We are living in one of the most exciting times in history. It is a time of crisis and breakdown, and a time of potential transition to a new and more evolved economic and social stage. Diverse and vibrant movements for social transformation are springing up all around the world. The US, while playing a reactionary role through its imperialist state policies and globalizing corporations, is also a locus of significant post-modern transformation. We call this time in the US ‘the Transformative Moment’, to emphasize its potential for paradigmatic and systematic economic and social change.

The Transformative Moment can be understood as a deep-seated and many-faceted response to the imbalances, inequality and lack of freedom created by the reigning economic and social paradigm, a paradigm that we call the Hierarchical Polarization Paradigm. In the first part of this paper, we will analyse the core elements of the Hierarchical Polarization Paradigm. In the second part, we will discuss the seven transformative processes that various US social movements are participating in now; processes, which are beginning to construct a new, more balanced, free and equal paradigm of economic and social life.

Our goal in this paper is to provide the reader with a new conceptual framework, which will help them understand the transformative potential of the present historical conjuncture in the US – the Transformative Moment. The conceptual framework presented here builds on the fundamentals of Marxian economics, particularly as interpreted by David Levine (1977; 1978; 1981).

This chapter explores neo-liberalism, its forms, its periodization, and its future in the context of the changing dynamics of the capitalist world market. It focuses particularly on American neo-liberalism and foreign economy policy because the US remains the dominant neo-liberal power. It argues that, notwithstanding the loss of American economic hegemony and the growing challenge to its domination across a number of fields, US economic and political power retains disproportionate significance. This is because the new forms of financial domination promoted by the federal government, its associated international economic apparatuses, and transnational financial capital are still ‘ecologically dominant’ in shaping the world economy and global order more generally. The chapter has five parts. It first addresses issues of periodization that bear on the capitalist world market and neo-liberalism, then defines neo-liberalism and distinguishes its four main forms. Subsequently, it proceeds to discuss four forms of economic determination broadly considered, argues that the logic of American neo-liberalism is ecologically dominant in the world market, and concludes with some general remarks on the contradictions and limits of American domination.

Questions of Periodization

To ask what follows neo-liberalism is to pose a problem of periodization. The primary purpose of any periodization is to interpret an otherwise undifferentiated ‘flow’ of historical time by classifying events and/or processes in terms of their internal affinities and external differences in order to identify successive periods of relative invariance and the transitions between them (cf. Elchardus, 1988, p. 48).

In this essay I want to utilize a particular interpretation of Marx's Capital to explore the extreme contradictions of the contemporary fast food system as it manifests in a particular sector (food) and in acute forms the general contradictions that Marx discussed in his brilliant three volume study of capital's inner logic. My approach features two levels of analysis proceeding from a theory of capital's deep structures to an analysis of some central features of the production and consumption of food in the US currently. The abstract level develops seven crucial themes extracted from capital's inner logic, and the historical level illustrates some ways in which these themes are played out in the current fast food sector of the increasingly globalized American economy.

Following the remarkable work of Japanese political economist Thomas Sekine, I have come to see that Marx's Capital can be reconstructed as a rigorous dialectical logic making it potentially the most powerful theory in modern social science. While the commodity-form never rules us completely, in developed capitalist societies, it does so to such an extent that it is possible to complete its rule in theory. By doing this we convert social power relations into economic structures that can be theorized as forming necessary inner connections that interrelate through quantities (essentially price signals) that are manifested in markets.

Introduction

More than 150 years ago, in The Communist Manifesto, Marx and Engels observed that capitalism has a powerful tendency to destroy pre-capitalist relations and institutions:

Since those words were written, the continuing history of capitalism has borne them out. The vigorous accumulation process that capitalism gives rise to has continued to erode non-capitalist institutions. Feudal and semi-feudal relations throughout the world have, over time, dissolved under the pressure of capitalist penetration. Relations of independent commodity production, while not entirely eliminated, have been gradually reduced and increasingly marginalized.

However, capitalism has not eliminated all pre-existing non-capitalist institutions. In certain instances it reshaped them to suit its needs while retaining them as non-capitalist in form. Three examples that have been essential to capitalist reproduction are states, families and educational institutions. Such institutions are able to play a role in the reproduction of capitalism, not in spite of their internally non-capitalist form, but because of it, as will be explained below.

