As discussed in the previous chapter, democracy has always been one of the elements of the CPV's claims to legitimacy. Democratic centralism is embedded at all levels of the party's structure, from the Politburo to the people's councils in small hamlets. Significant attention has been devoted to highlighting the National Assembly's significance as a symbol of democracy from the early 1990s. This chapter explores the National Assembly election process and recent endeavours to bolster its credibility through improvements in specific areas of its functioning.

Why Do Most Authoritarian Regimes Hold Elections?

One might argue that during wartime, military victories take precedence over elections and other democratic activities, as was the case in the United Kingdom during the Second World War when the 1940 General Election was cancelled. Nevertheless, despite the extreme conditions of constant warfare that Vietnam faced, efforts were made to ensure that elections were held in the North from 1960 until 1975, and from 1976 in a newly unified Vietnam.

In peacetime, while democratic legitimacy takes more priority, holding elections is not a trivial expense. In Vietnam, the entire electoral process is financed through the state budget, which has become increasingly expensive. Election expenses increased by 50 per cent from 2007 to 2011 and almost doubled from 2011 to 2016. The cost of the 2021 Election was roughly $59 million, 20 per cent higher than that of the 2016 Election, despite previous forecasts of 2.6 times increase in expenses. Put in perspective, the 2021 election expenses were comparable to the budgets assigned to the Ministry of Home Affairs ($49 million), the Ministry of Construction ($67 million) and the Ministry of Information and Communications ($58 million). Holding an election is one thing; maintaining the National Assembly and its representatives is another matter entirely. In 2021, the Standing Committee of the National Assembly allocated a total of $7.78 million to the National Assembly delegations of approximately 500 delegates, equating to about $15,500 per delegate per year. This amount is almost five times the GDP per capita of Vietnam in the same year.

The Party is absolute.

Being born into a family steeped in communist traditions shortly after the initiation of Doi Moi, I, like most of the children of my generation, took certain truths for granted—one being “the Party is absolute.” Our textbooks were filled with narratives of the Party's glorious victories and monumental achievements. Adults around us would scorn and even punish us for any perceived disrespect towards the Party's leaders, even if unintentional. Stepping outside, banners in bright red proclaimed, “Long live the glorious Communist Party of Vietnam.” We spent numerous days each year celebrating the Party's milestones like the birth of Ho Chi Minh, the foundation of the Party, the battle of Dien Bien Phu and the liberation of the South. Children as young as nine were required to join the Ho Chi Minh Young Pioneer Organization and don the red scarf, which represents the socialist ideology and the blood of those who fought and died for the country under the leadership of the Party.

As a naturally curious and somewhat troublesome child, I often found myself in hot water for asking questions or expressing myself in ways that were not welcomed. I vividly remember my grandfather, a veteran of the First Indochina War, furiously tearing up my innocent parody poetry about Ho Chi Minh. While my friends found it humorous, it was the first time I saw my grandfather that angry. That incident quashed my aspirations of becoming a poet.

In university, I was appointed as the political commissar of my class, likely due to my academic achievements and my family's loyalty to the Party. After graduating, I was invited to a “Party membership preparation class”, a stepping stone to becoming a full-fledged Party member. In my final report, I criticized the Party's governance and economic policies. Only one person failed that class.

Moving overseas for higher education provided me with opportunities to speak with both refugees who had fled Vietnam post-1975 and foreign scholars studying the country. Their perspectives on the Communist Party of Vietnam starkly contrasted with what I had experienced back home as many among them considered the Party to be an oppressive, authoritarian regime that subjugated the Vietnamese people while yielding to China.

To assess the level of political interest and perception of the political landscape and elections in Vietnam among its citizens, the author conducted two surveys in the weeks following the 2016 and 2021 National Assembly elections. Since people are typically more enthusiastic about politics-related issues during elections, the author expected that they would be more inclined to respond to the surveys. The author directly contacted respondents through social media and requested their participation in the survey, also asking them to refer any political enthusiasts who might be interested. The 2016 survey recorded a total of 988 valid responses while the 2021 survey recorded 385 valid responses.

