Having focused on the so-called revolusi fisik (physical revolution) as it played out in Central Java, and especially in the two north coast ports of Surabaya and Semarang, we should not ignore that the resource-rich Outer Islands were never far from Allied or nationalist concerns, each with their separate agendas. East Coast Sumatra looms large in this analysis as the site of some of the bloodiest confrontations between militia and traditional leaders. Neither Medan nor Palembang in South Sumatra stood apart from the “social revolution” backed by radical nationalists, some of them self-styled communists, and specific ethnic groups numbered high among the counts of victims. With Acting Governor-General van Mook in the driving seat in Eastern Indonesia, the Dutch organized the Malino Conference of 16–25 July 1946 in Sulawesi, whereby loyalist representatives from Borneo and eastern Indonesia backed the Dutch proposal for a federal United States of Indonesia, which would have links to the Netherlands. This arrangement preceded the Linggadjati Agreement of 15 November 1946, under which the Dutch recognized de facto Republican control over Sumatra, Java and Madura in a formula in which the Dutch queen would be the symbolic head of a Dutch-Indonesian union of sovereign states.1 Space precludes a more detailed survey, but overall, we would have to conclude that Java was the major arena and focus of political and military struggles weighing on the legitimation of the declaration of independence, even if the archipelago came to be Balkanized as the Dutch naval advance proceeded.

In the weeks following the Japanese capitulation, forces attached to Mountbatten's South East Asia Command (SEAC) arriving in Java under the terms of the Potsdam Conference confronted a perplexing situation—namely, militant nationalists defending the newly declared Republic. While officially committed to restoring Dutch sovereignty over its former colony, in the face of such intransigence, the British attitude turned to non-intervention in quarrels between the Dutch government and the Republic, provided law and order was preserved. Until the Allied withdrawal in early 1946 and the arrival of the main force of Dutch units, there was much slippage in this position, leading to major clashes and casualties in Surabaya, Semarang and elsewhere. As is well known, a shifting coalition of Republican and guerrilla forces raised the costs for both the Allies and the returning Dutch forces to the point where world opinion drew a line at the human cost suffered in the futile attempt to enforce the colonial status quo ante. In the wider sweep of history, the dates between the Proclamation of Independence on 17 August 1945 and Dutch recognition of the de jure sovereignty of the Republic in December 1949 define Indonesia's nationalist revolution.1

Several defining events underscore relations between the Republic and the Dutch. First was the Linggadjati Agreement, the political accord concluded on 15 November 1946 between the Dutch and Republican negotiators in which the Netherlands recognized the Republic as exercising de facto authority in Java, Madura and Sumatra.

Complacent as a distant antipode to global conflicts in the late 1930s, even as Japan launched its invasion of China, Australia could no longer ignore that nation's southward lurch to break through the “American-British-Chinese-Dutch” encirclement as it was perceived in Tokyo. With US general Douglas MacArthur setting up in Brisbane, Australia would become a huge rear base for the Pacific War. The evacuation in mid-1943 of some five hundred Indonesian internees from Tanah Merah and the nearby port of Merauke to Australia was one such signal for alarm, and they were preceded by a progression of civilian Dutch evacuees for protection and even a cohort of Japanese including families identified by the Dutch as potential subversives. Besides Digulists, the five thousand or so Indonesians in Australia during the wartime period included NEI army and navy members, former heiho captured by the Allies, Indonesians working in Dutch offices and shipping companies in Australia, seamen deserters from Dutch ships, and even a large group of working-class Javanese evacuated from New Caledonia. Not incidentally, the Digulists included such individuals as Sardjono, the PKI chair at the time of the 1926 rebellion; labour leader Hardjono; veteran journalist and founder of Sarekat Ambon, A.J. Patty; the Tan Malaka loyalist Djamaluddin Tamin; the PNI-Baru official Mohammad Bondan, along with religious scholars trained in Cairo and Mecca and members of the Islamic organization Permi—namely, Muchtar Lufti and Iljas Jacoeb (a former editor of the pro-independence Medan Ra’jat newspaper).

