INTRODUCTION

Myanmar approaches 2010 with only a few areas of certainty — one being that external observers will differ in the many possible interpretations of the events and process in the lead-up to the election, and another that there will be many dissatisfied with the result, regardless of the process. The new constitution offers potential opportunities for change and improvement in Myanmar, but various aspects of the transition are still unclear, yet critical for stability. Given the conflicting views, the process of change should be gradual.

National development goals are diverse. The consideration of this diversity should be coupled with the understanding that the Myanmar government is not monolithic, as often portrayed, and that at times a surprising mix of approaches is shown in methodology. Myanmar is a country of enormous richness and variety, and home to many groups characterized by great resilience, courage and a passion for national development.

Myanmar has rarely received positive press, or commendation for work done well, despite a considerable amount of progress that has taken place. A flow on from this has been more negativity in foreign policy or attitudes than is appropriate for the context. Failure to recognize progress for what it is devalues the efforts of a host of people working hard to create change in many ways. Yet few news reports or studies are written on positive achievements, although it can be expected that an increasing number of diverse, positive case studies will emerge as more summaries of accounts of work done as part of the overall response to Cyclone Nargis accumulate. The December 2008 edition of Humanitarian Exchange, published by the Overseas Development Institute, included a number of these. In general, as reporting on Nargis-related activities has been far better publicized than other examples, this chapter will seek to draw on other lesser-known examples. It acknowledges the many criticisms made of complex issues in Myanmar and makes no attempt to refute them, or to add to the shortcomings detailed elsewhere. The main purpose is to present some more positive and lesser-known perspectives on progress in Myanmar as alternatives that can be built on as a means of offering different pathways to future national development.

INTRODUCTION

Karen-populated areas of Burma/Myanmar have been affected by armed conflict since 1949, the year after independence. For much of this period, the Karen National Union (KNU) operated as a de facto government, controlling large swathes of territory across Karen State, and adjacent areas of Mon State, and Pegu and Tenasserim Divisions. Although not recognized internationally, the KNU administration aspired to reproduce in areas under its control the (Weberian) “modern/rational-bureaucratic” state, fielding departments for health, education, and civil administration, and making claims to a legitimate monopolization of violence, and rights to extract taxes from the population.

By the 1990s the KNU had lost control of most of its once-extensive “liberated zones” — although the organization still exerted varying degrees of influence over areas contested with government forces and proxy militias. This process was accompanied by a dramatic fall in revenues which the organization derived from taxing the black-market cross-border trade, and from logging deals. The decline of the KNU was exacerbated by the defection in late 1994 of several hundred battle-hardened soldiers, who established the government-allied Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA), in protest against the Christian domination of the KNU, and the failure of its long-term leader, the charismatic General Bo Mya (who died in 2006), to discipline adequately field commanders operating under his authority.

Ten years later, the DKBA had displaced the KNU's armed wing — the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) — as the militarily and economically most powerful Karen non-state actor in Burma. Other ex- KNU/KNLA armed factions included the Karen Peace Force (KPF, established 1997) in southern Karen State, the “P'doh Aung San Group” (1998) and KNU-KNLA Peace Council (PC, 2007) in central Karen State, and two small ceasefire groups in northern Karen State (which split from the KNU in 1997), as well as various local militias. Whereas in previous years the KNU had been strong enough to demand at least symbolic loyalty from locally based field commanders — many of whom operated under the umbrella of the Karen national movement — the collapse of the organization's fortunes in the 1990s led to the splintering of the old insurgent paradigm, and the reorientation of specialists in violence towards the military government and its networks of control.

INTRODUCTION

This chapter assesses the impact of the policy regime of Burma's ruling State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) on the relief and reconstruction programme that followed Cyclone Nargis, which struck lower Burma on 2–3 May 2008. The policy of the SPDC is only one determinant, albeit a critical one, of the success (or otherwise) of the aid effort. The chapter argues that its policy incompetence, neglect and brutality — hallmarks of the military regime more or less throughout its nearly 50-year rule — were once again evident in its response to the cyclone.

Of course, any analysis of the SPDC's role in the relief and reconstruction programme is limited by the availability and independence of public information, most of which derives from reports published by aid organizations. Given that one of the goals of aid organizations is to maximize the amount of donations received from the public and different governments, they have an incentive to censor information that might conflict with this goal. These same sources also frequently exaggerate the effectiveness of their projects (for the same motivation), while denying that problems arise from delivering aid under authoritarian systems of government of the sort in place in Burma.

