INTRODUCTION

Mobility restrictions, or lockdowns, are critical measures many economies used to respond to the Covid-19 outbreak. During the early stage of the pandemic, there was a common belief that an early and decisive decision to impose lockdowns was an appropriate policy response, given the uncertain nature of the coronavirus infection.

Countries including China, Italy, Australia and New Zealand imposed strict lockdown measures and rigid border controls when they recorded increased cases of infection. Nevertheless, for various reasons, primarily economic, not all economies implemented such strict lockdowns. Indonesia decided not to implement complete lockdown measures.

The Indonesian government decided that more relaxed and micro-scale restrictions on public activity were the preferred strategy for this populous archipelagic country. These relatively relaxed mobility restrictions provided some space for selected critical and essential activities (such as the health sector and local markets) to continue. At the same time, the government also tried to manage the spread of Covid-19 and provided social assistance and business support for those adversely affected by the mobility restrictions.

The effectiveness of halting people's day-to-day activities to save lives has been critically assessed (see Correia, Luck, and Verner 2020; Goolsbee and Syverson 2020; Bianchi, Bianchi, and Song 2020). These studies show the policy is economically and politically costly. Concerned about the economic and political repercussions, Indonesia did not implement a complete lockdown (Sparrow, Dartanto, and Hartwig 2020). As a result, the Indonesian economy only suffered a mild recession compared to those suffered by countries that enforced more stringent restrictions. In 2020, the Indonesian economy shrank by 2.07 per cent, the first recession since the 1997 Asian financial crisis.

This chapter explains the rationales behind Indonesia's decision to impose and ease its mobility restrictions. We attempt to answer three questions. First, what are the likely factors that determined lockdown decisions? Second, how effective were the lockdowns in controlling the pandemic? Finally, how did the lockdowns affect the economy?

INTRODUCTION

The Covid-19 pandemic has caused significant damage to the socio-economic development of the Lao People's Democratic Republic (Laos). Before the Covid-19 pandemic, Laos had maintained high economic growth for about two decades, while also facing a number of economic challenges, including high external debt, and trade and fiscal deficits. The growth slowdown due to Covid-19 was compounded by increased deficits, largely due to public spending to mitigate the impacts of the pandemic.

Over the period 2020–21, the Covid-19 pandemic resulted in the deployment of lockdown and social distancing measures across the globe. Strict lockdown measures impacted immensely on economies and livelihoods, with economic activities constrained or halted, causing massive contractions in output and income. Stringent measures to limit travel further harmed businesses, leading to the closure of many firms, particularly in services and service-related sectors. The inability of business owners in these sectors to sustain their operations led to serious unemployment as many firms had to lay off their employees.

Like every country, Laos also faced the socio-economic and health impacts of Covid-19. Even though the number of transmissions was kept low compared to many countries, the global nature of the pandemic and the international travel restrictions seriously impacted the Lao economy and its healthcare and education systems. To mitigate the damage caused by the pandemic, the Government of Laos implemented several policies, including fiscal and monetary responses. The economic recovery pathway from the pandemic has become an important debate in Laos.

This chapter investigates the policies and strategies for economic recovery in Laos. First, we provide some context for Laos's economic situation and recent development record, with attention paid to macro-economic factors that affected the country's capacity to respond to and recover from the Covid-19 pandemic. We then provide an overview of the impacts of the Covid-19 virus on Laos and the country's responses. We also discuss Laos's long-term economic challenges. Further, this chapter incorporates an expert survey conducted in 2021 to gather opinions about Covid-19 policy measures and priorities and expectations for economic recovery. Laos's recovery can be observed in retrospect, but the survey findings are useful for shedding light on opinions towards public policy and the recovery outlook while the country was amid the pandemic. Laos's further progress hinges on broader policies that help maintain macroeconomic stability, mitigate devaluation of the domestic currency, moderate inflation and avoid a debt crisis.

INTRODUCTION

The Covid-19 pandemic was, first and foremost, a human tragedy. Most countries prioritized public health and launched various measures—chiefly lockdowns, social distancing and workplace closures—to reduce the spread of the virus. These policies resulted in unprecedented economic impacts on individuals and businesses: access to essential services, food and livelihoods was disrupted, economic activity slowed, firms defaulted and jobs were lost.

