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Vietnam's foreign policy towards China and the United States (US) involves a delicate process of reconciling and balancing competing perceptions, goals and interests within the country. This leads to foreign policy decisions that may respectively lean towards either China or the US, depending on specific circumstances and issues, while trying to maintain an overall equilibrium between the two powers. Vietnam's foreign policy adopts the paradigm of 'cooperation' and 'struggle' in its relations with major powers, and defines 'national security' as encompassing both national sovereignty and regime security. Given the common ideology and imperative of preserving political control of their respective communist parties, China may be a critical partner for Vietnam in terms of regime security but is often an 'object of struggle' on national sovereignty. On the other hand, the US is Vietnam's partner in the South China Sea but an 'object of struggle' when it comes to regime security.
The Vietnamese public's favourable sentiments towards the US, contrasted with their distrust towards China, pose a challenge for the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) in mobilizing public opinion to bolster its legitimacy while preventing any potential threat to its political authority.
Vietnam has thus far benefited from the US-China rivalry but it faces substantial challenges ahead, including heightened vulnerabilities to an assertive China in the South China Sea and Lower Mekong, potential trade tensions if Donald Trump is re-elected as US president, and risks in balancing its ideological ties with Beijing while maintaining its strategic alignment with the US.
When Malaysia was formed in 1963, the Borneo states of Sarawak and Sabah were granted special provisions under the Malaysian Agreement 1963 (MA63) to safeguard their autonomy. However, centralization measures pursued by the federal government over time have eroded these rights, particularly pertaining to education, development spending and revenue sharing. Despite being on the same island and sharing a history distinct from Peninsular Malaysia, Sarawak and Sabah have evolved very differently in asserting their autonomy. Sarawak has managed to attain a greater degree of self-government, while Sabah has been more influenced by priorities pursued by Peninsular Malaysia. These varying outcomes are due to three differences between the two states: distinct historical developments in the run-up to independence; varying degrees of political control attained by the parties in power; and different priorities pursued by state leaders.
This 'Trends in Southeast Asia' explores the different political trajectories of Sarawak and Sabah through a structured comparison of the two states across these three aspects. Sarawak's combination of sub-nationalism, dominant state-level coalition, and astute political leadership has enabled the state to push the boundaries much further than its neighbour. The downfall of the erstwhile-dominant Barisan Nasional coalition has increased the room for manoeuvre of Borneo-based groupings, heralding a new power relationship between West and East Malaysia. Sarawak is well-poised to push for further privileges and prerogatives. Should it want to push for more autonomy and resources, Sabah will need to emulate key aspects of its neighbour's strategy.
Sustainable development is present everywhere in Vietnam. This book analyses the sustainable development narrative and its use by different actors in Vietnam. It examines how narratives are used to establish environmental rule in the socialist state. By focusing on NGOs and their positions in the Vietnamese context, the book illustrates how different actors use the Sustainable Development narrative to navigate power relations with the authoritarian state and the international donors, and how the narrative differs from theory to the actual practices on the ground. The book will be of interest to scholars of Vietnam who wish to understand development and state-society relations in environmental governance. It is an important read for development practitioners.
Since the normalization of relations in 1991, Vietnam and China, two of the five remaining communist regimes, have established a robust framework for mutual learning and cooperation. This collaboration has primarily centred around party governance and cadre training. Vietnam has actively studied and adopted elements of China's successful model, which combines economic reform with strict political control. This approach has allowed Vietnam to maintain communist rule in the face of increasing global pressure for democratic reforms. The process of learning from China involves two key dynamics: desirability versus capability, and effectiveness versus appropriateness. While Vietnam desires to achieve the same level of effectiveness as China in certain policy areas, it has been cautious in fully replicating the Chinese model, and shown consideration for its appropriateness to Vietnam's unique circumstances and for China's underlying motivations. Vietnam has adopted a mixed approach to learning from China, incorporating direct emulation, selective adaptation and drawing inspiration from China's experiences. One notable example of this is the ongoing anti-corruption efforts of both regimes, which share some similarities but also have distinct differences. The learning relationship between Vietnam and China is not without its challenges. Historical animosities, maritime disputes and anti-China sentiment all play a role in shaping this partnership. As a result, Vietnam has had to employ innovative tactics to adapt Chinese lessons to fit its own circumstances.