The tendency of capitalism to erode non-capitalist institutions potentially clashes with the need for non-capitalist institutions to be maintained in their supportive role in capitalist reproduction. A social system made up entirely of institutions that operate on capitalist principles and embody capitalist relations would not be viable.

Few events in the history of the British Empire have attracted as much interest or controversy as the Indian mutiny-rebellion of 1857–8. Since its immediate aftermath historical readings of the tumultuous events that swept across north India during these years have focussed largely on the causes of the revolt, and explanations for it are many and various. This reflects the multi-facetted character of the military and popular uprisings that fuelled and sustained events. Widespread mutiny in the Bengal army was accompanied rapidly by massive civil unrest, and few communities in rebellious areas in the North-West Provinces, Awadh, and western Bihar were unaffected. Though British and Indian historians have claimed variously that the unrest was ‘mutiny’, ‘rebellion’, or ‘war of independence’, it is impossible to capture the essence or meaning of the revolt in such simplistic, singular ways.

Mutiny first erupted in the cantonment of Meerut on 9 May 1857, provoked by the fettering and imprisonment of a group of sowars (cavalrymen) and sepoys (from the Persian sipahi, meaning native infantry) who had refused to use a new issue of cartridges allegedly greased with animal fat. Military mutiny fanned civil unrest and that night sepoys and rebels broke open the town's two prisons.

When in 2006 the original edition of this publication was completed, there were growing concerns regarding the state of Russian-European relations. Russia was in the process of becoming a more assertive energy power, the values gap between Russia and the West was perceived to be widening with the latter facing a difficult challenge of balancing values against interests in the pursuit of a strategic partnership with the Russian Administration.

Since this time, the relationship has become even more problematic. The impact of the European Union's enlargement to the East in 2004 has been extensive in terms of policy formulation on Russia, and has seen an emerging rift between accommodationist and more hard line member states. The breakdown of negotiations on a new treaty agreement in 2007 presented political challenges for both Russia and the EU, and it remains to be seen what kind of deal will be reached in the course of 2009. The election of Dmitri Medvedev in March 2008 prompted speculation regarding the relationship between the new President and Vladimir Putin, who had taken up the post of Prime Minister, and the future course of Russian foreign and domestic policy, particularly in terms of the ‘shared neighbourhood’, comprising the former Soviet republics to Russia's western and eastern borders. The outbreak of violent conflict in South Ossetia in August 2008 has had a detrimental effect on Russia's relations with the European Union, NATO and the US, and has prompted discussion whether we are witnessing the onset of a new Cold War.

Social Realities in Crisis

Are sociologists, therefore, getting back to their original roots? Applied sociology has its own tradition, which urges its practitioners to raise the question – ‘Sociology for whom and for what purpose?’ Simplistically speaking, those sociologists should not trouble themselves any further to open new avenues for intellectual stimulation. If such a process continues it is undeniable that we will touch the borderline of post risk society and simulacra-fashioned ‘sociological imagination’. The reality of the unreal has already dominated the field of theoretical puzzles. The other name for theoretical simulacra is postmodern theoretical abstraction. Alfred McClung Lee (1976) feels that ‘the character of any sociological inquiry depends upon by and for whom it is conceived and applied.

The Legacy of the Soviet Period on Russia's International Trade Structure

Russia's Communist experience resulted not only in political, but also in economic isolation from the West. Trade and financial transactions with the non-Communist world were not ruled out per se – indeed the Soviet authorities carefully nurtured a reputation for being reliable debtors and were not averse to tapping foreign financial markets when needed. Nevertheless, the doctrine of economic self-sufficiency (autarky) and the country's adversarial relationship with the West quickly reduced economic contacts to a minimum. The situation did not change radically after the victory in World War II; indeed, the extension of Soviet power over central Europe allowed the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) access to supplies of advanced mechanical equipment (notably from Eastern Germany or the Czech Republic) and to agricultural produce, giving new life to the system. The USSR did not join any of the major international economic institutions (such as International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank), and prevented its satellites from participating in the Marshall Plan and in the organisation that ran it, which later developed into the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Soviet-bloc countries instead joined the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon), whose transferable rouble system offered the Soviet Union the opportunity to base trade with its satellites on a favourable monetary regime, unconnected to world prices and not dependent on hard currency.