Countries also responded with decisive economic policies to cushion the short-term human costs of the downturn induced by the pandemic response. Global fiscal support of US$14 trillion contributed to saving lives and livelihoods and mitigated the effects of the pandemic on consumption and output. Fiscal response, nonetheless, varied greatly across countries, from 2 per cent of gross domestic production (GDP) in Egypt to 46 per cent in Italy (World Bank 2022b). Combined with the economic contraction that caused lower revenues, such support led to a rise in national deficits and public debt. Government budget deficits for 2020 were projected at 13.3 per cent for advanced economies, 10.3 per cent for emerging market and middle-income economies and 5.7 per cent for low-income developing countries (ibid.). Global public debt soared to an estimated 98 per cent of GDP at the end of 2020, compared with 84 per cent in 2019 (Gaspar et al. 2021; World Bank 2022b). Despite the decisive economic policy responses, together with a massive amount of fiscal stimulus, the world experienced the largest global economic crisis in more than a century (World Bank 2022b).

A wide range of policy measures were introduced to confront the short-term impacts of the pandemic. These included direct income support programmes, temporary debt relief (i.e., debt moratoriums for households and businesses, regulatory forbearance for banks) and tax breaks for firms and individuals. These measures were introduced differently across countries, depending on the availability of resources and the specific nature of risks each country faced. In the context of developing countries, implementing these measures was in some cases challenging as social safety net schemes are nascent. Further, developing-country governments also often lack basic information that would allow them to identify and reach the vulnerable and those eligible for support during a crisis, thereby hindering policy efforts. As a result, the magnitude of fiscal resources spent by a country during the crisis might not be a reliable indicator of the impact of Covid-19 on its economy.

INTRODUCTION

As with other countries, Myanmar's response to Covid-19 was shaped by its own social and economic contexts, and, perhaps more than in any other Southeast Asian country, by its political history and climate. The role of the autonomous, powerful military or Tatmadaw in the post-independence national political landscape influenced how Myanmar responded to the pandemic in 2020, while the multi-faceted political crisis affected the response from February 2021 onwards.

On 1 February 2021, the military (a.k.a. the Tatmadaw) seized power alleging major irregularities in the November 2020 general election. It instated a state of emergency that was still in place as of early 2024. Myanmar now has two entities claiming to be the country's legitimate government. The military formed the State Administration Council (SAC) which exercises de facto control over all major economic and policy infrastructures. Lawmakers loyal to the overthrown civilian government formed the National Unity Government (NUG). The country has since seen renewed civil war between the SAC and its various opponents, including the NUG.

This chapter outlines the Covid-19 response and coordination measures implemented in Myanmar. It provides an overview of the four Covid-19 waves in the country between 2020 and mid-2022, and associated response measures including testing and vaccination, stay-at-home orders, quarantine in community facilities, economic responses including cash and non-cash transfers, and civil society, community and private sector responses. We analyse the effects of and responses to Covid-19 in two time periods—before the 2021 coup and after it. We draw on official government publications, but, due to the dearth of reliable official sources, also use media articles.

Myanmar reported its first confirmed case in March 2020. Stay-at-home orders and requirements for people to quarantine in community facilities under a zero-Covid approach were implemented during the first two waves with varying efficacy. The coordination efforts of the National League of Democracy (NLD) government were considered to be one of the leading factors in Myanmar's success in handling the first two waves. However, as the second wave was petering out, the military seized power (February 2021) and the country's Covid-19 response was disrupted. The health system, including testing and vaccination facilities, was incapacitated as healthcare staff spearheaded strikes, protesting against the coup (Nachemson 2021). Vaccinations resumed in March 2021 but were hampered by the political crisis and a ban put in place by India on exports of its vaccine. There was a heavy death toll during the third wave, the Delta variant (June to October 2021), due to continuing health system disruptions and challenges (Figure 4.1). However, by the time the fourth Omicron wave arrived, vaccination rates had increased, and most people opted to self-test and treat themselves at home.

