In 1977, Syed Hussein Alatas criticised the function of colonial capitalism in perpetuating the notion that Malays, Filipinos and Javanese populations were inherently lazier than other ethnic groups in their communities. This chapter revisits the ‘myth of the lazy native’ through an examination of the ideological function of this racial stereotype in the context of neoliberal capitalism. I draw from historical sociology and interview data to argue that the lazy Malay stereotype becomes re-appropriated in different historical formations. I carry out in-depth qualitative research interviews with twenty-five Malaysian nationals in the United Kingdom and Malaysia who work in middle-class occupations. I find that significant portions of middle-class Malays believe that the stereotype of laziness has a truthful basis, and argue that this stereotype is selectively applied based on class background. Furthermore, Malaysian middle-class interviewees tend to interpret and conceptualise laziness through the framework of neoliberal rationality, as they assess a person's industriousness through his/her contribution towards the market economy. This chapter aims to contribute towards our understanding of how the middle class plays a unique role in the reproduction of capitalist culture and class relations in Malaysia. It argues that the myth of the lazy Malay has helped to legitimise intra- and inter-ethnic inequality, and establish new notions of ‘deservedness’ and ‘un- deservedness’ within neoliberal capitalism. It is thus argued that the myth of the lazy Malay thus holds important political implications in contemporary Malaysian democracy, particularly for how we tackle issues of wealth inequality and Malay affirmative action.

The return of Mahathir Mohamad to the premiership of Malaysia has been accompanied by a resurgence of public discourse concerning the stereotype of laziness applied to the Malay community, as evidenced by his above remarks during the Parti Pribumi Bersatu Malaysia (Bersatu) party's second annual celebration (Ruzki & Chan, 2018).

Mental health problems are rising among Malaysian youth, according to national statistics. In 2017, the Malaysian National Health and Morbidity Survey (NHMS) revealed that two in five school-going adolescents struggled with anxiety issues, while one in five were depressed. Based on Depression, Anxiety and Stress Scale (DASS-21) scoring, at least one-fifth of these students regularly experienced a range of emotional difficulties, including hopelessness, self-deprecation, and devaluation of life. Meanwhile, between 2006 and 2015, the prevalence of 16 to 19-year-olds reporting psychological problems in previous NHMS surveys increased almost triple-fold, rising from 14.4 per cent to 34.7 per cent.

From a health and development perspective, these figures have sobering implications. The onset of a mental disorder in adolescence invites social and economic setbacks that may last well into adulthood, including functional impairment, exposure to stigma and impaired quality of life. In light of mounting evidence of rising youth mental health issues, policy planners must prioritise early stage interventions that act to check potential psychological disturbances from progressing into full-blown disorders. The key measures to be taken include implementing and providing access to treatment services and support for vulnerable youth groups.

Beyond this, systematic research that seeks to build a solid evidence base for the wider social, cultural, and political determinants of youth mental health is much needed. In the long term, understanding the issues perpetuating youth mental distress will help drive better policies that empower the youth to thrive, nourish and protect their own mental well-being.

Introduction

In recent years, mental health issues have increasingly become a health concern for young people worldwide. According to the World Health Organization, as of 2018, mental health conditions accounted for 16 per cent of the global burden of disease and injury in people aged 10–19 years. Globally, depression was found to be one of the leading causes of illness and disability among adolescents, while suicide was the third leading cause of death in 15–19 years old (World Health Organization, 2018).

The rising tide of youth mental health issues is a worrying trend. The second decade of a person's life is a unique and formative period, and sets the stage for the foundations of good physical and mental health in adulthood.

On 9 May 2018, a New Malaysia was born. Like an ellipse in time, this moment finished 61 years of single-party dominance and has made its mark on history by bringing to an end the rule of one of the oldest postcolonial dominant ruling parties. A historical moment that opened the doors to a new government was achieved by the unexpected coalition of the former old guard of the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) who had resigned in the years and months before the election, their former opponents from Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR), the Democratic Action Party (DAP) and the Islamist Party (PAS) breakaway party Parti Amanah Negara (AMANAH). Yet, in spite of the uniqueness of this victory, Malaysian democracy has yet to show its true colours.