The public information about the situation after Cyclone Nargis indicates that the aid programme was successful in averting famine in the face of widespread lost agricultural capacity in the delta. Yet, we also know that by the end of 2009 the situation for around one (of 2.4) million people severely affected by Cyclone Nargis had not returned to precyclone conditions (TCG 2009b). We know that many households were still unable to command enough resources to feed themselves or rebuild their assets, except by incurring increasing and unsustainable levels of debt (Soe Lwin 2009; TCG 2009b; WFP 2009). We know that the regime allocated minimal resources to the relief and reconstruction programme, with most of the projects being undertaken by NGOs and UN agencies (ACTED 2009; Merlin 2008). Moreover, available evidence also indicates that even the low levels of stock and quality of infrastructure and public goods that existed prior to Cyclone Nargis have not been replaced (IRIN 2009; JRCS 2009; TCG 2009b).

INTRODUCTION

Between 2007 and 2009, Burma experienced two major political crises that have drawn international focus and criticism upon the country and its military junta. In the aftermath of the September 2007 demonstrations and the passage of Cyclone Nargis in May 2008, European Union countries, both individually and as a whole through EU institutions (Council, Parliament and Commission), have had little leverage, let alone influence, over the gridlocked state of Burmese affairs (Selth 2008). A critical dilemma is caused by the tension between the EU's normative stance and its selfproclaimed willingness to assist, springing from its position as the world's largest provider of ODA. In practice, the easiest option has been followed since the 1990s; namely, that of isolating the regime on ethical grounds, rather than considering and elaborating another approach. Yet, strict implementation of the EU Common Position, first defined in October 1996 and reinforced several times since, which imposes restrictions on further aid and development assistance — albeit one that is little observed on the ground — has achieved little.

In spite of a few successes since the first sanctions decided by Brussels in the early 1990s, EU policies towards Burma have failed, both in encouraging a political breakthrough and in fostering economic growth, let alone socio-economic development. Even progress on the EU's bottomline humanitarian agenda has been limited. Seen from Naypyitaw, Europeans are considered by the Burmese regime more as a potential threat than as a source of much-needed financial or humanitarian assistance, as Japan is. How can the EU's limited success be explained? We suggest that the present diplomatic and political configuration, both internally within the individual twenty-seven EU member states and the European Union as a whole, has neither facilitated in the past nor augurs well in the near future for any concrete policy change towards Burma. This is despite the fact that a change of approach to the Burmese conundrum undertaken by the Obama Administration may have a direct impact on other Western countries. Unfortunately, there are too many diplomatic obstacles, political constraints and internal EU divisions to revise the current EU Common Position significantly, including in a post-2010 elections context.

INTRODUCTION

Some studies suggest that the Myanmar government spending will remain heavily focused on military expenditure, with few (if any) initiatives in the pipeline to support households and businesses or to stimulate the economy in the face of the global economic downturn. The Myanmar government announced that the current global economic slowdown has had only a marginal impact on Myanmar. It seems doubtful, however, that it would be capable of taking effective action to limit damage, as indicated by the speeches of military leaders and articles in the daily papers.

In an article entitled “Resilient Country, Resilient People”, which appeared in the New Light of Myanmar on 18 December 2008, Kyaw Ye Min (the pseudonym of an official) claimed that Myanmar had suffered no spill-over effects from the crisis of neighbouring Southeast Asian countries during the Asian financial crisis in 1997. Myanmar, he said, was capable of managing the economy to stabilize it and of isolating itself from economic crises in other countries. A country without any external aid and help could survive easily in the face of difficulties, it was assumed.

In 2003, Myanmar experienced a banking crisis. Problems in subprime financial services infected banks, creating a liquidity crisis. To make things worse, rumours spread which influenced people to withdraw their deposits. Some private banks had a poor record of financial discipline and depositors had a low level of trust and confidence in Myanmar's banks. The government provided 59.90 billion kyat of credit to banks as emergency liquidity during this period. In addition, as a lender of last resort, the central bank extended a credit line of a further 50.68 billion kyat. With a total of 110.58 billion s given to thirteen private banks, the banks recovered by January 2004, which was an indication, the article said, that the Myanmar government was willing and capable of helping people in times of need and emergency.

To help victims of Cyclone Nargis, which left Irrawaddy Division and Yangon Division helpless in May 2008, subsidies of 88.44 billion kyat were provided by the government, with 42.32 billion kyat more coming from private donors. Even if Myanmar is a poor country, the help from government should be recognized, the columnist added.