The experiences of Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand in providing relief and stimulus packages can be compared and contrasted in various ways (Nungsari, Ch 11 in this volume; Ho, Ch 12; Archanun, Juthathip, and Mayoon, Ch 13). We observed cross-country similarities and differences, and policy responses had country-specific elements. The scope of measures to remedy the pandemic-induced economic contraction is vast and, in general, common practices that yield positive results can be taken as examples worth serious consideration. This chapter synthesizes definitive and prescriptive findings while being mindful that policy options may be contingent on circumstances. Lessons can be drawn in three key areas: (1) objectives and transitions in policy focus, (2) targeting and mechanisms and (3) structural consequences.

OBJECTIVES AND TRANSITIONS

The urgency of providing job and income protection was readily apparent in the early phases of the pandemic, specifically when all three countries implemented nationwide lockdowns from March to May 2020. As mobility restrictions were scaled down, modified or localized, relief and stimulus measures remained important, but policy priority gravitated towards job creation and economic stimulus, especially as vaccination progressed. Amid these common threads, notable similarities and variations in the policy specifics provide lessons.

Cash transfers emerged as a necessary and impactful intervention for safeguarding well-being during the unprecedentedly extensive and state-imposed lockdown, meaning mobility restrictions. Cash transfers are worth reprising in the event of another pandemic, or any crisis that may entail shutdowns beyond the control of businesses, whether due to mobility restrictions or financial meltdown. The Covid-19 experience established a precedent of concerted, direct and effective means to protect jobs and income, both of which are of utmost importance to society. Malaysia and Singapore's informal economies are relatively small and hence formal mechanisms and existing social protection institutions were able to deliver assistance to broad swathes of the population. However, some communities remained marginalized and excluded, notably migrant workers, undocumented workers and refugees.

In early 2020, Vietnam, as chair of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) for the year, found itself in an uncomfortable and challenging position—it had to either sound the alarm on an increasingly threatening public health emergency or wait and see if the situation would allow for the country's best-laid plans for its chairmanship to come to fruition. Significantly, this decision-making was set against the backdrop of consecutive border closures and self-protecting national measures across the region.

ASEAN is an association of ten member nations. Since its establishment in 1967, it has gone through much change and development, in tandem with the growing global importance of the region on the political and economic fronts. With a combined population of over 620 million, the ASEAN region boasts an economic market of about US$2.3 trillion. On the political-security front, the region is the ostensible epicentre of the contested Indo-Pacific region. In the recent context of rivalry between the United States and China, many, if not most, ASEAN member states maintain a neutral position and hence are able to straddle both sides of the divide, often benefitting economically from this neutral position. While each ASEAN member state maintains its own bilateral relations with key partners around the world, the region as a whole possesses its own strengths and selling points. Therefore, ASEAN maintains relatively strong diplomatic relations with numerous different countries and international organizations.

This chapter outlines the ASEAN experience in countering and dealing with the Covid-19 pandemic. The regional response will be traced not only through the initiatives that ASEAN put in place in response to the pandemic but also through the collective sentiment that the ASEAN policies were espousing. The Covid-19 initiatives will be explored through case studies of two regional initiatives with a view to understanding the political, social and economic motivations behind the policies.

INTRODUCTION

The Covid-19 pandemic, one of the most serious health crises in human history, spread rapidly across the globe since the end of 2019. As Covid-19 spread and the death toll mounted, governments faced the hard reality that saving lives entailed severely limiting or strictly monitoring social contact, with most opting to impose mobility restrictions and economic shutdowns that came at high economic cost. Strategies adopted by governments around the world did, however, range from no intervention at all to strict measures imposed on the population, such as lockdowns (Zibaseresht 2020).

One year into the pandemic, Vietnam emerged as one of the few countries that had largely succeeded in controlling the outbreak, while others, including more advanced and developed nations, witnessed an out-of-control spread of the virus, causing hundreds, even thousands, of deaths every day. However, the emergence of the Delta variant in 2021 put into question the entire system of rigorous contact tracing and other preventive mechanisms, which had until then enabled the country to perform well. In 2021, Vietnam hit its hardest days since the beginning of the pandemic, with the daily infection rate swelling to the thousands and the death toll rising. In end-August 2021, after several lockdowns and closures of most activities, Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh announced that the country could not rely indefinitely on these measures and quarantines. Instead, it would switch to a strategy of living safely with the virus.

