For most scholars, the first elections after regime change, the so-called founding elections, constitute the beginning of the consolidation phase, the end of which is more difficult to determine than for the other phases of transition (Merkel 1999). Democracy is fully consolidated, if — as Przeworski maintains — it has become “the only game in town” (Przeworski 1991, p. 26). However, when exactly this is the case is open to debate. Of analytical use in this respect is Pridham's suggestion to distinguish between “negative” and “positive” consolidation. Negative consolidation means the containment of anti-democratic veto groups, while positive consolidation refers to the deepening of democracy through fostering a broad-based civic culture and improving the effectiveness of democratic institutions (Pridham 1995). Inclusive parliaments foster both negative and positive consolidation. They facilitate negative consolidation by drawing veto forces into the electoral and parliamentary arena, by integrating them even after defeat at the polls, and by preventing them from obstructing parliamentary procedures. Legislatures facilitate positive consolidation if they perform their functions effectively, if they provide for a modicum of social justice, and, if as a result, they enhance the trust of the population in democracy and thus help to build a civic culture.

The chapters that follow will examine how parliaments contribute to consolidating or sustaining — in the case of India's older democracy — democratic order. Crucial in this respect are not only the founding elections, but elections in general. Elections constitute parliaments and determine their composition. They have, in consonance with the electoral system and the extent to which the societal cleavage structure has led to party-building, a great impact on the inclusiveness of a legislature and, hence, to a considerable degree a legislature's legitimacy. Electoral inclusiveness has several dimensions: it depends on the proportionality of the electoral system, that is, how votes are translated into seats, the spectrum of political parties represented in parliament, and the social profile of the legislators (Nohlen 1992, p. 296; Sartori 1994, p. ix; Croissant 2001a, p. 71).

We may expect greater insight into the way the five parliaments operate, if we move on from the internal division of labour to the functional performance of legislatures. The latter is best gauged by the extent to which they fulfil the functions assigned to them by the scholarly literature. In his pioneering study on the English Constitution, Walter Bagehot named five such functions: elective function, expressive function, teaching function, informative function, and legislative function (Bagehot 1963). Since then the catalogue of parliamentary functions has been widely extended. Yet, it is neither desirable nor necessary here to go into all ramifications of this debate. As most authors, in one way or another, acknowledge that parliaments perform elective, legislative, oversight, and representative functions, we have decided to concentrate on these four core parliamentary functions. However, when referring to legislative functions we do not contend that the entire legislative process rests with parliament. But even though bills are predominantly formulated by the executive, parliaments still have a pivotal role in the deliberation, that is, the screening and amending of bills introduced by the executive. Moreover, closely related to policy deliberation is the power of parliaments to pass resolutions which, though not being binding for the executive and not becoming law, may help to popularize certain norms and may even exert pressure on the executive to take into account such norms for policy-making. We do not follow Mezey (1979, p. 48), who subsumed oversight functions under what he termed the policy-making functions of parliaments, suggesting that, by checking the efficacy of legislation, oversight is the last stage in the law-making process. This is a rather narrow concept of oversight which in our view should extend to a very general and broad supervision of executive departments and is thus a very important function in its own right.

Returning to the research questions formulated in the introductory chapter, a number of conclusions can now be drawn. A first is that in–depth studies of legislatures are a useful complement to macropolitical studies of political change, as long as they are related to the contextual structural factors and actors. Our study is part of a second-generation research agenda on political change and democratic consolidation which, in consonance with studies concentrating on other aspects of the political system such as elections and electoral systems, constitutional processes, the party system, the functioning of parliamentary committees, and the interplay between parliament and civil society, may provide more detailed insights into processes of democratic change and consolidation in a particular arena.

A second conclusion is that behavioural change of political actors spurred by parliamentary processes has been slow, limited, and ambiguous, albeit not elusive. After all, processes of behavioural change generally tend to be sluggish and prone to reversals; they are rarely linear. Seen in this light and taking into account the low level of institutionalization from which our legislatures entered the process of democratic change and consolidation, this is hardly surprising. Nevertheless, our analysis shows that some change of actor behaviour took place in key areas of parliamentary processes. One is the change of behaviour in electoral politics. Though machine politics still dominates electoral campaigning and subsequent strategies of preserving and consolidating political power, electoral violence and fraud are on the decline. Moreover, the watchdog functions exercised by NGOs, pollwatch organizations, and an attentive media, have made it more difficult for political parties and their candidates to engage with impunity in rampant vote buying and cheating. While in South Korea and — to a lesser extent — India these practices have been largely eliminated, they are still endemic in the Philippines. In South Korea and in Thailand, too, as a result of more effective election supervision, there is now a growing tendency among political parties to woo voters with populist policies and promises. Whether such policies, if implemented, enhance the inclusiveness of legislation or whether they only promote a personal cult centred on certain political leaders remains to be seen. What is more certain, however, is that in most cases politicians still rely more on personal appeal than programmatic policies.

