Economic recovery in the region is well under way, underpinned by robust growth in the global economy. In 2004, global output is projected to grow by 5 per cent while world trade volume (goods and services) will expand by 8.8 per cent (IMF 2004). Stronger global growth has been driven by economic rebounds in the United States, Japan, and the European Union as well as rapid economic expansion in China.

Southeast Asia is expected to register a strong GDP growth rate of 6.2 per cent in 2004 while the whole of East Asia is expected to grow by 7.3 per cent (ADB 2004). Robust growth in regional economies has been underpinned by increased industrial production in major economies (namely, the United States and Japan), sustained demand from China's booming economy, and an upturn in the information and communication technology (ICT) industry. Merchandise exports are expected to expand by 13.9 per cent in 2004 with many countries projecting double-digit growth rates (ADB 2004).

Singapore, Malaysia, and Vietnam are the region's star performers in terms of economic performance in 2004. Singapore's economy is expected to expand by 8.9 per cent while both Malaysia and Vietnam are projected to grow 7.5 per cent. Other Southeast Asian countries such as Thailand and Laos are also expected to register healthy GDP growth rates. (See country contributions for more detail on the economic projections.)

China continues to receive the lion's share of the world's foreign direct investments (FDI) — the country received US$53.5 billion worth of FDI in 2003 (UNCTAD 2004). In the same year, FDI flows to Southeast Asia increased by 27 per cent to US$19 billion. There continued to be disinvestments in Indonesia although the magnitude was significantly smaller compared with previous years.

Private investment has been picking up in Southeast Asia after several years of contraction or lackluster growth. Progress made in reducing non-performing loans, higher-capacity utilization, low interest rates, and improved business confidence have all contributed to the revival in private investment.

Developments in the wider international, and in particular Asian, security environment have an important bearing on peace and security in Southeast Asia. This external security environment can be said to have worsened.

War and the continued deterioration of the situation in Iraq in 2004 has had significant negative repercussions. It has given a boost to international terrorism as foreign and Iraqi Islamic militants seek to turn the country into a new base for jihad. It has caused divisions between the United States and some of its key European allies, in the process rupturing the grand international anti-terror coalition that came into being in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. The growing insurgency and chaos in Iraq has absorbed much of the quality time of the Bush administration and stretched the US armed forces, especially the army. While this has not adversely affected the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific, where the United States remains the strongest military power, it has a certain conscribing effect on US strategic freedom in the region.

A domestic debate is taking place in the United States on Iraq. Although most Americans still appear to support the war, a perception that the war has no end in sight as casualties mount could erode that support. So what will happen in Iraq and with what consequences for international security has become a major new uncertainty. Any US withdrawal which leaves Iraq in chaos and which looks like a US defeat could have important strategic repercussions as well as implications for international jihadist terrorism.

The latter remains a significant threat. While Al-Qaeda has suffered from the loss of the Afghan sanctuary and attrition in its leadership ranks, the movement's dispersal and atomization to various countries has made the threat more decentralized and less detectable. Al-Qaeda-associated and other groups in various parts of the world now operate in relatively independent cells, while sharing a common ideology.

Brunei

The marriage of the Crown Prince Al Mutadee Billah to Dayangku Sarah Pengiran Salleh, which is the biggest non-political event of the year, could have an enormous implication for Brunei's political development. Dubbed as the Asian marriage of the century, it may signal the beginning of an elaborate process of political succession to the monarchical institution of Brunei. If history is to repeat itself, Bruneians may witness the ascension of a new Sultan (the 30th) to the throne in the near future. The current Sultan inherited the throne after a year of his own marriage to the current Queen and he has been ruling the state for the past 36 years. Speculations are widespread that he may want to abdicate and assume the position of a Begawan Sultan.

This could also entail a generational change of cabinet ministers. The current line-up of cabinet ministers has been occupying their seats, with minimal changes, since independence in 1984. A change in the Head of State and Head of Government may be a convenient excuse to retire most of the current cabinet ministers who have expended their productive lives. This is also a great opportunity to find and appoint new talents to the cabinet and let them grow with the new 30th Sultan of the kingdom. The next generation of cabinet ministers could come from the current young generation of the royal court and the existing crop of permanent and deputy permanent secretaries.