A year later, the stagnation of reform in New Malaysia reveals the existence of a deep structural problem in Malaysia: the nature of its political culture. Political culture is a window through which people perceive the functioning of politics. It is entrenched in a society's political imaginary, culture, beliefs and contributes to the shaping of their opinions, and their social and electoral behaviour. Political culture is at the origins of the recurrent abuse of power at every level of society. The resistance in the administration as denounced by the Prime Minister (Free Malaysia Today, 2018e) is one of the symptoms of a more systemic problem.

In Malaysia, the question of identity is tied to that of politics, religion, and the political imaginary. For many years the fate of the Malays, the majority of the population, was intrinsically linked to the destiny of UMNO. Yet over the years, UMNO's advocacy for the Malay agenda lost its nationalist and anti-imperialist tone and turned into a sterile ultranationalist, and sometimes religious (Islamic), rhetoric. The agenda of the New Malay (Melayu Baru) (and not the New Malaysia) gave way to years of misguided State-led economic and socio-political policies and to an intellectual apathy which failed to craft an inclusive national identity.

Malaysia is one of the few countries in the world where the majority of the population is economically advantaged by legal provisions and State policies; the others are Fiji, Brunei and South Africa.

While Malaysia underwent a peaceful regime change in the 14th general elections (GE14), one issue not discussed widely enough is the different political dynamics operating in the East Malaysian states of Sabah and Sarawak. Unlike other states, Sabah and Sarawak are physically located in Borneo, far away from Putrajaya. These two states have a very different history, demography and social history from the eleven states in the Malay Peninsula, or Malaya. In the past decade, politics in these two states have been increasingly dictated by state nationalism, which locals refer to as ‘MA63’. This refers to the Malaysia Agreement, the legal instrument signed in 1963 which led to the formation of the Federation of Malaysia. After more than half a century, many in Sabah and Sarawak think that they did not get anything out of the federation despite many promises made prior to the signing of MA63. Today, all the political parties in Sabah and Sarawak are clamouring for ‘rights’ lost in the past fifty years and are openly calling for a review of federal–state relations.

This chapter will detail the historical grievances among the peoples of Sabah and Sarawak and argue that if Putrajaya does not take heed of the unhappiness, over the long term there is a real risk of secession or a breakdown in federal–state relations.

Introduction

On 9 May 2018, Malaysia underwent a peaceful regime change after more than six decades of rule by the Barisan Nasional (BN) and UMNO, the linchpin of the BN. While many articles have concentrated on why UMNO lost control, little attention has been paid to the political dynamics in Sabah and Sarawak, the two Malaysian states located in Borneo. It is my argument that not only are the political dynamics different in the Borneo states, historical grievances over the 1963 Malaysia Agreement (MA63), the agreement that led to the formation of the Malaysian Federation, are the main political force shaping Sabah and Sarawak politics.

MA63 and GE14

In Sabah, the GE14 contest was all about Parti Warisan Sabah (PWS), a new political party established by Shafie Apdal and Darell Leiking, and Sabah UMNO. In 2016 Shafie Apdal, then UMNO's vice-president, was sacked from the Federal Cabinet when he questioned Prime Minister Najib Razak over the 1MDB scandal.

Introduction

A free and independent judiciary is the sine qua non of any properly functioning democracy. Montesquieu (1748) said:

In America, James Madison, who midwifed the American Constitution, said in the Federalist Papers (1788), ‘The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.’ A judiciary servile to the executive – is that not the accumulation of all powers in the same hand?

The failure of the judiciary is ‘human, all too human’. Fear of the disapproval of superiors, ambition, prospects for advancement, all may play a part in the tendency of judicial decisions which consistently negate fundamental freedom. I have in my professional practice as an advocate found judicial officers in Malaysia generally pleasant and frequently regretful that politically motivated prosecutions are brought before them. But as a collective, the judiciary decided cases in a way that deprived citizens of their right of effectively protesting and questioning executive action.

