On 2 March 2011, the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) and the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) convened a joint conference in Singapore to mark the fortieth anniversary of the five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA), the military pact linking two Southeast Asian countries, Singapore and Malaysia, with three external powers, the United Kingdom (UK), Australia and New Zealand. The conference, which was attended by regional and international scholars, senior security practitioners, diplomats and journalists, had three aims: to examine the origins of the FPDA and especially the primary motivations of the five powers; to assess the FPDA's contribution to regional security over the past four decades; and to explore possible future roles for the alliance in the context of emerging geopolitical trends and security challenges in the twenty-first century.

While the speakers offered varied assessments of the origins, utility and future of the FPDA, a consensus emerged on the following points. first, the FPDA's flexibility and adaptability to changes in Asia's security environment over the past 40 years remains its core strength. Second, the FPDA has functioned as an important confidence-building measure (CBM) between Singapore and Malaysia and that it continues to facilitate interoperability, professionalization and cooperation among the armed forces of the five countries. Third, that there is neither a compelling strategic rationale, nor a political desire either within or outside the FPDA, to expand its membership beyond the current five members. Fourth, regional perceptions of the FPDA are generally positive because the Arrangements are not seen as directed against a third party.

The FPDA superseded the 1957 Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement (AMDA) in 1971. The origins of the alliance lay in the British Labour government's announcement in 1967 that it intended to withdraw its military presence “East of Suez” due to financial difficulties. In 1970 the newly-elected Conservative government decided to maintain some military engagement in the region by proposing a successor to AMDA which would take the form of a “loose consultative political framework”.

This volume has its genesis in a conference co-organized by the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) and the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) in March 2011 entitled the “Five Power Defence Arrangements at Forty”. The conference celebrated the FPDA's contribution to regional security over the last four decades and explored its response to changes in the strategic environment.

The FPDA was set up in 1971 at a time of considerable geopolitical uncertainty. It was not just Singapore-Malaysian relations that were touchy at the time, after the Separation of 1965. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was also new, having been established only a few years earlier, and its members were still in the early stages of building confidence to work together to face the common security challenge of the time, namely communism. The war in Vietnam was not going well for the non-communist side, and a US withdrawal seemed inevitable at some point. US President Richard Nixon had already announced the Guam Doctrine in 1969, according to which American involvement in wars on the Asian mainland would be limited to a supportive role while allies and friends would be expected to bear the main burden of defending themselves by providing ground troops.

In 1971, nobody could tell how long the FPDA would last. Sceptics dismissed it as an impotent successor to the Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement (AMDA), a mere figleaf to cover the British military withdrawal from the region. They were proved wrong, given the fact that it has lasted 40 years and its five members continue to attest to its ongoing relevance. It has proved to be a valuable confidence-maintaining mechanism and its built-in flexibility allows it to adapt to a changing security environment.

Since its inception in 1971, the FPDA has played a critical confidence- building role in Singapore-Malaysian relations. Before its formation, the Malaysian and Singaporean armed forces had long been comfortable with working with British, Australian and New Zealand forces.

The paper examines the role of the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) in regional security from the perspective of Malaysia. It begins with a framing of Malaysia's defence posture and needs in terms of a transition from conventional defence in the 1950s and 1960s to a security- oriented discourse since the mid-1970s. That transition took place when the Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement (AMDA) of 1957 was replaced by the FPDA in 1971. Malaysia's non-participation in the South-East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and its insistence that the nuclear weapons option be excluded from AMDA had provided an important context for Malaysia's overall stance on defence and security even during the early years of independence. By the mid-1970s, Malaysia's foreign policy was cast in terms of neutralism and nonalignment. It had found cause in the promotion of a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) in Southeast Asia and saw an active participation in the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ). Some may argue that Malaysia's participation in the FPDA compromised such a foreign policy. However, seen from the perspective of regional security, the FPDA was an important construct and confidence building measure (CBM) for the continued involvement of Commonwealth forces in Malaysia's defence and role in regional security. Moreover, the FPDA was especially crucial as a CBM for boosting and maintaining security cooperation between Malaysia and Singapore. Military exercises under FPDA up until today continue to provide for a practicable regional security instrumentality for two Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) members, Malaysia and Singapore. By the same token, the FPDA is thereby considered to be “exclusivist” as it does not encompass all members ASEAN. However, the fact that ASEAN has had no appetite for regional military arrangements of its own has meant historic constructs like the FPDA have remained in place. That said, even the long-standing FPDA has from time to time suffered from the vicissitudes of low activity or economic constraints, and Malaysia has been in large part responsible for this.

