Although the national budget and government expenditure have never been a secret in Myanmar, any attempt to calculate Myanmar defence expenditure is fraught with peril. This is particularly true since 1988. The published figures are unreliable. Besides, there are several other factors that should be considered in calculating Myanmar defence expenditure. First, the defence expenditure itself is underestimated. There is heavy state subsidization coming from other ministries and agencies, rather than the Ministry of Defence. For example, the armed forces get subsidized fuel from Ministry of Energy. Second, some of the expenditure in foreign currencies is calculated on the basis of the official exchange rate, which is more than 200 times lower than the market rate in early 2000s. Third, some expenditure comes from other agencies, such as home affairs and forestry. And fourth, some expenditures are paid by military businesses. Finally, some expenditures, such as payment for overseas suppliers, are made in kind under a barter system. (Some claim that some of the military hardware bought from the PRC are paid for in teak and other natural resources.)

Defence Expenditure

Financing the force modernization programme in Myanmar has always been a major issue. The defence budget takes the lion's share in the Total Government Expenditure (TGE) or Central Government Expenditure (CGE). In the first two years immediately after the nation's independence in 1948, the defence expenditure in momentary terms amounted to 40 per cent of the TGE. And it remained relatively high throughout 1950s — about 32 per cent of the TGE. Between 1948 and 1961, the Myanmar government spent Kyat 4,067.7 million (in current price terms) or Kyat 880.8 million (in 1960 constant price) on the defence. This budget was used mostly for equipment, salaries, rations, and medical facilities for the troops. The calculation of the percentage of defence expenditure to the TGE or CGE was simply for the period between 1948 and 1962 when there was little state-owned economic enterprises (SEE). In the early 1950s, the Tatmadaw found a way to provide welfare services for its members and their families; it established a number of business firms, including stores to sell subsidized commodities for Tatmadaw members. The issue of military business will be discussed later in the chapter.

Military training in Myanmar is the second task of the Tatmadaw, the first being combat duty and the third being public works. Training is the most important business of the Tatmadaw in peacetime and can take many forms. Military training is the key to achieving combat readiness. The Tatmadaw has been developing a training regime to provide officer education and leadership training for its officers. In this context, a wide range of skills needs to be developed and a variety of people need to be trained. This chapter discusses the development of military training in Myanmar from 1948 to the present. In the mid-1990s, in accordance with its modified military doctrine, the Tatmadaw introduced a new training regime to train its officers and men to be capable of fighting conventional warfare.

Military Training Programme

At the time of Myanmar's independence in 1948, in accordance with the War Establishment, a major was appointed as G-II (general staff officer — grade II) for military training and operations at the insufficiently staffed war office. He was assisted by two G-IIIs captains, one of whom was responsible for military training. The G-II was under the G-I (staff duty), a lieutenant colonel, of the General Staff Office. Then in September 1950, the War Office introduced a new set-up in which a new G-I (training) was appointed under the Vice-Chief of General Staff while the G-I (staff duty) was placed under the Deputy Chief of General Staff. The G-I (training) oversaw the Burma Regimental Centre, Burma Army Training Depot, Burma Army Central School, Burma Army Officers' Training School, Burma Army School of Education, and Burma Army Staff College.

Until 1953 there was neither a directorate of military training nor a proper training policy. Most of the officers were sent overseas for training. Although the Tatmadaw could send several officers to foreign training schools to take junior officer courses, mostly in the United Kingdom, India, and Pakistan, it was incapable of securing places in such training facilities as the staff college and the artillery school. At the 1953 Tatmadaw conference, held on 24 August, the then Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, General Ne Win, pointed out the weaknesses of the military training programme in Myanmar.