I will show in this chapter that the above freedoms were rendered crippled and ineffective by the long line of illiberal judicial decisions – by a strange irony the very body created by the constitution to safeguard those freedoms became the means by which those freedoms were subverted, thus handing the people over to the tender mercies of an autocratic government.

The Ideal and the Actual in Judicial Practice

The reception of English law in Malaysia can be traced to the administration of Francis Light in Penang and thereafter in both Malacca and Singapore, the three regions collectively known as the Straits Settlements.

Sabah, Malaysia, is home to an estimated two million irregular migrants, a large number having arrived from the Philippines. Since the 1970s, thousands have migrated every year through porous sea borders, increasing their numbers exponentially. The Malaysian government responds to the presence of irregular migrants with policies of detention and deportation, impacting the way marriages and relationships are experienced by those repatriated. This chapter delves into the lives of irregular female migrants impacted by these policies, many of whom have begun romantic relationships with local Sabah men. The lives these women lead are indeed arduous; from the separation of having to send their children back to the Philippines to avoid on-going arrests, to working long inhumane hours in the informal industries at restaurants and factories. Thus they see their relationship with their Sabah partners as providing respite and comfort. Data show that, leading up to the GE14, these women began to experience a newfound feeling of hope through their partners, all of whom were galvanised to vote for change. For these women, their identities have always been framed within the context of survival and suffering; they try to mimic stability whilst accepting a life of on-going disprivilege and judgement. In an attempt to impact the election and change an administration of abuse and corruption, irregular migrant women tried to coerce their partner to vote differently from the past. Ultimately, the participants of this chapter hoped to find new ways to affect the electorate enough to lead to a possible life of normalcy and stability whilst expanding the informal discourse of political agency.

Introduction

It was a quiet night for the popular pub located at Api-Api centre in the heart of Kota Kinabalu, Sabah. While it isn't uncommon to openly have a beer at six in the evening, it didn't seem like much of a norm that Wednesday evening in May 2018. It seemed as though most Sabahans were too engrossed with the on-going political campaign leading up to the 14th general election to be in the bars. ‘These days they come in much later because you need to be sober to keep up with the drama,’ jokes Liberty, a 36-year-old Visayan bar hostess as she touched up her lipstick. Her observations of the local political scene have always been sharp.

Pakatan Harapan's (PH) 2018 election manifesto pledged to ‘restore the true spirit of federalism’ and ‘strengthen the role of local authorities’ in Malaysia. This has raised expectations for decentralisation reforms and the restoration of local elections following the coalition's unexpected win in the 2018 general election. Three major obstacles, however, have prevented immediate reform. First, proper sequencing is required to avoid exacerbating the ‘missing middle’ problem. Second, lack of consensus around local elections within PH makes them potentially divisive politically, particularly because of fears, whether well-founded or not, that they may exacerbate racial tensions. Third, original survey data suggest limited enthusiasm for extensive political decentralisation among PH supporters now that Barisan Nasional has been removed from power.

Introduction

Malaysia's 14th general election (GE14) on 9 May 2018 delivered a previously all-but-unthinkable outcome: the dominant United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) and its Barisan Nasional (BN) coalition partners, which had led Malaysia since independence in 1957, were defeated at the ballot box. The ultimate causes of this turnover will be debated at length over the coming years. There is little dispute, however, about the most immediate cause: Malaysia's Prime Minister (and UMNO president) Najib Tun Razak was widely perceived as having abused his powers and engaged in massive corruption, catalysing a backlash against the status quo.

Najib's abuses were enabled, at least in part, by the highly centralised nature of power in Malaysia, where the federal level dominates over the subnational tiers (Hutchinson, 2014; Loh, 2015) and the Prime Minister's Department has amassed immense power (Ostwald, 2017a). This power concentration precipitated long-standing calls from both civil society and opposition coalitions to redistribute power, specifically to disperse it across the tiers of government. The run-up to GE14 was no different. The manifesto of the opposition coalition, known as Pakatan Harapan (PH), clearly laid out its reform agenda, including a promise to ‘Revive the true spirit of federalism’ (#24) and to ‘Strengthen the role and powers of the local authorities’ (#25) (Pakatan Harapan, 2018). The latter promise was widely read as an intention to reinstate local elections.