After a ten-year hiatus, the Sultan made a surprising but welcomed announcement on political reform. The Sultan announced, in his 58th birthday royal address, the reconvening of the State Legislative Council in the immediate future thus ending its 20 years of suspension.

Brunei

Skyrocketing oil prices, upbeat performances in the manufacturing and service sectors, creation of new jobs, and a strong growth in the Southeast Asian region offers a big boost to the Brunei economy. According to the International Finance Corporation (IFC), for every dollar increase in the price of oil, Brunei can expect to see an additional real GDP growth of US$100 million. A record oil price hike can thus turn the government budget deficit into a surplus. Against this backdrop, the economy is likely to experience 3 to 5 per cent GDP growth in 2005 and 2006.

Traditionally, oil prices have played a crucial role in Brunei's economy, as the oil sector constitutes half of the country's GDP and 90 per cent of its exports. Due to a stronger demand from China and a supply disruption in the Middle East, the sultanate's average weighted oil production increased by 1.2 per cent from 204,803 barrels a day in the first quarter of 2003 to 207,323 barrels a day in the first quarter of 2004. The government is expecting to see a 2 to 3 per cent growth in this sector. The non-oil private sector has posted affirmative growth rates owing to a buoyant performance in the non-oil mining, quarrying, and manufacturing sectors, as well as wholesale and retail sectors.

The sultanate recorded a budget deficit of BND 31.5 million (US$18.5 million) in the first quarter of 2004. During this period the government's expenditure of BND 1.43 billion (US$860 million) exceeded its revenue of BND 1.820 billion. However, the government's fiscal position is expected to turn around from a deficit to a surplus. The government revenue, which, to a large extent is dependent on revenues from the sale of oil and gas, is projected to benefit from the high oil prices. Nevertheless, large government expenditure to support development projects may reduce the surplus.

Regional Outlook was launched in 1992. Designed for the busy executive, professional, diplomat, journalist, and interested observer who face severe time constraints, this annual offers a succinct analysis of political and economic trends in the countries of Southeast Asia and the outlook for the forthcoming two years.

Just as 2003 was difficult for Southeast Asia, the year 2004 has had its share of problems. The external security environment continues to be grave. The festering military conflict in Iraq and its impact on the US presidential election have serious implications for the US fight against international terrorism. The terrorist threat has not receded. Indonesia suffered its third suicide bombing incident. The region has to be sensitized to new forms of terrorist attacks, particularly on the high seas where no one national authority is in charge. Unabated tensions between China and Taiwan continue to point to a possibility of military conflict. The North Korea nuclear programme adds another item to the list of worries.

However, on the economic front, the outlook is fairly robust, with a rebound in global economic growth. The region is expected to register a strong GDP growth rate of 6.2 per cent in 2004 according to the Asian Development Bank. However, rising oil prices, the possibility of an economic slowdown in China, terrorism concerns in the region, and the continued sporadic outbreaks of the avian flu are potential risk factors that are likely to affect the short-to-medium-term growth prospects of the region. It is expected that improved business investment and consumer spending will keep the region's economic growth fairly robust in 2005 and 2006. ASEAN efforts to step up regional economic cooperation as well as strengthen bilateral links with major trading partners — including the three major economies of Japan, China, and India — will have regional impact. However, there are concerns with the slow progress of ASEAN economic integration. Regional Outlook: Southeast Asia 2005–2006 was written by a team of scholars from within the Institute and without.

Both Malaysia's Prime Minister Datuk Seri Abdullah Ahmad Badawi and the Philippines’ President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo had their mandate renewed in national elections. Indonesia voted to have a new President, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. Singapore's Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong handed the leadership baton over to Lee Hsien Loong. Myanmar deposed its Prime Minister. Cambodia has a new king. Brunei has reconvened its State Legislative Council after 20 years. All these happened in 2004, which may give an impression that change is in the air.

However, the forecast for the region is not to expect anything radical from the new or renewed leadership. In some cases, the rhetoric is not matched by a more sober reality. In others, the need for reforms are dire but the new leader represents only a hope that things will improve somewhat rather than a definite solution to long-entrenched problems.