Convenience sampling, a type of non-probability sampling, was utilized. In non-probability sampling, respondents are not selected in proportion to the population. Although simple random sampling is preferred, convenience sampling was chosen because there were no other feasible options. The author initially planned to acquire a list of voters of a voting district (Cau Giay District, Hanoi) using his personal connection but that was impossible given the sensitive nature of the survey.

Some limitations of this sampling method could potentially undermine the credibility of the survey. The reliance on social networks as the primary means of conducting the survey created a disproportionate impact on the outcomes, as only individuals with a social network account could be reached. In 2016, most social network users were forty years old or younger, meaning that a significant portion of the population, primarily people who were over sixty, could not be adequately included. Considering that younger individuals tend to be more open-minded, this may affect the results of the survey as a whole. Respondents are divided into two age groups: between eighteen and thirty, and over thirty. The age thirty was chosen because Doi Moi was initiated thirty years before the 2016 election. Respondents under eighteen, who are not legally allowed to vote, were excluded. As of June 2016, out of 988 respondents, 828 (84 per cent) were between eighteen and thirty, while 160 (16 per cent) were over thirty.

Democracy in its broadest sense refers to a collective method of decision-making that involves all participants equally. The term originated in ancient Greece from as early as the fifth century BC to denote the notion of a political system that is “ruled by the common people”, in contrast to the term aristocracy, which basically means “ruled by the few”. Although the concept of democracy has been known to political scientists for thousands of years, up until the twentieth century, virtually all regimes who branded themselves democratic failed to practise full enfranchisement. Women, minor ethnic groups and slaves were often denied the right to vote. Contemporary definitions of democracy are distinctively different in the sense that universal suffrage is considered to be a fundamental requirement. The autonomous Grand Duchy of Finland was the first modern state to grant universal suffrage to all of its citizens in 1906.

In modern politics, although there has been no universal consensus on what exactly democracy entails, most political scientists use the term to denote a political system in which each citizen can practise their political power through voting. In a direct democracy, each individual represents themselves by casting their own vote directly. In a representative democracy, representatives are elected to represent an electorate. These democratically elected representatives would then convene to make a decision-making institution, such as a national assembly or a state parliament. As a decision is often made depending on the majority of the votes, democracy is sometimes referred to as the “rule of the majority”. Because of this “rule of majority”, democracy has been criticized for its two inherent flaws: negligence of the rights of the minority and the irrationality of the decisions made through a democratic decision-making mechanism. To address the former, a constitutional democracy employs a constitutional framework to control the power of the majority and ensure the rights of the minority.

Definition of Political Legitimacy and the Legitimation Model of the CPV

There have been two main scholarly approaches in defining legitimacy, namely the empirical descriptive definition and the normative definition. The descriptive definition is based upon the ruled people's faith in the ruling authority, whereas the normative definition is based upon the justification of the coercive political power of the ruler.

One of the most prominent pioneers of the conception of descriptive legitimacy was Max Weber, who proposed an authoritative account of legitimacy that did not include any normative standards. Weber suggested that a ruling regime can only be considered politically legitimate if its subjects feel a certain level of obedience towards it. He argued that political legitimacy comes from three main sources: traditional legitimacy, which is based on the history and longevity of the political system; charismatic legitimacy, which revolves around the leaders’ personal qualities and leadership; and rational-legal legitimacy, which depends on the regime's rule of law and the reinforcement of law. If we look at the CPV through the descriptive lens, the authority of the CPV is tolerated by the Vietnamese people because they believe in the traditional values that the Party represents, the leadership of Ho Chi Minh and his successors, and the rule of law upheld by the Party's apparatus.

