INTRODUCTION

Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), the largest Muslim organization in Indonesia, with a reported membership of between 40 and 162 million, has played an immense role in Indonesian presidential elections. It can be described as a loosely structured organization comprising Islamic boarding schools and autonomous agencies. However, given its vast resources and branches across the archipelago, including a massive budget, NU-affiliated schools, and its representatives in the influential umbrella organization, Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI), NU has effectively played both the roles of power broker and community mobilizer. Many senior kiais who serve as NU leaders can influence their followers and sympathizers through sermons and speeches. Given such a context, initiating and maintaining political engagement with NU have been crucial for Indonesia’s presidents if they are to execute their social, political and developmental agendas and guarantee their re-election for a second term or their longevity in power.

Because of their immense number, NU voters have played a crucial role in contributing to a presidential candidate’s victory since 2004. In the 2024 presidential election that secured Prabowo Subianto’s win, they made up at least 40 million, or one-fifth of the 204.8 million registered voters. Among them, more than half (55.8 per cent) voted for Prabowo, while 21.8 per cent and 12.8 per cent voted for Anies Baswedan and Ganjar Pranowo, respectively. A similar percentage of NU voters (56 per cent) voted for Joko Widodo in the 2019 presidential election, securing his win.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• Since Indonesia adopted a direct presidential election in 2004, which applies a one-man, one-vote system, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), the country’s largest Muslim organization, has played an increasingly significant role in elections.

• Candidates actively develop ties with the organization’s leaders and vast voter base to improve their chances of winning elections.

• Factors driving the political engagement between Indonesia’s presidents and NU are arguably contingent on the dynamics of the existing political situation. Whereas material or transactional factors defined the political engagement between NU and presidents Soeharto, Megawati Soekarnoputri and Prabowo Subianto, the relationships were driven mainly by ideological factors under the administrations of Soekarno and Joko Widodo.

• This article seeks to trace, albeit briefly, the political engagement between Indonesia’s presidents and NU throughout the presidencies of Soekarno to Prabowo Subianto. This longitudinal research seeks to give readers a more comprehensive understanding of NU’s political engagement with different presidents throughout Indonesia’s history.

The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.

The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policymakers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.

THE EDITORS

Series Chairman:

Choi Shing Kwok

Series Editor:

Ooi Kee Beng

Editorial Committee:

Daljit Singh

Francis E. Hutchinson

Norshahril Saat

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• Traditionally an opposition outfit, the Democratic Action Party (DAP) has evolved to become a mainstream operation. A consequential player in Malaysian politics, it now has forty members of parliament and ninety state assembly representatives.

• Because of its cadre-based structure, the DAP usually has orderly party elections. Nonetheless, foundational issues have caused some disagreements to bubble to the surface—most recently at the 2025 National Party Congress.

• Now approaching its sixtieth year, the party is grappling with three key challenges.

• The first is the managing of generational change and the fostering of greater inclusiveness. Senior leaders are retiring, not always willingly; and while the party is multiracial in outlook, it has struggled to diversify its leadership.

• The second stems from it evolving from having a small group structure into a larger and more complex organization. No longer a uniquely nationally focused party, the DAP’s leaders are increasingly nourishing support bases at the state level—shifting power within the party structure outwards and downwards.

• The third is the managing of diverse expectations. While much of its support base sees the DAP as the opposition, it is now in government. Navigating within the boundaries of what is politically feasible now calls for a different set of skills.

INTRODUCTION

Founded in late 1965 and formally registered in March 1966, the Democratic Action Party (DAP) is among Malaysia’s oldest parties. Initially the Malaya-based branch of Singapore’s People’s Action Party, the DAP was formed after Singapore’s exit from the Malaysian Federation. Since its founding, the party has advocated a multiracial and centre-left approach to political issues, as expressed in its first policy document, the Setapak Declaration.

In 1966, the DAP contested in by-elections in Selangor and Johor, and subsequently fielded candidates in the 1969 general election. It has contested in every general election since. In subsequent years, the party had successful forays in the southern part of the peninsula as well as its west coast. But while it also competed in elections in the north, the DAP had limited success in states like Kelantan, Perlis and Terengganu.

During the 1970s, the DAP built up its brand and grassroots network, focusing on issues such as education and language, parliamentary democracy, anti-corruption, and the rights and prerogatives accorded to East Malaysia. The DAP was the first major peninsula-based party to operate in East Malaysia, establishing branches in Sabah and Sarawak in 1978.

