Singapore 2000 Population Census indicates that there are about 15 per cent Muslims in the Republic, 14 per cent of which are ethnic Malays. In numbers, this comprises about 450,000 in a population of 4 million people. The remaining 1 per cent comes from ethnic groups such as Arabs and Indians. The Republic's ethnic composition has been, by and large, consistent for many decades — with the majority Chinese taking up 77 per cent and the other minority community, the Indians, 7 per cent. The male-female ratio of the Muslim population is about even, just like the Chinese. Singapore Muslims consists of quite a number of dialect sub-groups — such as Boyanese, Bugis, Javanese, and Malays with Indian and Arab descent, as well as Chinese converts — but there is a high level of unity since these groups generally regard themselves as belonging to the Muslim community.

There has been a steady increase of Chinese converts to Islam, but their numbers remain small. The majority of ethnic Malays are Sunni Muslims. They are also “born Muslims” since they profess the religion of their ancestors who were generally Muslim when they first arrived at Singapore's shores in the early centuries. In terms of geographical settlement, Malays (Muslims) are spread evenly throughout Singapore. This is the result of the Government policy of imposing ethnic quotas in public residential estates, where about 90 per cent of Singaporeans live. The Republic's small size and its rapid industrialization growth, has made the entire Singapore island (measuring 699.4 sq. km., including 63 offshore islands) a modern “city-state”, with all ethnic groups residing in mixed neighbourhoods. Gone are the days when ethnic groups were located in residential ethnic enclaves such as Chinatown (for Chinese), Geylang Serai (Malays) and Serangoon (Indians) and were isolated from each other. Hence, Muslims today live side-by-side with other Singaporeans of different ethnic and religious backgrounds in a modern, cosmopolitan environment, an environment that invariably also shapes the role of Islam in the Republic.

The issues facing the Muslim minorities in Thailand and the Philippines are, in some ways, quite similar. In both countries, Muslims constitute a relatively small population of about 5 to 7 per cent of the total population, are geographically located in the poorer southern part of the country, are proud of their identity and civilization, and have been struggling for some form of autonomy from the central government, without success, for many years. Historical neglect, low socio-economic status, religious antagonism, and violent separatist uprisings that have cost thousands of lives, all combined to explain the continuing plight of minority Muslims in these two countries, a plight not shared by other Muslim minorities in other parts of Southeast Asia.

MUSLIMS IN THAILAND

Thai Muslims have had a long history, stretching a few centuries, ever since the kingdom of Patani became a center of Islam around the late fourteenth century. In the seventeenth century, the success of Persian Muslim traders caught the attention of the Thai king, Pracau Songtham (1602–27) who appointed Muslims as some of his advisers. The fall of Muslim Patani to the Siamese monarch in 1789 led to the ethnic and religious segmentation of Thai Muslims, vis-à-vis the Thai nation (Che Man 1990; Kettani 1986).

At a time when all Thais were subjected to a common citizenship and to the official Thai religion of Theravada Buddhism, Muslims in the south, constituting about 7 per cent of the total Thai population of about 65 million, were clamouring for autonomy in matters of Islam and Malay culture. What ensued was decades of tension and conflict with the Thai state, which adopted an assimilationist policy in dealing with the “Muslim problem”, especially in the four southern provinces where Muslims are in the majority: Patani, Yala, Satun and Narathiwat.

The close proximity of these provinces to Malaysia — where the Muslim majority generally empathize with the plight of their Thai brethren — accentuates the tension.

Of the estimated 1.3 billion Muslims in the world, about 60 per cent live in Asia. Some 250 million Muslims reside in Southeast Asia. While Muslims in this region may be a minority in the Muslim world, their role in shaping the future destiny of Islam is far from peripheral. Indonesia is the largest Muslim country in the world, Malaysia is a dynamic, modern Muslim country, and Brunei is one of the world's richest countries. Other than these three Muslim-majority countries, there are sizeable Muslim minorities in this region, including in Thailand, Philippines and Singapore, and other lesser known, smaller Muslim communities in Indochina, each with their own set of identities, aspirations and challenges.

