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The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.
The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policymakers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.
• While much research has explored how perceptions of income inequality influence political outcomes—such as political participation, behaviour, and support for democracy—less attention has been given to how a country’s economic and political conditions shape these perceptions. This article argues that economic outlook and political stability play a crucial role in shaping how youths perceive income inequality.
• A youth and civic engagement survey conducted by the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute between August and October 2024 found that Indonesian, Filipino and Thai youths are the most pessimistic about the economic prospects and political conditions of their countries. This bleak outlook aligns closely with their negative perceptions of income inequality.
• In contrast, youths in Singapore and Vietnam exhibit higher levels of optimism, underpinned by the strong economic growth and political stability of their countries. These favourable conditions, in turn, contribute to more positive perceptions of fairness in wealth distribution in their respective countries.
• Malaysia, however, presents a more nuanced picture. Despite relatively high levels of income inequality, Malaysian youths remain optimistic about the economic future of the country, revealing a disconnect between economic optimism and perceptions of income inequality.
• Overall, this article urges policymakers to address objective measures as well as subjective perceptions of inequality by fostering economic environments and political systems that bolster youth optimism and confidence in equitable development. As these perceptions will shape future political landscapes significantly, ensuring a balanced narrative regarding economic growth and fair wealth distribution is essential for sociopolitical stability in Southeast Asia in the future.
Southeast Asian countries exhibit remarkable economic diversity. While some have experienced rapid economic growth alongside declining income inequality, others continue to grapple with persistent and substantial income disparities. Yet public discontent and anxiety about the economy remain widespread across the region, even where objective indicators like the Gini index paint a more optimistic picture. This suggests that perceptions of inequality, grounded in day-to-day economic and political realities rather than statistical measures, play a critical role in driving public concern, political engagement and demands for policy change. Research shows, however, that these perceptions are often inaccurate and biased.
Studies have shown that social and economic inequalities often serve as underlying causes of social unrest and political demands for change. In particular, these inequalities have played a significant role in fuelling separatist movements in Aceh (Indonesia), Pattani (Thailand) and Mindanao (the Philippines), as well as the non-separatist movement in Sabah, Malaysia. Income inequality has also been identified as an important factor in various violent conflicts that emerged during the post-Suharto era. A recent example is the Indonesia Gelap (Dark Indonesia) movement, which was behind multiple protests. Although various factors triggered the movement—such as unfavourable government policies, including education budget cuts affecting national strategic projects and military involvement in the civilian sector—the movement also reflects the growing social and economic inequality within the country. Similarly, in Thailand, economic inequality and urban-rural divides have contributed to various public protests in recent years. In short, these examples demonstrate how perceived social and economic inequalities are key drivers of political participation and demands for policy change.
• An escalation of violence in Myanmar has led to a significant loss of territories by the Myanmar junta and reconfigured the country’s political terrain. The territories can presently be characterized broadly into Junta-controlled areas with low resistance, junta-controlled areas with high resistance, active armed conflict areas, areas controlled by highly vulnerable non-state armed groups, areas controlled by non-state armed groups that are not as vulnerable, and border areas sheltering internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees.
• Each of these are evolving on a weekly or monthly basis, igniting both optimistic and pessimistic responses from Myanmar civilians and policy/scholar communities.
• Negative concerns originated from the proliferation of armed actors and a growing conflict among non-state armed actors and inter- and intra-communal hostilities, while positive responses are drawn from emerging bottom-up local governing practices.
• The SAC has various options. It can intensify repression, it can divide and rule, or it can negotiate settlements on the terms set by the National Unity Government (NUG) and its coalition partners. Any of these could perpetuate the status quo or lead to negotiations that may either revert to civil war or result in further negotiations for “federal democracy”.
• The nature of Myanmar’s future territorial and governing landscapes will be determined by the relationships between union-level actors (such as the NUG/NLD and Myanmar’s armed forces) and regional actors, as well as those among regional actors.
The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.
The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policymakers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.
