Introduction

Russia's relations with Europe depend on more than the diplomatic and the foreign policy positions adopted by contemporary governments. Over the longer term, Russia's relations with Europe depend on two factors: the development of Russia's socio-economic system and political regime, and the way that the development of Russian society and polity relate to the changes that are being wrought in Europe by processes of integration within the European Union (EU). The relationship between these two factors and how they impact on European-Russian relations is both complex and indeterminate; quite simply, relations could go in a variety of directions.

The complexity of the relationship between Russia's development and Europe's is understandable; many other factors and forces, not least domestic pressures in Russia and European states and the continued evolution of the post-Cold War global order and the wider ‘Western’ interaction with Russia mediate the influence of each on the other.

The indeterminate nature of relations is harder to understand. Developments in Russia and in Europe would seem to be leading to a steady improvement of relations between the two and to the creation of conditions that should guarantee continued incremental improvement. Despite setbacks to further integration (such as delays to the adoption of an EU Constitution) or disagreements over how to deal with extra-European foreign policy issues (such as the Iraq war), Europe as the EU is arguably developing as a civilian superpower, different from state actors in the international system because of its commitment to peace, democracy, human rights and foreign relations based on responsibility rather than self-interest.

In the summer of 1996 I arrived in Germany for further studies. Before I left my homeland, Cameroon, my secondary school teachers, family, friends and acquaintances were very sure I would take up a course in natural science, most probably either in Information Technology (IT) or engineering. Personally, even I wished to study natural science until about 1992 – when an usual phenomenon – changed my mind. Round about this time a political ‘wind of change’ blew across Africa, which came to affect the political life of the people of Cameroon also. Such political upheaval also ushered in social changes which, in turn, paved the way for a series of questions that called for immediate answers – from the ‘governance’. As a result of this change, the people of Cameroon were introduced to democracy, which meant, the citizens got the opportunity to choose their leaders (party or parties) and therefore, could do away with the prevailing system of governance, which failed to satisfy the people. All this while, I remained a keen observant of the situation. My direct social environment (my family and peers) influenced me to be preoccupied with what was going around me. Problems arose in my family when my father indulged in the age-old custom of polygamy on the pretext of respecting tradition. Similarly an alarming rate of ‘juvenile delinquency’, such as unwanted or teenage pregnancies, abortion and even death, became a common phenomenon among my peers.

Applied sociology differs from basic sociology as it is explicitly and consciously focused on providing information and insights relevant to particular pragmatic social concerns and is designed to assist in addressing a perceived social problem or organizational shortcoming. In other words, applied sociology attempts to translate research into practical action, while basic sociological research in its purest form seeks to advance knowledge for the sake of acquiring knowledge itself. Posed in these terms, it appears that applied research and basic research are stark dichotomies. The former is typically viewed as making use of the developments of the latter in a derivative way (in this regard, the role of applied sociologists is similar to that of engineers or doctors), while it is in the realm of basic research that substantive theoretical, methodological and empirical advances are made (Bulmer, 1992). However, in real world sociology the two are often far more interconnected than the above-mentioned portrayal might suggest, with applied research at times advancing sociological understanding in significant ways and basic research frequently being directly applied to specific social concerns (Lazarsfeld and Reitz, 1975).

While applied and basic researchers share a common sociological tradition, both theoretically as well as methodologically, there is a structural or contextual difference that serves to distinguish them. Applied sociologists work for clients who are responsible for defining the social issues or problems in question and setting the parameters of research agendas.

There have been few times before when there was such a thirst for knowledge and guidance about Russia. In the year when Russia charied the G8 and the oil price rocketed Russia back to super-power status there were still riddles to be solved about Russia and where it is going.

The shutting off of pipelines to the Ukraine started off 2006 which was to become a remarkable year. In one move, the Russian government claiming it was motivated only by normal market economics, the rest of Western Europe woke up to the issue of energy security. Whether this was another law of unintended consequences or part of some Machiavellian plan has still to be resolved, but it has certainly put Russia back in the headlines.

For even the expert Russia watchers there is a need for help in navigating the currents alive in Russian politics today. That is why this collection of essays is so important. Here a number of perceptive people have turned their minds to describing what is going on – and – more importantly, have combined to give us some conclusions.