If compared to Muslims elsewhere, it appears that Muslims in Southeast Asia are blessed with many assets and strengths. In fact, in some areas of nation-building, many countries in the Muslim world look upon Muslims here as a model — for economic development and modernization as well as a certain moderation in Islamic practice worthy of emulation. These assets aside, the sheer diversity and heterogeneity among Muslims here and the challenges besetting their relations with fellow non-Muslim citizens, and the State, cannot be underestimated in any analysis about Islam in this region.

The above challenges are more than evident when one considers matters such as the nature and extent of their Islamic practice; the salience of ethnicity in shaping their Muslim religiosity; the lack of unanimity among their religious elites (ulama) on the kind of Islam that is to be adopted in this age of globalization; and the Muslims' different levels of socio-economic progress, vis-à-vis non-Muslims. Muslim minorities, particularly those situated in the less developed countries in this region, are particularly susceptible to these problems and enigmas. Many are finding the going hard as they face the onslaught of modernization, globalization, and the States' perennial inability to accommodate their cultural and identity quests as Muslims and as citizens.

Islam has had a long history in Malaysia, ever since the faith “arrived” in its shores in what are now the states of Kedah, Perak, Kelantan and Trengganu, from around the twelfth century BC. Admittedly, this period has been a hotly debated one but the excavation of the “Trengganu stone” bearing the age of this period was a major argument used by some scholars to support the twelfth century origins of the Islamization process in Malaysia. The simplicity of the message of the faith, the role of Muslim Sufis and traders, and the conversion of the Malay Sultans, all helped to spread the religion in the Malay peninsular. From time immemorial, Islam in Malaysia — previously Tanah Melayu (Malay Land) — has been closely aligned with the Malay ethnic community, the majority, indigenous “sons of the soil” (bumiputra).

The role of Malacca (Melaka) in the eventual spread of Islam throughout the Malay world cannot be underestimated. After all, at the height of its power in the fifteenth century, Malacca was the centre of Islam in the entire region of Southeast Asia. When Malacca fell to the Portuguese in 1511, and later, British (1824), its role was taken over by the Johor-Riau kingdom. During British rule (1824–1957), Islam could be said to have been “bureaucratized”. British officials introduced and regulated Islamic institutions such as the Religious Council (Majlis Agama) and the Islamic courts, as well as exercised tremendous influence over the policy implementation of Islamic law (shar'iah) in the country. Although British officials (via Governor Generals, Commissioners and Residents) did not curtail Islam — for instance, Christianity was spread only to non-Malays in the main, and the Sultans' symbolic power over Malays and Islam were left intact — for the most part, however, the advice of British officials, had to be acted upon (Hussin Mutalib 1990; Pangkor Treaty).

When Malaya was approaching Independence in 1957, much debate and controversy occurred among the Sultans, the leading Malay nationalist party, United Malays National Organization (UMNO), the British-initiated Reid Constitutional Commission, and other ethnic communities, as to the position and role that Islam should play in multiracial and multi- religious Malaya.

INTRODUCTION: WHY VIETNAM, CAMBODIA, LAOS AND MYANMAR?

This chapter analyses the phenomenon of globalization in relation to Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar. These countries are in many ways less exposed to the forces of globalization than others. However, the membership of these countries in ASEAN has indicated a wish to become more integrated in the region as well as in the world economy. This integration is problematic for a number of reasons, such as increasing inequality within the countries as well as between them, coupled with political obstacles. The purpose here is, therefore, to problematize the relationship between globalization and political change using authoritarian and relatively under-developed states as a point of departure. The relationship between state and society will come into focus together with state strategies to cope with on-going changes in society. The chapter is structured around three broad issues: globalization as a process of homogenization; globalization as a process of fragmentation; and changing state-society relations and the importance of context.

