From the second decade of the twentieth century, the intelligentsia had found the means to communicate with the masses. Recognizing the misery of the masses, the high-sounding ideas of kemadjoean inherited from previous decades lost their magnetism. In the face of increasing social dislocation, it became important to translate ideologies into practical programmes of action and to resist colonialism.

The deterioration of the post-war Indies economy and the great economic depression of the 1930s provided a fertile soil for rampant radicalism. In the growing spirit of political resistance, many former proto-nationalist associations abandoned their socio-cultural aims and became more concerned with the adoption and formulation of political-ideologies. In response to contesting political ideologies, the less-structured proto-nationalist social movements’ of the early two decades of the twentieth century began to be transformed into structured “political parties”.

As political radicalism spread, the ethical policy became a faltering creed. In the first decade of the twentieth century, members of the Ethici such as Snouck Hurgronje publicly vowed: “We cannot rest content with measures which serve to strengthen our rule by preventing discontent and opposition. Our goal is not the quiet, formerly so valued, but progress.” In the early 1920s, however, mainstream Dutch public opinion regarded progressive Indies intellectuals as disturbers of colonial public order. To curb this potential public disobedience, the regime of rust en orde [tranquillity and order] was even more strongly enforced by the colonial administrators. Rather than encouraging the rule of law, rust en orde was a euphemism for the deployment of a repressive colonial state apparatus that negated the idea of due legal process.

When the Sukarno regime crumbled in 1966, the rising new power began to designate the period of Guided Democracy as the Old Order [orde lama] and celebrate the new era as the New Order [orde baru]. Although Sukarno was still granted official status as the President of Indonesia until 17 October 1967, his real power declined after the 30 September movement [Gestapu] of 1965. The groundwork for the New Order regime was signalled by the issuing of Sukarno' controversial “mandate” on 11 March 1966 entrusting Lieutenant-General Suharto, the army commander since October 1965, with the task of coordinating the power of the government. This mandate came to be known as Surat Perintah Sebelas Maret [Supersemar, 11 March Letter of Instruction]. Suharto took over the command of national politics following massive army-backed anti-Sukarno and anti-communist student demonstrations in the national capital and other cities. On 12 March 1967, the Provisional People' Consultative Assembly [Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Sementara, MPRS] appointed Suharto as the acting President of Indonesia.

To emphasize that this would be a new era, the new regime re-opened the public sphere but with some controls. All kinds of groups, individuals and publications who had been virtually silenced during guided democracy began to make themselves heard again. Conversely, those who had been so vocal during the Old Order period were silenced.

The rise of the New Order marked the ascendancy of the third generation of Indonesian intelligentsia. Members of this generation, who grew up during the Japanese Occupation and revolution, generally lacked exposure to Western academic training but were highly imbued with militaristic and nationalistic mentalities. The new regime was dominated by the military intelligentsia who had a long-standing aversion to the “unpatriotic” and disputatious politics of civilians.

Intellectuals of the PSI and Christian communities became the military' main partners in the formation of the New Order. Their decisive role owed much to their superior educational qualifications and the powerful influence of the PSI and Christian lobbies among the central army command.

Out of the galactic crisis of the Indonesian polity at the twilight of the previous century, a new crescent began shining in the sky of Jakarta: the emergence of the Muslim intelligentsia as the rising political and bureaucratic elite.

In the late Suharto era, following the demoralization of Muslim politics from the 1960s, various figures of the Muslim intelligentsia surprisingly took centre stage in Indonesian socio-political discourse. About the same time, many other members of the Muslim intelligentsia were appointed to the upper echelons of the government bureaucracy. Issues surrounding this Muslim intelligentsia produced extensive media coverage and provoked public debates following the establishment, in December 1990, of the Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Se-Indonesia [ICMI, the Association of Indonesian Muslim Intelligentsia].

By the time of the emergence of the reform [reformasi] movement in 1997/98, some figures of the Muslim intelligentsia played crucial roles in the process of President Suharto' resignation. This political significance of the Muslim intelligentsia was accentuated during the period of President Habibie' interregnum when the cabinet and senior administration were composed largely of ICMI members. At the same time, the leadership of the Golkar party (as the heir to the New Order' political machine) came to be dominated by former activists of the Islamic University Students’ Association (HMI). This culminated in the selection of Abdurrahman Wahid (former chairman of Nahdlatul Ulama) as President succeeding Habibie, along with the appointment of Muslim figures as senior state officials.

The end of a century and of a study is a moment for retrospection and reflection. The turn of the twenty-first century is just a numerical event, which does not necessarily contain historical significance. In the Indonesian context, however, historical events at the dawn of the new century invoked a parallelism with those at the dawn of the twentieth century.