Introduction

In contrast to the other major cities in Southeast Asia, Singapore is a city-state, that is, both a nation–state and a city. Being a unitary state, the advantage it would appear to have over the other city governments in the region, is that the single-tier government structure can expedite policy decisions and implementation. Most city governments in Southeast Asia would have to contend with national interests that can overwhelm localized or urban needs.

In terms of urban housing, Singapore's housing landscapes also contrasts sharply with those in other Southeast Asian cities. Public housing dominates. Some nine in ten people in Singapore live in public housing. This comprises largely high-rise and high-density apartments. Not only has the state developed the public housing units, it has allocated such housing and until the late 1980s, managed all the public housing estates as well. The majority are located in new towns or planned neighbourhoods provided with a range of basic services including shops, banks and public transport. Studies have highlighted that while Singapore has been an independent nation–state for only the last four decades, it had basically solved much of its housing problem within the first two decades, that is, in the 1980s.

Relationships between housing provision, urban planning and economic development in the economy as well the national savings system have been attributed with the success of public housing in Singapore. The successful public housing policy has also been linked to the political hegemony of the ruling People's Action Party (PAP) which has been in power since Singapore gained independence. Not only does the state play the dominant role in development in Singapore, it has provided the planning framework and regulates all land-use options and choices in the city-state.

If there is scepticism about whether the success of Singapore's public housing programme can be replicated elsewhere, there should be far more agreement about the range of larger economic and political objectives that the public housing agenda has met. In Singapore, the public housing policy reflects a programme of wealth distribution which should be more seriously considered. The policy has in turn contributed to the cooptation of the labour force into the economic development plans and political agenda set by the state.

Introduction

Indonesia comprises some 13,667 islands (and more it appears, are being found). Java, the most densely populated island, was important historically and continues to be Indonesia's economic and agricultural centre. The former capital city of the Dutch colony of Java and its surrounding islands, Batavia, now known as Jakarta, is located on a flat river delta plain on West Java's northern coast. With an estimated population of some 12 million in 1998, Jakarta ranks among the world's 11 largest cities and is one of 16 mega-cities in developing countries. Jakarta has characteristics that may be considered similar to those of the other mega-cities in Southeast Asia — Bangkok and Manila.

The population of the Jakarta mega-urban region or the greater urban area beyond its official boundaries would be much larger, estimated at some 17 to 20 million people. Jakarta's growth has been similar to the other cities, with substantial urban sprawl. Suburban development is spilling over and even incorporating and transforming neighbouring regional urban centres or towns. Urban land-use varies widely with a diversity of industries, services and housing of all types.

Like the other primate and capital cities in the region, Jakarta has a concentration of government and business activities including the manufacturing sector as well as construction, utilities, trade and services and finance. Jakarta is also the site of the headquarters of Indonesia's largest banks as well as the offices of multinational corporations. Not unexpectedly, Jakarta is also where most of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and hence, jobs in Indonesia are being generated. Just before the 1998 economic crisis, the GDP of the city was reportedly 3 per cent higher than the national rate.

Yet, social development indicators suggest a city of social contrasts. Even in the late 1980s, less than a quarter of the city's population was directly connected to a piped water supply system. Some 30 per cent depend entirely on water that they buy from vendors. This has driven the cost of water to five times that of piped drinking water. The city has no waterborne sewage system.

Debating Urban Housing Needs

Some one in two people in the world now live in cities and the projection of the population living in cities in Southeast Asia in 2025 is expected to multiply equally rapidly. Furthermore, the population forecasts of the distribution of this urban population is that the majority will be concentrated in the largest metropolitan areas or regions. A 2001–2002 survey released by the Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions informs us that as many as 7 million persons living in 60 countries were forcibly evicted from their homes. Similarly some 6 million and more people were living under the threat of forced eviction in 38 countries.

Housing remains a major issue particularly in the developing world. The resistance that is mounted against forced eviction is often met by brutal reprisal. People who are being removed from their homes are fighting against not only the devastation of their neighbourhoods and communities but also the destruction of their livelihoods. These livelihoods depend on key social ties and networks that are extremely place-bound. Odd-job contract workers on construction sites or other urban businesses require a network of persons who know where to contact them. The fragility of these networks is such that, once the people move away, contact can be broken and never re-established. Hence forced evictions can cause havoc to the economic and social well-being of urban poor families.