A multifaceted approach has always been necessary in understanding this great country and its neighbours. Kremlin watching was once a profession all of its own. Nowadays democratic Russia has still many facets which need explanation and interpretation. It is a fact that in today's complicated world to be ignorant of Russia is to be without a key ingredient in understanding what is happening to our lives.

Introduction

One of the main trends shaping the character of the contemporary international relations system is the increasing role of sub-national territorial units (regions). Nation states tend to take into account the opinions of their territorial units when elaborating their national external relations policy while from the other side their decisions are evaluated from the perspective of their consequences for regional development.

Direct involvement of the sub-national territorial actors in the realm of international relations represents one of the distinctive features of the so-called ‘new regionalism.’ This is especially true for federative political systems that involve at least two meaningful levels of government and each level has its own institutionally designed policymaking responsibilities. Any discussion of the policymaking process must consider the degree to which the country's authority is centralized. Such discussions about the distribution of political authority usually focus on a single constitutional feature: does a country have a unitary or a federal political system?

Nowadays the desire of the regions to increase their autonomy in the international arena represents a constituent element of more general processes of intrastate regionalization and federalization. In turn, these very processes stimulate further activation of the regions when they try to influence the agenda in the external relations sphere. It is important to stress that the degree and character of the regions' involvement in the national decision-making process in the field of external relations represent a significant feature of a national model of federalism; the very character of centre-regional relations in a state determines the degree of possible involvement of the regions in shaping external relations at the national level.

This research is an exploratory study that addresses the relationship between altruism, empathy and forgiveness. We hypothesize that respondents who score high on measures of altruism, spirituality/ religiosity, empathy, social responsibility, moral identity and selfesteem are more likely to be forgiving and helpful in nature. A second hypothesis is that respondents who score high on those same measures and who have been hurt or offended in some serious way will be more likely to forgive those who have harmed them. We have reasoned that respondents who receive high scores and who have been hurt or offended would be more altruistic and empathetic towards the harmdoers; this was confirmed by our data.

To test these assumptions, we gathered responses from 435 people, including moral exemplars, members of clergy, college students and the general population. Some of the data was obtained by interviewing a sample of respondents, while other respondents completed a selfadministered questionnaire. All of the respondents completed a forgiveness scale. We began this research by interviewing a sample of moral exemplars to explore their motivations for showing compassion and acts of kindness.

My interest over the years has moved from the study of smaller social units to that of larger ones, from greater concern with conceptualization to an emphasis on the social relevance of social science and from a fair segregation of the role of the sociologist and the active citizen to a greater effort to articulate the two. In doing so, I believe my work reflects trends which affect social sciences in general and sociology in particular. I shall focus first on these trends and then briefly discuss a contribution I might have made to their extension.

Numerous sociological article begins with a definition of a new concept (or relationship) and a discussion of methods to be employed to measure it. Such a definition is frequently followed by presentation of some data relevant to the new concept and familiar sociological variables related to it as for instance, ‘the distribution of elephantiasis by age and sex in the cities with a population of over one hundred thousand’. Most sociologists, the author included, feel that such combination of theory and methods forms the very foundation on which sociology as a science ought to be built. In fact, it is being constructed on such a foundation. But many of us also feel that something is lacking.

What is lacking most is social analysis, the systematic exploration of social issues, i.e., concern with the methodological questions of sociological analysis of the great issues of our age, which tend to involve the study of macroscopic units.

The social, political and economic effects of globalization are manifesting themselves in modern society in innumerable ways. A central impetus behind this process is the development and proliferation of Multinational Corporations (MNCs) – large conglomerates that foster increased economic interconnectedness. Multinational corporations, or firms that produce, distribute and market in more than one country, such as Microsoft, wield assets and profits far larger than the Gross Domestic Products (GDP's) of most countries in the world. Moreover, such MNCs are able to influence the politico-economic developments through the goods and services they produce and the wealth at their disposal (O'Neil, 2004). This fact allows MNCs' increasing ability to operate above the laws of their home countries, largely beyond the sight of both the government and the general public. In that regard, Chirayath, Eslinger & DeZolt (2002) assert, ‘…changes in the global economy, toward increased oligopolization, lend themselves to additional opportunities for corporate deviance’. Since all of the implications of corporate deviance as it relates to globalization go beyond the size and scope of this paper, the focus will be limited to the theoretical frameworks which attempt to explain corporate deviance with the use of contemporary cases of corporate deviance and their general outcomes.