Reinstating local elections – which in Malaysia are often referred to as the ‘third vote’ to complement existing federal- and state-level votes – would mark a return to an earlier institutional arrangement. Limited elections for local representatives were held between 1857 and 1913, then brought back in the waning days of colonial rule in 1951.

This chapter analyses the GE 14 campaign's interaction with the Orang Asli (indigenous people) and how the Orang Asli chose to vote. It will argue that such an exploration is important despite the fact that the Orang Asli constitute such a small percentage of the population, because they are often marginalised and deprived of political agency. Furthermore, the Orang Asli continued to vote primarily for the Barisan Nasional (BN) coalition despite significant concerns. In an election based on change, therefore, the Orang Asli represent a strong continuity.

Based on an ethnography of the political campaigns in the state of Pahang, this chapter argues there was a continued lack of engagement with the Orang Asli, due to both lack of willingness and resource constraints. Pakatan Harapan's (PH) campaigning was not successful because they did not engage effectively. Forgetting the names of the villages, talking down to attendees, repeating programmatic narratives, a shortage of gifts and resources, and emphasising differences all served to alienate the Orang Asli in attendance. Such problems meant that BN's vast rural machinery could not be countered. Since PH has formed the government there have been positive signs they are giving the Orang Asli greater consideration, but also indications that they are willing to use BN's former tools of political control which is limiting meaningful political engagement focused on bringing about change for the Orang Asli communities.

Introduction

In the recent historic Malaysian election, the anticipated ‘Malay tsunami’ instead became described as the ‘Malaysian tsunami’. As a Malaysiakini editorial noted, this ‘tide comprised not just the major ethnic groups in the peninsula – Malays, Chinese and Indians – but also those in Sabah and Sarawak’ (Malaysiakini, 2018a). There is one group, however, often described as forgotten – that of the peninsular Orang Asli (indigenous peoples). In an election that was dominated by a narrative for change, the Orang Asli represent a strong continuity. Gains were limited for Pakatan Harapan (PH) in areas with a high proportion of Orang Asli, despite acknowledgement that the support of the Orang Asli would be potentially decisive in areas where the rural Malay populations were expected to mostly side with Barisan Nasional (BN) or Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS).

Malaysia is a place of sanctuary for many persecuted individuals and communities from around the world. In the 2018 general election Pakatan Harapan included in its manifesto of 60 promises, a commitment to improve the lives of refugees and asylum-seekers; promise number 59 was to ratify the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol. However, hot on the heels of the election it was announced by UNHCR in June 2018 that resident Chins would have to go back home to Myanmar by 2020. At present this community and others like it live in Malaysia without local legal protections including access to employment and formal education, and are indistinguishable from other irregular migrant groups. The policies that govern this community remain ad hoc and assume Malaysia as a temporary home for unrecognised refugees and asylum-seekers. There are some 160,000 refugees and asylum-seekers registered with the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) in Kuala Lumpur. Around 140,000 of these are from Myanmar, comprising an estimated 75,000 Rohingya, 30,000 Chins, 10,000 Myanmar Muslims, 4,000 Rakhines and Arakanese and other ethnicities. There are also 22,000 refugees and asylumseekers from other countries including Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, Syria, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, Iraq and Palestine. The time is therefore ripe to reassess the situation facing refugees and asylum-seekers amidst the changed political landscape in Malaysia. This chapter draws on ethnographic research with refugee communities in Malaysia to inform broader legal, policy and political discussions on charting the future of this community and its place in Malaysia.

Introduction

Malaysia, which has the second largest refugee population in Southeast Asia, is currently a non-signatory to the Refugee Convention. As of January 2018, there were 153,480 refugees and asylum-seekers registered with UNHCR. Approximately 133,000 persons originate from Myanmar, of whom 42 per cent have been identified as ethnic Rohingya. The UNHCR also estimates there are an additional 35,000 unregistered asylum-seekers in Malaysia who are mostly Rohingya. In addition to those from Myanmar, UNHCR receives asylum-seekers and refugees originating from 50-plus countries including Syria, Palestine, Yemen, and Somalia (UNHCR, 2018). The UNHCR's arrangements with the Malaysian government took place under the regional constraints of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of an ASEAN member state and a consensus-building decision-making approach to regional affairs. As such, since 1979 the UNHCR has had a working but informal relationship with the Malaysian government and international and national NGOs operating in Malaysia.