More than twenty years have now passed since the beginning of the organization of large-scale ceasefire agreements in Burma, with Khin Nyunt having taken the historical credit for spearheading this spate of accords. The United Wa State Army, or UWSA, is one such ceasefire group (in Burmese, a nyein chan yay apwe) and claims territories in the Northern and Eastern Shan State. Particularly in the past decade, the UWSA has repeatedly engaged in combat with the Shan State Army South, at the behest — and to the potential benefit — of the Burmese Tatmadaw. While ten years ago, the UWSA's tenth-anniversary celebrations were marked with fanfare, and attended and sanctioned by Khin Nyunt himself, the ceasefire group's twentieth-anniversary celebrations in April 2009 were markedly different in tone. Although the celebrations in the Wa capital of Panghsang were attended by roughly twenty thousand people and 2,400 UWSA troops, only a handful of lower-ranking SPDC military men were in attendance in 2009. Arguably, this diminished enthusiasm on the part of the SPDC foreshadows a lesser role ascribed to the ceasefire groups in the upcoming elections, and whether this will be a viable option for these organized groups in the context of the Shan State political economies remains to be seen.

These tense relations, with some observers waiting to see which side fires first will certainly have a significant effect on the political future of the Shan State. Of particular interest for the context of this conference on governance in the region is the Wa organizations’ overt refusal to accept and participate in the SPDC's recent ultimatum that they become a proxy force, or a Border Guard Force (BGF) ultimately supervised by the Tatmadaw (The Irrawaddy, 20 April 2010). All of the major ceasefire groups were urged to join the fold of the Burmese Tatmadaw, and out of the seventeen ceasefire groups given this ultimatum, the largest of these groups, including the UWSA as well as the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), have rejected these proposals, claiming that they would only negotiate with a democratically elected government in the future (The Irrawaddy, 18 May 2010).

BACKGROUND: POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CHALLENGES TO AUTHORITY

Significant changes in Myanmar/Burma since the popular demonstrations of 2007 mask a situation that seems superficially to be “more of the same”. The adoption of a new constitution, through a referendum conducted under questionable arrangements in May 2008, on paper restores a form of legal governance for the first time since 1988. However, few observers, in Myanmar or outside, have any illusions that this will mean a real transfer of power to a popularly elected government. Yet increasingly commentators and interested parties are taking the view that the elections, scheduled to take place in 2010 for the first time since 1990, at both the nationwide and regional level, will mark a new or accelerated phase in the agonizingly slow transitions purported to be occurring to bring about an end to military rule, even if they do not purport to restore participative government. This situation represents a major challenge for the citizens of Myanmar/Burma, whose ability to influence state decision-making is extraordinarily constrained, as well as for the international community.

Myanmar's military regime, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), not only maintains its tight grip on power, but since 2007 has moved to reduce further the space in which its authority can be contested and challenged. During 2008/09, the regime intensified its military campaigns against its opponents along its eastern border with Thailand. A new crackdown against political opponents during 2008, apparently aimed at weakening opposition groups before the 2010 elections, resulted in more than 2,100 political prisoners, more than at any other time in the modern period. Throughout 2009, the military leadership orchestrated a concerted (but poorly executed) campaign to convert armed minority groups into border security forces but, as tensions rose in August 2009, fighting between the army and the Kokang militia resulted in the first serious breakdown among the various ceasefire groups. The military regime has, however, still not been significantly challenged politically, despite the new array of sanctions (imposed outside the United Nations) since the 2007 crackdown against civil protests. Those UN Security Council members supporting Myanmar maintain their support, even though during 2008 they occasionally urged the military regime to cooperate more fully with the United Nations, as the UN's apparent impotence in dealing with the problem of Myanmar/Burma continued.

INTRODUCTION

Burma will be undergoing a political transition over the coming decade. The new constitution promulgated to guide this transition provides for a highly “disciplined”, military-dominated, quasi-parliamentary system with wide-ranging constraints on the participants in election politics and elected bodies. Some believe that this transition, despite the authoritarian constitution, may ultimately prove to be the long-awaited opportunity to develop alternatives to military rule in Burma. Others see the constitution and the coming elections simply as a codification of permanent authoritarian rule in the guise of democracy. Even a careful reading of the constitution does not answer this dilemma; the answer will only become apparent in its implementation, both near-term and long-term. In the near term, outside actors are likely to have very little impact on the 2010 elections and the formation of the newly elected government. Over the longer term, however, Burma's political transition could lead the country to greater international interaction, both politically and economically, depending upon the nature of the new leadership that emerges and the policies that Asian neighbours, Western governments, and international institutions adopt toward the new government. This paper will examine the possible outcomes of Burma's political transition and speculate on how different outcomes might affect U.S. policy.

LEGISLATING “DISCIPLINED DEMOCRACY”

The 2008 Burmese constitution has been carefully crafted by Burma's military rulers to guide the country into a new era of multi-party quasiparliamentary government in which the military itself plays a central role in assuring political “discipline.” Although the 2008 constitution has been dismissed by most observers as a thoroughly undemocratic document, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) has been clearly unwilling to entertain any suggestion of modification and appears determined to follow through with its plans for elections and transition to quasi-parliamentary government in 2010. We must therefore view the constitution as the blueprint for the transition process and the new government it will produce.