We dedicate this article to the memory of Gwen Robinson, whose untimely passing on 29 March 2025 prevented her from seeing the publication of this paper. A renowned journalist, Gwen devoted the last fifteen years of her life to bringing truth and awareness about a country ravaged by conflict and civil war. Gwen was also a generous and passionate human being who poured her heart, soul and energy towards helping others seek justice and equality. Gwen worked on this article up to and during her time in palliative hospice care, refusing to let go of revisions even when weakened by pain and interruptions. Gwen's efforts pay tribute to the courage and tenacity of many Myanmar who lost their lives in seeking a return to democracy and freedom from authoritarian military rule. Their sacrifices, strength and courage inspire us all to live a meaningful and impactful life in the remaining span of our existence.
INTRODUCTION
Four years after Myanmar's military ousted elected leaders and seized power, the country is pushing deeper by the day into uncharted territory. The escalation of nationwide resistance against the military junta known as the State Administration Council (SAC) has, however, seen significant territory fall to various armed groups, ranging from ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) to people's defence forces. But the SAC's continuing ability to launch airstrikes and long-range artillery shelling and to maintain surveillance and militia networks has prevented resistance groups from consolidating control over many areas where it has established some form of administration.
This article draws from a database of asset-level emissions to identify key methane-emitting coal, oil and gas facilities in Southeast Asia while taking stock of the methane commitments of their owners. Coal mines account for around a third of fossil fuel methane emissions globally, but in Southeast Asia they make up more than half of tracked fossil fuel methane emissions. Over half of emissions from the coal mining subsector is traced to its top ten emitters, mostly in East Kalimantan, Indonesia; while some coal mines in North Vietnam have high emissions intensities. Though the global discourse on fossil methane focuses on oil and gas, coal mine methane remains crucial for Southeast Asia due to the region's lack of decisive coal phaseout plans. As countries begin to tackle coal emissions at the power generation stage, a gap still remains when it comes to coal mining emissions. Methane monitoring and abatement actions are urgently needed for coal mines that will continue to operate, as well as those slated for closure. More clarity is needed on how private sector commitments in the oil and gas sector will translate to action under complex and changing ownership arrangements. These gaps and uncertainties in methane abatement are ripe opportunities for closer partnership in the region, including within the private sector.
Since the Islamic resurgence hit Southeast Asia in the 1980s, Muslim societies now have greater aspirations for adhering to the Shariah, the body of laws meant to govern Muslims' day-to-day lives. At the institutional level, the desire for this compliance manifested in the establishment of various institutions such as Islamic banking and financial programmes. At the personal and societal levels, there are increasing demands for the provision of halal-certified goods and services, most commonly in the food and beverage industry. However, increasingly, compliance to the Shariah is no longer limited to laws or ensuring that food and beverages are halal, but has become an entire lifestyle. The rise of the Muslim middle class in Southeast Asia has catalysed this preference. Muslim consumers now demand that products in other industries, such as fashion, sports, tourism, medicine and personal hygiene, should also be Shariah-compliant and even reminiscent of the time in which Prophet Muhammad lived. This book analyses the various social, economic, and political forces that have contributed to such trends across many countries in Southeast Asia. In identifying these trends and the forces that shape them, it discusses the potential consequences of such a lifestyle on society, specifically in entrenching various forms of stratification.
The Duterte administration (2016-2022) marked the return of an authoritarian style of rule in the Philippines. It was also accompanied by an economic recovery that was better than many expected, at least until the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. Both during and following the Duterte period, the country was buffeted by a series of internal and external shocks that called into question the state's legal and social policy contract with its citizens.
This period of 'contesting the Philippines' was an intense, normative and practical struggle to shape (or reshape) some of the Philippines' most critical institutions: the Constitution, the presidency, the Supreme Court and the rule of law, the free press, regional autonomy and independent regulatory institutions. These developments energized many domestic policy actors: technocrats, the business sector, civil society organizations, the police and the military, armed groups and religious leaders across the spectrum of Filipino politics. This volume considers some key sites of contestation between and among domestic policy actors, including the executive, during this eventful period for political and legal institutions in the Philippines.