Indeed many problems remain very much unchanged in the region. Terrorism is still the region's foremost security threat. Indonesia had its third suicide bombing incident in September. A mix of regional separatism and violent forms of Islamic ideology continues to plague the Philippines’ south. A similar problem has escalated in the southern provinces of Thailand. Another pan-region health threat in the form of the avian flu serves as reminder that the disruptive effects of the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) in 2003 can be repeated any time. As always, here and there are pockets of optimism scattered among the patches of resignation. The conduct of peaceful elections in the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia augurs well for the region's short-to-medium-term growth prospects. One resilient bright spot is that countries in the region are not at each other's throat even as they grapple with serious domestic problems, thus giving the region an overall environment of peace and harmony. There remains a unity of purpose and will to fight Islamic terrorist groups.

INTRODUCTION

This chapter will examine some important features of the civil rights movement in Indonesia. I will divide the chapter into four sections. Section one argues that the emergence of the civil rights movement — or anti-discrimination movement — in Indonesia was directly triggered by the crisis and conflict suffered by the Chinese Indonesians in 1998. The second section looks at the relationship between ethnicity and the formation of a civil society that was strongly influenced by the New Order's developmental state. The third section will take into account the story of GANDI (Gerakan Perjuangan Anti-Diskriminasi, Anti- Discrimination Movement) and Solidaritas Nusa Bangsa (SNB) as the genesis of the civil rights movement in Indonesia. The final section argues that while the civil rights movement in Indonesia is basically a human rights movement, the concept of basic human rights is not always accepted by the Indonesian public.

CIVIL SOCIETY, CRISIS, AND CONFLICT

After the fall of Soeharto in 1998, the concept of a civil society became very popular and gained prominence in Indonesian political discourses — especially among researchers and social/political activists. The correct translation of “civil society” into the Indonesian language is, however, still being debated. Some, mostly Indonesian Muslims, prefer to use the term masyarakat madani because their main reference is the assumed similarity with the “democratic” situation of Medinah city under the Prophet Mohammed's leadership (Mulkhan 1999, pp. 221–25; Sukidi 1999, pp. 234–38; Mohamad 1999, pp. 242–46). The word “madani” itself comes from the Arabic word meaning well abiding and/or well-governed society. The most important characteristics of the Medinah civil society — as written down in the Medinah Charter — are “religious freedom, brotherhood between different religions, peace, unity, political ethics, citizen rights and obligations, as well as consistent law enforcement based on truth and justice” (Sukidi 1999, p. 236).

Others, especially Western-influenced scholars, often use the literal translation of civil society, namely masyarakat sipil, and its definition. They thus associate it with an “independent, mature and foresighted society”, which includes the development of “civil religion” (Qodir 1999, p. 159). There are also others who prefer the term “masyarakat warganegara”, or a society of citizens, because they want to emphasize the importance of a citizen's (individual) right to freely express his/her ideas.

1. Negotiations to create a free trade area linking ASEAN and ANZ — the AANZ FTA — should be a symbolic centrepiece of their new relationship. The summit meeting in Vientiane between ASEAN and ANZ leaders should be the platform to launch these negotiations. The aim should be to make any agreement as comprehensive as possible so that it will stimulate trade, growth and economic integration within and between ANZ and Southeast Asia.

A final decision on whether to begin the FTA negotiations will be made by the ANZ and Southeast Asian heads of government when they meet in Laos on 30 November 2004. They are expected to accept the schedule outlined by ministers. The ASEAN and ANZ trade and economic ministers recommended in September that the FTA negotiations should start as early as January 2005 and be concluded in two years. They agreed that an FTA should be fully implemented within 10 years, though whether this will be from the start of negotions or from the date of entry into force of the agreement has yet to be decided. The aim is to move to zero tariffs on as many goods traded between the two sides as possible, liberalize trade in services, reduce non-tariff barriers to trade, and promote investment.

The aim should also be to refocus on the potential for further growth for mutual benefit. But an AANZ FTA should also ensure that products of interest to ASEAN agricultural exporters, including tropical fruit, will be able to enter the ANZ market, subject to acceptable quarantine and health standards.

Some ASEAN countries allege that Australia has misused quarantine powers to block imports of competitively priced food products from Southeast Asia. Indeed, New Zealand is challenging Australia to demonstrate, as rules of the World Trade Organization require, that there is a scientific justification for Australian quarantine bans on imports of New Zealand apples. Market access for farm products is a major issue for ASEAN agricultural exporters — one that will be a litmus test in their eyes of Australia's committment to free trade.

