This chapter examines Russia’s relations with maritime Southeast Asia’s three Muslim-majority countries: Indonesia, Malaysia and Brunei. Of the three, Moscow has always prioritized relations with Indonesia due to its size, population, regional influence and non-aligned status. During the Cold War, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) forged close political and military ties with Indonesia’s first president, Sukarno. After his ouster in 1965, bilateral ties cooled under his anti-communist successor, Suharto. Nevertheless, the USSR’s relations with the Sukarno regime has served post-Soviet Russia well as the Indonesian elite remains grateful for the support Moscow provided Jakarta in the immediate aftermath of independence. When Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, in accordance with its “active and independent” foreign policy, Indonesia adopted a neutral position. But its stance on the war was also influenced by latent anti-Americanism which stood in contrast to Russia’s image as an Islamic-friendly state. Since the invasion, Indonesia’s leaders have proposed various peace plans to end the conflict though none have been taken seriously by the warring parties and other stakeholders in the conflict.

Malaysia’s relations with Russia have almost mirrored those of Indonesia. During the Cold War, they were neither friends nor enemies, and Malaysia felt the USSR played a useful balancing role against the United States and China. Post-Cold War, Malaysia, like Indonesia, looked to Russia as a source of arms and economic opportunities.

The last of the four country surveys, this chapter looks at Russia’s bilateral relations with the three remaining maritime Southeast Asian states: Singapore, the Philippines and East Timor/Timor-Leste. None has ever had strong political, economic or security ties with Moscow, and all three of them strongly condemned Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. Singapore and the Philippines have close defence ties with the United States and have never made any major purchases of Russian defence equipment. Of the three countries, Singapore, a trading entrepot, has shown the most interest in developing commercial ties with Russia, though economic engagement has been modest. The Philippines, a treaty ally of the United States since independence, has occasionally flirted with Moscow but always returned to Washington’s embrace. As for Timor-Leste, Moscow played a minor role in the country’s struggle for independence but has since lost Dili’s respect because of its egregious violation of Ukraine’s rights under the United Nations (UN) Charter.

Singapore-Russia Relations

In the Cold War era, Singapore viewed the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) as a threat to regional security and a country of limited economic value. Post-Cold War, Singapore’s perceptions of Russia were reversed, a recognition of its economic potential and its vastly reduced power projection capabilities after the collapse of the Soviet Empire.

This chapter surveys the development of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) engagement with the Soviet Union and Russia, from the organization’s foundation in 1967 until the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine War in 2022 and its immediate aftermath. For the first 20 years of that period, relations were marked by mutual suspicion and hostility. ASEAN’s founding members had a strong aversion to communism while the Kremlin regarded the bloc as the US-led anticommunist Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in another guise. Only in the early 1990s, when Southeast Asian leaders began to consider how they could shape the post-Cold War regional security order, did ASEAN simultaneously reach out to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and People’s Republic of China (PRC), both of which became Consultative Partners.

In the 1990s, ASEAN inducted Russia into the various building blocks of the emerging regional security architecture, despite Moscow’s preoccupation with the post-Soviet space and the Euro-Atlantic, and its diminished military presence in Southeast Asia. In 1994, Russia became a founding member of the security-focused ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and was promoted to full Dialogue Partner a few years later. Eventually, Russia became a Strategic Partner and was invited to join the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus) and the East Asia Summit (EAS). Meanwhile, at a string of ASEANRussia Summits, the two sides issued mutual declarations of esteem and endorsed detailed action plans for the future. Yet, overall it has been a relationship marked by unfulfilled potential and unmet expectations, primarily due to Russia’s tiny economic footprint in Southeast Asia.

To fully understand Russia’s role and interests in Southeast Asia, the region must be situated within the wider context of its foreign policy, especially Moscow’s approach to the Asia-Pacific. This chapter provides the starting point for that exercise. It begins by charting, in brief, Russia’s post-Soviet foreign policy under President Boris Yeltsin in the 1990s before moving on to examine Russia’s external relations under President Vladimir Putin, identifying his core foreign policy beliefs and how they precipitated Russia’s estrangement from the West from the mid-2000s onwards, culminating in the complete breakdown of relations following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022. The second half of this chapter examines the background to, and rationales for, the Kremlin’s “Turn to the East” policy in the early 2010s. As with previous reorientations eastwards in Russia’s foreign policy, pull and push factors were at work: the pull of Asia’s economic opportunities and the push of deteriorating ties with the West. This chapter sets the scene for the next one, which provides a more detailed examination of Russia’s bilateral relations with each of the major players in the Indo-Pacific.

Russia’s Foreign Policy under Yeltsin

During his two turbulent terms in office, from 1991 until 1999, President Yeltsin faced three Herculean tasks. He had to dismantle 74 years of communist rule and transform Russia into a representative democracy (a liberal democracy was always going to be a stretch given the persistence of authoritarianism in Russian history). At the same time, he sought to rapidly transition Russia from a command economy into a free-market economy by implementing radical economic reforms, including the mass privatization of state-run industries.