This quote by Singapore'S former Prime Minister, Mr Goh Chok Tong, illustrates the observable, but not too much studied, phenomenon of less developed states in Southeast Asia trying to become integrated in a global, or, in this case, primarily regional, economy. The four states — Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar — were the last to become members of ASEAN. With the end of the Cold War the initial, non-communist, members of ASEAN welcomed the new members, which had been communist/socialist enemies, into the grouping. Thus, the last four entrants into ASEAN suggested a political shift in Southeast Asia, which may have political effects at a national level in the four states. However, an expanded ASEAN has not been without problems and the new members have continuously reminded the rest of the ASEAN members — and the rest of the world — that interference in their domestic affairs is unwelcome. Vietnam, for example, has supported Myanmar on human rights issues on several occasions, probably trying to establish a standard to protect Vietnam'S own interests.

It is a cliché now to talk about a globalized world or that globalization is changing the way we live. It is a cliché because it is an everyday reality which we cannot escape. If globalization is an inescapable reality, then its consequences and side-effects are long-term problems that the academic and policy-making communities have to think our way out of.

For it is no longer enough to accept the fact that globalization has stitched the world closer together or that it has forced different creeds and religions to jostle for the same shrinking space. The conflict and contradictions that are part and parcel of the prosperity and progress that globalization bring must demand the attention of our best minds.

It is in this context that this volume is presented. A diverse group of scholars on Southeast Asia has been assembled to offer a multi-dimensional perspective and critique of globalization as it entrenched itself deeper into the region. The insightful and original offerings of these scholars will be useful to students of Southeast Asia, globalization and various social science disciplines in the years to come.

ISEAS takes pride in presenting this volume. It thanks the Swedish School of Advanced Asia-Pacific Studies for its contribution and the thoroughly enjoyable collaborative experience.

INTRODUCTION: GLOBALIZING SINGAPORE

Singapore was declared the most globalized economy in 2000 by U.S.-consultancy firm AT Kearney in conjunction with American thinktank magazine Foreign Policy. The AT Kearney/Foreign Policy Globalization which evaluates levels of global integration in a wide selection of advanced economies and emerging markets worldwide, was created to quantify has arguably become a buzzword of the twenty-first century. The four broad indicators used to measure globalization range from technological connectedness, political engagement, trade and economic integration to the extent of personal contact across borders. Singapore received the highest accolade in 2000 — a position it regained in 2004 after losing the top spot to Ireland for three consecutive years from 2001 to 2003 inclusive — due primarily to its willingness to embrace a more open economy, its nimbleness in economic and financial policies, as well as its advances and versatility in information and communication technologies (ICTs).

Although new variables have been added to the Globalization Index since 2001 to improve the accuracy of collectable data, one aspect of globalization remains unaccounted for, that is, culture or, indeed, cultural globalization. As AT Kearney revealed in its 2002 report:

INTRODUCTION: MEASURING CULTURAL GLOBALIZATION

Although globalization is clearly one of the major factors driving global economic growth, political interaction, and social development, there has always been some difficulty in attempting to define the concept in a meaningful way. It is typically defined in economic terms, and then illustrated through practical impacts, usually anecdotally. There is tremendous merit to a quantitative assessment of globalization, as this allows analysts and policymakers to better measure trends and to make appropriate policies. However, in this very process of quantifying globalization, its impact is obscured. Data are available for a huge number of phenomenon typically associated with globalization, such as foreign direct investment, international capital flows, and even migration, but typically these measures are abstract and far removed from the actual social and cultural practices of nations, the very areas in which globalization is supposed to have its greatest impact. The most salient impact of globalization, of course, is not in the huge amount of money which is exchanged across national borders on any given day, but rather in its cultural element, the extent to which the social and cultural lives of individuals and societies are influenced by international or transnational phenomenon. Religion, fashion, popular culture, philosophy, and even lifestyles are the domains of life in which globalization is worked out in the most interesting ways, and arguably much more significant in the lives of individuals. However, in the cultural milieu, globalization becomes notoriously difficult to define and measure. There are various reasons for this, which will be addressed later.