Rapid population growth and the phenomenon of in-migration — rural–urban, circular, or temporary — have been major contributory forces in explaining the heady pace of urbanization in Southeast Asia. Such rapid urban growth has often been held accountable for the abject housing and general living conditions in the major cities of the region — Bangkok, Manila, Jakarta, and Ho Chi Minh City. Squatter and slum communities have been featured almost as regularly as the pre- 1997 economic boom in the countries in which these cities are located. There are reports that in the metropolitan centres in the Philippines, squatting has become a serious problem, especially in the capital and largest city, Metro-Manila. According to reports, the degree of overcrowding and squalor of the slums with their unsanitary and often life-threatening conditions defy description.

The post-1997 period has seen a slowing down of economic development and in turn, some dampening of the burgeoning urban growth in Southeast Asia. Yet the population living in cities in Southeast Asia is projected to rise and grow above the growth rate of the national population. In many countries, the growth in urban population will be also higher in the mega-urban regions, that is, the regions that have grown around the largest cities and been incorporated into the expansion of these primate cities.

Continuing urban growth in the cities of Southeast Asia is of concern not only because urbanization is an inevitable trend as the region globalizes and continues to develop. The concern is with the living conditions in cities particularly for the large numbers of urban poor. There is also growing concern with the ability and capacity of city governments to address the needs of the growing numbers who are moving to cities to look for better living conditions and economic opportunities.

Housing provides a highly visible indicator of the citizens’ share and benefits from economic growth. In the cities of Southeast Asia, housing is also the most visible form of urban land use and hence, is an important aspect of the image of these cities.

Studies have highlighted the role which developmental and political ideologies have contributed to the measures undertaken to address urban housing needs. In Vietnam, the socialist state pursued housing policies that have changed since the transition to a more open economy. The changes have certainly been obvious in the country's major cities — Ho Chi Minh City and Hanoi. Under the socialist state, the ideological point of view was that housing is an amenity to be provided free of charge or at least practically free of charge to all citizens. Under socialism, housing was regarded as a welfare provision to which everybody was entitled and was ideally also intended to be distributed according to a formal definition involving minimum requirements as well as the maximum entitlement to space per person. Yet for practical reasons and largely because Vietnam is a poor country, the right to housing appears to have been bestowed on generally the employees of the state only. Furthermore, such provision serves more as a form of indirect salary.

Introduction

The Manila Metropolitan Area is also a primate city. Since the Spanish colonial period, Manila, the capital of the Philippines, has been its centre of trade, economic and cultural development.

For the Philippines, government resources will never be sufficient to maintain a continuous subsidy for housing for low income families and there is a need for policy reinforcements especially in land acquisition and strategies to lower the cost of housing in order to make it accessible to the poor. Only 15 per cent of the population of Metro-Manila is estimated to be served by sewers or individual septic tanks. Some 1.8 million lack adequate water supplies, educational, community, health and sanitary services. Inadequate services such as the collection of domestic solid wastes means that garbage is dumped into canals and drains in the city, causing blockage and flooding.

Despite the fact that relocation sites were planned to rehouse hundreds of thousands of squatters, the sites themselves were ill-prepared, the promised facilities were not available and people had to make do with hastily constructed shelters. For many squatter households, relocation meant the uprooting of life in its entirety. These urban dwellers had to move from an environment that had become vital to themselves and their families, economically and socially. Squatters were usually brought to locations and sites outside of Manila far away from their workplaces, their established network of friends or relatives and work as well as business contacts. Their children had to leave their schools. People who earned extra income looking after infants and children had far fewer opportunities to earn such secondary incomes in the sites to which they had been relocated.

Research has shown that before removal to the relocation or resettlement sites, household heads as well as their spouses would usually work for a living as drivers of jeepneys (jeeps converted into taxis). Others worked on construction sites, as security guards, street vendors, scavengers, laundrywomen, maids and dressmakers. Many who could not find regular work of this kind would have to find casual work in the city and hence, had to live close to the central city areas in order to locate such work. Most would have to be able to live close to work also so that they could walk or at least keep commuting costs down and save on transport. Casual workers were even more badly affected by the moves.

Introduction

The largest city in Thailand — its capital Bangkok — has expanded rapidly from its original location along the banks of the Chao Phraya river, some 20 km from the Gulf of Thailand. The city is sited in the midst of a flood plain which is the rice bowl of the country. Since the economic boom in the 1980s, foreign direct investment has flooded into Bangkok, resulting in turn in a boom in the development of residential housing estates, office buildings, factories, hotels and golf courses. There has been a rapid extension of inner city districts, metropolitan suburbs and provincial boundaries. Not surprisingly, the Bangkok Metropolitan Administrative area has now been designated the Bangkok Metropolitan Region or BMR and is effectively not just a mega-city anymore but a mega-urban region. Spanning some 1,567.8 sq km, the urban region comprises five provinces that have become an emergent economically integrated area. This is urban growth of enormous dimension from the original 4 sq km that Bangkok occupied at the time of its founding in 1882.