In contrast to Weber's descriptive definition, scholars who study political legitimacy from the normative approach such as Ripstein and Rawls believe that political legitimacy is simply the justification of coercive political power. In other words, a ruling regime can be considered to be legitimate even if it exercises coercive power over its citizens as long as such a practice can be legally justified. Based on this view, as long as the ruling regime can cling to power and ensure that its political authority does not meet with too much resistance, it can be considered the effective authority and over time this type of authority can create a sufficient right to rule. The main function of political legitimacy, in this interpretation, is to differentiate between merely effective or de facto authority and legitimate authority. According to this view, CPV has been able to sufficiently maintain and justify their use of coercive power so that their rule is perceived as legitimate by the Vietnamese people.

After more than three decades of economic reform and integration into the international community, the standard of living in Vietnam has experienced significant improvements. However, as Vietnam diversified its economic and diplomatic relationships, it became increasingly susceptible to Western influence, while other sources of its legitimacy began to show signs of deterioration. Decades after the last war on Vietnamese soil, military victories gradually lost their impact on people's perception of the ruling party. Additionally, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc, coupled with the success of the Vietnamese market economy, severely damaged socialism's reputation as a state-building ideology.

The CPV quickly became aware of these emerging challenges that threatened its authority. Six years after the initiation of Doi Moi, during its Seventh National Congress in December 1994, the CPV identified four major threats to its survival: falling further behind economically, misdirection towards socialism, corruption and bureaucratic misconduct, and the risk of “Peaceful Evolution”.

Thayer posits that the foundation of the regime's legitimacy is challenged on four fronts: ideology, economic performance, rationallegal and nationalism by southern war veterans, communist intellectuals, non-party elites, peasants, retired high-ranking military officials and pro-democracy advocates, with a specific emphasis on the era following the disintegration of socialism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union during 1989–91. During the 2000s, Thayer raised three challenges to the legitimacy of the CPV: opposition to bauxite mining in the Central Highlands, which tested the State's performance legitimacy; widespread demonstrations by the Catholic Church regarding land ownership disputes, which questioned the State's legitimacy grounded in rational-legal principles; and resurging political opposition led by pro-democracy activists and bloggers, which calls for democracy and raised environmental concerns, as well as issues regarding relations with China, posed a challenge to the State's legitimacy founded on nationalism. He also argues that despite the regime's inclination towards repression as its default stance, it has also demonstrated a capacity for accommodation and adaptation in addressing criticisms originating from grassroots movements.

The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.

The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policymakers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.

THE EDITORS

Series Chairman:

Choi Shing Kwok

Series Editor:

Ooi Kee Beng

Editorial Committee:

Daljit Singh

Francis E. Hutchinson

Norshahril Saat

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• Thailand's 2023 general election reveals a political landscape undergoing significant transformation, where the traditional Bangkok-versus-countryside political dichotomy has given way to more nuanced urban-rural electoral dynamics unfolding within individual provinces and constituencies.

• As urbanization spreads across Thailand, political candidates adapt their campaign strategies to appeal to voters across the urban-rural divide in their constituencies, leveraging the resources and competitive advantages that come with their party affiliation.

• Parties with strong ideological stances and popular prime ministerial candidates who took clear positions on political reform performed better in urban constituencies than rural ones. Conversely, parties that specialized in candidate-centred, locally driven campaigns—including vote-canvassing networks—saw greater success in rural constituencies.

• A visible trend of ballot splitting emerged in rural constituencies, where voters frequently supported nationally appealing parties like the Move Forward Party (MFP) in the party-list vote but chose local candidates from other parties for constituency seats.

• A more urbanized electorate nationwide, combined with rural voters’ strategic distinction between national and local preferences, enabled the MFP to win constituency seats outside major cities and secure strong party-list support across the urban-rural spectrum.

INTRODUCTION

The dominant narrative emerging from Thailand's May 2023 General Election is that the country's political landscape has been disrupted, even if the outcomes of government formation ultimately diverged from the election results. Central to this narrative was the surprising success of the Move Forward Party (MFP) in winning the most seats and the most votes. Not only did the MFP break the electoral supremacy that the Thaksin Shinawatra-aligned Pheu Thai (PT) Party and its predecessors had maintained since 2001, but the party also challenged the established way of doing electoral politics in Thailand. It did so in at least two key dimensions: first, by shifting the focus of the party platform away from

economic issues and towards structural reforms, including changes to the lèse-majesté law and the role of the military; and second, by leveraging social media and social movements as tools for mobilizing voters organically, bypassing traditional, local elite-driven vote-canvassing networks (rabob hua khanaen).