Before 1988, the Tatmadaw had been poorly equipped and modestly maintained and its weapons were of World War II vantage. Most of the Tatmadaw's major arms procurements, including aircraft and surface ships, were made in the 1950s and early 1960s. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the Tatmadaw's order of battle had been a very modest one compared with most of its neighbours. In this regard, the force modernization in Myanmar has been one long overdue. With the coming of the SLORC in September 1988, the Tatmadaw began to pursue a force modernization programme. The Tatmadaw had injected a massive amount of resources to boost its order of battle. Moreover, the Tatmadaw embarked on ambitious arm production and procurement programmes. The force modernization programme of the Tatmadaw since the early 1990s indicates that external security threats had significantly influenced the Tatmadaw's threat perception. In accordance with its modified military doctrine, the Tatmadaw has been building up conventional war fighting capabilities. While it procured most of its artillery, aircraft, and surface ships from oversea sources, the Tatmadaw relied more or less on its domestic defence industries for small arms production as it has long been pursuing a policy of self-sufficiency in small arms and ammunition production. Force modernization took place for all aspects of the Tatmadaw. Here I will discuss the modernization of three services of the Tatmadaw, mostly in terms of military capability and order of battle.

THE TATMADAW-KYI (THE ARMY)

In his analysis of the Myanmar Armed Forces, Andrew Selth remarked that:

In one way, the force modernization of the Tatmadaw-Kyi was closely related to the building of local defence industries.

Building the Tatmadaw since 1948 has been a challenge. It has gone through various phases of development. In July 1947, Bogyoke Aung San, father of the present day Tatmadaw, expressed his view on the future of Myanmar's national defence and the armed forces in the following terms:

Over a period of nearly six decades, the small and lightly equipped Tatmadaw has grown in size, force structure, and technological sophistication. Largely as a result of recent force modernization and expansion, the Tatmadaw has transformed itself from essentially a counter-insurgency force into a force supported by tanks and artillery, capable of fighting a regular conventional war. It has now become Southeast Asia's second largest military force, next to Vietnam's. One of the declared missions of the Tatmadaw is to build a “strong, highly capable and modern armed forces”, which, according to the rhetoric, “keeps up the twelve noble traditions of the Tatmadaw”. According to official statements, in building a strong, highly capable, and modern Tatmadaw, three capabilities — military, organization, and administrative, have to be achieved through four means — training, administration, welfare, and morale. While training is a key to enhance all capabilities, there are other factors that play an important role in building the Tatmadaw, especially in the field of military capability: military doctrine and strategy, force structure, armament and force modernization, and military training and officer education.

This chapter primarily discusses the historical development of the military doctrine and strategy of the Tatmadaw since Myanmar's independence in 1948. It sets out both security perceptions and policies, charting developments in each against the situation at the time, and also notes the contributions of the leading actors in each period. The Tatmadaw has gone through three phases of doctrinal developments. In the initial period, doctrine focused on the method of coping with foreign invasion; the second period saw the development of counter-insurgency doctrine and the formulation of the concept of total people's war; in the third period the Tatmadaw modified its people's war doctrine to meet modern conditions.

First Phase of the Development of Military Doctrine

Since independence day in January 1948, the armed forces of the Union of Myanmar, the Tatmadaw, have been combating a number of insurgencies throughout the country. The insurgencies of both right- and left-wing groups, such as the Karen National Defence Organisation (KNDO) and the Burma Communist Party (BCP), were so strong in the late 1940s that the Myanmar Government was described in the international media as the Rangoon (Yangon) government. Various communist and separatist insurgencies in Myanmar were so widespread that the government of the time admitted that “large section[s] of the countryside was under complete domination of the insurgents”. Only from the early 1950s was the Tatmadaw able to recapture and reassert its control over some important cities. However, the rural areas were still very much under the control and influence of various insurgents. This internal armed security threat to the state has long overshadowed the security perception of the Tatmadaw, in terms of doctrine, force structure, armament, and training. In the meantime, as the communists came to power in China in 1949, remnants of the Kuomintang (KMT) troops under General Li Mi moved into Myanmar and used the frontier as a springboard for attack against the People's Republic of China, which, in turn, became an external threat to national security in Myanmar.

The first military doctrine for the Tatmadaw was formulated in the early 1950s, when the security situation of the Union had improved markedly, but it focused on methods of coping with foreign invasion, rather than suppressing insurgency. Despite the fact that internal security operations continued to preoccupy the Tatmadaw's operational priority, the first military doctrine was surprisingly for external defence.