Indonesia has become a majority urban society. Despite the classic images of rice fields, volcanoes and rural life we often associate with the country, now almost 60 per cent of Indonesia's people live in cities, towns, suburbs, gated communities and other urban areas. Urbanisation has brought with it a familiar range of problems, including some of the worst traffic jams and air pollution in the world, housing scarcity, periodic flooding and dramatic land subsidence. These problems pose massive challenges to Indonesian governments as they try to provide clean water, public transport, housing, garbage disposal and other services to urban dwellers. Governing Urban Indonesia brings together scholars and practitioners with diverse backgrounds to examine how urbanisation is remaking Indonesia, and how governments are responding. It focuses on how varied political patterns are shaping urban governance, enabling some cities to pioneer improved service delivery and better public amenities for their citizens, while others stagnate. And it brings to bear multiple perspectives on how historical legacies, changing residential patterns, social inequality and myriad other factors are combining to produce a new social and political landscape across urban Indonesia.
Chinese firms have become global leaders in the electrification, networking and intelligentization of vehicles. They are globally dominant in minerals extraction and processing and battery production for electric vehicles (EVs) and are becoming internationally competitive in the enabling microelectronics, components and systems. This report covers the role of Chinese firms in Southeast Asia across five segments of the EV supply chain, namely minerals extraction and processing; battery manufacturing, energy storage and charging; original equipment manufacturer (OEM) production of complete vehicles; microelectronics design and manufacturing; and research and development activities. The report focuses on Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and Vietnam. These are the five ASEAN economies where activities relevant to EV production are concentrated and where Chinese firms are involved in the supply chain. The report concludes with policy considerations for ASEAN governments. EVs and connected vehicles have become a new front in the technology contest and political tensions between China and the US, with other big players like the European Union now also moving towards measures to shield their automotive sector markets and companies. As 'technology-taker' economies at the forefront of climate change, the nations of Southeast Asia have much at stake in informed choices about this supply chain. They can benefit from participation in the evolving automotive sector without committing to one side, despite continued escalation in the global technology and trade war.
'This is one of the most comprehensive studies of contemporary Thai politics seen through the careers of Thai military leaders since 1932 up until now. It is of vital importance if one is to understand present-day Thai politics.' Kullada Kesboonchoo-Mead, Chulalongkorn University (retired) and author of 'The Rise and Decline of Thai Absolutism'.
'This is a long-awaited book discussing systematically the political system in Vietnam: why has the present political regime continued for such a long period, and what are the resources of legitimacy concerning the communist rule. The book also covers the recent development in the political scene, including the anti-corruption campaign and the frequent changes in the top leadership.' Shiraishi Masaya, Emeritus Professor, Waseda University, Former Chairman, Japan Society for Vietnamese Studies.
The People's Justice Party (PKR) may in many ways be synonymous with its larger-than-life leader, Anwar Ibrahim, who, although only president for six of the party's twenty-five years, has always been its de facto leader and adviser. However, PKR is much more than only about Anwar, and this paper traces the evolution of the party independently of Anwar as a person. PKR's evolution can be broken down into four main periods: 1998-2004 (formative), 2005-13 (golden era), 2014-18 (all-in for power), and 2019-22 (lessons on restraints). From 1998 to 2022, PKR tended to adopt a big-tent approach (internally and externally), ideological synthesis to find a middle ground, and a loose organization led by a charismatic personality at the top and self-organization at the grassroots. PKR was born out of a major crisis when Anwar, then deputy prime minister, was sacked in 1998 and subsequently jailed twice in the following two decades. For the most part, the party operated with its figurehead in jail, thus learning how to rely on coalition strengths, working with civil society, mass movements, and political parties to survive and win power.
The post-election Unity Government with Anwar Ibrahim as the tenth prime minister marks PKR's first 'real' governing experience, and this would not have been possible without PKR's core identity operating in full gear.
Whenever the Islamist party PAS comes to power in Terengganu, its political agenda has been to combine populist-type development programmes with the wish to turn Terengganu into a shariah-compliant state. Terengganu's state budget is however heavily dependent on the federal government, to the tune of 80-90 per cent. This hinders the state government's policymaking and implementation, especially when the federal government is controlled by its political opponents.
This article argues that the politics of development play a more central role in determining the durability of the PAS state government in Terengganu than it does in neighbouring Kelantan. PAS cannot simply carry out its Islamic agenda without being complemented by tangible economic progress if it aspires to govern beyond a single term; PAS's loss in the 2004 election after being in power for one term is a prime example of this dynamic. One reason that the current PAS state government managed to get re-elected in 2022 was the unimpeded flow of oil royalty payments into state coffers since 2018, which allowed the state government to fulfil its campaign promises; PAS's inclusion in the Perikatan Nasional federal government in 2020 further improved the state government's financial standing.