Drawing on fieldwork, remote-sensing data, and election statistics from the 2023 general election, this article argues that this narrative of disruption reflects broader transformations in Thailand's enduring urban-rural divide. First, building on the work of Hicken, Napon, and Mathis, this research highlights the emergence of urbanized pockets nationwide and illustrates how party preferences correlate with the degree of urbanization within constituencies.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• Youths in Southeast Asia have been active in making their voices heard in politics and in society, both online and offline. However, comparative studies on their civic engagement across the region remain wanting.

• This pilot study, conducted by the Regional Social and Cultural Studies Programme (RSCS) at the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, gathers insights from educated youths across selected Southeast Asian countries. Between August and October 2024, the team surveyed undergraduates from six Southeast Asian countries: Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam.

• The survey drew responses from 3,081 participants, attaining a generally balanced representation of female and male respondents, and of students from STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics) and non-STEM majors. Respondents were evenly spread across the ages of 18 and 24.

• This paper highlights some key findings from the survey, focusing on four broad themes: (1) the issues that concern youths the most; (2) their levels of religiosity and political engagement; (3) their optimism towards the political system, law enforcement and economic outlook; and (4) their online and offline participation.

The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.

The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policymakers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.

THE EDITORS

Series Chairman:

Choi Shing Kwok

Series Editor:

Ooi Kee Beng

Editorial Committee:

Daljit Singh

Francis E. Hutchinson

Norshahril Saat

INTRODUCTION

In the last decade, Asian youths have been making their voices heard. Youth activists from Myanmar and Thailand were part of the so-called “Milk Tea Alliance”, with netizens from Taiwan and Hong Kong calling for democracy and human rights. One of the most vocal forms of resistance to Myanmar’s military coup in 2021 emanated from young students who took to the streets in protest. Similarly, youths in Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia and Thailand have been deeply involved in the democratic processes of their countries. Thailand’s Move Forward Party (now dissolved) was youth-centric and did well in the most recent Thai election. In Indonesia, youths and students routinely push back against religious conservatives and political elites to defend democracy, challenge dynastic politics, and uphold freedom of expression. In Malaysia, a youth-led party MUDA (Malaysian United Democratic Alliance) was formed with the aim of changing the country’s Malay dominant political narrative, although with little success in the 2022 election. However, with Malaysia’s electoral reform lowering the voting age to 18 (Undi 18), youths will now have a stronger role in the election process. As for Singapore, while political participation is not as visible, youths are actively volunteering in meet-the-people sessions, or making their voices heard through online platforms such as Facebook, X, YouTube and Instagram.

INTRODUCTION

After almost a decade of semi-authoritarian rule and a series of tumultuous political incidents, Thailand was ready for a reboot. The elections in May 2023 served as the light at the end of the tunnel for voters. Yet, political dramas continued as the Move Forward Party (MFP), the winner of the popular vote, failed to form a government and eventually was rejected from the ruling coalition entirely. Anyway, this paper is not so much about ousting a party elected by the people; rather, it seeks to explore the pathways of persuasion employed by political parties in Thailand’s pivotal 2023 general election. While it is clear that parties employ both online and on-ground tactics to reach voters, we are particularly interested in the use of social media for campaigning. Since its advent almost two decades ago, social media platforms have gradually become an indispensable tool for politicians and parties around the world largely due to cost-effectiveness, and the ability to reach the targeted audience in real-time.

The conventional wisdom for effective political campaigns is that people are generally “retrospective” and are “pocketbook voters”. This means that they will use past performances as a heuristic cue to evaluate the incumbent candidate and that they also tend to evaluate candidates based on promises relevant to their immediate financial well-being(Elinder, Jordahl, and Poutvaara 2008; Fiorina 1978, 1981; E. Tufte 1978).