Ever since Myanmar regained its independence in January 1948, the Tatmadaw (Myanmar Armed Forces) has been crucial in restoring and maintaining law and order. It is one of the most important institutions in Myanmar politics. During the civil war of late 1940s and early 1950s, the Tatmadaw suppressed both communist and separatist insurgencies, restored law and order, and maintained peace and stability. While it had engaged in counterinsurgency operations, the Tatmadaw also had to drive foreign aggressors out of the country. However, in October 1958 as the political situation began to deteriorate to such a point that a national security crisis was imminent, the civilian government of the time, at the intervention of some senior Tatmadaw commanders agreed to transfer state power to the Tatmadaw. On 28 October 1958, the Tatmadaw formed the Caretaker Government to restore political stability and to hold general elections; it finally held general elections in February 1960 and subsequently transferred state power back to the elected government. As a political crisis had been looming large again, the Tatmadaw this time staged a military coup d'état in the name of the Revolutionary Council (RC) on 2 March 1962. By the end of April, the RC declared the Burmese Way to Socialism (BWS) as its nation building programme. The Tatmadaw leadership subsequently founded the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) in July 1962 to lead the socialist revolution in Myanmar. The Revolution Council rule came to an end only when a new constitution was promulgated and general elections were held to restore a constitutional government in 1974. Since January 1974, the Tatmadaw accepted the political leadership of the BSPP. Only in September 1988, did the BSPP allow Tatmadaw personnel to resign membership from the party. Then on 18 September 1988, the Tatmadaw took over the state again in the name of the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), renamed the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) on 15 November 1997.

Myanmar has a total land area of 667,000 square kilometres (261,228 square miles), measuring 936 kilometres (581 miles) from east to west, and 2,051 kilometres (1,275 mile) from north to south.

A Brief History of Regional Command Headquarters at (Maymyo/Mandalay) and (Mingalardon/Taungoo)

The history of the two regional command headquarters located at either Maymyo or Mandalay and at either Mingalardon or Taungoo is complex and confusing. In order to understand these commands, we need to look at Myanmar's pre-independence period. The reoccupation of Burma was carried out by the British 14th Army under the command of General William Slim. As troops were needed to operate on the Malay peninsula, the 14th Army was assigned the duty. The 12th Army commanded by Lieutenant General Stopford took over the command on 1 June 1945. The HQ-BURMA COMAND was formed on 1 January 1946 with Lieutenant General Stopford as commander, by transforming the British 12th Army. However, on 30 January, General Briggs was appointed as the General Officer Commanding (GOC) of the HQ-BURMA COMMAND. He served in this position until the HQ-BURMA COMMAND was abolished in late 1947. No. 64 Infantry Brigade (Maymyo), North Burma Area HQ (Mandalay), and South Burma Area HQ (Yangon) were under HQ-BURMA COMMAND.

In June 1945, the Supreme Allied Command South East Asia (SACSEA) appointed Major General Thomas as Inspector General (IG) of the British Burma Army. He remained in this position until the end of April 1947. Colonel Letya and Colonel Smith Dun served under him as Deputy Inspector Generals (DIGs). When the HQ-BURMA ARMY was opened on 1 May 1947, Major General Thomas became the General Officer Commanding (GOC). He was assisted by Brigadier Smith Dun as Vice-GOC. Colonel Letya was attached to the HQ-BURMA COMMAND. No. 1 Infantry Brigade (Meikhtila) and No. 2 Infantry Brigade (Mingalardon) were under the HQ-BURMA ARMY.

In August 1947, North Burma Area HQ and No. 64 Infantry Brigade were merged as North Burma Brigade Area HQ in Maymyo, later renamed North Burma Sub-District (NBSD). No. 1 Infantry Brigade was attached to NBSD although it remained directly under the HQ-BURMA ARMY. In December 1947, South Burma Area HQ and No. 2 Infantry Brigade were merged as South Burma Brigade Area HQ in Mingalardon, later renamed South Burma Sub-District (SBSD). Now the HQ-BURMA ARMY had NBSD and No. 1 Infantry Brigade. Beginning from 1 November 1947, the commanding officers of Burma Rifles and Burma Regiments were replaced with Myanmar citizens.