EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• This study analyses the impact of social media election campaigning, disinformation and election propaganda on voters’ perceptions and behaviours in Indonesia’s 2024 presidential election. It assesses the influence of social media platforms and chat messaging apps as sources of election-related information on voters and their level of trust in these mediums. The study also assesses how exposed and susceptible voters have been to various disinformation and election propaganda narratives.

• Our findings affirm traditional sources of communication like television (TV) and direct conversations with friends and family as being among the top sources of election-related news. The social messaging platform WhatsApp ranked second across all demographic groups. Significantly, the youth segment (15–24 years old) showed markedly different consumption habits, citing TikTok as its topmost important source of election-related news, followed by WhatsApp, TV and Instagram.

• However, when it comes to trusted sources of information, all demographic groups scored social media platforms relatively lowly, citing TV and direct conversations with friends and family as their most trusted mediums for election-related news. TikTok was ranked tenth out of fifteen mediums as the most trusted, even among youth. Taken together, these findings suggest that the Indonesian population does possess fairly high levels of resilience, awareness and literacy regarding mis/disinformation online.

• Nonetheless, concerns surrounding the use of social media platforms to propagate mis/disinformation and, increasingly, deepfakes remain notable but their impact is more nuanced and complex.

The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.

The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policymakers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.

THE EDITORS

Series Chairman:

Choi Shing Kwok

Series Editor:

Ooi Kee Beng

Editorial Committee:

Daljit Singh

Francis E. Hutchinson

Norshahril Saat

INTRODUCTION

The ubiquity of social media platforms and the widespread commercialization of various artificial intelligence (AI) applications have sparked global concern about the impact disinformation, political propaganda and deepfakes can have on the outcomes of democratic elections. The use of social media in election campaigns has become indispensable for candidates to engage voters, amplify their campaign messaging, and oftentimes undermine their opponents.

In the 2024 Indonesian presidential election (PE), all three candidate pairs actively used social media platforms to increase their reach and engagement with voters. Notably, there was a clear shift in the online campaign strategy of eventual winner and third-time candidate Prabowo Subianto, departing from the combative tactics of previous campaigns (such as in 2014 and 2019) to focus instead on positivity, digital innovation and social influencer partnerships. Nonetheless, there remained instances of disinformation and smear campaigns targeted at the three presidential candidates, albeit that this seemed less rampant and incendiary compared to previous presidential campaigns. During the 2019 Indonesian elections, disinformation and smear campaigns against then-President Jokowi were widely circulated, among which were that he belonged to the Indonesian Communist Party and was of Chinese descent. For the first time in Indonesia’s PE, AI-generated deepfakes were pervasively and prominently used in election campaigning.

This study analyses the impact of social media election campaigning, disinformation and election propaganda on voters’ perceptions and behaviours in Indonesia’s 2024 PE.

INTRODUCTION

Changes in Philippine foreign policy over the past two decades have exemplified how small states have had to navigate the intensified big-power rivalry between the United States (US) and China. Since 2022, President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. has been taking proactive steps to protect Philippine security interests amid heightened regional uncertainties. While his predecessor, Rodrigo Duterte, attempted to undermine the Philippines-US alliance to demonstrate the country’s foreign policy pivot to China, Marcos Jr. has reinvigorated the Enhanced Defense Cooperation

Agreement (EDCA) with the US and adopted more assertive responses to Chinese intimidation in the West Philippine Sea (WPS), the maritime space that includes the country’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ). These foreign policy shifts in the past decade have tended to flow from the national government down to the lowest unit of local governance. However, unlike its Southeast Asian neighbours, local government units (LGUs) in the Philippines have had powers or functions devolved to them which could have national security implications.

In November 2022, the Armed Forces of the Philippines announced that the EDCA would include four additional sites, two in Cagayan and one each in Zambales and Palawan, totalling nine sites altogether nationwide. All these provinces are located in the northern part of the Philippines, with Cagayan being adjacent to Taiwan (see Figure 1). Signed in 2014, EDCA aims to improve Philippines-US defence cooperation by allowing American troops to be temporarily based in Philippine military facilities. EDCA implementation was largely dormant during the Duterte administration.

The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.

The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policymakers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.

