Having discussed the activities of the reformist nationalist group of expatriate Indonesians in Holland, this chapter turns to another pole of attraction—namely, the Soviet Union in the decades following the Bolshevik Revolution and the establishment of the Third International. Relative to say Vietnamese or Chinese, the number of Indonesians in Moscow was always finite at a core of around four or five along with several recruits from among young seamen groomed to establish links with Java. Although the shipping link between Indonesia and Europe was well established, the Moscow-based cadre also sought to work a direct link via China with revolutionary Guangzhou as a base. Nevertheless, there was much toing and froing between Holland and Moscow and between Java and China via various Southeast Asian destinations, including Singapore and Manila. In many ways, differences in approaches compounded by distance from homeland led to infighting, and we should not be surprised to learn that the founding generation of PKI leaders fell out one by one over personality issues, recriminations about working with the nationalists, stress with Moscow, and the shadow cast by the Dutch party over the PKI at a time when it sought to assert its own autonomy. At a time when the group around Sardjono were languishing in Boven Digul, a splintering that culminated in the 1927–30 period would set apart the PKI-Moscow around Musso and Alimin from the rest, and that would include Tan Malaka.

The year in review saw a Myanmar still mired in conflict. Both sides of the political divide continued to assert their claim to govern amidst deteriorating socio-economic conditions, conscription fears and an increasingly uncertain future for many communities struggling with the consequences of the 2021 coup. As of December 2024, the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (Burma) listed at least 6,000 deaths (outside of armed clashes) since the 2021 coup and over 28,000 arrests, of which over 21,000 remain in detention.

Despite its receding administrative control across several parts of Myanmar, and the loss of significant and strategic commands and posts, particularly in the northern Shan and Rakhine States, the State Administrative Council (SAC) remains unlikely to lose control of major cities, such as state and regional capitals, or in ethnic Bamar areas. Even so, the aftermath of Operation 1027 in late 2023, along with its second phase launched in June 2024, have revealed the implausibility of the SAC's nationwide census efforts, which are intended to pave the way for an election aimed at legitimizing the SAC's governance. The election is now projected for 2025, after a census in October 2024 that was preceded by two incomplete attempts at household surveys in 2023. Nevertheless, the SAC's confidence in the nationwide census and subsequent election remains unfounded given its receding control in several ethnic minority-dominated states and the People's Defense Force (PDF) units’ demonstrated ability to intimidate and assassinate local officials in ethnic Bamar areas.

There was an increase in economic growth in the Lao People's Democratic Republic (Lao PDR) in 2024. The remarkable success of Visit Laos Year 2024 and a rise in agriculture and electricity-related exports brought about a modest increase in the Lao PDR's real GDP percentage. There was also an uptick in foreign investments in special economic zones (SEZs) within and outside the capital Vientiane. Similarly, the Lao PDR increased its focus on harnessing renewable energy resources as another development driver. Despite the steady progress, macroeconomic difficulties—particularly kip depreciation and price hikes—persisted, impeding the efforts of the Lao government to be removed from the list of least developed countries and local people from fully recovering from post-pandemic shocks.

In 2024, the ruling Lao People's Revolutionary Party (LPRP) continued implementing strict monetary and protectionist measures to keep its economy afloat. Although some of them improved the Lao PDR's revenue collection, they remained insufficient to boost the Lao kip. The latter's protracted devaluation stemmed not only from the ongoing rise of the US dollar's value but also from the Lao PDR's lack of ability to service its massive external debt, the lion's share of which was owed to Chinese financial institutions.1 This kip depreciation, in turn, built up inflationary pressures. To cope with the spiralling cost of living, numerous breadwinners the author spoke with employed different strategies to augment their income and enhance their economic resilience. A persistent labour supply deficit in private and public sectors was still a pressing concern in 2024, becoming another source of economic volatility in Laos.

