategies of the GWOT

In US military doctrine, “counterterrorism” is usually defined broadly as “offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism” (US Department of Defense 2003: 130) or “activities and operations taken to neutralize terrorists and their organizations and networks” (US Department of Defense 2014). This is understood as a set of security tasks at the national or transnational levels using military, political, diplomatic, legal and economic instruments to detect, deter and defeat terrorist activities.

The WOT involved direct and indirect forms of militarized interventions around the world. Wars in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria were major fronts in the GWOT. The hunt for al- Qaeda and the war against the Taliban in Afghanistan, the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the wars against ISIS in Iraq and Syria all took centre stage at different points in time. The invasions and subsequent occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq entailed regime change, significant commitment of “boots on the ground” in long- term counterinsurgent wars and substantial nation- and state- building. Later interventions into Syria from 2014 primarily centred on aerial bombing campaigns against ISIS targets and the commitment of troops in an “advise and assist” capacity to regional armed groups allied to the US.

In addition, the US engaged in indirect forms of military intervention by supporting counterinsurgency and stability operations in various allied countries. From the Philippines to Colombia and the Sahel region of Africa, the GWOT prompted US engagement with allied governments and local partners towards US- led counterterrorism initiatives and “foreign internal defence”. As we explore in Chapter 5 , this “by, with and through” strategy, as it was known, also underpinned even more “remote” approaches to counterterrorist warfare that came to define the latter phases of the GWOT.

As discussed in Chapter 2 , jihadist Islamist movements posed serious political problems in various countries across the Middle East and South Asia. The GWOT was not just a series of transnational counterterrorism initiatives; it led to US military engagement in localized conflicts, active participation in stability operations and considerable state- and nation- building efforts, particularly in Afghanistan and Iraq. Where jihadist movements fuelled violent insurgencies, the GWOT compelled the US to develop and implement strategies and practices of counterinsurgency.

As its own phenomenon (distinct from, but related to, counterter-rorism), counterinsurgency can be defined as a set of politico military strategies combining military, political, economic and psychologi-cal operations aimed at undermining local insurgent movements. In such multifaceted engagements, “winning hearts and minds” and building stable, democratic societies were understood to be as impor-tant as defeating enemy combatants. Counterinsurgency operations not only involved “boots on the ground” engaged in combat but also efforts in infrastructure development, governance and humanitarian aid.

I was delivering a guest lecture in 2021, discussing the challenges of countering the illegal wildlife trade due to the power of the criminal networks and the elite interests involved, and the limited resources available to CIWT organizations. After discussing the role of corruption in enabling IWT in both a national and international context, we moved to audience questions. A man raised his hand and asked why we couldn't just agree to pay the president of a country $1 million each year if they stopped poaching within their borders. His argument was that if elites benefited economically from conservation, they would stop the corruption enabling the trade and use national law enforcement to clamp down on IWT networks, bringing the trade to the end in a simple and cost-effective manner.

Although there are policy, ethical and practical challenges with such a policy, that argument struck a chord with me. Criminal networks are involved in the trade because it is low risk and lucrative; getting powerful interests to support conservation, and not IWT, would help change that. This chapter seeks to delve more deeply into that argument by examining how to break up the criminal networks driving high-value IWT, nationally and internationally. As such this chapter moves from the tactical, local level of “save the animal to kill the trade”, to the strategic national and international level. It considers how we might effectively counter these organized networks and their illicit financial flows. I examine efforts to apply existing models for countering financial crime to CIWT and the successes that has achieved. I emphasize the value of utilizing existing approaches from outside of the sector, backed up with the resources and experienced specialists to deliver them. In particular I explore what we can learn from counterinsurgency techniques. I argue that CIWT is similar to a low-intensity counterinsurgency environment, where disillusioned local populations support poachers (insurgents) against the rangers (the government). Drawing on British Army procedures, I show how best-practice counterinsurgency approaches share lessons for CIWT through their focus on winning the support of the human terrain (the local population) and a limited, highly-targeted law-enforcement effort against the highest levels in an insurgent (poacher) group.

As a ranger in Kahuzi-Biega National Park, John Kahekwa was concerned to see members of the community he had grown up in arrested for poaching. When he asked a man why he had done it, the man replied, “Empty stomachs have no ears”. With no way to make a living, the man entered the park to trap bushmeat to sell and to feed his family. When asked if he would stop poaching if he had a job, the man replied, “Yes, of course!”. John went on to set up the Pole Pole Foundation and that man and several other former poachers were trained to become carvers of wooden souvenirs to sell to tourists, turning them from poachers into protectors, and it kicked started a three-decades-long effort to work with communities to deliver gorilla conservation.

This anecdote gets to the heart of both conservation's problem and its solution. Too many people living around national parks and protected ecosystems live in poverty and are dependent on natural resources for their survival, be that charcoal for cooking or bushmeat for food. With few jobs available, the only way to secure an income is to illegally poach wildlife or exploit timber. There is often no malice involved or the pursuit of great riches, it is simply about supporting their families in the only way they can. It is the reality of “poverty poaching”.

Filling empty stomachs is therefore key to ending poverty poaching. Poaching is an awful activity to be involved in, something only those with no other choice would do. Wild areas are dangerous places and difficult to navigate. All sorts of animals, reptiles and insects can kill you. I heard one story of a bushmeat hunter in Zambia carrying freshly captured carcasses out of the park who was attacked by a male lion seeking out an easy lunch; the man would have died if he had not received urgent medical help. Trudging through forests or over savannahs in search of game or timber and then hauling it long distances is back-breaking work and does not pay well. Add to that the risk of arrest by rangers and we can see why poverty poaching is such a miserable occupation, and why the man John spoke to was so keen to take that job.

Happy Kasonde, a Wildlife Police Officer (a Zambian ranger) was escorting a school group in Kafue National Park when they came across a herd of elephants. When he thought the herd had gone past, he allowed the children out of the bus to have a closer look at the herd walking off into the distance. He hadn't seen that there was a baby calf among the herd, not far from the bus. Elephant poaching is rife in Kafue, so the elephants can be more hostile than they are in many other parks. The mother thought her calf was in danger and became very aggressive towards the group of children. He realized the danger, made sure that the children were all safely back on the bus, and then drew the elephant mother away. Despite firing warning shots to try and scare the elephant away, she attacked him and he died of his injuries.

On average three rangers are killed each week, part of the “thin green line”. The story above is just one illustration of the dangers they face; it is not just heavily armed gangs of poachers that threaten their lives, but the game, many of it dangerous, in the Parks in which they operate. Wildlife cannot always tell the difference between poacher and protector. Beyond rangers, there is also the wider threat to environmentalists, often overlooked. The corruption and illicit economies associated with IWT have led to the murder of many activists, particularly in South America, as well as ambushes of key personnel, such as the killing of Chingeta Wildlife NGO's CEO Rory Young in Burkina Faso and the ambush of Emmanuel de Merode in the Virunga region of the DRC to name two well-known examples.

We ask rangers to endure these dangers in order to protect wildlife and habitats, yet their compensation is often poor. Low salaries, poor equipment, a lack of specialized training, for example, “combat medic” skills needed to deal with gunshot or puncture wounds, a lack of weapons and ammunition to protect themselves, and a lack of suitable transport to get in and out of where they need to be, all make their job very challenging.