INTRODUCTION

The 2021 coup in Myanmar precipitated a countrywideconflict which has since significantly decreased thegeographical reach of the military-controlled stateand its economic governance. Non-state authorities,many of whom are fighting to oust the militaryregime, have expanded their areas of control orinfluence, and begun to fill the governance vacuumleft by the State Administration Council (SAC). Thisincludes developing their own forms ofgovernance—including over economic activity.However, these non-state authorities have differentexperience levels and economic governancecapacities. Some groups, such as the Karen NationalUnion (KNU), have engaged in economic governance fordecades, though mostly at a local level. Othernon-state authorities are newer, including many ofthe People’s Defense Forces (PDFs) and People’sAdministrative Teams that are affiliated with theNational Unity Government (NUG). These groups havenew latitude to govern economic activity but alsoface numerous challenges—including a lack ofexperience and limits on the licit ways with whichthey can fund their governance activities.

Most economic activity in areas now controlled bynon-state authorities is in the primarysector—covering agriculture, livestock, fisheriesand natural resource extraction. Some naturalresource deposits, such as jade in Kachin State ortin in areas controlled by the United

Wa State Army (UWSA), are among the most lucrative inthe world. Despite this, or perhaps because of it,many of Myanmar’s resource-rich areas have longsuffered from active or latent conflict.

The economic, political, strategic and culturaldynamism in Southeast Asia has gained addedrelevance in recent years with the spectacular riseof giant economies in East and South Asia. This hasdrawn greater attention to the region and to theenhanced role it now plays in internationalrelations and global economics.

The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nationssince 1967 towards a peaceful and gradualintegration of their economies has had indubitablesuccess, and perhaps as a consequence of this, mostof these countries are undergoing deep political andsocial changes domestically and are constructinginnovative solutions to meet new internationalchallenges. Big Power tensions continue to be playedout in the neighbourhood despite the tradition ofneutrality exercised by the Association of SoutheastAsian Nations (ASEAN).

The Trends in Southeast Asia series actsas a platform for serious analyses by selectedauthors who are experts in their fields. It is aimedat encouraging policymakers and scholars tocontemplate the diversity and dynamism of thisexciting region.

THE EDITORS

Series Chairman:

Choi Shing Kwok

Series Editor:

Ooi Kee Beng

Editorial Committee:

Daljit Singh

Francis E. Hutchinson

Norshahril Saat

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• Since Myanmar’s 2021 military coup, the reach andinfluence of non-state authorities have spreadconsiderably, providing them with greater scope togovern economic activity in parts of Myanmar.

• Taxation is among non-state authorities’ mostwidespread aspects of economic governance. Numerousgroups rely on checkpoints and road tolls, withother common taxes covering natural resourceextraction, agricultural production, and businessactivity. At least one non-state authority collectsmonthly household taxes, with higher rates forwealthier households.

• Other forms of economic governance implemented bynon-state authorities include land titling andregulation, business licensing, businessregistration, and infrastructure repair/development.Numerous groups have authority over aspects oftrade, and some have either stated policies orinformal engagement with foreign investors.

• Economic governance varies due to historicalexperience and group capacity, among other factors,but there are numerous promising practices that showpolicy experimentation and responsiveness to localneeds and concerns. The Karen National Union’sgovernance of land shows that sophisticatedgovernance at scale by non-state authorities ispossible. However, there are examples of policiesand practices that distort economic activity,negatively affect livelihoods, and raise revenue inregressive ways.

• Non-state authorities face challenges in governingeconomic activities, including ongoing conflict; theinternational community’s state-centric economicapproach; contestation between groups about theauthority to govern; the scale of illicit economicactivity in Myanmar; and differences in economicmotivations. While some non-state authorities arefocused on governing economic activities, others arefocused on doing business—including illicitbusiness—and have little interest in governing.

INTRODUCTION

Malaysia’s federation is comprised of thirteen states and three federal territories. It is an asymmetrical system, with slightly distinct arrangements for its different components. While the eleven peninsular states share a set of revenue sources and responsibilities, the Borneo states Sabah and Sarawak have a more expansive array of prerogatives. This is due to their incorporation into the Malaysian Federation in 1963, their distinct ethnic and religious composition, and a set of guarantees negotiated by their leaders to safeguard their autonomy. These extended sets of rights are written into the Malaysia Agreement 1963 (MA63).

Despite these agreements, elites and average citizens in Sabah and Sarawak feel hard done-by; while both states generate a substantial part of the federal government’s revenue due to their natural resource wealth, they still face high levels of poverty. Furthermore, their position within the federation has been encroached upon in important ways, most notably via a constitutional amendment passed in 1976 that removed their unique status.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• Malaysia’s federal system is asymmetric, as the East Malaysian territories of Sarawak and Sabah have more autonomy and prerogatives than their West Malaysian counterparts. This reflects their incorporation into the Malaysian Federation in 1963 and distinct ethnic and religious composition.

• Despite this, many East Malaysians do not feel that their position within Malaysia has been beneficial. Due to their natural resource wealth, these states generate a substantial proportion of federal government revenue and yet suffer high rates of poverty and insufficient infrastructure investment.