The rapid development of Artificial Intelligence (AI) technologies has been nothing less of awe-inspiring. Policymakers are put in a bind as debates over how the deployment of these AI systems is to be managed - with good governance and ethical considerations in mind, and without stifling innovation. ASEAN's response has been the formulation of the ASEAN Guide on AI Governance and Ethics, or the ASEAN AI Guide. This Guide serves more as a 'practical guide' for organizations involved in the development and deployment of AI for commercial and non-military or dual-use applications, as opposed to a policy playbook for governments. Though voluntary in application, it does have some positive attributes including laying out the groundwork for regionwide discussions around AI governance and ethics issues, promoting human involvement in AI system management and having an ecosystem approach to policy.
For the ASEAN AI Guide to translate into actionable outcomes, some public policy areas warrant additional consideration. Firstly, some focus will need to be redirected to ex-post regulations, such as legal recourse for AI-generated Intellectual Property (IP) infringement. Furthermore, how new technologies and human capital can be leveraged to better manage potential ill-effects of AI system deployment should be given more focus, along with keeping tabs on psychological changes among different segments of society with greater AI system usage. Lastly, the ASEAN AI Guide should be used as a basis for greater regional engagement in this integral area.
Since the start of Operation 1027, Myanmar's resistance groups have gained control over large parts of key overland trade routes and a number of important border crossings, fundamentally changing the realities in the control of border trade. Despite these losses, the State Administration Council (SAC) retains control-of-trade-related institutions that are vital for accessing an international trading system characterized by state-to-state interactions - giving them significant influence over trade even if they do not control trade routes and border crossings.
International precedents from territories such as Palestine, Transnistria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia show that non-state actors face significant challenges engaging in trade, and are vulnerable to frequent changes in trading arrangements. Perhaps the most important factor shaping trade in these territories is the state of their relationship with either the state of which they are nominally a part, or a neighbouring state. Thailand allows small-scale trade and limited movement of people through 'checkpoints for border trade', which exist outside the formal system and are unilaterally established by Thailand. These checkpoints represent an alternative opportunity to reshape border trade.
If Myanmar's resistance hopes to transform trade from a revenue source to a meaningful strength, their prospects are best if they collaborate and develop a status-neutral plan (e.g., not requiring diplomatic recognition nor denying recognition to the SAC) for trading arrangements with neighbours, and enhance dialogue with them about this plan.
Proton has been a vital part of Malaysia's industrialization journey and a key pillar of its modernization drive. Launched in 1983 to fulfil then Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad's vision of a pride-infused national car company, the state-owned Proton grew quickly and captured a dominant share of the country's domestic car market, aided in no small measure by generous protective measures and subsidies. However, in the subsequent decades, the car giant lost market share and power due to a variety of challenges, such as non-market performance requirements, less effective protection, and growing competition from a second national car firm and from global car companies. The automaker has had a variety of ownership structures over time, but was resolutely kept in domestic hands - public and private. This did increase control over the corporation, but did so at the expense of exposure to and adoption of leading-edge technology. This impasse was resolved in 2017, when Proton sold a 49.9 per cent share to the Chinese auto firm Geely. The joint venture has rejuvenated the carmaker, which has begun to reconquer market share through a number of popular SUVs. Despite this, the Malaysian auto market is becoming increasingly competitive. Going forward, Proton will need to begin to export significantly to expose its vehicles to new niche markets as well as global standards, obtain and retain skilled workers, and continue to rationalize costs in its supply chains and distributorships.
Peatland ecosystems in Southeast Asia are globally important as carbon sinks, rich in terrestrial and aquatic fauna and flora, and important sources of livelihood for local communities. However, agribusiness-driven land-use change and drainage cause peatland degradation and peat fires, which generate 'haze' air pollution and lead to significant economic losses and health impacts. Disturbed peatlands also become substantial sources of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. While the problems of haze and climate change are connected through peatlands, these issues have been treated largely separately in policy and governance. We provide an overview of Southeast Asian peatlands, assessing opportunities and challenges for greater integration of policy and governance in addressing haze, climate change and other sustainability dimensions. We focus on Indonesia and Malaysia, the Southeast Asian countries with the largest peatland areas.