THE EDITORS

Series Chairman:

Choi Shing Kwok

Series Editor:

Ooi Kee Beng

Editorial Committee:

Daljit Singh

Francis E. Hutchinson

Norshahril Saat

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• The intensified rivalry between the United States and China has put small states like the Philippines in a precarious position, given its relative importance in the regional geo-strategy of both big powers.

• Since foreign and security policymaking tend to be formulated in a top-down manner, existing analyses have not paid sufficient attention to what extent this big-power competition has affected local political dynamics and local governance.

• The Philippine foreign policy pendulum has swung since 2016 between adopting a more cordial relationship with either the US or China. This opened opportunities for each big power to engage local governments in political, security, economic, and socio-cultural activities that potentially hold implications for national security.

• This study compares the engagement of the US and China with the local governments of Cagayan province in northern Luzon and Palawan province in southwestern Luzon. Both are geo-strategically important to the big powers for having coastal access to critical territorial and maritime zones (South China Sea and Taiwan).

• While China has fostered good economic and political relations with these two provinces, the presence of military sites and facilities identified by the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement between the US and the Philippines have made it difficult for the local governments to veer away from the foreign and security policies adopted by the Marcos Jr. administration.

Timor-Leste in 2024 enjoyed political and economic stability with little to no significant conflict or controversy among its political elite and parties. Such stability allowed for a successful visit by Pope Francis, which saw strong participation from the country's predominantly Catholic population of 1.34 million. Over half of the population directly participated in the main event, a Papal mass by the sea near the capital city, Dili.1 Foreign policy initiatives, especially furthering Timor- Leste's accession to ASEAN and developing its relations with larger powers, were pursued smoothly because of this general stability. Timor-Leste's policy of building closer relations with Indonesia through ongoing reconciliation continued with only a brief eruption of controversy in November, when President Ramos- Horta invited a former pro-Indonesia militia leader to attend Independence Day celebrations, but the invitation was declined.

Basis of Current Political Stability

Timor-Leste's political stability in 2024 arose from the clear-cut results of two major electoral processes in 2022–23. The first was the 2022 presidential election, which saw José Ramos-Horta elected in a run-off round with 62 per cent of the vote,2 a strong victory. The victory solidified an alliance between President Ramos- Horta and National Congress for Timorese Reconstruction (CNRT) leader Xanana Gusmão. The inability of the three-party alliance supporting the candidate of the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (FRETILIN), former president Francisco “Lú-Olo” Guterres, to get much beyond 40 per cent of the vote share pointed to a situation in 2024 where Gusmão's party, CNRT, in alliance with the Democratic Party (PD), would be in a strong position.

Malaysia's fifteenth general elections (GE15) in 2022 left the country with a hung parliament and substantial uncertainty over what might lie ahead. Pakatan Harapan (PH) leader Anwar Ibrahim forged an unlikely “unity” or “Madani” coalition government with Zahid Hamidi and his Barisan Nasional (BN). That government has remained stably afloat, yet mostly by not rocking the boat: substantial reforms remain largely off the table. The same concerns that stymied progress in 2023, especially of ethnonationalist challenge, remain germane,1 albeit with an added frisson now of geopolitical uncertainty: elections elsewhere, particularly in the United States, have stepped up uncertainty about the state of the world—and especially global trade—moving forward. By this point, Anwar has consolidated more firmly his position as prime minister. Nonetheless, he has yet to deploy what political capital he has to press forward with the reform agenda for which he was elected, even to the extent that PH's agenda overlaps with those of their governing-coalition partners.

While any number of factors are germane, two best explain that stasis. First, as has been the case since GE15, the fact of a challenger rooted in the Malay- Muslim majority still discourages reform in line with PH's stated “progressive” principles. Second, the administration spends inordinate time and energy putting out fires, at risk of leaving the public disillusioned and distracted. To understand the extent and sources of this impasse, we turn first to what Anwar's administration did accomplish in 2024 and where it fell short, before turning to these essentially external and internal constraints impeding more far-reaching progress.