Having exposed the colonial carceral apparatus that targeted the supposed authors of the 1926–27 rebellions, this chapter turns to the origins of the pergerakan or anti-colonial movement in Indonesia (pergerakan was a self-definition that entered the vocabulary of the key protagonists and editors). This chapter is also sensitive to the zaman or epoch that the anti-colonial movement epitomizes. Traditions of anti-colonial rebellion confronting colonial power that reach back through hundreds of years of colonial rule cannot be ignored. Neither can we neglect a cascade of events that signalled major changes in world order. Pertaining to Islam, such an event includes the rise of the Islamic modernist movement with its insistence on religious faith in public life, such as touched the Ottoman Empire. On the part of the colonial order, the advent of the Bolshevik Revolution and the setting up of the Soviet-controlled Communist International (Comintern), also called the Third International, were fearful developments. The opening decades of the twentieth century were an era of rapid social change. decades of the twentieth century were an era of rapid social change. As aptly evoked by author-editor Mas Marco Kartodikromo, this was a Doenia Bergerak, or world in motion, matched by the rise of newspapers, editors and readership. As a movement, the pergerakan also witnessed the advent of political parties, both religious and secular, typically around charismatic leaders. Budi Utomo (BU) was a pioneer, but, from its advent in 1912, Sarekat Islam (SI) quickly emerged as the first truly mass-based organization.

For the Indonesian nationalists and communists who departed their homeland in the 1920s, whether for study or as exiles, there were two primary poles of attraction. For those who graduated through the colonial Dutch education system, Holland was the obvious destination, and so student groups clustered in such places as The Hague or Amsterdam. Some from these groups would visit Berlin or Brussels for conferences, and still others were attracted to Paris. But for those who the Bolshevik revolution was an inspiration or who otherwise heeded Lenin's opportunistic call to bring down the capitalist world order starting from the colonies, then Moscow was a lodestar. As seen in the preceding chapter, setting up in Moscow required dedication and patronage, not to mention proven revolutionary credentials such as membership of the PKI or its affiliates. Likewise, as this chapter brings to light, operating within the bounds of the metropolitan legal system in Holland required special organizational as well as cultural and linguistic skills on the part of the Indonesian anti-colonial nationalists. Without ignoring Berlin, the major comparison with Holland is with the diasporic communities of Vietnamese, North Africans, Madagascan, and French West Indians residing in France who were active in pro-independence activities and who were also divided as to the best approach under fierce metropolitan surveillance.

Dating from the Koiso Declaration of 7 September 1944 (a reference to the vague promise by then Japanese prime minister Koiso Kuniaki of independence for the East Indies), Japan went about planning the future state system in Indonesia as an integral part of the Japanese Empire to have a standing analogous to Korea or Taiwan. Nevertheless, as the tide of war changed, both the timetable and the procedure underwent significant changes. Notable in this respect was the creation of a consultative group to engage a select segment of Indonesians, termed the Dokuritsu Junbi Chosakai but better known by its Bahasa Indonesia name as Badan Penjelidik Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia (BPUPKI) (Investigating Committee for Preparatory Work for Indonesian Independence). Such planning helps to explain how, on the day after the proclamation of independence, a central Republican government was established in Jakarta.

The first section of this chapter sets down the key steps leading to the historic Indonesian Proclamation of Independence, offering a range of Japanese narratives on the timetable and process of the independence movement as recorded by Allied interrogators. The second section focuses on the Japanese Naval Liaison Bureau in Jakarta. It also includes a post-war prison interrogation with the key Japanese official in charge among others involved in the proclamation of Indonesian independence.

Enigmatically styled an “affair”, a “rebellion”, a “coup” or a “provocation”, the advent of the PKI-backed rebellion in the East Java city of Madiun and the crushing of it was a game changer especially insofar as the Republic would win new legitimacy in the eyes of the West. As far as the United States was concerned, the events appeared to strike a decisive blow to Moscow’s ambitions at a juncture when the fault lines of the Cold War were clear. Nevertheless, even with most of the top leadership arrested and/or executed in the TNI repression of the event, others escaped, with certain among the 1945 generation going on to command and revive the PKI “phoenix” in the 1950s and beyond. Still, much remains enigmatic about the Madiun Affair until this day, especially as the failed revolution within a revolution mounted in a provincial capital without apparent mass support outside of a thin local working class was entirely outside of the lexicon of communist revolutions.

The first section of this chapter examines the dramatic return from Moscow of Musso in August 1948 and the events leading to the Madiun Affair in September–October 1948. The second section examines the failure of Madiun while seeking new answers to old questions about events and historical narratives. The third section sets down the facts of the rebellion and its repression that led to Musso’s death, along with those of Sardjono, Amir Sjarifoeddin and other ranking PKI-Moscow members at the hands of the TNI. The final section examines Western media and diplomatic reporting on Madiun.