We summarize key developments, along with evidence indicating that peatlands represent a large proportion of national GHG emissions in both Indonesia and Malaysia. We trace the evolution of peatland policies at the national and regional levels, from focusing on conservation to addressing fire and haze issues, reflecting their complex relationship with national development and the corporate sector. We found that for these two key countries, the most recent government-reported peatland emissions appear somewhat lower than is suggested by academic studies for Indonesia and substantially lower in the case of Malaysia. We emphasize the complex challenge of integrating policies across multiple scales and issues, with international, regional and national actors, and in multiple industries, all active in peatland governance.
As digital platforms continue to evolve, youths increasingly employ social media, online forums, and digital campaigns to advocate for social and political change. While this phenomenon is often considered disparagingly as slacktivism, recent studies find that individuals engaging in digital activism often also participate in other conventional forms of activism.
Despite a surge in youth activism across Southeast Asian countries, comparative analysis in this region remains scarce. Using data from the World Values Survey of several studies, and case studies on Indonesia, this article examines the extent to which online political activism serves as a catalyst for mobilization, awareness and community building among young people in Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines. Additionally, it examines the interplay between online and offline political activism and its impact on traditional forms of activism.
The study argues for a reciprocal relationship between online and offline political activism, particularly noting the potential for digital efforts to influence real-world action, especially on cohesive issues such as corruption.
There is an increasing trend among young Malay voters in Malaysia to support the Perikatan Nasional coalition, with a particular emphasis on the Islamist party PAS. Despite recognition of the weak economy as a significant national concern, young Malay voters continue to place a higher emphasis on Muslim leaders who assert their commitment to safeguarding the rights of Islam in Malaysia. Consistent with theories on political socialization, the influence of family members significantly affects young Malay voters in Malaysia, particularly due to their limited political awareness of alternative channels like formal schooling.
Young Malay voters acknowledge the significant impact of social media and TikTok, particularly in how these shape the voting patterns of their peers. They nevertheless maintain a perception of their own impartiality in this regard. Interestingly, the influence of Islamic institutions, with their own educational philosophy, on the political behaviour of Malay youth is minimal, as their political ideas are already shaped by their early experiences.
Following the formation of the Unity Government in December 2022, two of its component coalitions, Pakatan Harapan (PH) and Barisan Nasional (BN), jointly campaigned during the state government elections held in August 2023. A key question arising from this cooperation between PH and the BN lead party, the United Malays National Organization (UMNO), was the extent to which it would strengthen the appeal of both coalitions, especially among Malay voters. This ‘Trends in Southeast Asia’ finds that, contrary to expectations, DAP actually gained voter support from campaigning with UMNO. DAP would probably still have won at least forty-one of these state seats without transferring BN/UMNO votes, but working with UMNO allowed the DAP to win by comfortable margins some of what would usually be marginal seats for the party. DAP gained the largest transfer of Malay votes from older voters who show stronger allegiance to BN. These findings show that UMNO's grassroots outreach is still somewhat effective among older voters but much less so among younger voters. Clearly, more of the Malay votes that previously supported the BN went to the Perikatan Nasional (PN) than to PH. The calculations in this article show that four out of five Malay voters who previously supported BN in these seats voted for PN in the 2023 state elections. Going forward, the DAP's stranglehold over these seats may well become weaker, due to demographic changes, and if turnout and support for PH and the DAP should decrease among non-Malay voters.
Malaysia's support for Palestinian independence has always been based on religion. Historically, Malaysia has had warm relations with Palestinian leaders including the Palestine Liberation Organization - during Hussein Onn's and Mahathir Mohamad's administrations - and Hamas since Najib Razak's administration. However, Malaysia's support is not just based on their affinity to Palestinians as fellow Muslims but is also a matter of domestic politics. Support for Palestine has been used as a political tool for various quarters to prove that they are more Islamic than the other.