In conventional writing on the Indonesian National Revolution, perjuangan (struggle) is often counterpoised against diplomacy. But seen from another angle, both activities served each other. For Tan Malaka and his supporters, guerrilla warfare was a subset of the broader political and ideological campaign. It connoted a particular form of struggle exercised through political coalition building and through the exercise of mass campaigns, rallies or other mass actions joined by left-wing and religious groups supporting laskar, or militias, who took their struggle to the streets, the countryside or even the mountain slopes. From 1945 to 1949, practically no one on the Left in Indonesia knew anything about guerrilla warfare contained within communist theories of revolutionary takeover, much less had any deep experience of them (and that included the group around Musso). The exception was Tan Malaka, who set out his own blueprint for a revolutionary takeover of Java in his 1925 publication, and which he further refined in some of his prison writings.

This chapter is divided into two sections. The first sets out the details of Tan Malaka's Persatuan Perjuangan, or Struggle Front, following his first open political plays in the young Republic. The second goes on to detail the emergence of the Gerakan Revolusi Rakyat (GRR), a grand Tan Malaka coalition linking political parties with sections of the TNI, and even with radical Islamists, that came together in the wake of the crackdown on the PKI. In the Dutch estimation, the GRR emerged to become the most potent threat to peace on their terms.

Uneventful Completion of Political Succession

On 15 May 2024, Lawrence Wong (born in 1972), was sworn in as Singapore's fourth prime minister in a solemn ceremony on the pristine garden lawn of the Istana. Only the third leadership handover since Singapore's independence, this generational change in leadership was a historic occasion. It was the culmination of a process of leadership renewal and succession that had taken more than a decade and that was rudely disrupted by the Covid-19 pandemic, which Wong's predecessor, Lee Hsien Loong, had described as the “crisis of a generation”.

In April 2021, in a move that stunned the nation, then presumptive successor Heng Swee Keat took himself out of the running for the top job, two and a half years after emerging as the frontrunner to succeed Prime Minister Lee. Mr Heng had said then that he would have too short a runway should he take over as prime minister after the Covid-19 crisis was over. He turned 63 in 2024. He reasoned that it would be in Singapore's best interests for a younger leader to take the country forward.

In his first address to the nation as prime minister, Wong—who left a strong impression on Singaporeans as the co-chair of the pandemic task force to protect lives and livelihoods—recalled the nation's unity and trust in one another that saw her through the pandemic.

Cambodia underwent a historic political transition in 2023 when Prime Minister Hun Sen, after thirty-eight years of rule, passed the reins to his eldest son, Hun Manet. This handover had been long in the making and was part of a broader generational shift within Cambodia's dominant political dynasties, which remain deeply influential in shaping the country's political and economic landscape. Alongside Hun Manet, many other princelings took on new ministerial positions in 2023, such as Sar Sokha replacing his father Sar Kheng as Ministry of Interior head and Tea Seiha succeeding his father Tea Banh as Ministry of National Defence head. The central focus for 2024 thus revolved around the prospective changes the generational succession would bring about.

Whilst many observers of Cambodian politics were quick to assert that Hun Manet's leadership would be highly unlikely to bring any major policy shifts, 2024 did bring with it a sliver of hope for some form of expanding civic space. Leadership transitions always carry some uncertainty, and, as widely noted, Hun Manet's time living in the United States and the United Kingdom provided him with the opportunities to envision a new direction for Cambodia. Sadly, however, observers’ predictions were accurate. Hun Manet is a man of his father's making and, despite stepping down as prime minister, Hun Sen's grip on power remains firm. Now serving as president of the Senate, Sen continues to exert influence over domestic and foreign policies, while his youngest son, Hun Many, holds key positions as deputy prime minister and head of both the Ministry of Civil Service and the Cambodia Youth Federation Confederation (CYFC).

The starting point in the chain of events leading to the uprisings on Java and Sumatra in 1926–27 and their rapid suppression was the occasion in December 1925 when a group of ultra-leftist members of the PKI met in Prambanan, a tenth-century temple complex in Central Java, in response to the increasingly tightened political control of the colonial government. Despite the absence of the party's core leaders, who were then outside Indonesia, the group decided—against objective conditions as it turned out—to rebel against the Dutch authorities in mid-1926. As we have seen, the rebellion broke out in West Java in November 1926 and West Sumatra in January 1927, and its bloody suppression led to thousands of individuals, including PKI and SI members, arrested and deported to Digul. This resulted in the pro-Communists being virtually eliminated until after the Pacific War. The rebellions have also been the object of close study. First by the Dutch, who were keen to find an outside hand in them, such as the Comintern. And these studies in turn became source material for a succession of scholars examining the rebellions. It is not my intention here to analyse the failed rebellions per se, or even to fit them into a taxonomy of rebellions such as millennial, proto-nationalist, nationalist, anti-tax, desire for change, and so on. But rather to examine them through the prism of intra-party and Comintern debates while assaying the fallout for the anti-colonial movement in Indonesia at large.