The key for the PAS state government to rule beyond the current term is its ability to negotiate the tense federal-state relationship, develop other sources of revenue, and find ways to claim credit for economic progress, in addition to burnishing its Islamic governing credentials by making Terengganu a shariah-compliant state.
ASEAN and Japan share a robust and multifaceted partnership that has evolved over five decades, and that is grounded in mutual respect, trust and shared values. The establishment of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in 2023 further solidifies their commitment to advancing cooperation in traditional areas while expanding into emerging domains such as digital transformation and sustainability. In the security domain, Japan has consistently prioritized ASEAN's centrality in the regional order, even as it aligns with the United States and participates in frameworks like the Quad. Initiatives such as the Japan-ASEAN Ministerial Initiative for Enhanced Defense Cooperation (JASMINE) and the Overseas Security Assistance (OSA) framework demonstrate Japan's evolving approach, transitioning from traditional capacity-building to a broader focus on enhancing maritime security, conducting joint exercises, and providing non-offensive defence equipment to ASEAN countries. The partnership's new emphasis on 'co-creation' marks a transformative shift through public and private sector collaboration to address pressing socio-economic challenges. By fostering innovation and co-developing solutions in areas like green energy, digital trade, and healthcare, the co-creation model underscores ASEAN and Japan's shared commitment to inclusive and sustainable development. Looking ahead, the ASEAN-Japan partnership is well-positioned to navigate the complexities of an evolving geopolitical landscape. By harnessing Japan's expertise in advanced technology, infrastructure development, and healthcare systems to address ASEAN's evolving priorities, and by leveraging on Japan's role as a stabilizing force amid intensifying major power rivalries, this partnership will become pivotal to the fostering of long-term regional stability, resilience, and inclusive growth.
Malaysia has traditionally adopted an intensive automotive industrialization model and created its own vehicles under national brands. The national car project started with Proton in 1983, and the national motorcycle project with Modenas in 1995. While policies and scholarship have focused on national car projects, the two-wheeler sector has stood in their shadow. Modenas witnessed early growth and remains a popular brand after Yamaha and Honda; it has however failed to hit export targets, owing to limited technology transfer and the inability to scale. Recently, there has been renewed interest in the two-wheeler sector, focusing on phasing out combustion motorcycles in favour of electric two-wheelers (E2Ws). Still nascent, Malaysia's electric two-wheeler (E2W) sector appears to prioritize an extensive model of assembly and distribution rather than the protection of home-grown brands. Still in its infancy, E2W adoption rates remain low at under 1 per cent, albeit there has been high year-over-year growth since 2022. Interviews with E2W manufacturers, regulators, dealers, and consumers reveal challenges beyond common issues like price, range, charging time, maximum speed, absence of servicing infrastructure and a second-hand market. Notably, Malaysia lacks a suitable product for Malaysian roads and lifestyle due to insufficient institutional support for Research and Development (R&D) and talent matching. With aspirations to be an E2Ws regional manufacturing hub, the government and businesses should step up on public education to bridge the information gap, rethink the R&D support model for the electric vehicle industry, and develop clarity surrounding what a 'Made in Malaysia' motorcycle entails.
Since the Sheraton Move in 2020 which led to the fall of the Malaysian government, many state governments in the federation have held their elections separately from the central government. This has resulted in a dynamic political situation in which coalitions have been formed in different ways at different times in different states. At present, there are seven states ruled by the Pakatan Harapan - Barisan Nasional (PHBN) grand coalition, while four states are under the Perikatan Nasional (PN) coalition. States have increasingly demanded greater political and policy autonomy over the last few years, particularly in the area of fiscal revenue-sharing between the federal and state governments. Progress has been most forthcoming for issues related to the East Malaysian states of Sabah and Sarawak, and the federal government's newly set-up Malaysia Agreement 1963 Implementation Action Council has been meeting regularly. Contentious state-federal issues remain for states apart from Sabah and Sarawak, to which the federal government has not seriously responded. Limited space exists for formal state-federal negotiations that can result in firm decisions.
Sabah will be holding its state election in 2025, followed by Sarawak and Malacca in 2026. Pressure will continue to build up as these timelines draw near, and the federal government will need to identify better federal-state negotiation platforms than are currently available.