With the communist parties underground during the war years, and with Dutch colonialists along with perceived enemies incarcerated in a network of prisons and internment camps, the Japanese occupiers had a free run in cultivating a pro-Tokyo cadre of collaborators from among the former Dutch-educated native elite as well as among traditional, including Islamic, figures. At the same time, Japan unleashed a wave of xenophobic anti-Western (anti-Dutch) sentiments that would be sustained beyond the long, staggered-out surrender process by the Japanese to the Allies in the archipelago. As we shall see in this chapter, the Japanese occupation of the NEI—which spanned three and a half years—also had other long-term effects. One was the adroit psychological use of propaganda to re-orient the population to embrace Japan's rhetoric of a Greater East Asia Prosperity Sphere, along with its militaristic, fascist and even Shintoism overtones. The Japanese achieved this through language change, by the manipulation of patriotic symbols and, especially, through the mobilization of youth, women and religious groups. Certain youths were also given military training, and they would go on to create the nucleus of a national army. Others, fired up by demagogues, would join deadly militia, even turning upon the remaining Japanese and arriving Allied forces. No less important was that, even as the tide turned against Japan, Tokyo made hesitant steps to offer some form of autonomy to Indonesia along the lines of Formosa or Korea within the Japanese empire; the autonomy package was further expedited as total collapse and defeat appeared imminent.

INTRODUCTION

How do young Southeast Asian elites view geopolitical developments in the region? While foreign policymaking generally falls under the remit of senior statesmen, the segment of individuals aged between 18 and 35 years old today is expanding to become a demographic majority in many Southeast Asian countries. Collectively, youths in the region have emerged as a significant political force, even if they may still be far from the levers of power. For instance, the political weight of young voters held significant sway in recent elections across several democracies in the region, including Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand.

Aside from their growing sway over the ballot box, young Southeast Asian elites6 are likely to grow into positions of power, whether in government or the private sector. Research on “operational codes”, which refers to the decision-making frameworks that individuals rely on when making key foreign policy decisions, suggests that many of these heuristics are formed through socialization during an individual’s formative adult years. Furthermore, with the growing accessibility of information, made possible by the widespread uptake of social media in

the region, many of these young elites may already be influential thought leaders today.

For young Southeast Asians aged 18 to 35, global affairs are perceived differently. To many, the immediate post-Cold War period can be viewed as a distant history. After all, individuals aged 35 would have been born in 1989, the very year that the Berlin Wall fell. Closer to home, respondents younger than 27 would not have been born during the Asian Financial Crisis, which shook the economic foundations of the region in 1997.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• Youths are becoming an increasingly significant political force in Southeast Asian countries. As a collective, young Southeast Asians aged 18–35 have the potential to exert greater sway over their respective national foreign policymaking landscapes. They will also occupy key positions in their respective countries and societies in the future, thus understanding young Southeast Asian opinion leaders’ views on geopolitics can provide valuable insight into the future of foreign policymaking in the region.

• Using mixed purposive and open sampling methods, this series of Focus Group Discussions engaged thirty-three youths from the ASEAN-6 countries—Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam—between September and October 2024. Semi-structured interview questions and polling methods were used, and the results were aggregated and comparisons made for all age groups found in The State of Southeast Asia 2024 survey.

• Overall, the study’s findings are fourfold. (1) Mainstream news sources remained the most referred source of information for youth elites in the region. (2) Young Southeast Asian elites had a stronger preference for China over the US when compared to respondents across all age groups in The State of Southeast Asia 2024 survey. (3) Japan and India emerged as the top preferred hedging partners for Southeast Asian youth. This stood in contrast to the results of the general survey where the EU emerged as the most preferred choice. (4) Youth elites in the region were deeply concerned about ASEAN becoming an arena for major power competition, the ineffectiveness of the organization, the disunity, and the growing disconnect with the average Southeast Asian citizen.

The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.

The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policymakers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.

THE EDITORS

Series Chairman:

Choi Shing Kwok

Series Editor:

Ooi Kee Beng

Editorial Committee:

Daljit Singh

Francis E. Hutchinson

Norshahril Saat

The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.

The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policymakers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.

THE EDITORS

Series Chairman:

Choi Shing Kwok

Series Editor:

Ooi Kee Beng

Editorial Committee:

Daljit Singh

Francis E. Hutchinson

Norshahril Saat