By the late 1980s, the population of the so-called Bangkok Metropolitan Region (BMR) had been estimated at 7.7 million people and some 2.2 million households. Bangkok has been held up as an example of the archetypal primate city, that is, the type of cities dominating the urban hierarchy in developing countries.

The best infrastructure together with economic growth and development have been concentrated in Bangkok. This explains in part why some 60 per cent of the urban population of Thailand live in Bangkok. In contrast, the next largest city in Thailand in the urban hierarchy is almost twenty times smaller in terms of population.

Located on the flood plain of the country's major river, Bangkok faces major environmental challenges apart from those concerning basic needs such as housing. During the monsoon season, the city is regularly flooded because of heavy rain and high water levels in the river. The situation is worsened by considerable land subsidence due to the long-standing practice of extraction of ground water as well as large-scale and indiscriminate filling in and obstruction of the canals running through the city. This formerly extensive system of canals (klongs) was an important drainage network leading into the Chao Phraya. Many have been filled in to serve as roads since motorized land transport has overtaken the use of water transport in the city.

Introduction

There is no national housing policy in Malaysia, although the quinquennial Malaysia Development Plan does outline social and macroeconomic objectives. These stated objectives are to ensure that all Malaysians, particularly low-income groups, have access to adequate and affordable housing.

Housing delivery in Kuala Lumpur and elsewhere in Malaysia has been undertaken by both private and public sectors. The private housing sector comprises large and small-scale developers, individuals, cooperative societies and groups of individuals. Almost 96 per cent of private sector housing has been provided by developers. Hence, cooperative societies and the other agents in the private housing market remain little more than supplementary sources.

The private sector has built not only high and medium-income housing but also low-cost homes. Since the Fourth Malaysia Plan, the state has required private sector developers to cooperate in the provision of low-cost homes. More specifically, the government requires the private sector to provide 30 per cent of housing units that are low-cost in their developments.

The public housing sector comprises largely a range of national and sub-national agencies. Public low-cost housing programmes have been undertaken by the sub-national government agencies under the supervision and monitoring of the Ministry of Housing and Local Government. These programmes comprise low cost housing units, sites and services schemes as well as housing loan schemes. The national government has provided loans to the sub-national agencies or state governments to carry out the low-cost public housing programmes. These funds are channelled through the Ministry of Housing and Local Government.

The State Economic Development Corporations and the Urban Development Authority are other agencies which contribute to public housing within each state at the sub-national level and particularly in urban areas. City Hall in the Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur prepared the Kuala Lumpur structure plan that since the 1980s has been aimed at addressing urban issues such as housing. The plan actually envisaged that every resident in Kuala Lumpur would have his or her own home.

Housing policies during the colonial period, not unlike those seen in British colonial cities elsewhere, generally adopted a laissez-faire attitude particularly in terms of the provision of housing for Asian urban dwellers. The policies of the Malaysian government have been more interventionist.

Introduction

All too often when discussing contemporary Myanmar, the focus tends to shift quickly to its national politics, its ethnic schisms, or its state–society relations, crowding out everything else. Some have referred to this phenomenon as the “hostage” model, a one-dimensional approach to change in Myanmar in which any such discussion unrelated directly to the struggle between the military and the opposition over national power bumps hard against heavy scepticism or cynicism (or both) because political reform is seen by some as the sine qua non of everything else.

While not discounting the importance of any of those issues, the aim of this chapter is an attempt to redirect some attention among Myanmar watchers and researchers to something seemingly more innocuous but of no less importance: the country's anodyne but enduring civil bureaucracy. Socioeconomic research and analysis has long been preoccupied with the role of public institutions, particularly the “bureaucracy” in fostering or impeding socioeconomic transformation. That socioeconomic growth crucially depends on governance is not only a widely acknowledged fact today, but is also the basis for continuing fascination with the role of bureaucracies in any country for theorists and practitioners alike. Specifically, this chapter tries to make the sometimes not so obvious case that understanding the history bequeathed by Myanmar's various postcolonial governments to its contemporary civil bureaucracy is critical not only to understanding the bureaucracy's tribulations, but also for prescribing appropriate remedies. Indeed, regardless of its various ills, Myanmar today has a public service that refuses to wither away; for the moment it is all the country has. Accordingly, the first principle when considering reform options is to accept that it is crucial, at least in the medium term, to work with the existing bureaucratic machine, and seek merely to turn it from its negative attributes inherited from past legacies. In the absence of a fair dose of realism to inform any bureaucratic reform, there is always the risk of compromised change. Such realism demands that any starting point is to comprehend how Myanmar's current civil bureaucracy came to be what it is today.