Vietnam's Covid-19 experience thus followed two distinct phases. For the first year and a half of the pandemic, the country adopted strict measures and a zero-Covid strategy. Thereafter, the government declared that people would have to learn how to live with the virus instead of avoiding it and incurring high economic costs. Vietnam's second phase was a move to a strategy of flexible adaptation in dealing with the pandemic. The country moved into this second phase later than some other countries, but it marked the end of an era of severe restrictions and a shift towards more flexible and adaptive measures that allowed daily life and business to return to normal. This chapter provides an account of Vietnam's Covid-19 coping strategy and its policy interventions and outcomes.

THREE DISTINCT YEARS: 2020, 2021, 2022

Covid-19 shook the globe at the dawn of a new decade. The scale and speed of viral transmission, and the concurrent health and economic crises resulting from border closures and mobility restrictions, posed unprecedented policy and political challenges. Southeast Asia shared the global experience of Covid-19, with distinct national and regional features.

At the onset of the pandemic in early 2020, the world gravitated towards “flattening the curve” by minimizing human contact, which shut down economies except for essential services. As the year progressed and countries experienced waves of Covid-19 infection, mobility restrictions and border closures were maintained in much of Southeast Asia. Governments extended economic relief and stimulus to protect jobs, mitigate income losses and keep businesses afloat. Governments also grappled with the challenges of coordinating security, health and economic policies, creating and managing mobile applications for recording movement and tracing the contacts of infected persons, and communicating information between agencies and to the public. The region performed relatively well in containing Covid-19 infection, but almost all economies significantly contracted. The adverse consequences were mitigated for some segments, especially those able to shift to online work and formal entities supported by public assistance, but swathes of society experienced great socio-economic hardship.

The storyline of 2021 was markedly different. The more transmissible Delta variant surged across the region but, having gained experience, including in contact tracing applications and public communication channels, governments shifted towards more localized mobility restrictions and adopted mechanisms for gauging the severity of the pandemic and applying commensurate measures for physical distancing. Countries stumbled along the way, with some incapacitated by political instability and others undermined by vested interests. Cross-border travel remained tightly controlled, with quarantine protocols widely in place. As vaccines were approved, procurement and mass roll-out were pursued as the highest priorities. Most countries accelerated Covid-19 inoculation from the second half of 2021. Southeast Asia broadly shifted into recovery mode, while public expenditure and indirect income supplements continued to provide relief and stimulus, and increasing attention was placed on job creation and reviving business activity. Cross-border travel resumed in late 2021 after an almost two-year hiatus, bringing relief to the strains placed on business, leisure and personal ties, although onerous screening and testing requirements were also introduced.

INTRODUCTION

When history looks back at the Covid-19 pandemic, it will perhaps recall “social distancing” as one of the most important phrases to enter humankind's lexicon. At a time when countries were urging their residents to physically distance themselves from each other, the Internet and social media came to the fore as channels to gain information about the virus and its devastating effects on the economy and healthcare. Citizen sentiments as expressed on social media can predict support (or not) for national policies and happenings in the world (Neri et al. 2012). Thus, it is useful to recall the public discourse during this time as a proxy, imperfect as it may be, for the impact of government policies.

At the beginning of the Covid-19 pandemic and the first lockdown in Malaysia, people rallied together on social media in support of each other and healthcare professionals. Hashtags such as #KitaJagaKita (we take care of each other), #DudukRumah (stay home) and #StayHome went viral, with citizens urging solidarity against an invisible enemy—the SARS-CoV-2 virus (Lee 2023). The #KitaJagaKita movement was then co-opted by the government to build support for its policies surrounding movement restrictions and lockdowns. This led to a public backlash in which the hashtag #RakyatJagaRakyat (citizens take care of citizens) went viral in the face of weakening economic opportunities and increasing unemployment (Abdul Halim 2021). In July 2021, as the country entered another round of lockdowns and many peoples’ savings were running short, the hashtag #BenderaPutih (White Flag Movement) went viral, with citizens urging those who needed financial support or food supplies to display white flags on their balconies or homes (BBC 2021). This movement, driven by civil society (primarily individuals), was effective in getting aid to those who needed it. For example, more than twenty households in a fishing village in Kedah found help after putting white flags on their doors (Wang 2021). Tech entrepreneurs in Malaysia—such as Reza Razali, the founder of Terato Tech—also rose to the occasion, creating a web-based platform to connect those who needed aid to those who wanted to donate. The platform featured tens of thousands of requests for help mere weeks after launching; it lives on until today at kitajaga.co, having morphed into an instrument used by the Malaysian Ministry of Finance to disseminate pricing data for specific controlled goods to the public (Malaysiakini 2023).