In Southeast Asia, the impact of cultural globalization is perhaps a bit more contentious than in some other parts of the world. Singapore, for example, consistently ranks at or near the top of indicators of globalization, and its culture clearly reflects multiple sources. The same is true of the Philippines, and perhaps Thailand.

INTRODUCTION: INDONESIAN-EUROPEAN UNION RELATIONS

International terrorism is often seen as a counter-force against the Westernled form of globalization. Local terrorists from different places often mobilize together, find global common agendas to replace their local ones and start targeting global symbols of the current hegemonic form of globalization. At the same time international terrorism is also itself a phenomenon of the globalized world. It is a counter-hegemonic form of globalization. It mobilizes a global constituency by cleverly exploiting the international media, communicating by e-mail, telecommunications, SMS, and MMS services, and it uses global means of financial transfers to fund deadly operations. Similarly, international counter-terrorism fights globalized violence and represents the mainstream of global cooperation. In short, international terrorism and international counter-terrorism are two parts of a global battle between two very different coalitions applying global opportunities for the promotion of their goals against each other.

While international terrorism has historically drawn its motivation from many different global divisions, tensions and conflicts, the current mainstream of international terrorism gets its strength from the difficult relationship between the Western and the Muslim civilizations. Thus in the process of reducing violence and making globalization more inclusive, a crucial task is to find rules for co-existence between these two civilizations for a less violent relationship between the West and the Muslim world.

This chapter will tackle part of the challenge of creating cooperation between the West and the Muslim world by analysing two actors — Europe and Indonesia — who have an understanding of each other, and who both, can make claims of significant representation of the two civilizations. I will first look into inter-civilizational difficulties between Indonesia and the European Union (EU). The discussion will then look into the possibilities of finding models in Indonesian-European relations to provide a middle ground between the antagonistic positions of the West, as represented by the United States, and the Islamic world, as represented by some of the radical Middle Eastern states. Finally, a framework will be proposed that could enable a common Indonesian-European agenda for building a bulwark against inter-civilizational violence, by creating a platform for a more inclusive form of globalization.

INTRODUCTION: GLOBALIZATION'S DEMOCRATIZATION OF POWER

Even as the world shrinks with each technological and communicative breakthrough, we are still uncertain as to where this much-hyped phenomenon called “globalization” is going to bring us. Over the years it has forced us to re-assess big ideas like the “nation-state” and “community”, needled us into refining their characteristics, and challenged us to imagine them anew. We have accepted that age-old values like sovereignty and national identity have not been rendered irrelevant but, instead, stretched and manipulated by an increasing array of transboundary processes. And yet, while globalization has cornered us into re-thinking how we define ourselves, we are still unsure as to how the human story will unfold. This is because, far from the picture of an economic beast roaming the earth in search of self-fulfilment that many politicians, journalists, even scholars, have painted, globalization, like all social, political and cultural forces, is of man. Globalization, though driven largely by the logic of neo-capitalism, is more than just economic process. Its political, social and cultural dimensions have shown us, through numerous studies, that homogenization and universalism are but some of the possible outcomes. Resistance, hybridity and sheer indifference are legitimate possibilities of globalization, suggesting that as long as it remains impossible to predict how global processes will affect the interests of certain groups, or how they would react, it will be just as impossible to say exactly where globalization will take us.

It is with this understanding that we have moved from the imperialist school of thought towards a more open-ended mode of analysis of globalization. The belief that globalization is imperialistic and homogenizing in nature is premised on the dualistic framework that describes the global political and cultural economy as the sum total of the uneven power relations between the core and periphery, the developing and developed countries, the West and the rest.