Thailand ended 2024 on a disappointing note. There has been no attempt by elected governments to initiate important reforms for the country's politics and economics. Although the election on 14 May 2023 marked the end of the eight-year military regime led by General Prayut Chan-ocha, the path to democratic consolidation in Thailand remains obstructed. The conservative establishment still wields significant influence over the political and economic direction of the country, and the governments led by the Pheu Thai Party (PTP) have been compliant to the establishment.

One year on, it is evident that the PTP has abandoned its electoral promises, including its commitment of non-cooperation with military-backed political parties and to reform the military and laws related to the monarchy. The PTP's compliance stems partly from the establishment's effective entrenchment of power through the 2017 constitution and numerous organic laws that solidify its control. Additionally, it appears that the PTP prioritized protecting the interests of its true leader, former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra. However, PTP's alignment with its former adversaries has not brought stability to its governments. Srettha Thavisin's premiership ended abruptly before he could complete his first year in office (22 August 2023 – 14 August 2024). Paetongtarn Shinawatra stepped up as Thailand's new premier. As Thaksin's daughter, she drew ferocious attacks from his old enemies. The party and its leaders now face intense legal battles instigated by agents of the conservative establishment.

We are pleased to present the 2025 edition of Southeast Asian Affairs. Since it was launched in 1975, the volume has recorded the evolution of regional and national developments in Southeast Asia. As in many past years, Southeast Asia in 2024 presented a mixed picture of steady economic progress and enormous potential, together with security and political challenges, as well as shortfalls in governance.

Political Developments

Post-Election Struggles: Challenges in Power Consolidation and Effective Governance

In 2024, the struggle to consolidate power remained a significant challenge across Southeast Asia as countries like Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia and Cambodia navigated the aftermath of their respective elections. What initially seemed like opportunities for effective governance slipped into uncertainty as countries grappled with, inter alia, institutional weaknesses, issues of corruption, unfulfilled policy pledges, and internal power struggles.

Indonesia's February 2024 presidential elections saw former general Prabowo Subianto—backed by the strategic support and political influence of Joko “Jokowi” Widodo—secure more than half the popular vote. While Prabowo's resounding electoral triumph seemed to offer a clear path forward, the country's political landscape continued to be marked by ferment and controversy. Pro-democracy protests erupted against a controversial revised bill on regional elections, which would have paved the way for Jokowi's youngest son, Kaeseng Pangarep, to enter the political fray. Meanwhile, Prabowo's focus on political consolidation over efficient governance and technocratic expertise—as evidenced by his bloated, alliance-driven cabinet—raised concerns about the administration's capacity to effectively implement policies, enforce laws and deliver public services.

Having focused on the so-called revolusi fisik (physical revolution) as it played out in Central Java, and especially in the two north coast ports of Surabaya and Semarang, we should not ignore that the resource-rich Outer Islands were never far from Allied or nationalist concerns, each with their separate agendas. East Coast Sumatra looms large in this analysis as the site of some of the bloodiest confrontations between militia and traditional leaders. Neither Medan nor Palembang in South Sumatra stood apart from the “social revolution” backed by radical nationalists, some of them self-styled communists, and specific ethnic groups numbered high among the counts of victims. With Acting Governor-General van Mook in the driving seat in Eastern Indonesia, the Dutch organized the Malino Conference of 16–25 July 1946 in Sulawesi, whereby loyalist representatives from Borneo and eastern Indonesia backed the Dutch proposal for a federal United States of Indonesia, which would have links to the Netherlands. This arrangement preceded the Linggadjati Agreement of 15 November 1946, under which the Dutch recognized de facto Republican control over Sumatra, Java and Madura in a formula in which the Dutch queen would be the symbolic head of a Dutch-Indonesian union of sovereign states.1 Space precludes a more detailed survey, but overall, we would have to conclude that Java was the major arena and focus of political and military struggles weighing on the legitimation of the declaration of independence, even if the archipelago came to be Balkanized as the Dutch naval advance proceeded.

Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim was in deep political trouble at the start of 2024. In August 2023, there were six state elections held in the states of Selangor, Penang, Kelantan, Terengganu, Negeri Sembilan and Kedah. The results were politically damaging to Anwar and the Unity Government. Anwar had hoped to claw back some of the Malay votes lost to the opposition Perikatan Nasional (PN) coalition, especially Parti Islam Malaysia (PAS). Instead, PN and PAS did extraordinarily well in the elections. PN increased its share of the votes and won additional seats in all six states. Hence the momentum was with the opposition at the start of the year, and Anwar's Unity Government did not look as it may last. In December 2023, there were rumours of a “Dubai move” to replace the Anwar government in early 2024.

Yet, by the end of 2024, Anwar had strengthened his position and his government was safe from collapse. In fact, Anwar managed to secure the all-important two-thirds majority in parliament—the benchmark used by the political class to measure the strength of a government.

In 2024, Malaysia's economy grew by 5.1 per cent, surpassing the previous year's performance. The government introduced significant reforms to both the fuel subsidy and pension systems, addressing long-standing issues. A major point of contention was Sarawak's dispute with Petronas regarding oil and gas monopolies, which concluded with an agreement recognizing Sarawak as the gas aggregator within its borders, while Petronas maintained its rights to LNG.

Former president Joko “Jokowi” Widodo's final year in office has been a hectic one. His endorsement of the campaign of former defence minister Prabowo Subianto—which featured his eldest son, Gibran Rakabuming Raka, as the vice president—proved instrumental to Prabowo's election victory, making Prabowo the country's eighth president after two prior unsuccessful bids. Despite this transition, Jokowi has demonstrated little intention to withdraw from politics. To maintain his influence over future policies, Jokowi supported leadership change within the Golkar party, enabling Bahlil Lahadalia, a loyal associate and former head of the Investment Board, to replace Airlangga Hartarto as party leader.

Jokowi's final year in office was not, however, focused solely on politics; he also remained deeply involved in economic matters. He devoted the final months of his presidency to advancing national strategic projects (PSN), including the controversial and costly relocation of the capital city from Jakarta to Nusantara in East Kalimantan. While several PSN projects remain incomplete, projects of greater strategic importance and substantial prior investments are expected to proceed, albeit on a reduced scale and extended timeline.

Meanwhile, economic and business performance in 2024 has been mixed. While there were considerable weaknesses in the first half of the year, economic activity rebounded in the second half, with growth projected to reach 5.1 per cent by year end. Sectors such as construction, manufacturing and services have shown recovery, but others such as wholesale, trading, mining and agriculture continue to languish. Despite the overall inflation rate easing to 1.8 per cent, down from a peak of 3.1 per cent in March 2024, food inflation has surged. This has been particularly evident in the prices of rice, which has reached record highs.

In the weeks following the Japanese capitulation, forces attached to Mountbatten's South East Asia Command (SEAC) arriving in Java under the terms of the Potsdam Conference confronted a perplexing situation—namely, militant nationalists defending the newly declared Republic. While officially committed to restoring Dutch sovereignty over its former colony, in the face of such intransigence, the British attitude turned to non-intervention in quarrels between the Dutch government and the Republic, provided law and order was preserved. Until the Allied withdrawal in early 1946 and the arrival of the main force of Dutch units, there was much slippage in this position, leading to major clashes and casualties in Surabaya, Semarang and elsewhere. As is well known, a shifting coalition of Republican and guerrilla forces raised the costs for both the Allies and the returning Dutch forces to the point where world opinion drew a line at the human cost suffered in the futile attempt to enforce the colonial status quo ante. In the wider sweep of history, the dates between the Proclamation of Independence on 17 August 1945 and Dutch recognition of the de jure sovereignty of the Republic in December 1949 define Indonesia's nationalist revolution.1

Several defining events underscore relations between the Republic and the Dutch. First was the Linggadjati Agreement, the political accord concluded on 15 November 1946 between the Dutch and Republican negotiators in which the Netherlands recognized the Republic as exercising de facto authority in Java, Madura and Sumatra.