INTRODUCTION

Reforming the education system is arguably Malaysia's most paramount development challenge, and also one of the most daunting and difficult for the still fledgling Pakatan Harapan (PH) government. The menu of areas earmarked for reform is comprehensive, encompassing early (pre-primary), primary, secondary and higher levels of education, and covers policy questions from lofty philosophical heights down to ground-level operational concerns. A non-exhaustive list includes the enjoyment of education, quality of public schools, multiple secondary school certification and university entry systems, teachers’ bureaucratic workload and other morale- and efficacy-inhibiting issues, diffused and underperforming technical and vocational institutions, financing of the system and financial aid for students, serious allegations of misconduct and fraudulent practices in higher education institutions, and quotidian matters such as the weight of school bags and the colour of school shoes. Adding a further layer of complexity, PH inherited from its predecessors an ambitious education agenda, and has yet to clarify which plans will be continued, altered, or jettisoned. PH has repeatedly committed to modify, not overhaul, ongoing reforms, and to focus on more effective implementation. Hence, it is pertinent for us to review the Malaysian Education Blueprint (MEB) to set the context for this article.

The pre-election promises and post-election commitments are too broad-ranging for this article, requiring a selection of key issues. Merely cataloguing the programmes would also fail to do justice to the dynamic process that has unfolded. In the first year of PH's administration, some issues less salient or even absent in PH's manifesto have risen to the fore, while some seeming priorities in the manifesto have taken a relative back seat (Lee 2018). This article evaluates the reform agenda—based on emergent priorities, initiatives and pressures—arranged under three themes: quality, equity, autonomy.

The emphasis on quality, the first overarching theme, follows on policy priorities in recent years, and applies foremost to primary and secondary schooling, as well as technical and vocational education which spans secondary and post-secondary levels. The new government arrived with expectations that deep-seated problems of the previous regime might finally be fixed. Questions of access, largely resolved for primary and secondary schooling, amplify in post-secondary and higher education. The second theme thus revolves around equitable opportunity, particularly among ethnic groups’ advancement to university.

The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.

The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policymakers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.

THE EDITORS

Series Chairman:

Choi Shing Kwok

Series Editor:

Ooi Kee Beng

Editorial Committee:

Su-Ann Oh

Daljit Singh

Francis E. Hutchinson

Benjamin Loh

The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.

The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policymakers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.

THE EDITORS

Series Chairman:

Choi Shing Kwok

Series Editor:

Ooi Kee Beng

Editorial Committee:

Su-Ann Oh

Daljit Singh

Francis E. Hutchinson

Benjamin Loh

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

INTRODUCTION

At the November 2017 APEC meeting in Da Nang, US President Donald Trump announced a new approach towards Asia with a slogan “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP) that was repeated in the US National Security Strategy (NSS) of December 2017. The FOIP slogan had already been used by Japan to name its own strategic approach towards the Indo-Pacific while Australia had used the term Indo-Pacific in its 2016 Defence White Paper and 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper. What, if anything, US FOIP meant in terms of a coherent policy strategy became relatively clear only in late 2018.

As explained below, FOIP seeks to engage like-minded nations in the now-integrated Indian Ocean and Asia-Pacific regional complex. The strategy is to construct a collaborative and scalable network of partnerships with FOIP stakeholders that will be able to respond flexibly to meet a wide range of stakeholder needs and regional contingencies in the Indo-Pacific region (IPR).

The shared material interest among FOIP stakeholders is open and unhindered trade and investment flows between the United States and its advanced allies on the one hand and, on the other hand, developing countries in Southeast Asia and South Asia that could drive global growth for the next two generations if they make it through the middle-income trap. To make this a reality, both the advanced West and developing Asia have a vital stake in maintaining open trade and investment relations with each other.

This FOIP strategy marks a new era in US Asia policy. From 1972 to 2017, one could characterize US strategy towards Asia as one of “China engagement”. After informal relations with China began under Nixon based on shared but narrow anti-Soviet interests, the United States worked patiently to broaden friendly cooperative relations with China in order to win its trust and socialize it to the “rules-based order” (RBO).