INTRODUCTION: THE ECONOMIC RISE OF CHINA

The economic rise of China is usually linked to phrases such as “factory to the world” or “an awakening giant”. Many view China'S rise with trepidation and fear. Even a developed country like Japan has expressed fears that industrial upgrading in China with the assistance of Japanese multinational corporations (MNCs) will keep moving continuously upstream until China has acquired a full industrial structure, at the expense of Japan. It is, therefore, not surprising to sense increasing uneasiness among Southeast Asian countries which are using foreign direct investment (FDI) and the path of export promotion to further their development goals as Chinese exports flood the world. This chapter will assess the rise of China and its impact on the countries of Southeast Asia in order to see whether such fears are realistic or not.

The economic rise of China is generally associated with its rapid economic growth, the growth of its manufacturing sector and exports as well as the large flows of foreign direct investment (FDI) that have surged into the country since the early 1990s. Although China recorded relatively high growth rates from the late 1970s to the early 1990s (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand) (referred to here as the ASEAN-5) also registered spectacular growth rates over the same period. Hence, the rise of China was not viewed as such a formidable threat before the advent of the Asian financial crisis. However, since the crisis affected the economic performance of the ASEAN-5, there has been an increasing perception that the economic rise of China is a threat, as shown by the following comparison of the economic performance of China and the Southeast Asian economies since 1997.

Between 1997 and 2007, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in China grew at an average of 8.4 per cent, which was higher than the average achieved in the Southeast Asian countries (Table 8.1).

INTRODUCTION: DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL GENDER EQUALITY

In all contemporary societies, women as a group continue to face social and political subordination. This is a fate women share with many other groups, the difference being that gender is a group that cuts across class as well as ethnicity and thus has equal bearing on all societies. One illustrative example, and, arguably, one of the most important keys to change, is the continued under-representation of women in politics. Women constitute 50 per cent of the world'S population, but only make up just over 14 per cent of the world'S political representatives at the beginning of the 21st century. Who holds political office, and who does not, has for centuries mirrored power relationship in societies. Important societal transformations have, however, seemed to hold a promise of change. Industrialization and economic growth lay the foundation for change by bringing subordinate groups forward to a place in the public sphere where new roles have been possible. Globalization has rendered these forces relevant to almost all societies. Democracy should, ideally, enhance equality in society and give everyone, including women, equal rights and possibilities to influence their situation.

The general aim of this short study of Southeast Asia, and of Thailand in particular, is to investigate these complex societal transformations and their impact on politics and gender. While it is true that developments such as economic growth and democratization have impacted societies profoundly, it cannot be assumed that such complex processes will function in simple and predictable ways. There are, of course, important global indicators, drawn from statistical evidence, which can provide guidance in the right direction. In addition, it is important to focus on the extent and form of these processes as well as on the response of particular actors. This will enable us to better interpret and predict the impact that broad societal changes have on democratic arrangements affecting a variety of things, including women'S political representation.

INTRODUCTION: QUESTIONING THE EAST ASIAN MIRACLE AS A UNIVERSAL MODEL

The so-called economic miracle in the Asia-Pacific region is clearly the most spectacular development experience the world has seen during the second half of the twentieth century. It has provoked scholars in the social sciences, development economists in particular, to rethink theories of economic development and social change, and has urged policymakers to reconsider and reformulate strategies and policies. The experience of the Asia-Pacific region has rightly been held up as a case of development worth studying and learning from. It has been the case in point for numerous empirical studies and it has generated an abundance of theorizing, not least about the role of political institutions in economic development. This chapter looks at the new role for the state and the changing policies that have emerged with globalization among some of the ASEAN states since the mid-1980s.

The uniqueness of the Asia-Pacific economic transformation is that it has three, beneficial, interlinked characteristics. First, extremely high rates of economic growth have been maintained over a period of several decades. Second, economic growth has been associated with a process of large-scale industrialization and structural transformation and modernization of society. Third, the gains from economic growth appear to have been shared by the population in a reasonably equitable manner.