INTRODUCTION

The Covid-19 pandemic took Malaysia by surprise, as it did most other countries. The first wave of cases came about as the country faced a political crisis, which led to a rapid change of government at the federal level in early March 2020 when the Pakatan Harapan administration fell. The newly formed Perikatan Nasional coalition—comprising Parti Pribumi Bersatu Malaysia (Bersatu), Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS) and the United Malays National Organization (UMNO)—took over. It is important to note that the Perikatan Nasional government took over with only a slim majority of 113 parliamentary seats out of 222. In July 2021, UMNO officially withdrew its support from the Perikatan Nasional government, leading to political and policy uncertainty and instability.

Between 2020 and 2022, there was also a second change in the top leadership position, when in August 2021 the Prime Minister was replaced with another member of the same coalition—but from a different party—and the Cabinet was reshuffled significantly. Consequently, Malaysia had three different health ministers in as many years and it was amid high levels of political instability that the pandemic took hold in several increasingly devastating waves.

Following the March 2020 federal government change, four states—Kedah, Perak, Malacca and Johor—also changed government. Then, in September 2020, Sabah held a state election due to political defections from the ruling coalition, leading to a fifth change in state government. Three other state elections took place in 2021 and 2022 (in Malacca, Sarawak and Johor), and although the incumbent coalitions retained power, the Chief Minister of Johor was replaced. Such rapid political changes over a short period of time would be expected to and did disrupt policy coordination at the state level.

The policy coordination required to handle a national health crisis tested the robustness of the institutions and leadership. Indeed, Malaysia needed efficient horizontal and vertical coordination to facilitate effective pandemic management. Instead, changes in the individuals helming federal government agencies crucial to this coordination within health and socio-economic spheres meant interrupted administration.

Although Malaysia is a constitutional federation, law- and policymaking has been historically highly centralized (Hutchinson 2014; Ostwald 2017). During the pandemic and the political crisis between 2020 and 2022, the federal government continued this centralized approach and adopted top-down approaches to managing Covid-19 through federal laws and regulations. In several cases, federal-state relations became fractious when disagreements arose, particularly when the federal government did not conduct meaningful prior consultation with the states.

INTRODUCTION

The emergence of the Covid-19 pandemic necessitated the administration of safe and effective vaccines. The vaccine also needed to be given to sufficient numbers of people to achieve the herd immunity required to halt transmission of the virus, as well as the health and mortality impacts and the negative effects on the economy. There was thus a rush to produce vaccines, but these had to be produced at scale, priced affordably and made available globally. Vaccines also had to be authorized or approved for human use. Each country had to choose whether to use only vaccines approved by the World Health Organization (WHO) or to expand their choices based on their assessment of the available vaccines and their country's needs. The supply of vaccines to a country, especially to developing countries with no capacity to produce their own, became a critical factor in managing the pandemic. Procuring vaccines has become a serious challenge for many developing countries (Sheikh et al. 2021), including those in Southeast Asia. Local production can also support supply since some developing countries do have the capacity to manufacture vaccines. Unfortunately, intellectual property rights and limited technology transfer can stand in the way of local production (OECD 2021). Vaccines were not accessible in most developing countries at the end of 2020 when they were first authorized for use, because high-income countries had pre-purchased a significant portion (Tagoe et al. 2021). Given budget constraints, developing countries had to consider different supply sources, including donations and aid.