By any measure Malaysia's civil and political human rights record has been poor and Malaysians have not enjoyed social, economic and cultural rights in an equitable and non-discriminatory way. The new Pakatan Harapan government's election manifesto promised to fix this. During its first year in office, however, it has not produced a consistent programme. Rather, as the examples of child marriage and racial equality show, when faced with a choice between adopting international human rights standards or heeding ethno-nationalist and religiously based claims, the Pakatan Harapan administration has chosen the latter.

Rights under the Former Regime

It is indisputable that the fundamental civil and political rights and freedoms Malaysians are ostensibly guaranteed by the Federal Constitution have long been abridged by draconian laws and policies administered by successive United Malays National Organisation (UMNO)-led Barisan Nasional (BN) governments. It is also beyond doubt that Malaysians’ enjoyment of the internationally recognised human rights they could expect their government to protect and promote – because it has repeatedly promised to do so – has similarly been compromised (Whiting, 2013). Within the vast United Nations (UN) human rights apparatus, trenchant criticisms have been made during the cyclical reviews conducted by the committees established under the International Convention to Eliminate All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), and during the UN Human Rights Council (HRC) Universal Periodic Review Process (the UPR) in 2009 (UPR1, 1st cycle) and 2013 (UPR2, 2nd cycle). With vengeful and embattled UMNO's narrow return to power in the 13th general election in May 2013, the situation became dire (Whiting, 2017).

At the same time, it must be conceded that the old regime's state development plans and policies delivered significant advances in education, employment and health (Gomez and Saravanamuttu, 2013) – what might, through another lens, be termed economic and social human rights. A price for these socio-economic achievements, however, has been the erosion of civil and political liberties, and racial and religious polarisation (Munro-Kua, 2017). It is thus also indisputable that the politicisation of religion and ethnicity have infected, rather than enriched, the public sphere (Welsh, 2018a).

Many of us have fought for years to bring a change in government. We were clear that the abuses of the Barisan Nasional government had to stop if there was to be a better future for all. We were equally clear that it was near impossible to displace Barisan Nasional who had been there for 61 years.

Despite all the challenges, Malaysians changed the government for the first time on 9 May 2018. The Pakatan Harapan government was elected on a grand manifesto and many promises of human rights and institutional reform. Many who are now in power have led, marched and fought alongside civil society, calling for change and reform. They spoke our language and understood our aspirations for the people.

Once in power, we were pleased to see progressive appointments made to head key institutions such as the Election Commission, the Attorney General's Chambers and the Judiciary. The Institutional Reforms Committee, which I was a part of, was formed to hear from stakeholders and make recommendations to the government on a roadmap for reform. This, and other work, was done in record time as the excitement of a brand new future for this country saw many giving their time and energy to make change happen. It was a promise of a just nation built on the rule of law that brought Malaysians together to help wherever we could.

Many of us believed that human rights and institutional reform would take place swiftly and decisively. We assumed that after our years of struggle, things would move quickly to make Malaysia a more democratic country. We believed that we could count on some of our colleagues in the new government.

Stagnation of reform

As the editor of this book Sophie Lemière has stated, there has unfortunately, been a stagnation of reform in new Malaysia.

Significant U-turns have been made with regard to the reform agenda, even when they involve straightforward legislative reform. After all, the repeal of the Sedition Act was a no-brainer, given the fact that many who are new in government had faced investigations and charges under that extremely archaic Act, which was a relic of our distant British colonial past. But that Act remains and investigations continue under it. We now hear some members of government justifying its use.

The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.

The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policymakers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.

THE EDITORS

Series Chairman:

Choi Shing Kwok

Series Editor:

Ooi Kee Beng

Editorial Committee:

Su-Ann Oh

Daljit Singh

Francis E. Hutchinson

Benjamin Loh

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY