We have seen APEC's progress in its main activity, trade investment liberalization and facilitation in Chapters 2, 4, and 5. APEC met its midterm Bogor Goals in 2010 and has started to tackle the post-Bogor agenda, that is, to pursue deeper liberalization and facilitation in the form of FTAAP and the Trans-Pacific Strategic Partnership (TPP), as well as broader cooperation in pursuit of greater economic growth.

In 2006 the APEC Business Advisory Council (ABAC) proposed a greater free trade area (FTA) covering all of the APEC economies (ABAC 2006). It aimed to promote the integration of all the FTAs that had mushroomed in the region over the past decade, thus creating a greater single market to achieve the maximum scale economy. The joint ABAC/Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC) report of the same year (ABAC/PECC 2006) included both pros and cons of the FTAAP. Fred Bergsten, Director of the Peterson Institute of International Economics, Washington D.C., expressed his concern about the hobbled negotiations of the World Trade Organization (WTO)/Doha Development Agenda (DDA), and recommended FTAAP as a “Plan B” in preparation for the failure of the DDA and resulting vacuum of liberalization momentum in the region (Bergsten 2006). On the other hand, Charles Morrison, the American Chair of PECC, represented a majority view of PECC academics, indicating practical difficulty in conducting liberalization negotiations within APEC and insisting on the pragmatic strategy of the Busan Roadmap (Morrison 2006).

Bergsten served as the chair of APEC/EPG (Eminent Persons Group) from 1993 to 1995 and actively led the liberalization momentum within APEC then. The momentum heightened to the Bogor Declaration in 1994 and he planned to achieve it by negotiating an FTA (see Chapter 2 for details). However, in the following year the Japanese host invented the concept of “concerted unilateral liberalization” (CUL) within the Osaka Action Agenda, which disappointed many Americans, including Bergsten. I conjecture that after ten years he has resumed his original proposal together with American ABAC members. Of course FTAAP implies that APEC should quit its CUL modality and convert it to a legally binding FTA.

STATE POWER AND THE CONTESTATION OF SOCIAL FORCES

Most of the literature on Malaysian politics portrays the ruling regime as a powerful force that possesses hegemonic power to dominate society (Zakaria 1989; Case 1993, 2004; Crouch 1992). This study re-evaluates the strength of the Malaysian regime by aggregating its capabilities to perform four tasks, namely: to penetrate society, to regulate social relations, to extract resources, and to distribute resources in determined ways. Based on this analysis, the Malaysian regime is undoubtedly a strong state but its power is curtailed by the prevailing forces in society, known as social forces which are in constant struggle with the state over the right to dictate “social control”. The state which is usually the biggest and most powerful social organization could dominate in certain arenas but would have to compete with social forces in acquiring control over other arenas. A weak state would have no choice but to accommodate the social forces which resist its authority, failing which the state could collapse. But a strong state could either engage or ignore the contesting social forces. When a strong state engages the social forces, this would result in the weakening of the state functions and its capabilities to achieve the goals envisioned by its leader. If a strong state decides to ignore the social forces, this will not result in the collapse of the state as in the case of a weak state. Instead, the strong state might face difficulties in implementing its policies and programmes within the contested arena.

In Sarawak, the most potent social force in the early period of Independence was the Muslim Bumiputera intelligentsia who had replaced the Malay aristocrats as the new force in Sarawak politics. The intelligentsia had successfully displaced the Malay aristocrats because the latter's position had been severely weakened through the process of state formation during the Brookes’ rule. When the number of the intelligentsia soared during the British colonial rule, they started to challenge the authority of the Malay aristocrats as the undisputed leaders of Sarawak's society. Weakened, the Malay aristocrats were not able to fend off the contestation mounted by the intelligentsia who were more knowledgeable about the nitty-gritty of modern politics as compared to the traditional strongmen.

The Year of Mid-term Bogor Goal

The year 2010 was the mid-term target of the Bogor Goals issued by President Soeharto that “industrialized economies achieve free and open trade by the year 2010, while rest of the economies by 2020”. Have these ambitious goals been achieved? Although it is not well known that APEC has shifted to more realistic timelines since the Asian currency crisis, many people still remember the Bogor Goals, APEC's main appeal. APEC has to reply to this question, which Japan, as its host in 2010, tackled together with senior officials of other economies. Japan's hosting of APEC this particular year may be related to the fact that she also hosted it and produced the Osaka Action Agenda to achieve the Bogor Goals in 1995.

It requires sensitive diplomatic efforts to respond to this question given APEC's “no name, no shame” modality. Despite such diplomatic constraint, economists wish to find out to what extent the Bogor Goals have been achieved so far. This chapter presents an attempt by an independent expert.

At November's Leaders' Meeting and Ministerial Meeting in Japan, APEC provided an assessment of the progress towards achieving the Bogor Goals by the industrialized economies plus alpha. APEC's IAPs (Individual Action Plans) tend to give details of implementations in its positive list that stretches over hundreds of pages but seldom mentions what still remains unachieved. It is contrary to the European Union's formula in which all measures of regional integration are obligatory under the law, and the implementation by individual member states are scored openly so that they are effectively implemented. APEC will not be able to adopt the European Union formula immediately, but the author believes that APEC needs to move in the direction of objective assessment of individual economy's achievements.

INTRODUCTION

When the Federation of Malaysia was formed in 1963, Sarawak became one of the fourteen negeris that made up the new state. This newly acquired status brought tremendous change to Sarawak politics especially in regards to its autonomy. Although physically isolated from the centre of power in Putrajaya, this isolation fails to deter the central state from imposing its authority in the negeri that is as vast (geographically-speaking) as the Peninsula. Hence, any study of Sarawak politics cannot be done in seclusion from the realm of central state politics. This chapter, therefore, attempts to locate Sarawak within the larger context of Malaysia in order to capture the state-society relation in the negeri. But before that, an analysis of the state formation in Sarawak from the Brunei Sultanate to the establishment of Malaysia will be presented. This analysis provides an understanding of Sarawak politics prior to the formation of Malaysia and the transformation that the former Brunei's territory had undergone since the eighteenth century. The focus of this chapter subsequently shifts to the Malaysian state with a focus on its capability to perform four tasks: penetrate society, extract resources, regulate social relationships, and distribute resources in determined ways. Based on this analysis, we will be able to determine whether Malaysia is a strong or weak state, which is imperative for evaluating its domination of Sarawak politics.

The second part of this chapter examines the role of Sarawak's society in affecting the central state's agenda of dominating the people of the negeri, particularly the Muslim bumiputera. In evaluating the role of Sarawak's society, this chapter identifies several social forces that are influential in mobilizing the populace hence posing a threat to the state. Through the analysis of state and social forces in Sarawak, this chapter provides the basis for an understanding of the role of both entities in establishing political domination among the Muslim bumiputera.

STATE FORMATION IN SARAWAK

The modern negeri of Sarawak as we know today is different from the political entity established more than six centuries ago. As a result of colonialization, the physical boundary of Sarawak had been enlarged from the Sarawak River valley, located at southwest of Borneo, to the Lawas River valley, located at north of Borneo.

INTRODUCTION

To better comprehend the state's strategies in dominating the Muslim bumiputera, this chapter presents a micro analysis of the state's domination based on the study of the coastal Malays in southwest Sarawak.1 In analysing the domination of the southwest Sarawak Malays, this chapter begins by giving a brief description of the community. Through this description, an understanding of the local context that shaped the coastal Malays’ loyalty to the state can be achieved. To validate the state's domination of the coastal Malays, this chapter then discusses the voting trend of the community who had strongly backed the ruling party despite its apparent marginalization. Subsequently, an analysis of the strongmanpolitician's three-pronged strategies in dominating the coastal Malays and the community's response towards this domination will be discussed.

THE COASTAL MALAYS OF SOUTHWEST SARAWAK

Southwest Sarawak constitutes the northern region of “Old Sarawak” which is now the First Division or also known as Kuching Division. On the west of southwest Sarawak is the border between Indonesia Borneo and Sarawak, which runs along the ridge of the most westerly point of Borneo, Tanjung Datu (see Figure 7.1). Moving eastward from Tanjung Datu, southwest Sarawak stretches for nearly 100 miles of coastline until it reaches another cape known as Tanjung Po, located at the mouth of Sarawak River. Southwest Sarawak had been a zone of intense human activity since more than one thousand years ago (Harrisson 1970, p. 118). Based on the excavations by Sarawak Museum in Tanjung Datu (five archaeological sites) and Muara Tebas (four sites) in 1950, there is substantial archaeological evidence to suggest that human activity in southwest Sarawak was at its peak between the eighth and fourteenth century (Bongkissam in Santubong) (Harrisson 1970, p. 118).

During the colonial period especially the British's rule, the Malay population in southwest Sarawak increased significantly, transforming the region into a Malay land. This trend continues to persist when the independent negeri of Sarawak moves into the new millennium under the rule of the Muslim Melanau strongmen-politicians. Despite the overall growth of the Malay population in southwest Sarawak, some Malay kampongs experienced a slower growth rate compared to other Malay kampongs. In 1960, Bako was the most populated kampong in southwest Sarawak, and it continued to maintain that status after more than forty years.

In Malaysian politics, Sarawak is popularly known as the Barisan Nasional's (BN) fortress. This connotation is derived from the ruling party's ability to dominate both the parliamentary and negeri elections in Sarawak after the first direct elections were introduced in 1970. Initially, the ruling party faced an uphill battle in cajoling Sarawak's electorate as evident from its dismal performance in the 1970 election; it only won nine parliamentary seats and less than half of the Council Negeri seats. The ruling party only began to impose its dominance over the electorate in the following 1974 election when it drastically increased its representatives in parliament and Council Negeri to fifteen and thirty respectively. After that election, BN had persistently maintained its dominance in the Council Negeri by securing more than a two-thirds majority. Meanwhile, in the parliamentary elections, the ruling party constantly delivered more than 78 per cent of the seats which tremendously boosted the national ruling party's presence in parliament (see Table 1.1 and Table 1.2). Without a doubt, BN has shown great capability in cajoling Sarawak's electorate, but its dominance is more prevalent among the Muslim bumiputera. Throughout the elections in Sarawak, the ruling party consistently made a total sweep of the Muslim bumiputera seats (except in 1987) and recorded a higher percentage of the popular vote in these seats, compared to the party's overall popular vote.

Unfortunately, the political domination of the Muslim bumiputera has not been adequately addressed by the existing literature which leads to the inception of this study. In analysing this political phenomenon, it is argued that political domination of the Muslim bumiputera is achieved through the state's strategy in accommodating social forces in Sarawak. These coopted social forces would then act as a medium to extend the central state's domination of Sarawak's society including the Muslim bumiputera. Hence, the juncture between the state and social forces in Sarawak becomes the basis of domination in the negeri, particularly among the Muslim bumiputera since the last three decades.

THE STUDY OF SARAWAK POLITICS

There is a large collection of books, articles and monographs on Sarawak politics, encompassing various subjects such as colonial rule, the formation of Malaysia, voting behaviour of major ethnic groups, money politics, political patronage and central state-negeri relations.