INTRODUCTION

The term “nation-building” is enjoying a revival in scholarly circles as well as becoming common in international politics. It has come to prominence in the debate on failing states, conflict management and development theory. In the post-colonial nation-states of South and Southeast Asia particularly, it has been on the political agenda since the 1950s (Derichs and Heberer 2006). This earlier usage needs to be distinguished from the term now widely being used, especially in the United States, to mean creating a “nation” in a country undergoing conflict. The latter usage denotes the employment of armed force and civil authority in putting together a workable government in a country recovering from war or still embroiled in it. There is a growing literature on this, but the meaning differs greatly from that intended in this paper.

Anthony Smith defines the nation as “a named human population which shares myths and memories, a mass public culture, a designated homeland, economic unity, and equal rights and duties for all members” (1995, pp. 56–57). It does not take much effort to realize that by this definition Myanmar still has a long way to go before attaining nationhood. At the present time, there is little sharing of myths among its peoples, and there would be marked differences particularly in the memories of the post-independence period, which has been witness to what is perhaps the longest-running civil conflict in the world.

According to Jochen Hippler (1998), nation-building consists of three major elements:

1. An integrative ideology, that might be nationalist, but could also be religious, racist, developmentalist, or shaped along other lines, as long as it provides for integrating the sub-groups of the inhabitants of a country into one society.

2. An integrated society, with its several elements communicating more often with each other than with outsiders. This implies a “nationwide” integration of geographic regions, economic sectors, and politics. It also presupposes a functioning infrastructure and intellectual discourse of “national” scale.

3. An existing state apparatus, which actually fulfils its functions on all of the national territory.

INTRODUCTION

A common characteristic of most policies towards Myanmar/Burma is to seek to achieve some change for the better in the situation in the country despite the continued authoritarian rule of the military regime. This more modest change agenda was necessitated by the lack of any prospect of bringing the case of Burma to the UN Security Council. As at mid-2009 no external strategies (or, for that matter, internal strategies) have been especially successful in accomplishing much improvement, and certainly not in the sense of achieving “regime change”. Few organizations conducting programmes there would even claim to have accomplished much success in pressing for systemic change, and so surprisingly few attempts have been made to rigorously assess or measure the extent of change attributable to these policies.

Nevertheless, there is some point in examining objectively what approaches have succeeded in accomplishing a modest degree of behaviour change by the military regime. Whether these changes have been caused by applying pressure, through sanctions or some other strategy, or, on the other hand, by using persuasion, or even some combination of the two, is not the ultimate test in this case. Yet, despite the claims to the contrary by the regime's critics, there is ample evidence of certain changes in its behaviour resulting from particular strategies. These changes may not have been sufficient to make Burma/Myanmar fully compliant with relevant international norms, but they can be documented, may have become “permanent”, or may be a key step in a transitional process.

It would be instructive to look carefully and dispassionately at what changes have occurred in Myanmar/Burma and to try to establish why they happened. Where we are faced with a regime as averse to reform and “democratic” processes and as wedded to controlling events, an intelligent mix of strategies is likely to prove to be the best approach in seeking to bring about improvements. This is based on the obvious proposition that there clearly is no “magic bullet” solution and that, realistically, short of invading Myanmar/Burma, outside countries are extremely limited in what they can achieve there.

INTRODUCTION

Seventy-five per cent of Burma's 54 million people live in rural areas. The country's economic structure depends on agriculture and farm-related activities that provide livelihoods to more than 65 per cent of the population. While most rural households are engaged in farming as operators or labourers, and agriculture accounts for over half of the country's gross domestic product, only about one-fifth of rural households currently run viable farms of at least five acres (Dapice 2009, p. 11). Despite Burma's highly fertile agricultural land, some 32 per cent of the population are deprived of adequate food, nutrition and essential non-food items, with poverty levels particularly higher in rural areas (UN Human Development Initiative 2009).

Farmers with no clear rights of land ownership face severe survival pressures in Burma. An estimated one-half to two-thirds of rural households are landless farmers or farm labourers. Farmers’ survival is further threatened when their land is confiscated. The State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) has implemented large-scale, arbitrary land confiscations in order to relocate civilian populations deemed supportive of armed opposition groups; to establish military bases in disputed areas by constructing or supporting new army battalions; to create infrastructure development projects such as the proposed Salween River dams; to facilitate natural-resource extractions such as the offshore Arakan Shwe Gas project; and to privilege interest groups such as military and foreign investors with commercial opportunities, in mining, logging and agriculture. The United Nations General Assembly has reported the broad negative cultural, social, environmental, and economic consequences of these confiscations (2006, p. 14).