The Five Power Defence Agreements (FPDA) came into force in 1971 as a consultative forum and not a treaty alliance. The FPDA was initially conceived as a transitional agreement to provide for the defence of peninsula Malaysia and Singapore until these new states could fend for themselves. The FPDA has evolved and adapted over the past forty years. As the author has argued elsewhere, the FPDA has become “the quiet achiever” and an important component among the plethora of multilateral security organizations making up Southeast Asia's security architecture.

The FPDA has developed a robust consultative structure, complemented by a standing multilateral military component, and a comprehensive exercise programme. The FPDA has gradually expanded its focus from the conventional defence of Malaysian and Singaporean air space, through an annual series of Air Defence Exercises (ADEXs), to large-scale combined and joint military exercises designed to meet emerging conventional and non-conventional security threats extending into the South China Sea. This chapter analyses the contribution of the FPDA's programme of exercises to regional security in the period from 2004 to the present when the latest evolution took place.

Background (1971–2003)

During the first decade of its existence (1971–81), the FPDA conducted only a handful of exercises. It was left up to each member to decide the degree of resources that it would contribute. The FPDA exercise programme evolved slowly. The operational command of FPDA exercises alternated between Malaysia and Singapore.

During the 1980s, the FPDA exercise programme evolved into staging regular land and sea exercises. In 1981, Australia hosted the first land exercise, Exercise PLATYPUS. Since 1981 the FPDA has conducted regular naval exercises. Initially designated Exercise STARFISH, they were renamed Exercise BERSAMA LIMA.

Towards the end of the 1980s, the FPDA exercise programme had become routine and predictable. The FPDA went into the doldrums as the forces committed by external powers began to decline. In 1988, the five defence ministers attended Exercise LIMA BERSATU and took stock of the situation and decided to revitalize the FPDA consultative process.

Far from being a mere relic of the Cold War, the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA), has survived four decades since its inception in 1971. It may be argued, as its principal protagonists do, that it has constantly been “re-tooled” to meet the changing challenges of Southeast Asia's security landscape. In the post-9/11 period, more importance has been accorded to the threat of terrorism, and more recently, to Non-Traditional Security (NTS) issues. However, the bulk of FPDA military exercises and the operation of Integrated Air Defence System (IADS) of Peninsular Malaysia and Singapore, now broadened to area defence, reflect more traditional security concerns.

The FPDA's Relevance and Durability

In assessing its present status and future direction, it is germane to consider the raison d'etre of the FPDA in relation to the central security concerns of its principal actors, namely Malaysia, Singapore and Australia. The other two members, Britain and New Zealand, are more “peripheral”, albeit committed to the FPDA. Students of international security argue that since the end of the Cold War and the concomitant demise of bipolar rivalry between the United States and the former Soviet Union, the threat of military conflict and major inter-state war has diminished. In Southeast Asia, with the advent of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its gradual transformation to encompass all ten of the region's states, the danger of inter-state war has also been deemed to be remote. In view of these factors, critics have postulated that the FPDA is an anachronism that should have met its demise, perhaps even in its early years.

That the FPDA has survived since 1971 is indicative of its relevance to its three principal actors. It is often overlooked that the FPDA was established at a time of great uncertainty, political turbulence and regional turmoil. For Southeast Asia, the period from the 1940s to the 1970s witnessed war, the tumult of decolonization and the assertion of nationalism of its newly-independent states which were confronted by issues of survival, development and communist uprisings.

This book is a revised and updated version of my PhD thesis submitted to Universiti Sains Malaysia in 2008. It analyses the political domination of the Muslim bumiputera in Sarawak, focusing on the period between 1970 and 2006. The book also draws attention to the most recent development in Sarawak politics particularly the historic 2008 elections which are highlighted in the Postscript.

The idea behind this study was sparked by the need to fill the knowledge vacuum on Muslim bumiputera politics that had been left unattended for so long. Since most of the literature on Muslim bumiputera politics covered the colonial and post-Independence period, this study analyses political change among the community beyond the corresponding period. At the same time, this study aims to contribute to the ongoing debate on state power in Malaysia especially its capabilities to dominate society. While much of the existing literature tends to focus on the overwhelming power of the state, this study argues that the state has to occasionally accommodate various social forces which subsequently lead to changes in society and the state itself. This strategy would safeguard the state's position in society but paradoxically weaken its authority.

Since the literature on Muslim bumiputera politics in Sarawak is relatively sparse, this study had to rely heavily on documentary evidence such as government gazettes, local newspapers and government documents as a major source of information. In analysing the Muslim bumiputera's voting trend, this study utilized the electoral data published by the Election Commission of Malaysia. This was complemented by referring to secondary sources, books and journals, on Sarawak politics and on Muslim bumiputera politics specifically.

In the course of completing this book, several individuals and institutions had guided, supported and inspired me. My greatest gratitude goes to my supervisor, Professor Dr Francis Loh Kok Wah, for setting ambitious goals and constantly pushing me to achieve them. I am also grateful to Professor Dr Johan Saravanamuttu for his kind advice during the early stage of my study. In Sarawak, I must thank my colleagues at the Faculty of Social Sciences, Universiti Malaysia Sarawak for their support and encouragement. The staff at the Sarawak Museum Library were helpful with archival documents.

Something shocking was brewing when the 2008 election results were not forthcoming on the tube that night. Except for a string of positive results for BN courtesy of its component parties from Sarawak and Sabah, there was an unusual delay in the announcement of the rest of the results which would normally become public knowledge by 10 p.m. Puzzled and intrigued with the unusual turn of events, many Malaysians turned to the Internet to look for answers. The results posted on the popular and widely read news portal, Malaysiakini, sent shockwaves throughout the country. Several BN's leaders were facing defeat while the opposition had secured a significant number of parliamentary and negeri seats throughout the Peninsula. By 3 a.m., the opposition remarkably formed governments in five negeris (Kelantan, Penang, Kedah, Selangor and Perak) and historically denied the ruling party a two-third majority in Parliament. Initially, there was a sense of fear that the ruling party would try to overturn the results or even declare a state of emergency in order to nullify Malaysia's twelfth general elections. However, the air of trepidation was subsequently cleared when the ruling party graciously accepted its worst performance since the 1970 election in the wee hours of 9 March.

The failure of the ruling party to defend its two-third majority in Parliament and its defeat in five negeris was liken by many political analysts as a tsunami that brought catastrophic effect on the formidable party. Prior to the March 8 election, everyone including the opposition expected BN to maintain its dominance albeit with a reduced parliamentary seats and popular vote. Many analysts doubted the opposition's capabilities to pose a serious challenge towards BN mainly because of the ruling party's ability to exploit the state's resources and the mass media to win elections. This assumption was severely contested in the March 8 election. The people power was too strong that even the practice of vote buying, the manipulation of the electoral process, the ruling party's control over the mainstream media, the exploitation of racial sentiments and the politicization of development could no longer ensure the ruling party's dominance in the elections.

In Sarawak, the political tsunami that erupted in the Peninsula did not reach the shore of this negeri.

INTRODUCTION

The political pact between the central state and Sarawak's first strongman-politician, Rahman Yakub, had proven to be successful in maintaining the state's presence in Sarawak. At the same time, it strengthened the ruling party's domination of the electorate, particularly the Muslim bumiputera. Realizing the effectiveness of this political pact, the central state continued to rely on Muslim bumiputera strongmen-politicians to dominate Sarawak after Rahman's departure. This paved the way for another influential Muslim Melanau intelligentsia, Abdul Taib Mahmud, to occupy the powerful Chief Minister's seat, hence maintaining the Muslim bumiputera's grip on Sarawak politics. Through the highest political office in the negeri, Taib has transformed himself into an even more powerful strongman-politician than his uncle, introducing sweeping changes in the negeri.

Taib's journey towards attaining immense power is not without intrigue and contestation. In his twenty-seven years as Sarawak's Chief Minister, the strongman-politician has survived several attempts to unseat him, outlasted many federal and negeri ministers, witnessed the dissolution and formation of many political parties, led the SBN through six Council Negeri elections and six parliamentary elections, served under three Prime Ministers and overseen the rapid development of Sarawak. This chapter and the following two chapters chronicle Taib's journey as Sarawak's strongman-politician and analyse his dual roles as the central state's representative and local strongman. These chapters also examine significant political events during Taib's tenure as the Chief Minister with a special focus on the Muslim bumiputera. As a start, this chapter discusses Taib's first six years in office which was considered as the most testing years of his long illustrious political career. A particular focus is given in analysing the crisis that engulfed the Muslim bumiputera community and also Taib Mahmud's response towards the crisis. But before analysing the turbulent years of Sarawak politics, this chapter will first discuss Taib Mahmud's rise in becoming, arguably, the most powerful strongman-politician in the negeri.

ABDUL TAIB MAHMUD: PRESERVING THE STRONGMAN-POLITICIAN's RULE

Abdul Taib Mahmud's appointment as Sarawak's fourth Chief Minister was highly anticipated by the people of Sarawak. When Abdul Rahman Yakub who was also Taib's uncle decided to step down, it was obvious to everybody that Taib would succeed his uncle as the new Chief Minister. As a young educated Muslim bumiputera, Taib's political ascendancy was fast-tracked mainly due to his uncle's patronage.

The Busan Road Map: Towards a Better Business Environment

In Chapter 2 we saw that APEC's momentum for liberalization heightened in 1993–96, but decreased after the Asian currency crisis. Instead APEC has shifted to a realistic strategy of improving the business environment of its participants in the first decade of the twenty-first century. Although APEC is strictly constrained in its liberalization attempts by its nonbinding framework, many economies have voluntarily implemented facilitation measures such as standards and conformance, customs procedures, and business mobility once they find that it helps their own trade and investment expansion. With increasing globalization and people, goods, and money moving freely across borders in the 2000s, these facilitation measures made a big contribution towards this development. As was shown in Chapter 2, the ratio of commodity trade, services, and direct investment to GDP increased distinctly in many economies. This ratio differs according to the size of an economy, but in the 2000s it increased in all econom ies, regardless of their size. The increase was most distinct in the European Union, but APEC economies followed the European Union closely (Chapter 2). Let us pick up major measures highlighted in the various Leaders'sand Ministerial Statements.

In 2000, in Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei, the APEC leaders committed to not letting any economy be left behind the digital divide under the IT revolution. The following year in Shanghai, they announced the Shanghai Accord of “reducing the business transaction cost across border by 5% for five years”. In 2002, at the APEC Conference in Mexico, the Trade Facilitation Action Plan (TFAP I: 2002–06) was established and promptly implemented. It instructed the abolition of administrative barriers in standards and conformance, customs procedures, and business mobility. It duplicated the Osaka Action Agenda towards achieving the Bogor Goals, but strengthened it by setting a concrete target of “reducing 5% in 5 years”. This tended to be offset by the prolonged customs procedures put in place under strengthened security systems at airports and harbours after the 11 September attacks in 2001, but they managed to achieve this target.