INTRODUCTION

In the 1999 general election, for the first time in Malaysian history, the Malaysian women's movement fielded a woman candidate to run for a Parliamentary seat based on a platform of women's issues within the framework of justice, democracy, and sustainable development. This initiative, known as the Women's Candidacy Initiative (WCI), was part of an initial effort by activists to inject an issue-based discourse in electoral politics that have been largely dominated by the traditional ethnic- and party-based discourse. Significantly, this move also marked the women's non-governmental organizations’ (NGOs) direct involvement in electoral politics. The political atmosphere was tense with excitement as the popular perception, prior to the voting day, was that the ruling National Front (Barisan Nasional, BN) might lose its stranglehold on Parliament or that the Mahathir regime was nearing its end.

Undoubtedly, a contributing factor to the emergence of the vibrant reformation politics was the manner in which Anwar Ibrahim, the former Deputy Prime Minister (DPM), was sacked, brutalized while under police custody, and then sentenced to serve fifteen years for abuse of power and sodomy. Inspired by the spirit of the moment, the WCI sought to impress upon the public that it was high time to do away with injustice towards women as well. However, the WCI's alignment with the Alternative Front (Barisan Alternatif, BA), which comprised among others the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (Parti Islam Se-Malaysia, PAS), known for its conservative stance on women's issues, and the Democratic Action Party (DAP), which was beset by charges of undemocratic practices of its leadership, suggested that this move might be fraught with dilemmas and uncertainties. Another initiative from the women's movement was the Women's Agenda for Change (WAC), a lobbying initiative, where women's NGOs approached political parties from both the ruling and opposition parties to adopt the WAC agenda in their respective election manifesto. This chapter will reflect on the WCI's participation in the 1999 general election, in particular the responses of two women's NGOs, Friends of Women (Persatuan Sahabat Wanita Selangor, PSWS) and Sisters in Islam (SIS), to highlight the ambiguities towards this initiative.

INTRODUCTION

At daybreak on the morning of 25 February 1986, I awoke from a restless night's sleep on a road behind Camp Aguinaldo in Quezon City, Philippines. Around me were seminarians, religious sisters, and lay people; we were there as a human barricade to prevent the reinforcement of troops loyal to President Marcos, who were holed up inside the camp. As the sun came up, I offered Mass there in the middle of the road and my companions joined in, devoutly indeed for none of us knew what dangers the day might bring. In fact, the day was to bring the overwhelming good news that Marcos had abandoned the presidential palace and was on his way to Honolulu.

One episode of that night is worth noting. An army patrol in a truck approached the barricade. Trained in the spirit and practice of non-violence, our group greeted the soldiers politely, and a negotiating committee went to meet with them. The officer in charge said that they had orders to deliver food to the men in the camp. We made sure that no arms were being smuggled in, shook hands all around, opened the barricade, and parted as friends. I do not know whether that patrol eventually defected to our side; it is clear, however, that the spirit of respecting one's opponents as fellow human beings and Filipinos, a spirit inculcated in seminars by churchbased, active non-violence groups, had much to do with the success of the unarmed popular uprising.

In addition, many will recall dramatic images of religious sisters, rosaries in hand, blocking the path of army tanks; of General Ramos, a Protestant, in the midst of the crowd with a statue of the Virgin beside him. Much more could be added, but this may be sufficient to suggest the powerful role played by religion, religious symbols, and the Catholic Church in the recent political history of the Philippines.

In what follows I shall not attempt to give a precise definition of civil society. The term was introduced in the Philippines in a series of discussions held in December 1993, followed by a three-day workshop involving social scientists and social activists in June 1994.

This publication grew out of the workshop Civil Society in Southeast Asia, organized by the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) and held in Singapore in November 2001. Financial support for the workshop came from the Konrad Adenauer Foundation.

Over the past two decades, civil society has become an important catchphrase in political and development discourses because of its perceived relevance to the quality of governance, empowering public participation, and sustaining a healthy democracy. In the Southeast Asian region, the concept indeed influenced many individuals and groups who were actively engaged in advancing a wide array of interests and causes. Conversely, the reactions of the Southeast Asian state regimes have ranged from adroitly co-opting to fiercely rejecting the idea of civil society. With their diverse colonial histories (except for Thailand which was never colonized by any European powers), ethnic, religious, and class stratifications, levels of economic development, and forms of state regimes, the Southeast Asian region offers an excellent crucible to study how these factors would shape civil society formation and, in turn, how it would affect governance and democracy.