Chirayath, et.al (2002) emphasizes that ‘Corporate decisions are made as an extension of private interests for the accumulation and mobility of capital required for increased productivity’.

It is a good sign that the discipline of sociology is held in high esteem, both in its academic and applied form. While some claim sociology as ‘a gauche newcomer’, they also recognize its contribution. The non-sociologists, on the other hand, at times ‘mock at those who pursue it professionally’ (Bruce, 1999). Developmental policies to eradicate social problems mostly depend on sociological insights. Its theory and knowledge are based on the construction of the real society. Bruce (1999) obser ves: ‘Sociology recognizes the socially constructed nature of reality; it identifies the hidden cause of action; it describes the unanticipated consequences of action’. If the sociologists deal with such issues, the attempt would be totally non-professional. The amateur view of sociological explanation is rhetorical and concerned with the world, but professional sociology serves the true purpose of the real world. If it is the discourse of the real world, then it has a humanistic perspective. Peter Berger (1963) says convincingly that sociology as a form of social consciousness includes scepticism about the official claims or common sense interpretation of human behaviour. Some argue that sociology emphasizes in-depth knowledge about society and social life. The wisdom of the ages thus signs the development of sociological theory and thinking. When this theoretical wisdom merges with empiricism the study of sociology undergoes a transformation. The debate of rhetoric vs reality, theory vs application, knowledge-sociology vs practising sociology gradually comes to the fore. Mill's (1961) Sociological Imagination gives a new impetus to the theoreticians and practitioners.

Introduction

President Vladimir Putin's overriding purpose from the very first days of his presidency from 2000 was the normalization of Russian foreign policy. Russia was to be treated as neither supplicant nor threat, but as just one more ‘normal’ great power. Through a combination of luck, skill and circumstances Putin achieved this remarkably quickly and effectively. By the time of the second Iraq war of 2003 Russia was treated no differently than any other country. That is to say, the harsh realities of the post-post-Cold War world hit Russia just as hard as any other country. The shedding of exaggerated illusions about Russia's status in the world did not mean that the country could avoid making hard choices and assuming responsibility for some of the world's problems. At the same time, unresolved problems of internal political development, the country's regional role and identity questions affected relations with the West. During Putin's second term, following his re-election in March 2004, the ‘regime question’ – the condition of Russian democracy – became an ever more salient issue in Russo-Western relations.

Towards a New Realism

McFaul and Goldgeier have argued that post-communist Russian foreign policy does not follow the pattern anticipated by realist thinking.

This essay examines how Western social theory from Marx and Weber to Wallerstein and Frank has been based on a Eurocentric version of history. The latter not only denies real world history, but also neglects most of the human reality, especially in Asia, even during the early modern period. In doing so, this Eurocentric history and historiography, as well as the social theory derived from the same substantially distorts the experience of the West. Therefore, as Asia is now re-emerging as the centre of world history, it is high time to re-orient our historiography and social theor y and that of the nineteenth century as well, during which the West and Asia traded places in the world.

How Western Perceptions of the East Changed

Until about 1800, the predominant Western perception of the East was favourable. Europeans were attracted to and sought to learn from many parts of the Orient that were seen as civilizationally, culturally, politically, socially, economically and technologically more advanced than any part or all of Europe. Indeed, ‘Orient’, according to the Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English, whose first edition dates to 1911, meant the following: ‘ORIENT: The East; lustrous, sparkling, precious; radiant, rising, nascent; place or exactly determine position, settle or find bearings; bring into clearly understood relations; direct towards; determine how one stands in relation to one's surroundings.’