In 2020, it was already established that several leading vaccines required ultra-cold storage and transport chains and had short shelf lives once removed from the ultra-cold conditions. Hence, the deployment of vaccines also depends on a country's logistics infrastructure, capacity and capability (OECD 2021). There can also be significant variations within a country, namely between better-developed urban areas and logistically challenged rural regions.

Another challenge that remains even once supplies are made available is the state's capacity to distribute and administer the vaccines to their entire populations, taking into account the risk factors of different age groups and vulnerabilities, geographical constraints and sociocultural factors (Tevdovski, Jolakoski, and Stojkoski 2022). A state's capacity to implement a viable and effective vaccination strategy is therefore another key factor that can influence a country's vaccine roll-out.

INTRODUCTION

The Covid-19 pandemic has taken a significant toll on many countries, both in terms of lives lost and economic disruption through the impact on jobs, incomes and livelihoods.

In the long battle against Covid-19, the Singapore government prioritized the protection of both lives and livelihoods. Singapore's approach at the outset of the pandemic was to control the spread of the virus so as to minimize deaths and prevent the healthcare system from being overwhelmed. Concurrently, substantial financial support was provided to keep businesses and households afloat.

Singapore's experience of SARS in 2003 and the global financial crisis of 2008–9 informed its approach to dealing with Covid-19 and the economic fallout. Task forces comprising government ministers and civil servants were quickly set up to coordinate policies, both for infection control and management of the economy. State assistance covered jobs, citizens, households and businesses. The assistance was a buffer against job and income losses, designed to mitigate the impact of the pandemic on the economy and labour market. To finance this exceptional support, the Singapore government enacted five budgets in 2020 and drew on the nation's Past Reserves1 for the first time since the global financial crisis.

Subsequently, with Covid-19 becoming endemic, it became necessary to open up the economy in phases, accepting a rise in infections while seeking to minimize deaths and serious illness. Singapore's reopening was aided by the efficient roll-out of its vaccine and booster programme, as the more transmissible Delta and Omicron strains of the virus made a zero-Covid policy untenable for a country heavily dependent on global connectivity.

Singapore emerged from the pandemic with a relatively low mortality rate (below 0.1 per cent as of end-2022, compared with the global average of about 1 per cent).2 It also significantly mitigated the fallout of the pandemic on the economy and labour market. However, the longer-term impact of the pandemic in areas such as inequality and foreign workforce policies will require sustained attention.

In mid-March 2024, during a private conversation, the author's sixty-seven-year-old uncle, a longstanding member of the CPV who fought for the North during the Vietnam War, predicted that the then State President Vo Van Thuong would be dismissed. When asked for the reason behind his prediction, he ascribed it to the sudden cancellation of the visit by the King of the Netherlands. The author's uncle further explained that State President Thuong had extended the invitation to King Willem-Alexander to visit Vietnam, and as the head of state, the responsibility to receive the Dutch monarch would naturally fall to Mr Thuong. However, the visit was quietly cancelled at the last minute, causing great confusion. This can only mean that Mr Thuong's status as head of state is somewhat compromised, and he may no longer be able to fulfil his duties. The reason, according to the author's uncle, was President Thuong's involvement with Phuc Son group, a construction entity under investigation for corruption and fraud.

Reports regarding the official visit of the King of the Netherlands were initially covered by the state-controlled media; however, it appears that most of these reports have since been removed. The abrupt cancellation of the visit, which occurred at the eleventh hour, received minimal coverage from domestic media outlets. Nonetheless, foreign media extensively reported on the cancellation. BBC highlighted that the stated reason for the cancellation was “internal affairs” and suggested the possibility of Mr Thuong's involvement in a corruption scandal. The rumour that Mr Thuong allegedly received 60 billion VND from the Phuc Son group, purportedly to construct a worship house for his clan, was also reported by VOA. This information, as my uncle explained, was discussed within his circle of acquaintances, some of whom are retired military personnel and police officers, who frequently engage in discussions about Vietnamese politics.

People are clearly aware of the corruption taking place around them but usually take it for granted. The compulsory military service system in Vietnam is another example. Male citizens between the ages of eighteen and twenty-seven are required to serve two years of compulsory military service. Since serving for two years may cost a conscript his career and there is a risk of hazing, many people actively avoid it.