Malaysia is now led by Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, a former student leader who rose to prominence in the 1970s for his activism on issues regarding the Muslim ummah, including Palestinian independence. Over the years, Anwar has demonstrated consistency in his support for Palestinians, and this has especially been the case since the outbreak of Israeli aggression against Gaza which began on 7 October 2023. As a result, Malaysia has gained global prominence for its aggressive stand against Israel. Thus, this paper discusses the Malaysian government's responses to issues pertaining to Palestine over the years. In doing so, it illustrates that while Islam has been a crucial rallying point in supporting the rights and independence of the Palestinians, it is also arguable that Malaysia's foreign policy outlook is also influenced by domestic politics and the need for the government of the day to maintain its support from the Muslim voter base.
Myanmar's economic trajectory has shifted across various governmental regimes, transitioning from socialist to democratic systems and from planned to market economy structures. The economic policies implemented by successive governments often lacked coherence and were characterized by ad hoc measures aimed at short-term solutions rather than addressing underlying issues.
Policymakers since 1989 have endeavoured to guide Myanmar towards a market-oriented economy, characterized by what could be termed the 'Burmese/Myanmar Way to Market Economy', which includes significant restrictions and controls. Both the military-backed Union Solidarity Development Party (USDP) and civilian-led National League for Democracy (NLD) administrations made significant efforts to enhance liberalization and strengthen market economic principles, despite multidimensional challenges including inadequate capacities for policy formulation and over-reliance on past domestic experiences rather than international lessons. All these reforms and economic pillars, established through intellect and hard work to ensure liberalization and a market economy, collapsed under the State Administration Council regime following the military coup of 1 February 2021.
Effective policy formulation and implementation are pivotal for Myanmar's economic trajectory, and policymakers must navigate historical practices and global standards with discernment, fostering policies that promote transparency, accountability, and inclusivity while adapting to feedback and interconnected economic realities.
Amid political polarization, knowledge and understanding of Thailand's history have also diverged radically. This divide is especially evident between younger and older generations. Driving this phenomenon is the growing rejection by students of the traditional history taught in public schools, which in the past had been a means for the Thai state to instill in the young a sense of nationalism, national pride and shared values. Poor pedagogy that emphasizes memorization, and that discourages discussions and critical thinking, has alienated many from the subject. Education professionals and student activists have also been critical of this development. Moreover, the democratization of information and the availability of alternative sources of historical knowledge have allowed young people to learn about history in ways that challenge the traditional narratives taught in classrooms. The alternative sources include social media, websites by historians and enthusiasts, as well as books printed by independent publishers. Young people have also begun to engage with history in new ways. They have organized themselves to commemorate aspects of history overlooked in school textbooks and have used history to legitimize their political activism. This diverging understanding and engagement with history has two main consequences. First, political polarization can deepen, with different sides utilizing their versions of history as legitimization for their political views. Second, it will be harder for the Thai state to instill communal values and a basic understanding of the nation among young people, which can have implications for the building of a shared Thai identity in the future.
ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) building is a long journey. For continued relevance and impact, the AEC must remain dynamic while taking into consideration evolving contexts and emerging opportunities and challenges. Notable progress has been made under the two AEC Blueprints (2015 and 2025), particularly in laying down the frameworks for regional economic integration and community building. Nonetheless, gaps remain in implementation, calling for a more streamlined but result-oriented agenda and stronger institutional coordination. Today, the AEC is faced with a markedly different context and unprecedented challenges resulting from a poly-crisis, involving geo-economic fragmentation, supply chain restructuring, and climactic changes. Without adjustment, ASEAN's pillar and sector-centric approach can be expected to fall short in effectively responding to these challenges. As AEC 2025 enters its final quarter, ASEAN needs to recalibrate its priorities. It also increasingly needs to take a whole-of-community approach to integration, as issues and their solutions are spread across multiple sectors. Furthermore, as it develops the AEC Post-2025 agenda, it needs to strike a balance between ambition and pragmatism, and to support substance with institutions and processes.
