On 15 May 2024, Singapore's third prime minister (PM), Lee Hsien Loong, witnessed a successor chosen by the fourth generation of leaders of the ruling People's Action Party (PAP), fifty-two-year-old Lawrence Wong, take up the mantle on the lawn of the presidential residence, the Istana.

Mr Wong was his peers’ second choice after the first, the more senior Deputy Prime Minister (DPM) Heng Swee Keat, stepped aside in April 2021 so that Singapore could have the benefit of a younger person with a “sufficiently long runway” to lead when the time came. This was the knock-on effect of PM Lee promising voters in the July 2020 general election he would remain at the helm to guide Singapore out of the Covid-19 global pandemic.

When Mr Lee became premier after Singapore's second PM, Mr Goh Chok Tong, he pledged at his swearing-in ceremony on 12 August 2004 to create a “vibrant, open and inclusive city; a meritocratic, united and warm society” where all communities would benefit from progress, and no one—certainly not even the disabled—would be left behind.

Over the twenty years, as the world witnessed a souring of faith in globalization associated with tectonic shifts in geopolitics and Singapore transited to a super-aged, more socially stratified society, it would be instructive to understand how PM Lee led the country to adapt to those trends and realities. More critically, while the now Senior Minister (SM) Lee is gratified to have handed over Singapore in good order post-pandemic, it is useful to discuss the ongoing policy, political and geopolitical challenges PM Wong will need to grapple with in the days ahead.

Complacent as a distant antipode to global conflicts in the late 1930s, even as Japan launched its invasion of China, Australia could no longer ignore that nation's southward lurch to break through the “American-British-Chinese-Dutch” encirclement as it was perceived in Tokyo. With US general Douglas MacArthur setting up in Brisbane, Australia would become a huge rear base for the Pacific War. The evacuation in mid-1943 of some five hundred Indonesian internees from Tanah Merah and the nearby port of Merauke to Australia was one such signal for alarm, and they were preceded by a progression of civilian Dutch evacuees for protection and even a cohort of Japanese including families identified by the Dutch as potential subversives. Besides Digulists, the five thousand or so Indonesians in Australia during the wartime period included NEI army and navy members, former heiho captured by the Allies, Indonesians working in Dutch offices and shipping companies in Australia, seamen deserters from Dutch ships, and even a large group of working-class Javanese evacuated from New Caledonia. Not incidentally, the Digulists included such individuals as Sardjono, the PKI chair at the time of the 1926 rebellion; labour leader Hardjono; veteran journalist and founder of Sarekat Ambon, A.J. Patty; the Tan Malaka loyalist Djamaluddin Tamin; the PNI-Baru official Mohammad Bondan, along with religious scholars trained in Cairo and Mecca and members of the Islamic organization Permi—namely, Muchtar Lufti and Iljas Jacoeb (a former editor of the pro-independence Medan Ra’jat newspaper).

Amid an intensifying major power rivalry and polarizing regional wars in Europe and the Middle East, the search for direction in Southeast Asia, as Chong Ja Ian described in the previous issue, has become an individual pursuit by nation-states rather than a collective one in 2024. Despite shared objectives of economic growth and regime security, Southeast Asian states have taken different, and at times divergent, foreign policy paths to realize them. A slow but not imperceptible continental drift is under way as their economies and politics shift along with global trends of protectionism and centrifugal forces of great power competition. Southeast Asians resolutely insist on not “choosing sides”, but their different reactions to wars waged abroad and tensions at home bear out the subtle gradients in their political and strategic outlooks. Whereas tensions in the South China Sea continue to shape US relations with Vietnam and the Philippines, frustration towards the West over the Gaza crisis has seen Indonesia and Malaysia gravitate towards China. The pull of economics remains the fundamental force behind their relations with great powers, but the push of politics can act as an enabler—or mitigator—as well.

The noticeable absence of ASEAN and its centrality from geopolitical and geo-economic conversations over the past year accentuate these divergences. In the face of several major crises that have accelerated in the past twelve months, ASEAN has not mustered adequate voice. With Indonesia and Thailand occupied with internal dramas during and after their respective elections, little attention from regional states, not to mention ASEAN as a whole, was given to the civil war raging in Myanmar, which has now entered its third year.

Having exposed the colonial carceral apparatus that targeted the supposed authors of the 1926–27 rebellions, this chapter turns to the origins of the pergerakan or anti-colonial movement in Indonesia (pergerakan was a self-definition that entered the vocabulary of the key protagonists and editors). This chapter is also sensitive to the zaman or epoch that the anti-colonial movement epitomizes. Traditions of anti-colonial rebellion confronting colonial power that reach back through hundreds of years of colonial rule cannot be ignored. Neither can we neglect a cascade of events that signalled major changes in world order. Pertaining to Islam, such an event includes the rise of the Islamic modernist movement with its insistence on religious faith in public life, such as touched the Ottoman Empire. On the part of the colonial order, the advent of the Bolshevik Revolution and the setting up of the Soviet-controlled Communist International (Comintern), also called the Third International, were fearful developments. The opening decades of the twentieth century were an era of rapid social change. decades of the twentieth century were an era of rapid social change. As aptly evoked by author-editor Mas Marco Kartodikromo, this was a Doenia Bergerak, or world in motion, matched by the rise of newspapers, editors and readership. As a movement, the pergerakan also witnessed the advent of political parties, both religious and secular, typically around charismatic leaders. Budi Utomo (BU) was a pioneer, but, from its advent in 1912, Sarekat Islam (SI) quickly emerged as the first truly mass-based organization.