• Furthermore, since their inclusion into Malaysia, the federal government has gradually encroached on the rights and responsibilities initially accorded to the Sarawak and Sabah governments. This was enabled by Barisan Nasional’s commanding majorities in parliament, and strict control over component parties—including those from East Malaysia.

• However, in Malaysia’s current political context, East Malaysian parties are now kingmakers, as any national coalition must gain their support to be viable. Sarawak is particularly influential since its ruling coalition, Gabungan Parti Sarawak (GPS), is virtually invulnerable.

• GPS used to be part of BN but left the grouping in 2018 and is now proudly independent. Keenly aware of its influence, GPS supported the two previous national coalitions and steadily increased its share of cabinet positions as well as the status accorded to its leaders.

The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.

The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policymakers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.

THE EDITORS

Series Chairman:

Choi Shing Kwok

Series Editor:

Ooi Kee Beng

Editorial Committee:

Daljit Singh

Francis E. Hutchinson

Norshahril Saat

INTRODUCTION

How do young Southeast Asian elites view geopolitical developments in the region? While foreign policymaking generally falls under the remit of senior statesmen, the segment of individuals aged between 18 and 35 years old today is expanding to become a demographic majority in many Southeast Asian countries. Collectively, youths in the region have emerged as a significant political force, even if they may still be far from the levers of power. For instance, the political weight of young voters held significant sway in recent elections across several democracies in the region, including Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand.

Aside from their growing sway over the ballot box, young Southeast Asian elites6 are likely to grow into positions of power, whether in government or the private sector. Research on “operational codes”, which refers to the decision-making frameworks that individuals rely on when making key foreign policy decisions, suggests that many of these heuristics are formed through socialization during an individual’s formative adult years. Furthermore, with the growing accessibility of information, made possible by the widespread uptake of social media in

the region, many of these young elites may already be influential thought leaders today.

For young Southeast Asians aged 18 to 35, global affairs are perceived differently. To many, the immediate post-Cold War period can be viewed as a distant history. After all, individuals aged 35 would have been born in 1989, the very year that the Berlin Wall fell. Closer to home, respondents younger than 27 would not have been born during the Asian Financial Crisis, which shook the economic foundations of the region in 1997.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• Youths are becoming an increasingly significant political force in Southeast Asian countries. As a collective, young Southeast Asians aged 18–35 have the potential to exert greater sway over their respective national foreign policymaking landscapes. They will also occupy key positions in their respective countries and societies in the future, thus understanding young Southeast Asian opinion leaders’ views on geopolitics can provide valuable insight into the future of foreign policymaking in the region.

• Using mixed purposive and open sampling methods, this series of Focus Group Discussions engaged thirty-three youths from the ASEAN-6 countries—Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam—between September and October 2024. Semi-structured interview questions and polling methods were used, and the results were aggregated and comparisons made for all age groups found in The State of Southeast Asia 2024 survey.

• Overall, the study’s findings are fourfold. (1) Mainstream news sources remained the most referred source of information for youth elites in the region. (2) Young Southeast Asian elites had a stronger preference for China over the US when compared to respondents across all age groups in The State of Southeast Asia 2024 survey. (3) Japan and India emerged as the top preferred hedging partners for Southeast Asian youth. This stood in contrast to the results of the general survey where the EU emerged as the most preferred choice. (4) Youth elites in the region were deeply concerned about ASEAN becoming an arena for major power competition, the ineffectiveness of the organization, the disunity, and the growing disconnect with the average Southeast Asian citizen.

The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.

The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policymakers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.

THE EDITORS

Series Chairman:

Choi Shing Kwok

Series Editor:

Ooi Kee Beng

Editorial Committee:

Daljit Singh

Francis E. Hutchinson

Norshahril Saat

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• Higher education has been a coveted policy domain in Malaysia. Political dynamics and shifting emphasis in policy not only shape the higher education system but hold deep implications for the institutional and educational life of universities.

• The first four decades after independence saw the government tightening its control over universities and corporatizing and liberalizing the higher education sector before elevating the importance of higher education by establishing the Ministry of Higher Education in 2004.

• However, since becoming a stand-alone ministry, the Ministry of Higher Education has twice oscillated between a merger with and separation from the Ministry of Education; this inevitably brought about organizational and governance confusion.

• The pattern of ministerial appointments further suggests a continual salience of political interest in the role. Despite having eight ministers (including one who occupied the office twice), six Prime Ministers and five configurations of government across two decades, the striking fact remains that all except one of the Ministers of Higher Education have been from the United Malays National Organization (UMNO).

• Crucially, the immense powers and authority of the Minister of Higher Education specifically on appointments of governing and executive positions of public universities attenuate the institutional autonomy of universities to safeguard academic freedom and chart their directions for development, therefore compelling universities to “surf” the policy flux created by the waves of political dynamics.

The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.

The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policymakers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.