Humanitarian Islam refers to the efforts of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) to promote peaceful coexistence among people of different faiths in the world, with a focus on rahmah (universal love and compassion). The main vehicles for promoting Humanitarian Islam have been North Carolina-registered non-governmental organizations (NGOs), namely Bayt ar-Rahmah (Home of the Divine Grace) and the Center for Shared Civilizational Values. Key advocates of this campaign include current NU chairman Yahya Cholil Staquf and North Carolina native Holland Taylor. The Humanitarian Islam message promoted under Yahya Cholil Staquf's leadership goes back to the philosophy of Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) and NU's promotion of Islam Nusantara under Said Aqil Siroj's chairmanship. It focuses on recontextualizing orthodox religious teachings through the establishment of various inter- and intra-religious partnerships globally. NU and Bayt ar-Rahmah leaders have witnessed early-stage successes in promoting the Humanitarian Islam vision to forge ties with other large religious organizations across the world such as the Imam Warith Deen Muhammad (IWDM) community and World Evangelical Alliance through utilizing universal vocabularies such as indigeneity, human dignity and humanitarian Islam. However, precisely owing to the broad, catch-all nature of this concept, NU faces, among others, three communications-related challenges in implementing the Humanitarian Islam concept - within NU, among the grassroots, and with its partners. Ethnographic work and interviews with NU leaders, Gerakan Pemuda Ansor members, NU's partners and the grassroots reveal that the vision suffers from a lack of clarity and buy-in beyond a select few leaders.
Oil palm was brought to Malaysia from West Africa as part of British colonial agricultural development initiatives, but the refining of crude palm oil only began in the 1970s as part of the move by the Malaysian government to industrialize the country's agrarian economy. Malaysia is the world's second-largest producer of palm oil, after Indonesia. Both countries account for about 85 per cent of total exports. Incidentally, smallholders produce about 40 per cent of the total output of palm oil in Malaysia. The palm oil industry is mired in controversy. Global campaigns originating in Europe and the US have branded the crop the biggest cause of deforestation, with proposed bans to follow in December 2024. Certification has been proposed as the solution to address gaps in sustainability. Sabah is used as an illustrative case study of an effective approach for statewide certification using both the Malaysian Sustainable Palm Oil (MSPO) and Roundtable for Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) schemes.
Andrew Selth has been watching Myanmar for fifty years. During this time, he has published ten books and more than four hundred other works about the country. In 2020, he released a collection of almost one hundred articles that had been posted on the Lowy Institute's Interpreter website. This second anthology brings together another seventy-two articles, written for a range of outlets between 2007 and 2023. This period saw the installation of a 'disciplined democracy' under Aung San Suu Kyi, the 2021 military coup, and the country's descent into a bitter civil war. Many of the articles in the book deal with international relations and security issues, but there are also works on Myanmar's history, politics and culture, as well as some personal reminiscences. Together, they make a unique contribution from an Old Myanmar Hand with wide ranging interests and insights.
Southeast Asian Affairs, produced since 1974, is an annual review of significant trends and developments in the region. The emphasis is on ASEAN countries but important developments in the broader Asia-Pacific region are not ignored. The publication seeks to provide readable and easily understood analyses of major political, strategic, economic and social developments within the region.
'The Covid-19 pandemic was unprecedented in its impact and repercussions which are still being felt today. The Southeast Asian region is no exception with the loss of hundreds of thousands of lives, economic contraction, and increased poverty. The impact varied across the region. Some countries were more effective than others at implementing lockdowns and delivering public health interventions. Pandemic responses were also differentiated by the efficacy of communication, policy coordination, and leadership. Policy evaluations have highlighted the need to improve institutional capacity as well as global and regional cooperation to respond to future public health crises. This timely and crucial volume, authored by leading regional scholars, thoroughly explores these issues and more. It is indispensable reading for anyone interested in Southeast Asia and broader international development challenges.' Mari Pangestu, Managing Director of Development Policy and Partnerships, World Bank (2020–23) and Former Minister of Trade and Minister of Tourism and Creative Economy, Indonesia.