Discourse on Applied Sociology is the collection of essays from the scholars who are excellent in the field of applied sociology. This engaging study urges a balance between knowledge-sociology and use-sociology. The authors are aware of the impasse often deliberately created by the self-conscious language of sociological theory. The primary concern of the applied sociologist is to adapt theoretical knowledge to actual human situations, using it to formulate social policy, investigate domestic and international social problems and create a pragmatic ‘sociology of possibility’. The volumes provide workable guidelines for social scientists, policymakers, planners, administrators and social activists. The reader is also introduced to the sophisticated research methods employed in the social sciences. Emphasizing cross-cultural experiences and a global perspective, the essays study social problems using inductive and deductive approaches, measurable concepts and quantitative analysis. Modern crises precipitated by war, terrorism, anarchy and poverty are examined in practical and realistic terms.

Professor Jay Weinstein of Eastern Michigan University, USA, an excellent friend, philosopher and guide has inspired us to undertake such a great venture. We are deeply indebted to him. It has been our pleasure to work with Anthem Press – we thank them for their unfailing enthusiasm.

Introduction

When the long-projected enlargement of the European Union (EU) finally took place on 1 May 2004, the Western Newly Independent States (WNIS), as the European Commission calls the former Soviet states of Belarus, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine, became the EU's new eastern neighbourhood. Although they had no prospect of acceding to the EU in the foreseeable future, they were perceived as ‘the EU's essential partners’. Indeed, the attainment of security, stability and sustainable development within the Union was deemed to require political reform, social cohesion and economic dynamism outside it, in particular in the EU's new eastern neighbourhood. The European Commission proposed a European Neighbourhood programme to promote a set of values ‘within the fields of the rule of law, good governance, the respect for human rights, including minority rights, the promotion of good neighbourly relations, and the principles of market economy and sustainable development’.

Russians were appalled that the EU's new neighbourhood plans appeared to put Russia in the same category not only as Belarus and Moldova, but also as the states of North Africa. Russia was duly left out of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP); instead the EU and Russia decided to develop their strategic partnership through the creation of four common spaces. However, the EU-Russian strategic partnership was already experiencing considerable strain by this time. Following the December 2003 parliamentary election, the Duma was dominated by the pro-presidential United Russia party, with little or no representation of those parties, Yabloko and the Union of Right Forces, which had previously been the most enthusiastic supporters of relations with the EU and of a ‘European perspective’ more generally.

Mutual Disappointment

One of the main objectives of the book was to examine the current state of Russia's relations with Europe from the perspective of both parties since the long-term prospects of any relationship must depend on meeting the needs of all those involved. What is particularly striking is the level of disappointment on all sides about what has actually been achieved over the past 15 years. There have certainly been a number of apparent breakthroughs in the development of a genuinely strategic partnership such as the NATO-Russia Founding Act in May 1997, the coming into force of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) in November 1997, the adoption of the European Union (EU)'s Common Strategy and Russia's Medium-Term Strategy in 1999, the establishment of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) in 2002, the commitment to the four common spaces at St Petersburg in 2003 and the adoption of the road maps in 2005. However, the optimism and high expectations generated by such initiatives rapidly gave way to frustration at the slow progress being made in translating the ambitious goals into concrete achievements. It is clear that neither Russia nor Europe are satisfied with the current state of their partnership and both feel that the other has not lived up to their expectations.

From Russia's perspective, the West has provided only meagre aid to support its economic transition and been slow to open up its markets, either through the EU or the World Trade Organization (WTO).

Introduction: Norms, Values, and EU Foreign Policy*

For the European Union (EU), the link between norms, values and foreign policy seems to be an obvious one. For example, the new Constitutional Treaty spells out the set of values on which the Union's external action is based: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law. In the treaty, the development of relations with third parties is made conditional upon sharing and upholding them.

In its external action the Union thus wants to be seen as an essentially normative power. This emphasis is understandable not only in the light of the EU's own history as a successful economic project based on political reconciliation between former deadly foes, but its current postmodern, or civilian power nature as well. Despite the recent and hectic work on the development of its military crisis-management capabilities, the Union still largely lacks the traditional (military) means of coercion, and is consequently forced to rely on ‘ softer’ means for influence and persuasion instead. Moreover, it needs to be stressed that this choice is not merely practical, reflecting the lack of means, but it also stems from the Union's self-conception (or identity) as a new and qualitatively different international actor that shuns away from traditional modes of ‘ power politics’ and seeks to promote a ‘ rule-based international order’ in its stead.