INTRODUCTION

Since 1970, the central state has relied on Muslim Melanau strongmenpoliticians to administer Sarawak albeit the changes in the central state leadership. When Rahman Yakub took over the helm from Tawi Sli in July 1970, the central state was still led by Tunku Abdul Rahman. However, Tunku had lost the legitimacy to rule following the racial riots of 13 May 1969, which triggered the formation of the National Operations Council headed by Deputy Prime Minister Abdul Razak. As the de facto central state leader, Razak was the prime figure in elevating Rahman as Sarawak's third Chief Minister after the 1970 negeri election. When Razak finally became the Prime Minister in September 1970, Rahman's position was firmly secured with the former lending his undivided support towards the strongman-politician. The sudden death of Razak in 1976 paved the way for Hussein Onn to assume the central state leadership which inevitably changed the political landscape in Sarawak. Unlike Razak, the new premier was not willing to accommodate Rahman who became increasingly powerful and sometimes critical of the central state. Without the strong support of the central state coupled with the instability within the Sarawak Barisan Nasional (SBN), Rahman finally stepped down as Sarawak's third Chief Minister; five years after Hussein Onn's appointment as the premier.

On March 1981, Abdul Taib Mahmud succeeded his uncle during which Hussein Onn was still holding the helm of the central state leadership. Although Taib was not the central state's preferred choice, his candidacy still received the central leaders’ support especially from Dr Mahathir Mohamad who was then the Deputy Prime Minister. Two months after Taib's appointment as Sarawak's Chief Minister, Dr Mahathir rose to become Malaysia's fourth Prime Minister. During Dr Mahathir's tenure, the central state forged a strong relationship with Taib, allowing the strongman-politician to become arguably the most powerful politician at the periphery of the state.

After dominating Malaysian politics for twenty-one years, Dr Mahathir unexpectedly announced his resignation during the UMNO general assembly in June 2002. The longest-serving premier, however, was coaxed by his party members to stay on, prompting Dr. Mahathir to delay his retirement until October 2003.

The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation's (APEC) momentum heightened in 1993–96. In 1993 in Seattle, the United States hosted the first APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting. In 1994 in Bogor, Indonesia, the leaders issued the ambitious statement of “the industrialized economies achieving the goal of free and open trade and investment no later than the year 2010 and developing economies no later than the year 2020”. The Osaka Action Agenda was adopted in 1995 and the Manila Framework was adopted in 1996. However, ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) and other Asian members were hit severely by the East Asian currency crisis in 1997–98, while APEC's liberalization agenda turned out to be much less than had been expected. Both leaders' meetings and ministerial meetings have continued to be held in one of the APEC member economies in autumn every year, but the media only report the leaders' statements. APEC has developed a pragmatic agenda for regional econ mic cooperation focusing on business facilitation and has achieved steady expansion of trade and investment in the region through its second decade.

Globalization has continued in terms of money, business, and people. While trying to overcome the current world financial crisis, all economies need to cooperate on such new global issues as global warming, pandemics, poverty, and human security. The G-20 Summit emerged in 2008 as a new global consultation forum for global governance, in addition to the United Nations, International Monetary Fund, World Bank, World Trade Organization, and World Health Organization, while APEC and other regional cooperation bodies are expected to supplement them.

APEC was hosted by Singapore in 2009, Japan in 2010, and will be hosted by the United States in 2011. It expects capable hosts to successfully tackle the new challenges in the beginning of its third decade. Japan took the lead in the assessment of the mid-term achievement of the Bogor Goals in 2010 and paved the way towards the Free Trade Area of the AsiaPacific Region (FTAAP). With strengthened U.S. engagement, negotiationsamong nine APEC members for the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) beganin 2010. Following Singapore's lead in addressing the desirable attributesfor growth in the region, Yokohama APEC announced the APEC GrowthStrategy as the post-Bogor agenda.