For the Indonesian nationalists and communists who departed their homeland in the 1920s, whether for study or as exiles, there were two primary poles of attraction. For those who graduated through the colonial Dutch education system, Holland was the obvious destination, and so student groups clustered in such places as The Hague or Amsterdam. Some from these groups would visit Berlin or Brussels for conferences, and still others were attracted to Paris. But for those who the Bolshevik revolution was an inspiration or who otherwise heeded Lenin's opportunistic call to bring down the capitalist world order starting from the colonies, then Moscow was a lodestar. As seen in the preceding chapter, setting up in Moscow required dedication and patronage, not to mention proven revolutionary credentials such as membership of the PKI or its affiliates. Likewise, as this chapter brings to light, operating within the bounds of the metropolitan legal system in Holland required special organizational as well as cultural and linguistic skills on the part of the Indonesian anti-colonial nationalists. Without ignoring Berlin, the major comparison with Holland is with the diasporic communities of Vietnamese, North Africans, Madagascan, and French West Indians residing in France who were active in pro-independence activities and who were also divided as to the best approach under fierce metropolitan surveillance.

Global supply chains have long been the backbone of twenty-first-century manufacturing and trade, fostering unprecedented levels of efficiency and specialization. However, rising nationalism and protectionism have disrupted established trade relationships, with new uncertainties arising from events like Brexit in 2016 and the US-China trade war since 2018. The Covid-19 pandemic further exposed vulnerabilities in these highly interconnected and efficiency-driven supply chains, compelling countries to prioritize domestic industries and resilience over the cost-saving advantages of global outsourcing. The pandemic also accelerated a global shift towards environmentally sustainable supply chains, particularly in high-emission industries, where stricter environmental regulations and growing consumer demands for corporate accountability are reshaping practices. Geopolitical tensions—such as the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the rise of regional trade agreements, and an increasing focus on economic security over mere efficiency—are further reshaping global trade and production dynamics.

To mitigate tariff costs and geopolitical risks from trade tensions, companies are diversifying production bases by shifting operations from China to countries like Vietnam, Malaysia, India, Hungary and Mexico. This diversification has resulted in shorter supply chains and the rise of friendshoring, where production and trade are relocated to politically allied nations, driving regionalization in North America, Europe and Asia. Additionally, reshoring—the process of bringing overseas production back to a company's home country—is gaining traction, particularly among advanced economies seeking greater control over their manufacturing processes.

Dating from the Koiso Declaration of 7 September 1944 (a reference to the vague promise by then Japanese prime minister Koiso Kuniaki of independence for the East Indies), Japan went about planning the future state system in Indonesia as an integral part of the Japanese Empire to have a standing analogous to Korea or Taiwan. Nevertheless, as the tide of war changed, both the timetable and the procedure underwent significant changes. Notable in this respect was the creation of a consultative group to engage a select segment of Indonesians, termed the Dokuritsu Junbi Chosakai but better known by its Bahasa Indonesia name as Badan Penjelidik Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia (BPUPKI) (Investigating Committee for Preparatory Work for Indonesian Independence). Such planning helps to explain how, on the day after the proclamation of independence, a central Republican government was established in Jakarta.

The first section of this chapter sets down the key steps leading to the historic Indonesian Proclamation of Independence, offering a range of Japanese narratives on the timetable and process of the independence movement as recorded by Allied interrogators. The second section focuses on the Japanese Naval Liaison Bureau in Jakarta. It also includes a post-war prison interrogation with the key Japanese official in charge among others involved in the proclamation of Indonesian independence.

Enigmatically styled an “affair”, a “rebellion”, a “coup” or a “provocation”, the advent of the PKI-backed rebellion in the East Java city of Madiun and the crushing of it was a game changer especially insofar as the Republic would win new legitimacy in the eyes of the West. As far as the United States was concerned, the events appeared to strike a decisive blow to Moscow’s ambitions at a juncture when the fault lines of the Cold War were clear. Nevertheless, even with most of the top leadership arrested and/or executed in the TNI repression of the event, others escaped, with certain among the 1945 generation going on to command and revive the PKI “phoenix” in the 1950s and beyond. Still, much remains enigmatic about the Madiun Affair until this day, especially as the failed revolution within a revolution mounted in a provincial capital without apparent mass support outside of a thin local working class was entirely outside of the lexicon of communist revolutions.

The first section of this chapter examines the dramatic return from Moscow of Musso in August 1948 and the events leading to the Madiun Affair in September–October 1948. The second section examines the failure of Madiun while seeking new answers to old questions about events and historical narratives. The third section sets down the facts of the rebellion and its repression that led to Musso’s death, along with those of Sardjono, Amir Sjarifoeddin and other ranking PKI-Moscow members at the hands of the TNI. The final section examines Western media and diplomatic reporting on Madiun.