Introduction

No developed countries embrace the concept of multipolarity as much as France and Russia do. Using fulsome language on frequent occasions, both sides go to great pains to emphasize their mutual goals to replace the current US-dominated unipolar system with a multipolar world order. ‘France and Russia’, hailed Jacques Chirac, ‘have a common vision of the future…, a certain vision of a multipolar world that takes fully into account the end of the Cold War and the process of reunification of the European continent.’ This is not mere diplomatic pomp. These two countries genuinely see each other as like-minded pioneers in the struggle for multipolarity. Each views itself as a vanguard power, indeed a great power, with a universal mission to help erect a new, multipolar system of international relations. Each envisions this future system as one in which emerging poles of power – including the European Union (EU) (inspired by France), Eurasia (Russia), China, India and Latin America (Brazil) – would join the highest ranks of the international stage within a multilateral, law-based framework, putting an end to ‘unjust’ and ‘unequal’ American unipolarity. Moreover, their multipolar quest even lies at the heart of their bilateral relationship.

None of this is surprising – even though it may seem particularly odd to link France (an established democracy and the seventh largest capitalist economy in the world) and Russia (a ‘bureaucratic authoritarian’ polity with an emerging, state-capitalist economy) in any serious way.

Introduction: The Evolution of European Security Governance

Security governance can be defined as the coordinated management of issues by multiple and separate authorities. As applied to Europe, its most obvious formal characteristic is the development of dense patterns of multilateralism and institutionalization. This feature does not negate the continuing relevance of the state-as-actor but it clearly suggests that this actor is, to an important degree, subordinated to institutional imperatives and processes of cooperation, as well as subject to a normative discourse on the appropriate principles of order. Governance of this type was not absent in Europe during the Cold War, however, since the late 1980s it has both ‘widened’ and ‘ deepened’. Security governance has come to acquire a pan-continental (rather than a bipolar) quality that involves overlapping interactions among a range of state, institutional and private actors in multiple security-relevant issue areas. At both analytical and policy levels the conceptualization and operationalization of security governance can be disputed; however, what seems eminently clear is that European order is now as much about institutions and norms as it is statecentric concerts, balances of power, and the conduct and settlement of war.

The development of Europe's security governance has occurred against a backdrop of policy-driven controversies concerning the appropriate roles and hierarchy of security institutions. For two to three crucial years after 1989 this came in the guise of the so-called ‘ architecture’ debate concerning the relative merits of NATO, the then Conference (now Organization) on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE/OSCE) and the post-Maastricht European Union (EU).

Introduction: The Common Foreign and Security Policy and Russia

The election of Vladimir Putin as Russian President in March 2000 presented the European Union (EU) with a window of opportunity to develop its relations with the ‘ New Russia’. Whereas the Yeltsin regime had pursued a policy of benign neglect towards the EU throughout the 1990s and had focussed its attention more on North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and US relations, Putin had quickly recognized the potential that Russia’ s relations with the EU presented in supporting the domestic priority of economic modernization. Yet when the Commission report on relations with Russia was published in February 2004 and acknowledged that motivations for cooperation between the EU and Russia existed in a wide range of areas, it was noted that relations had come under ‘ increasing strain’ on sensitive issues. The response, it was argued, was for the Commission and the member states to ‘ concert their positions and speak with one voice’ in order to project a coherent and consistent policy line in negotiations with the Russian government. The report highlighted two interconnected sets of concerns; the first being the institutional shortcomings of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in general terms and the second specifically focused on the emerging ‘ two-level game’ influencing the internal dynamics of EU policymaking on Russia.

The first of these two concerns relates to the incremental fashion in which EU foreign policymaking has developed since the end of the Cold War and the RUSSIA AND EUROPE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY establishment of the CFSP in 1992.

Introduction

As at many times in its history, Russia has approached a certain turning point, when it has to decide once again about its true identity and actual role in the world. The era of stability during President Putin's first term and the reforms initiated during that period have created the prerequisites for rethinking the future development of the country. Russia is hesitating between modernization and accelerated qualitative growth and the desire to maintain the long-awaited stability and ensure gradual evolution, which is more appropriate for the public and the bureaucratic staff.