THE EDITORS

Series Chairman:

Choi Shing Kwok

Series Editor:

Ooi Kee Beng

Editorial Committee:

Daljit Singh

Francis E. Hutchinson

Norshahril Saat

INTRODUCTION

This article examines the development of Malaysia’s higher education with a focus on how political interests have prevailed over governance and policy. In the first four decades, higher education in Malaysia was subsumed in the Ministry of Education, which also oversaw primary and secondary education.

The creation of the Ministry of Higher Education in 2004 marked the “coming of age” for higher education in terms of importance. Since this watershed moment, there have been two mergers and separations between the Ministry of Higher Education and the Ministry of Education. Such monumental changes inevitably held implications for the system’s governance and for government-university relationships, especially with public universities.

Furthermore, within these two recent decades, Malaysia had five changes of government (or configurations of ruling majority), six Prime Ministers, and eight Ministers of Higher Education, which underlined significant political dynamics that each of the politicians brought with them into this ministerial office.

Given the almost dictatorial powers the Minister of Higher Education has on appointments in public universities—the governing board and executive team—this authority signified a lack of institutional autonomy

for universities. Inevitably, this authority would bring about policy flux affecting the sector and the universities.

The paper first sets the context by revisiting key historical moments in the development of higher education in Malaysia until 2004. It then focuses on the creation and development over the last two decades of the Ministry of Higher Education, on shifts in the philosophy and ideology involved, and on fluctuations in power dynamics that shaped higher education policies and the universities.

The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.

The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policymakers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.

THE EDITORS

Series Chairman:

Choi Shing Kwok

Series Editor:

Ooi Kee Beng

Editorial Committee:

Daljit Singh

Francis E. Hutchinson

Norshahril Saat

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• A variety of governance forms have emerged in Myanmar's post-coup landscape, bringing together established Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) with dynamic new actors from a broad spectrum of elected lawmakers, youth, women and civil society in Myanmar's “Spring Revolution” against the 2021 coup and military rule.

• Experiments with new forms of governance have had varying degrees of success, with wide swathes of territory across the country coming under the control of groups opposed to the State Administration Council (SAC). Governance in non-SAC areas ranges from union-level claims, through regional, township and village tract arrangements. We identify five main types of governance in non-SAC areas:

• 1. Direct EAO governance—generally an (often benign) one-party state, in the name of a specific ethnic group.

• 2. Emergent (post-coup) state or area-based governance with more inclusion of civilians and local minorities, in a specific area.

• 3. Transitional governance arrangements, moving from model 1 to model 2.

• 4. Local resistance administrations in non-EAO areas—often aligned with the National Unity Government.

• 5. Indigenous local governance—at organic village/community-level, but also radical initiatives such as the Salween Peace Park in northern Karen State.

• These developments have significant implications for democratic practices, national reconciliation and intercommunal relationships in Myanmar, serving as “bottom-up building blocks” for a new federalism aspired to by many ethnic minority (ethnic nationality) groups.

• However, they remain vulnerable to junta attacks, including air-strikes, and are potentially subject to conflict due to overlapping territorial claims and the unsettled nature of territorial control by competing armed groups.

INTRODUCTION

Since independence in 1948, scores of Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) have taken up arms against Myanmar's central authorities, waging struggles for greater political autonomy. In the 1990s and again from 2012 to 2015, many EAOs agreed to ceasefires with the Myanmar Army and government. Following the failures of the previous peace process from 2012 to 2021, these groups seemed to be becoming less relevant. However, after the 1 February 2021 military coup in Myanmar, EAOs and allied groups have enjoyed renewed momentum and increased relevance as political and governance authorities.

Most of the longer-established groups have long-standing governance roles in the areas under their control, providing various degrees of governmental administration and services such as healthcare and education to some of the most vulnerable people in the country. During both periods of ceasefire and struggle, EAOs have long been rulers of sometimes extensive territories, drawing legitimacy from their ethnic identities and seeking to represent their communities. Since the 1990s, EAOs that have signed ceasefires with the country's government have partnered with it or with other armed groups through negotiated or less

formal agreements to govern areas of “mixed administration”. The mobilization of ethno-nationalism has been an important part of resilience in the struggle against successive military regimes in Myanmar; however, nationalism can also be experienced as exclusionary for non-dominant local “minority-within-minority” communities and subgroups.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• The concept of political volunteerism in Indonesia differs markedly from that in established democracies. In Indonesia, it is less about civic engagement or strengthening democracy and more about serving as a tool for candidates to mobilize voters and win elections.

• The relationship between candidates and their volunteers is reciprocal but often imbalanced, fostering opportunities for patronage within electoral politics.

• Volunteers emerge from an electoral system requiring candidates to meet high thresholds to participate. In Indonesia’s multiparty system, where most parties fail to meet these thresholds, coalition-building becomes essential as support for the singular candidate.

• As a result, candidates often lack strong ties to a party or coalition. Volunteer groups, operating independently from party structures and directly under candidates’ control, provide an alternative mechanism for voter mobilization.

• The importance of volunteer groups may decline if political parties become more institutionalized, and candidates consolidate support through single well-established parties with significant voter backing.