Today, however, the United States has reluctantly concluded that the China engagement strategy has failed, and that China is a confirmed dissatisfied rising power that seeks to coercively institute its own model of narrowly self-interested regional governance that, if successful, could end the RBO in the IPR.

The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.

The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policymakers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.

THE EDITORS

Series Chairman:

Choi Shing Kwok

Series Editor:

Ooi Kee Beng

Editorial Committee:

Su-Ann Oh

Daljit Singh

Francis E. Hutchinson

Benjamin Loh

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

INTRODUCTION

Alongside Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Muhammadiyah is often seen as one of the two pillars of moderate Islam in Indonesia. It is commonly believed that these two largest Muslim organizations have contributed much towards stabilizing and balancing democracy after Reformasi—the Indonesian Spring of 1998—happened, and that it is partly because of these two organizations that civil Islam has been flourishing in the country.

Because of this, the two organizations are often expected to stand together on most issues. In recent times, however, leaders of these two organizations have appeared to be in different camps. Public statements by them attest to this, particularly on three issues: The banning of the Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), the recurrent controversy about the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), and the ruling of the Constitutional Court on Penghayat Kepercayaan. They even seemed to be pitted against each other during the religious gatherings in Garut, Karanganyar, and Sukoharjo where Ustadz Bachtiar Nasir and Felix Siauw were the main speakers; while the NU tried to stop these speakers, Muhammadiyah was protective of them.

This article analyses Muhammadiyah's response to Aksi Bela Islam, and the three abovementioned religious controversies. Why has this organization appeared to be closer to and to have shown more affinity towards Islamist groups than to NU? Has there been any ideological shift or change in Muhammadiyah? Do old designations such as modernist, puritan, and reformist Islam, still reflect its religious position? This article provides an overview of, firstly, the historically undisputed concern of Muhammadiyah with social services, and secondly, the organization's cultural transformation since the Congress in Aceh 1995, and thirdly, Muhammadiyah's responses on religious issues in 2017.

SOCIAL SERVICES AS MUHAMMADIYAH'S IDEOLOGY

Muhammadiyah has been labelled in a variety of ways, the most popular being modernist, reformist, and puritan Islamist. Be that as it may, the organization is fundamentally a social movement, with social services activities having been one of its most important aspects since its establishment in 1912. The social services provided by most of its branches throughout Indonesia are mostly in education, in helping orphans, and in health matters.

Senior General Than Shwe

Senior General Than Shwe was the mastermind of Myanmar's transition to democracy. The 2008 constitution was his brainchild. Under the 2008 constitution, the Tatmadaw does not play a leading role in day-to-day executive or legislative matters, but it serves as a gatekeeper for the constitution. This role is ensured by the twenty-five per cent of seats in all hluttaw filled by non-elected military officers, ensuring that the constitution cannot be amended without their agreement.

Than Shwe laid down the seven-step road map to democracy and created the political space in which the major players in Myanmar's politics—political parties, the military and ethnic armed organizations— can work together and build trust with each other. Than Shwe always said if all the stakeholders were able to build trust, they could amend the constitution in the future. However, few believed his road map would bring a bloodless democratic transition to Myanmar.

Than Shwe created the Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA). Later, as the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), it served as a political machine to implement his road map. He also ordered the construction of many infrastructure projects throughout the country, including the future capital, Naypyitaw. Than Shwe, however, paid very little attention to institution building. The only institution he prepared to serve the new political landscape was the Tatmadaw. Even the USDP lacked the concrete foundation of a true political party, being united only by his authority. When Than Shwe left the political scene, the USDP collapsed because of factionalism.

Than Shwe selected loyal and humble Thein Sein to lead the transition. He believed Thein Sein would never overstep his power but would dutifully implement the reform according to the 2008 constitutional framework. But Than Shwe made a mistake in selecting the very ambitious Shwe Mann as deputy chairman of the USDP and Speaker of the Pyithu Hluttaw. He underestimated Shwe Mann's ego and bitterness. If Shwe Mann had been president and Thein Sein Speaker of the Hluttaw, Thein Sein would never have plotted against Shwe Mann.2 If Than Shwe had asked Shwe Mann to retire with him and Vice Senior General Maung Aye and had appointed Htay Oo (secretary of the USDP) as Speaker, the clash between the executive and the Hluttaw would never have materialized.