More than a year and a half has passed since Prime Minister Hun Manet assumed the leadership of Cambodia, and during this time he has introduced and implemented a range of domestic and foreign policies that reflect his vision for the nation. His leadership has been marked by a series of statements and impromptu comments that offer insight into his political philosophy, values and approach to governance. In terms of public sector reforms, he focuses on maintaining stability while promoting efficiency and productivity.

To construct a nuanced understanding of his worldview, this chapter reviews the perspectives of external observers and insiders. Moreover, a selection of remarks made by Hun Manet since he took office in August 2023 is reviewed and analysed. These remarks offer valuable perspectives on his approach to leadership and governance, revealing his stance on key issues such as national sovereignty, economic development, political stability, and foreign policy. They provide a deeper insight into the philosophical underpinnings of Hun Manet's leadership as well as his long-term vision for Cambodia.

Outside-In Perspective

This section delves into the perspectives of external analysts, observers and critics who are not directly embedded within Cambodia's governance system but that provide valuable insights into Hun Manet's leadership.

Hun Manet boasts an impressive academic portfolio, holding degrees in economics from the United States Military Academy at West Point (1999), New York University (2002), and the University of Bristol (2008). This diverse educational background may have prepared him to engage with complex policy and governance challenges that lie ahead.

With the near destruction of the PKI at Madiun in August 1948, Tan Malaka remained the foremost proponent of the perjuangan line and, from the Dutch perspective, the foremost enemy. Released from prison the following December by Prime Minister Hatta ostensibly to add a powerful counterweight to the surviving PKI-Moscow faction, the Republican leadership also sought to win kudos from the United States and so strengthen its hand in upcoming diplomatic negotiations. Hastening with his entourage to the Solo River Valley battlefront in the face of the long-expected Dutch attack on the beleaguered Republican government in Yogyakarta—the so-called Second Dutch Police Action of December 1948—Tan Malaka broadcast a statement over radio rejecting negotiation, such as pursued by Sjahrir and Hatta, or any compromise such as the Linggadjati or Renville agreements.

In this chapter, I seek to link the Second Dutch Police Action with a shift on the part of Washington (and Canberra) to favour the centrist Republican leadership out of fear of a communist ascendancy only abetted by Dutch counter-violence and excesses. While such an argument may be implicit in international reporting on Indonesia, I seek here a novel interpretation with particular attention to the less-studied guerrilla context as opposed to the last-minute diplomatic manoeuvrings that better belong to standard Cold War histories. First, the chapter evaluates the rapid ascendancy of militia forces connected to Tan Malaka in the wake of the Second Dutch Police Action.

Introduction: The Philippines’ Bold Recalibration in an Era of Rising Tensions

In 2024, the Philippines found itself navigating a turbulent landscape defined by intensifying geopolitical rivalries and domestic political upheaval. Under President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., the nation has undertaken a bold recalibration of its foreign policy, abandoning strategic ambiguity in favour of a more assertive and pragmatic approach. This shift is driven not just by escalating tensions in the South China Sea, where China's aggressive manoeuvres have become increasingly confrontational, but also by internal pressures that demand a redefinition of national priorities.

China's provocations in the South China Sea have left the Philippines with limited options. Confronted with water cannon attacks, blockades and territorial infringements, the Marcos administration has pivoted decisively towards the United States. The renewed partnership has been cemented through high-profile diplomatic engagements, expanded military exercises and the formation of new defence alliances, such as the US-led “Squad” with Japan and Australia. Yet, this alignment with Washington is not just a security measure—it is also a strategic signal aimed at asserting the Philippines’ role in the Indo-Pacific.

However, to frame this foreign policy transformation solely as a response to external threats oversimplifies the situation. Domestically, the Marcos administration grapples with political instability following the collapse of the “UniTeam” alliance with Vice President Sara Duterte, mounting congressional investigations, and growing public discontent over unfulfilled economic promises.