The DAP further expanded in the 1980s, with notable successes in the 1986 and 1990 general elections, where it won 24 and 20 parliamentary seats, respectively. However, as with all opposition parties, the party was hampered by Malaysia’s first-past-the-post parliamentary system, which penalizes runners-up. Consequently, it always netted a lower proportion of seats than its share of votes.

The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.

The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policymakers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.

THE EDITORS

Series Chairman:

Choi Shing Kwok

Series Editor:

Ooi Kee Beng

Editorial Committee:

Daljit Singh

Francis E. Hutchinson

Norshahril Saat

Chronology of DAP National Party Congresses and CEC Elections

The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.

The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policymakers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.

THE EDITORS

Series Chairman:

Choi Shing Kwok

Series Editor:

Ooi Kee Beng

Editorial Committee:

Daljit Singh

Francis E. Hutchinson

Norshahril Saat

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• While much research has explored how perceptions of income inequality influence political outcomes—such as political participation, behaviour, and support for democracy—less attention has been given to how a country’s economic and political conditions shape these perceptions. This article argues that economic outlook and political stability play a crucial role in shaping how youths perceive income inequality.

• A youth and civic engagement survey conducted by the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute between August and October 2024 found that Indonesian, Filipino and Thai youths are the most pessimistic about the economic prospects and political conditions of their countries. This bleak outlook aligns closely with their negative perceptions of income inequality.

• In contrast, youths in Singapore and Vietnam exhibit higher levels of optimism, underpinned by the strong economic growth and political stability of their countries. These favourable conditions, in turn, contribute to more positive perceptions of fairness in wealth distribution in their respective countries.

• Malaysia, however, presents a more nuanced picture. Despite relatively high levels of income inequality, Malaysian youths remain optimistic about the economic future of the country, revealing a disconnect between economic optimism and perceptions of income inequality.

• Overall, this article urges policymakers to address objective measures as well as subjective perceptions of inequality by fostering economic environments and political systems that bolster youth optimism and confidence in equitable development. As these perceptions will shape future political landscapes significantly, ensuring a balanced narrative regarding economic growth and fair wealth distribution is essential for sociopolitical stability in Southeast Asia in the future.

INTRODUCTION

Southeast Asian countries exhibit remarkable economic diversity. While some have experienced rapid economic growth alongside declining income inequality, others continue to grapple with persistent and substantial income disparities. Yet public discontent and anxiety about the economy remain widespread across the region, even where objective indicators like the Gini index paint a more optimistic picture. This suggests that perceptions of inequality, grounded in day-to-day economic and political realities rather than statistical measures, play a critical role in driving public concern, political engagement and demands for policy change. Research shows, however, that these perceptions are often inaccurate and biased.

Studies have shown that social and economic inequalities often serve as underlying causes of social unrest and political demands for change. In particular, these inequalities have played a significant role in fuelling separatist movements in Aceh (Indonesia), Pattani (Thailand) and Mindanao (the Philippines), as well as the non-separatist movement in Sabah, Malaysia. Income inequality has also been identified as an important factor in various violent conflicts that emerged during the post-Suharto era. A recent example is the Indonesia Gelap (Dark Indonesia) movement, which was behind multiple protests. Although various factors triggered the movement—such as unfavourable government policies, including education budget cuts affecting national strategic projects and military involvement in the civilian sector—the movement also reflects the growing social and economic inequality within the country. Similarly, in Thailand, economic inequality and urban-rural divides have contributed to various public protests in recent years. In short, these examples demonstrate how perceived social and economic inequalities are key drivers of political participation and demands for policy change.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• An escalation of violence in Myanmar has led to a significant loss of territories by the Myanmar junta and reconfigured the country’s political terrain. The territories can presently be characterized broadly into Junta-controlled areas with low resistance, junta-controlled areas with high resistance, active armed conflict areas, areas controlled by highly vulnerable non-state armed groups, areas controlled by non-state armed groups that are not as vulnerable, and border areas sheltering internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees.

• Each of these are evolving on a weekly or monthly basis, igniting both optimistic and pessimistic responses from Myanmar civilians and policy/scholar communities.

• Negative concerns originated from the proliferation of armed actors and a growing conflict among non-state armed actors and inter- and intra-communal hostilities, while positive responses are drawn from emerging bottom-up local governing practices.

• The SAC has various options. It can intensify repression, it can divide and rule, or it can negotiate settlements on the terms set by the National Unity Government (NUG) and its coalition partners. Any of these could perpetuate the status quo or lead to negotiations that may either revert to civil war or result in further negotiations for “federal democracy”.

• The nature of Myanmar’s future territorial and governing landscapes will be determined by the relationships between union-level actors (such as the NUG/NLD and Myanmar’s armed forces) and regional actors, as well as those among regional actors.