The crisis of the liberal economy in the NEI in the twilight of the nineteenth century provided the impetus for the regime change in the Netherlands, which marked the beginning of the ethical “reform” era in the colony. Speaking from the throne in 1901, Queen Wilhelmina promised that the Netherlands would bear ethical responsibility for the people of the Indies. Education and social welfare were regarded as the moral duty of the government. This accelerated the formation of the intelligentsia as the new elite of the Indies society.

Apart from economic crisis and regime change, the dawn of the twentieth century also heralded the inception of Islamic reformism-modernism concomitant with the deepening penetration of Western secularism in the Indies life-world. These contesting new intellectual currents in their encounter with historic indigenous intellectual traditions had a great impact on the formation of the Indies intelligentsia. Some members of the intelligentsia gravitated toward Western secularism, while others gravitated toward Islamic reformism-modernism. Most of them, however, gravitated toward “translation”, by celebrating hybridity and syncretism — the fusion between different intellectual currents and cultural traditions. These varieties of responses combined with differences in socio-economic underpinning to give rise to the diversity of intellectual-political traditions of the intelligentsia.

As they entered the nineteenth century, the “clerisy” of the “land below the winds” stood at a crossroads. The knowledge road to Mecca inherited from previous centuries through the international networks of ulama remained. At the same time, the deepening penetration of Dutch colonialism and capitalism inescapably brought its own regime of knowledge that paved the new intellectual road to the West.

It was the Liberal-capitalist penetration of the second half of the nineteenth century Dutch colonial era that was responsible for the government' introduction of a Western-style education system to the East Indies. The introduction of the Netherlands right-wing “Ethical” colonial policy in the early decades of the twentieth century brought this educational transformation to a further stage.

Electrified by the pulsing wave of liberal movements and democratic revolution in Europe around the 1840s (Stromberg 1968, pp. 72–78), the Liberal wing in the Netherlands led by Jan Rudolf Thorbecke quickly responded to the political momentum by successfully shifting the course of Fundamental Law [grondwetsherziening] from conservatism towards liberalism. With this Fundamental Law of 1848, the Netherlands became a constitutional monarchy, and the Queen had to be responsible to the parliament. Consequently, the Dutch moved from the rule of absolute authority to the rule of law. Under the provisions of this law, the Liberal wing was able to intervene in colonial matters through parliament. In the educational realm, the Fundamental Law of 1848 guaranteed free education to everyone in the Netherlands and had a trickle down effect, which gradually led to a new attitude towards public education in the Netherlands East Indies (NEI) (Simbolon 1995, pp. 126–27).

Supported by private entrepreneurs and a politically conscious Liberal middle class, this Liberal force became increasingly dissatisfied with financial administration, first in the homeland and then in the colony. The Liberals aimed originally to wield power at home and, later, to have access to, or control over, colonial profits (Furnivall 1944, p. 148).

Suharto' increasing satisfaction through the 1980s with his ideological and economic handiwork coincided with the waning influence of the old political brokers within the New Order polity. As Elson observed (2001, p. 244): “Ali Murtopo' star, for so long in the ascendant, had begun to wane following his heart attack in 1978 (he died in May 1984), while Sudjono Humardani' influence faded in the early 1980s with the arrival of more professional and technically skilled bureaucrats.”

This brought a new political alignment within the inner circle of Suharto' patronage structure. The Golkar leadership during Sudharmono' period (1983–88) heralded the diminishing influence of Murtopo' group, as Sudharmono preferred to accommodate Islamic activists. The appointment of Murtopo' intelligence protégé, L.B. Murdani, as the military commander in March 1983 temporarily sustained the influence of the non-Muslim lobby. The dismissal of Murdani as commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces in 1988, however, marked the turning point in Suharto' attitudinal and strategic relations with the military elites. The president began to welcome the promotion of Islamic-friendly-military officers sometimes referred to as the “green army”.

Friendly overtures by Muslim organizations towards the state orthodoxy encouraged the regime to accommodate Muslim representatives in the leadership of the New Order polity and bureaucracy. During the 1983–88 period, some representatives of the Muslim intelligentsia began to play important roles on Golkar' central executive board (DPP-Golkar). This group of Muslim intelligentsia was comprised of Akbar Tanjung (as the vice secretary-general), K.H. Tarmudji, Ibrahim Hasan, Anang Adenansi, and Qudratullah (DPP-Golkar 1994, pp. 165–68). About the same time, Muslim intellectuals in the government bureaucracy such as Mar'ie Muhammad, Bedu Amang, Muslimin Nasution, Sajuti Hasibuan and some others were appointed to upper echelon positions.

This book about Japan's efforts on energy efficiency is part of the ISEAS Energy Series. The issue of energy efficiency has become one of the most important aspects in the global energy outlook today. The depletion of fossil fuels as energy resources as well as global warming as factors in global socio-economic development make it imperative for us to consider energy efficiency policies and measures as one of the most important priorities for policy-makers and every responsible global citizen.