The year 2024 ushered in notable positive developments for Brunei Darussalam, starting with the grand celebration of Prince Abdul Mateen's wedding, the fourth son of Sultan Haji Hassanal Bolkiah, in January. The economy showed strong signs of recovery, with real GDP growth projected at 2.4 per cent by the IMF in September, while AMRO+3 estimated up to 4 per cent and ADB forecasted 3.7 per cent. This marked a notable improvement from the modest 1.4 per cent growth recorded in 2023. The recovery was largely attributed to an earlier-than-expected increase in oil production, driven by the new Salman oil field, which became operational in late 2023, and other newly developed fields. This growth helped offset the production slowdown caused by maintenance activities in the previous year.

In the realm of international political economy, Brunei, as a small nation, has consistently conducted its economic relations and diplomacy within multilateral frameworks, particularly ASEAN, while carefully balancing great power rivalries and prioritizing dialogue and collective action. An active participant in initiatives like the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), and China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Brunei also conducts a defence cooperation with the United States. In addition to managing its relationships between the United States and China, Brunei continues to nurture strong ties with other key regional and international players, including the United Kingdom, Australia, Japan, South Korea, India, and ASEAN member states. This year, Brunei also strengthened its relations with Peru, a Latin American nation.

On 19 July 2024, the Vietnam Communist Party (VCP) announced General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong's death, thus confirming the end of his thirteen-year run as party leader. Media outlets changed their colour schemes to black and white in his honour, while leaders such as Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh and VNA chair Tran Thanh Man published lengthy tributes to his leadership.1 As of December 2024, the website of the official party mouthpiece Nhan Dan still featured a special link for a tribute to Trong underneath only two other former leaders—Ho Chi Minh and Nguyen Van Linh, who presided over the initial stages of Vietnam's economic opening.

After Trong's death, then-president To Lam swiftly moved into the breach and became acting general secretary before being fully confirmed a month later. Since his assumption of power, he has outlined pieces of his domestic agenda, potentially signalling a shift from a focus on corruption to a focus on infrastructure development and economic growth. His ascension, however, has raised familiar concerns from observers of Vietnamese politics about the possible end of collective leadership within the Politburo and Central Committee. In Lam's case, the concern is that the security establishment—the military and the police—have consolidated power, thus setting up a “security state”.

This chapter evaluates Trong's legacy on elite politics in Vietnam and assesses possible changes under Lam's leadership. It suggests that concerns over Lam's consolidation of power (reminiscent of similar concerns regarding Trong in 2018) are premature.

With the communist parties underground during the war years, and with Dutch colonialists along with perceived enemies incarcerated in a network of prisons and internment camps, the Japanese occupiers had a free run in cultivating a pro-Tokyo cadre of collaborators from among the former Dutch-educated native elite as well as among traditional, including Islamic, figures. At the same time, Japan unleashed a wave of xenophobic anti-Western (anti-Dutch) sentiments that would be sustained beyond the long, staggered-out surrender process by the Japanese to the Allies in the archipelago. As we shall see in this chapter, the Japanese occupation of the NEI—which spanned three and a half years—also had other long-term effects. One was the adroit psychological use of propaganda to re-orient the population to embrace Japan's rhetoric of a Greater East Asia Prosperity Sphere, along with its militaristic, fascist and even Shintoism overtones. The Japanese achieved this through language change, by the manipulation of patriotic symbols and, especially, through the mobilization of youth, women and religious groups. Certain youths were also given military training, and they would go on to create the nucleus of a national army. Others, fired up by demagogues, would join deadly militia, even turning upon the remaining Japanese and arriving Allied forces. No less important was that, even as the tide turned against Japan, Tokyo made hesitant steps to offer some form of autonomy to Indonesia along the lines of Formosa or Korea within the Japanese empire; the autonomy package was further expedited as total collapse and defeat appeared imminent.

When a group of Rakhine youths established the Arakan Army (AA)—later renamed the Arakha Army—in 2009, most observers saw them as ineffective idealists and pawns of the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO). The Thein Sein administration did not think the AA would be a fully fledged party to the peace process. Likewise, the KIO and other ethnic revolutionary organizations (EROs) did not foresee the AA emerging as a major ERO capable of controlling much of Rakhine State.2 When the leader of the AA, Twan Mrat Naing, said that he wanted Rakhine State to become fully autonomous, like the Wa Self-Administered Division, some ERO leaders dismissed his vision as unrealistic. However, the AA's 2019 offensive demonstrated that it had become a resilient force capable of influencing ethnic politics in Myanmar. In 2023, the AA launched another offensive under Operation 1027, successfully seizing control of multiple townships. As of December 2024, many Rakhine believe that it would soon control the whole of Rakhine State.

This chapter will explain how the AA developed into one of the most organized and strongest EROs in Myanmar, noting in particular how it mobilized unprecedented public support and capitalized on the military's inability to respond effectively to its growth following the 2021 coup d’état. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the challenges the AA will face if it manages to take the whole of Rakhine State.