Myanmar Media Landscape (1988–2011)

Under the military regime, the Press Scrutiny and Registration Division of the Ministry of Home Affairs tightly controlled the print media. Though administratively it was under the Home Ministry, the director was a former military intelligence officer who directly reported to military intelligence headquarters, until 2004 when the military intelligence corps was purged after the sacking of Prime Minister General Khin Nyunt. Publishing licences were awarded only to trusted people, government departments and military intelligence units. They, in turn, made a profit by leasing their publishing licences to genuine publishers. All publications were submitted for pre-publication censorship, as the 1962 Printing and Publishers Registration Law prohibited the publication or distribution of any printed material—other than that of a religious nature—without obtaining the prior approval of the government.

The government also controlled all domestic radio and television broadcasting facilities through the Ministry of Information (MOI). The official media remained propaganda organs of the government and did not report opposing views other than to criticize them. There were two private commercial TV operators and six FM radio channels that provided entertainment and sports programming. They were joint ventures with the state-owned Myanmar Radio and Television (MRTV), and they practised self-censorship. Mobile phone penetration was just 2.7 per cent of the population and Internet users numbered just over a hundred thousand, 0.3 per cent of the population in 2010. The government banned websites critical of the regime and blocked access to free email services and social media such as Facebook. Myanmar's freedom of expression was ranked 164 out of 168 countries.

After the military intelligence corps had been abolished, the Press Scrutiny and Registration Division was transferred to the MOI and the director was replaced by another military officer who had been the editor of a military science journal. After 2004, the national convention convened again to draw up the future constitution. On 10 January 2006 the convention began detailed discussions of principles for the fundamental rights and duties of citizens. It adopted fifty principles on 27 October 2006. One of the agreed principles allowed citizens to freely express and publish their convictions and opinions. As a result of the adoption of this principle, Senior General Than Shwe instructed information minister Kyaw Hsan to prepare for a new media landscape under the forthcoming constitution.

U Ye Htut has written a book of a very rare kind. Few accounts of the inside working of a government are available so soon after it has left office. Even fewer, indeed almost none, are written about the working of the government of Myanmar by an author who could be considered an “outside insider”. Ye Htut was not a key figure in the military government which preceded that of President Thein Sein in 2011. Having been an army officer on the cusp of becoming a colonel, he became a civil servant somewhat earlier in his career than many others would eventually become. Within the Thein Sein government he rose quickly, ultimately, in 2013, to the position of presidential spokesperson and then, the following year, minister for information. His talents and skills were clearly needed in Myanmar's transitional regime from military authoritarian to constitutional rule.

Moreover, Ye Htut's book is not merely his personal observations on the workings of the Thein Sein government from within. He has conducted extensive interviews with others more intimately involved in certain crucial decisions and events than himself, thus adding an additional dimension to his analysis. Many both inside and outside of Myanmar will be unaware of the crucial dynamics at work within the government for which he worked as a civil servant and ultimately as a minister. He was increasingly entrusted with greater responsibilities and increased inside knowledge because of not only his administrative competence but because of the high regard he was and is held as a result of his probity and open-mindedness.

Ye Htut's background is not unusual for someone of his age and position in Myanmar. Born in Yangon in 1959, his father, U Shwe Than, was a serving army officer and one of the earliest Myanmar graduates of the British Royal Military Academy Sandhurst. Shwe Than saw military service in various parts of Myanmar before being appointed first deputy head and then head of the police by General Ne Win in the 1970s. Subsequently, Ne Win moved Shwe Than to the headship of the country's national shipping company, then known as the Burma Five Star Line. Ye Htut, growing up in a military officer's home, could not be unaware of the intrigues that existed within the army and the army-dominated Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) during his youth.