In Southeast Asia, Russia is an economic minnow among whales. At the outset of the Putin era in 2000, two-way trade between Russia and the ten Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states was only US$1.4 billion. Over the next decade and a half, ASEAN-Russia trade grew steadily, but peaked at US$22.3 billion in 2014 before falling to US$15.8 billion in 2023 (it was US$13.5 from January to September 2024). Over the past quarter of a century, Russia has never accounted for more than 1 per cent of the ASEAN-10’s total trade. As a consequence, whereas ASEAN has signed free trade agreements with six of its 11 Dialogue Partners—Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea—it does not have one with Russia. Russia’s FDI into Southeast Asia has been meagre, and vice versa.

Given Russia’s limited economic engagement, it was unsurprising that in the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute’s 2019 survey of elite opinions, only 0.1 per cent of Southeast Asian respondents felt Russia had the most economic influence in the region (on a par with India), compared with 73.3 per cent for China (in 2019, ASEAN-China trade in goods was US$508 billion), 7.9 per cent for the United States (ASEAN-US trade was US$295 billion) and 6.2 per cent for Japan (ASEAN-Japan trade was US$226 billion). In the 2020 survey, the percentage of respondents who thought Russia had the most economic influence fell to zero.

Highlights

• ■ The Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) has undertaken regional power connectivity for three decades, becoming one of the most advanced regional energy trade and integration programmes in the world.

• ■ A review of the policy process sheds light on how GMS established cross-border power trade and explains the successes and limitations experienced by member countries.

• ■ The initial consensus-building was possible due to honest brokers as well as the rapid implementation of a small representative project before the design of the larger programme.

• ■ Physical construction has moved faster than institutional development, leading to an array of bilateral projects that may narrow the scope of cooperation.

• ■ Institutional construction requires longer periods of negotiation, including failures, compared to the development of interconnections. However, this process allows further development and exchanges that expand cooperation.

• ■ Energy transition offers an additional incentive to pursue regional power trade in the GMS.

INTRODUCTION

Energy cooperation has been at the core of the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) Economic Cooperation Program since its launch in 1992 by Cambodia, China (autonomous region of Guangxi and province of Yunnan), Lao PDR, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam, with the support of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) as the secretariat (Yu 2003; del Barrio Alvarez and Horii 2017). It is possible to trace the roots of this programme to an energy cooperation project between Lao PDR and Thailand: the relatively small 40-megawatt (MW) Xeset dam. This became the anchor for the regional agenda for economic cooperation among neighbouring countries (Cruz-Del Rosario 2014). From this example of power connectivity, the GMS programme was launched as a multisector cooperation project spanning transportation, telecommunications, energy development, environmental management, human resource development, and trade and investment.

Highlights

• ■ Countries including those in Southeast Asia are exploring lowcarbon hydrogen to achieve carbon-neutrality. This current interest in hydrogen is the fourth wave since the 1970s.

• ■ In this latest wave, major Southeast Asian economies have unveiled low-carbon hydrogen strategies, driven by enthusiasm for its potential to drive decarbonization, create jobs and improve energy security. However, they risk creating targets and policies based on hype.

• ■ Low-carbon hydrogen is competing not only with fossil fuels but also with other renewable-based alternatives for market share in Southeast Asia.

• ■ Given the region’s renewable energy potential and unique endowments, there are other existing and emerging low-carbon solutions that can perform as well as, if not better than, low-carbon hydrogen in Southeast Asia.

• ■ Southeast Asian governments need to be clear-minded on whether the low-carbon hydrogen they plan to produce is for local consumption to decarbonize the national economy, or for export to gain foreign revenue.

INTRODUCTION

The prospects of low-carbon hydrogen are enticing for Southeast Asia (ASEAN Centre for Energy 2022). The region has abundant renewable energy, natural gas reserves and carbon capture, utilization and storage (CCUS) potential (ASEAN Centre for Energy 2021), which are required for its production. As such, the common understanding is that low-carbon hydrogen can potentially be tapped to accelerate the region’s energy transition (ibid.). This excitement came to the fore after 2016 when the International Energy Agency (IEA), Japan, the European Union and other key international organizations started emphasizing the importance of low-carbon hydrogen in achieving net-zero emissions by 2050.

Highlights

• ■ This study investigates justice in Indonesia’s energy

• transition policies and financing using the energy justice

• concepts.

• ■ Justice in most energy-related laws in Indonesia is narrow, focusing on access, inclusivity, affordability and cost efficiency.

• ■ Financing policies do not adequately focus on building the capacities of impacted stakeholders.

• ■ Indonesia needs to develop a legally binding just transition framework outlining transition principles and policies.