The aim of the workshop was to bring together scholars and researchers from the region to explore the realities and experiences of civil society in Southeast Asia. The realities and experiences were examined through empirical studies of religious, ethnic, gender, and environmental nongovernmental organizations’ (NGO) activities and public participation. That a number of the contributors to this volume were also NGO participants provided first-hand understandings of the complex world of civil society activism.

While the workshop had sought to cover all the countries in Southeast Asia, no papers on Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar were presented because of the lack of success in finding researchers in the region working on those countries. This volume consists of eleven out of the fourteen papers delivered at the workshop. The editor would like to take this opportunity to thank all the paperwriters and discussants for their contributions to the insightful, stimulating discussions during the workshop. The ISEAS Administration staff must be commended for their first-rate support that significantly contributed to the smooth organization of the workshop.

The book would not have been possible without the generous cooperation of the contributors and I must thank them for their patience in consenting to the various editorial changes.

On the 30th anniversary of the establishment of the ASEAN- Australia Economic Cooperation Programme (AAECP), it is timely that a study be made to examine the state of relations between the two groups of countries and to recommend ways to improve them. Australia and New Zealand are old friends of ASEAN, being amongst the first Dialogue Partners and Defence Partners in the security of the region. Although ASEAN and Australia/New Zealand are geographically contiguous, there has not as yet been any extensive, public study which explores the multi-faceted relations between both sides, and offers concrete proposals to help strengthen these relations.

With these aims in mind, the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) has commissioned this report. It is co-authored by Mr Michael Richardson, a veteran journalist with a rich experience and deep knowledge of Asia; and an academic specializing in Southeast Asia, Dr Chin Kin Wah, who is a Senior Fellow and researcher in ISEAS. The report presents an overview of the growing relations between the countries concerned and presents detailed and concrete recommendations for enhanced economic linkages and cooperation in a systematic and thematic manner.

This report is timely as it will be issued around the time the leaders of Australia and New Zealand would be meeting their ASEAN counterparts at the ASEAN Summit in Vientiane, Laos on 30 November 2004.

ISEAS hopes that such a policy oriented report will contribute to a greater understanding of the dynamics of the relations between the two sub-regions. I wish to express our appreciation to Mr Michael Richardson and Dr Chin Kin Wah for undertaking this pioneering study and to all those who contributed towards this enterprise.

INTRODUCTION

There are sections of civil society in Singapore that live a troubled and tenuous existence. Actors in these constituencies see the state as wanting to co-opt or weaken them through a protracted war of attrition. There are other sections of civil society that work quietly and effectively with different levels of encouragement from and co-operation with the state. Even the concept of civil society in Singapore is an intensely contested one as it encapsulates this larger process of contestation and negotiation between the government and civil society actors.

This chapter will provide a brief review of the evolution of state–civil society relations since Singapore's independence in 1965 to the present moment. It will draw on a survey of civil society organizations and examples of interaction between the two sectors for a better understanding of the present relationship and its implications for the nature of governance and political development in the future.

HISTORICAL CONDITIONS: EVOLVING ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN GOVERNANCE

PAP's Ideology of Statism

Singapore has been widely recognized as a successful developmental state where the state has actively planned and directed the country's transformation into one of the most competitive economies in the world. Gross domestic product (GDP) grew at an annual average rate of 8.7 per cent per annum (1990 market prices) and per capita GDP increased from $1,567 to $36,963 from 1965 to 2000, reaching a high of $39,585 in 1994 (current market prices). The average household earned $4,166 a month and the median household $3,040 a month in 2000 (1990 market prices). The average household income grew at an average of 3.1 per cent from 1990 to 2000, and median income at 2.8 per cent for the same decade. More recently, however, the income of the higher-income households has been growing faster than the lower-income ones such that the income disparity has widened. The Gini coefficient moved up from 0.436 in 1990 to 0.481 in 2000.

Singapore is a one-party dominant system, where the People's Action Party (PAP) has formed the government at every general election from 1965 to 2001. Chalmers (1992) has organized the political economy of the PAP's development and governance strategy in its first two and a half decades in power — we shall call it the PAP Ideology of Statism — into three main tenets.