Domestic Policy Developments Affecting Russia's External Course

The President seems to support the first model and is prepared to sacrifice his unprecedented rating (around 60 per cent of approval even during the wave of protests in early 2005) to ensure his place in Russian history. As a prudent politician, he is attempting to make compromises in line with reality, but as a lame-duck President, who has to leave in 2008, he recognizes the limited period of time left for substantial achievements. Therefore, the launch of most of the reforms in Russia has been planned for between 2005 and early 2007, in other words, the period when the President can at last convert his incredible popular support into deeds – with the aim of enhancing Russia's ‘competitiveness’ and ensuring its modernization.

Obviously, to perform this noble mission, including the doubling of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) proclaimed in 2003, there is a need for deep restructuring of the Russian economy and social system.

Introduction

Nowhere else is the impact of the Eastern enlargement on the European Union (EU)' s foreign and security policy felt as strongly as in relations with Russia and the other Eastern neighbours of the Union. On the eve of enlargement, it was the Atlanticism of the incoming member states that caused most concern among many old EU countries. However, the fear that the new member states would act as ‘ Trojan horses of the US and put a brake on the development of the European foreign, security and defence policy seems to have been unfounded. The same cannot be said about another major concern of the old member states: they were right to assume that the new Eastern members were going to complicate relations between the EU and Russia by bringing the burden of history and their own problems in relations with the Eastern neighbour to the Union’ s table. The new member states on their behalf were hoping that EU membership would have a positive impact on their relations with Russia. They had also been expecting the EU to move towards a more unified and consistent Russia policy. Yet neither Russia nor the EU have lived up to their expectations: during the first one-and-a-half years of EU membership, (the time covered by this chapter), their relations with Russia developed in a negative rather than positive direction, and the EU still lacks a coherent policy towards Russia that would help to address the concerns of its Eastern members.

Introduction

As its title implies, this book is concerned with the nature of Russia's relationship with Europe. In that context, the NATO-Russia dimension poses a specific consideration in that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is much larger than European NATO. Consequently, there is a temptation to disaggregate NATO in order to focus upon its ‘European-ness’ in terms of its interaction with Moscow. The temptation should be resisted, however. It may in theory be possible to disaggregate NATO by separating out its North American and European components, but no meaningful discussion of Europe's security relationship with Russia is possible if it fails to acknowledge the primacy of the US in guiding, if not determining, the existence and persistence of NATO. One may write of the Alliance without specific reference to, say, the views of some of its smaller European members: indeed, in a sense, one may even discuss historical NATO views or positions without reference to France, given its history of autonomy from the military structures. However, any understanding of post-Cold War NATO, including the relationship with the Russian Federation, must contend with the views of Washington and the consequences thereof for its European allies, as will be discussed below. To that extent, nothing much has altered since the Cold War and the US remains, as Richard Holbrooke described it a decade ago, a European power. NATO-Russia interaction as examined here will reflect that fact.

We propose that the applied sociologist is well described as a craftsman in much the sense that C Wright Mills had in mind in his famous description of the model social scientist in general in The Sociological Imagination (1959). Fair enough, most would say, go ahead and add that to the long list of what the applied sociologist is and isn't, should and should not be. But our claim is more presumptuous – we assert that the applied sociologist is probably nothing more than a particular and peculiar figure of craftsman. To evaluate this claim we must first understand what is meant and what is implied by this characterization. Once established, the craftsman heuristic may then provide a standard for identifying roles and activities for applied sociologists that are consistent and authentic.

The Craftsman as Pragmatist

We know that Mills made a study of the pragmatists in his Ph.D. dissertation and therefore, while The Sociological Imagination does not mention Pierce, James, or even Dewey by name, we suspect that Mills had in mind a pragmatist version of craftsmanship. However, we must explain what we mean by this and, in the spirit of the American School, why it matters. It is reassuring to point out that Horowitz, in his introduction to Mills' Sociology and Pragmatism (1964) documents a strong and ongoing influence of Mills' interest in Dewey in particular on his thought and writing throughout his career.