The challenge to conventional development theory, and theory of social change in general, posed by the Asia-Pacific experience has been considerable. In short, the main controversy in the debate has been over the question of whether the Asia-Pacific growth experience confirms or challenges the universality of a “Western” road to industrialization and modernization, which boils down to the question of whether institutions normally associated with the market economy (ranging from regulatory frameworks, which enable impersonalized exchange, to financial and marketing institutions) have been implemented in the region or whether they have been substituted for by “Asian institutions”.

INTRODUCTION: ‘PIRACY’ IN SOUTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY

Along with the West Indies and the Mediterranean, maritime Southeast Asia (here meant to include the whole maritime region from the Andaman Sea in the west to Taiwan and the Luzon Strait in the east) has throughout history been one of the classical pirate regions of the world. Many early observers of Southeast Asia, from Faxian in the fifth century to Tomé Pires in the sixteenth century, have commented on the prevalence of piracy in the region. Francis Drake — himself, arguably, one of the world'S most notorious pirates — even reportedly called Southeast Asia the world'S most lawless regions.

“Piracy”, however, is a Western concept, and its application to the Southeast Asian historical context is not uncomplicated. As Nicholas Tarling has pointed out, the use of the term “piracy”, with its criminal connotations, to the Asian situation in the nineteenth century allowed Europeans to pass unfavourable moral judgement on non-Europeans. Even though motives of robbery and plunder certainly were important for many, if not most, of Southeast Asia'S pirates, maritime violence has also, historically, been intimately linked to social and political motivations. In many communities, piracy was a traditional and prestigious activity associated with male prowess. On the political side, the power of the pre-colonial maritime states in the region, including Srivijaya, Melaka (distinction between Kingdom of Melaka and modern straits) and a number of less influential states, relied on the control of strategic waterways, particularly the Straits of Malacca, and piratical activity in this context was crucial to the establishment and maintenance of these states. Prior to the nineteenth century, moreover, the European colonial powers themselves also engaged in piratical activities and maritime raiding in order to further their geopolitical and economic objectives. In the sixteenth century, for example, the Portuguese used their superior naval power to seize indigenous merchant vessels and to force local ship owners to buy trading licences (cartazes) protecting them from raids by Portuguese ships.

INTRODUCTION: POLITICAL TRANSITION IN THAILAND

This chapter assesses the relationship between political-administrative accountability, civil society and a new form of governance in Thailand, following the implementation of the new constitution in 1997. The chapter begins with the historical context, especially the democratic transition and consolidation that has taken place in the country since 1973, within which the notion of accountability and transparency — or good governance — has emerged as a dominant political discourse in recent years. Secondly, the chapter assesses the extent to which the new system of governance has been developed in light of the government led by Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra since 2001. It is argued that the issue of creating a new system of governance — a more responsive, more transparent and more accountable governance — cannot be separated from the issue of democratic consolidation. Thirdly, it notes that globalization provides an impetus for the rhetoric of good governance and democracy in Thailand. But as globalization has at least two parts: firstly, market forces, or the material, with key beneficiaries being capitalists; and secondly, the ideational or “good governance” — accountability and transparency — which to a considerable degree is a civil society-led counter-force to the increasing corporatization of Thai politics. In Thailand, the pro-market forces and businessmen-politicians are more dominant, resulting in the erosion of accountability and transparency. This chapter thus hypothesizes that the new system of governance in Thailand is not being achieved as envisaged by the constitution because the capitalist class (or rather a key section of it), in collaboration with more conservative/repressive state agencies, especially the police and the Interior Ministry officials — have captured the electoral process, the parliament, and thus the government. These new political forces are less interested in advancing democratic/participatory governance, but more in monopolistic capital accumulation and, at least rhetorically, the country'S international competitiveness. At the same time, the Thaksin government has attempted to curtail the activity of the middle class-based civil society groups by, among other things, rallying its support from the rural areas based on the ruling party'S populist policies. So, instead of participatory governance, Thailand is now developing a “corporatized governance”.