INTRODUCTION

There are multiple challenges facing the contemporary global energy regime: providing energy for everyone, including the poor; minimizing negative externalities and the unequal burden of energy provision; and implementing deep decarbonization of energy systems. These challenges require the transformation of socio-technical systems comprising a mix of technologies, infrastructures, organizations, markets, regulations and user practices that have developed over decades (Geels 2017). Since energy systems have been embedded in people’s lives, resistance to the transition is unavoidable. At the community level, resistance may come from workers and communities who rely on carbon-intensive industries such as coal mining (Healy and Barry 2017).

As a result, transitioning to a low-carbon economy is contentious. It is estimated that the entire coal industry value chain, from mining to power generation, employs 8.4 million people globally, a majority of whom will be impacted by the transition to a low-carbon system. The impact of the transition will also be concentrated in coal-dependent developing countries such as China, India, Indonesia, Mongolia, South Africa and Vietnam (Diluiso et al. 2021; International Energy Agency 2022a).

This volume is an attempt to provide a multifaceted overview of Southeast Asia’s efforts towards decarbonization and the associated challenges that impede progress. The chapters highlight some progress made by countries in the region in terms of financing renewable energy and facilitating energy trade. Regional countries have developed policies that aim to accelerate decarbonization in a just and equitable manner and incorporate the use of new technologies in mitigation efforts. However, the in-depth critique of regional decarbonization efforts by the contributors of this volume reveals the inadequacy of the current pace of progress in meeting renewable energy targets, and the shortcomings of existing domestic frameworks to address the social, environmental and political challenges of decarbonization. In addition, significant gaps between policy and implementation—resulting from the lack of capacity, poor governance, and political challenges—remain.

The slow rate of progress on decarbonization is concerning, but it does not invalidate the goal of developing environmentally sustainable economies in Southeast Asia. Decarbonization and energy transition are nonlinear processes that are likely to be impeded by socio-political resistance as well as economic and technical limitations, while also being facilitated by international and domestic mobilization of climate finance, technical innovation and increasing political will to fast-track mitigation efforts. Accelerating decarbonization in a dynamic environment marked by simultaneous and often contradictory flows of progress and backtracking requires identifying key intervention points that can have a significant influence on the future development of energy systems (Kanger, Sovacool, and Noorkõiv 2020; Huda 2024).

Highlights

• ■ Grid digitalization can enhance cross-border interconnections and accelerate renewable energy integration.

• ■ Cross-border initiatives for smart grid development compel a rethinking of the governance of transboundary energy commons.

• ■ An imperative for the ASEAN Power Grid is investment in a unified regulatory framework for smart grid development governed by regional mechanisms.

INTRODUCTION

The world’s most critical climate imperative is the decarbonization of the electricity sector by 2050 (IRENA 2022). This requires a dual strategy: (1) innovation where renewables deployment is massively scaled up, inclusively shared and efficiently utilized; and (2) exnovation where fossil fuel assets, particularly coal power, are decisively phased out. In Southeast Asia, amid the continued expansion of coal-fired power generation, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) aims to help member countries maximize their significant renewable energy (RE) potential and expand regional trade, while strengthening energy security (ADB 2022a; ACE 2022). Given the severe economic and power reliability implications of the coal phase-out, the region is compelled to deploy large-scale renewables and develop stable electricity grids (Demoral et al. 2022).

The imperative for grid digitalization is highlighted in the 7th ASEAN Energy Outlook (ACE 2022, p. 78): “Energy supply trails behind installed capacity by almost half of its value, indicating the efficient utilization of renewables is a priority … smarter and more flexible grid infrastructures, are required to address higher penetration of RE in the future.”

Highlights

• ■ This chapter reviews the distributive, procedural and recognized dimensions of environmental justice in the decarbonization of development projects in Malaysia.

• ■ The analysis of two case studies—Kota Damansara Community Forest Movement and Ampang Forest Park Movement—highlights existing forms of environmental justice and injustice.

• ■ The study suggests that Malaysia’s climate mitigation efforts must be grounded in environmental justice principles.

INTRODUCTION

The concept of sustainable development was introduced internationally in 1987 in the Brundtland Report by the World Commission on Environment and Development (Brundtland 1987), which stated, “Humanity has the ability to make development sustainable to ensure that it meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of the future generations to meet their own needs” (p. 16). The publication of the report offered a “political entrance” for the emergence of sustainable development (Daly 2014) by integrating economic growth and environmental conservation.

Sustainable development is a “shifting discourse” (Blowers, Boersema, and Martin 2012), and the term has changed organically since its inception (Daly 2014; Swain 2018; Pope et al. 2017; White 2013). The 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development aimed to address the restricted framework of sustainable development that overlooked human, or social, concerns including equality and social justice. This led to a broader interpretation of sustainable development based on three pillars: social, economic and environmental (Enders and Remig 2014).