Japan has been a leading country in the area of energy efficiency. Since the 1970s when the oil crisis hit, Japan, which depends almost wholly on imported energy supplies from abroad, has been conducting various efforts on energy conservation and diversification of energy sources. As a result, Japan has achieved the lowest primary energy consumption per GDP in the world. Asian countries should learn from Japan's success in this area, especially since their economic growth is predicted to be one of the primary drivers for growth in global energy demand.

The chapters in this book are based on presentations on Japan's energy efficiency and conservation at ISEAS Energy Forums on two separate occasions. Professor Makoto Nishimura, former Executive Vice-President of the Mitsui Global Strategic Studies Institute Japan, and now an economics professor at the Nagoya University, presented a paper on energy efficiency and new technology from the private business perspective, at the ISEAS Energy Forum on 7 March 2007. Together with Dr Ram Giri, Project Manager of the Mitsui Global Strategic Studies Institute (MGSSI), he addressed the challenges and problems on exporting Japanese energy saving technologies. Mr Yasushi Akahoshi, Executive Director of the Japanese External Trade Organization (JETRO) Singapore, which is the Japanese government agency dealing with cooperation in foreign trade, also wrote a chapter on the policy aspects of Japanese energy efficiency and conservation. This was based on his presentation at the ISEAS Energy Forum on 14 March 2007.

Introduction

In previous years, the situation regarding regional economic cooperation and integration has been developing actively. One tangible development was the East Asia Summit (EAS), a 16 member-country cooperation. Two EASs or leaders’ meetings have been held, in Kuala Lumpur in 2005, and in Cebu, Philippine in early 2007. The Third EAS leaders’ meeting will take place in November 2007 in Singapore. There are several issues that the leaders have decided as possible fields for cooperation. Energy issues have been regarded as the most important, as shown in the EAS leaders declaration entitled “Cebu Declaration on East Asian Energy Security”. Singapore has been one of the most active countries for energy cooperation, and has proposed to host the First East Asia Energy Ministers Meeting, a move welcomed by the other leaders.

This paper discusses the policy side of Japanese energy efficiency and conservation. Chapter 1 by Makoto Nishimura, Executive Vice-President of the Mitsui Global Strategic Studies Institute, Japan, is on energy efficiency from a private business perspective.

This paper is divided into three parts. The first part examines the situation on energy consumption in Japan as a brief background. The second part discusses energy conservation policies and measures. International cooperation for energy efficiency is discussed in the final part.

The material for this chapter was mainly contributed by colleagues in Tokyo. Therefore, credits go to the Agency for Natural Resources and Energy of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI).

The Present Energy Consumption in Japan

Figure 2.1 compares energy consumption in three sectors from 1973 onwards, when the first oil shock took place. The figures in the second column indicate the amount of energy consumption in each sector, with the amount in 1973 taken as 100. The figure shows that the energy consumption in the commercial and residential sector and the transportation sector has been steadily increasing, as indicated by the number 247 and 212 respectively. Meanwhile, the industrial sector's indicator has been almost flat.

At the Second East Asia Summit held in Cebu, Philippines on 14–15 January 2007, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe announced Japan's intention to provide Japanese energy saving technologies to help Asian nations achieve efficiency in energy use and to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The Prime Minister announced a US$2 billion aid package to help Asian nations develop energy saving technologies that can help to decrease the region's dependence on oil. He also invited researchers and Japanese experts to come on board. These commitments from the Prime Minister himself show that Japan has highly efficient energy saving technologies and is commited to spread such technologies to other parts of the world.

Before the “Oil Shock” hit Japan in 1973, the general view is that energy resources, especially oil, will not run out of supply. In that year, a brief but serious panic occurred in Japan. The manufacturing of detergent and toilet paper had to be halted, and about half of the elevators in buildings had to be stopped to reduce energy usage. Television stations ceased their broadcasting at midnight, and car usage had to be decreased to save petrol.

The year 1973 saw the dawn of energy conservation in Japan. Since then, many products, especially automobiles and household appliances, could only be sold if they have been proven to be energy saving (shoo-ene). Energy saving features are not restricted to general consumer products only but also to manufacturing facilities, transportation machines, houses, and buildings. Many Japanese products are now considered as a small package of energy saving technologies. Energy efficiency in Japan has improved by more than 37 per cent in the last thirty years (see Figure 1.1), and it has become the most energy-efficient country in the world. The Japanese Government has targeted a further energy conservation by 30 per cent in the next ten years (see Figure 1.2). Energy efficiency in the United States is half that of Japan, and in China it is is only one-ninth that of Japan (see Figure 1.3).