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15945 results in ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute

Page 665 of 798

  • Session IV - The ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community

  • from THE ASEAN COMMUNITY ROUNDTABLE: Report compiled by Denis Hew, Chin Kin Wah and Lee Hock Guan
  • Book:
    Towards Realizing an ASEAN Community. A Brief Report on the ASEAN Community Roundtable
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    04 November 2017
    Print publication:
    19 November 2004, pp 15-17

  • Summary

    The ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC) has received the least attention and is the least developed among the three pillars mentioned in the Bali Concord II. This glaring oversight might impede the development of the AEC and ASC as regional social and cultural integration is integral to advances in the economic and security integration. For instance, an ASEAN social agenda is needed to ensure that poverty, deprivation or social inequities do not undermine the potential of economic growth, and indeed if economic development is threatened by social inequities, it in turn can undermine political stability. At the national level, all ASEAN states evidently recognized the utmost importance of social and cultural integration to their nation-building and economic development projects. Yet, however, the importance of building a socio-cultural community has yet to move beyond the national mindset and boundary to the regional level.

    As it stands, the ASCC comes across as an afterthought in the Bali Concord II where non-security and non-economic issues are simply relegated. Moreover, it just strings together a lot of words that corresponds to what have by tradition been areas of functional co-operation, i.e., co-operation through projects rather than through policy-based initiatives, and this has been the traditional distinction between functional co-operation and economic cooperation in the ASEAN framework. Thus there is a need to make clearer what the ASCC means and what its objectives are, and below are a few issues for further consideration:

  • Unlike the ASC and AEC, the ASCC lacks an academic driver and this explains why the ASCC is both undervalued and underdeveloped. Scholars and researchers should be recruited to help to interrogate, conceptualize and define the concept. This would help policy-makers to better understand the concept and thus to set the socio-cultural agenda of a regional arrangement. Three elements to take into account in drafting an ASCC action plan are: (i) building caring societies to promote equity and human development in a broad sense, (ii) need to manage the social impact of economic integration, and (iii) strengthen the foundation of regional social cohesion and the promotion of ASEAN awareness. Perhaps an ASCC Integration Centre to facilitate the development and implementation of the concept could be established.

  • Mechanism of the Dispute Settlement System

  • Book:
    Towards Realizing an ASEAN Community. A Brief Report on the ASEAN Community Roundtable
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    04 November 2017
    Print publication:
    19 November 2004, pp 73-78

  • Summary

    Advisory Mechanism

    ASEAN Consultation to Solve Trade and Investment Issues (ACT)

  • (i) The ACT is adapted from the EU SOLVIT mechanism. It is a network of government agencies (one from each country) to allow the private sector to cut through red tape and achieve speedy resolution of operational problems encountered, thus helping to create a pro-business environment in ASEAN.

  • (ii) Private individuals and businesses faced with operational problems related to countries’ ASEAN commitments, either at home or in other ASEAN countries, can highlight these problems to the ACT in their country (Host ACT). For problems encountered within the home country, the Host ACT will direct the problem to the appropriate government agencies, and ensure that a proposed solution is sent to the individuals/businesses within 30 calendar days.

  • (iii) For problems encountered in other ASEAN countries, the Host ACT will forward the problem to the other countries’ ACT (Lead ACT). The Lead ACT will be responsible for directing the problem to the appropriate government agencies in its country, and ensuring that a proposed solution is sent to the individuals/ businesses via the Host ACT within 30 calendar days. To minimize delays, communication between Host and Lead ACTs should be via electronic means, for instance an online database accessible to all member countries.

  • (iv) If the proposed solution does not resolve the problem highlighted, the private individuals/businesses can request that their government raise this issue to the other dispute settlement mechanisms described below.

    • ASEAN Legal Unit

  • (i) The ASEAN Legal Unit will be staffed by qualified lawyers specialising in trade laws employed by the ASEAN Secretariat. The unit will offer legal interpretation/ advice on potential trade dispute issues upon request from countries. The advice is purely advisory and non-binding in nature.

  • (ii) The ASEAN Legal Unit would play a useful role in screening out issues that are operational/technical in nature which could be resolved through bilateral consultations, rather than being surfaced to the ASEAN Compliance Monitoring Body or the Enhanced ASEAN Dispute Settlement Mechanism. The ASEAN Legal Unit will also be responsible for providing legal advice and secretariat support to the ASEAN Compliance Monitoring Body and enhanced ASEAN Dispute Settlement Mechanism.

  • Session II - The ASEAN Security Community

  • from THE ASEAN COMMUNITY ROUNDTABLE: Report compiled by Denis Hew, Chin Kin Wah and Lee Hock Guan
  • Book:
    Towards Realizing an ASEAN Community. A Brief Report on the ASEAN Community Roundtable
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    04 November 2017
    Print publication:
    19 November 2004, pp 8-11

  • Summary

    While the ASEAN Security Community (ASC) has been endorsed by the 2003 Bali Summit, there is scope for giving more coherence to the concept and to the linkages between the ASC and the other two pillars of the ASEAN Community namely, the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) and the ASEAN Social-Cultural Community (ASCC).

    The concept of a security community (à la Karl Deutsch) has been in the literature for a very long time. To the extent that such a community implies conscious war avoidance in the conduct of intra-mural relations, it can be said that ASEAN is already a security community. However, in the post-Cold War era there is a need to go beyond external threats given the new generation of transnational security challenges (the 1997 regional economic crisis and its aftermath, environmental pollution, the spread of infectious diseases, international terrorism, etc.,) facing ASEAN. Such problems cannot be dealt with by ASEAN acting alone. They require the co-operative efforts of the international community. While external threats are largely dissipated in the post-Cold War regional security environment, internal threats to regimes are real. But how a security community deals with this kind of threat requires careful deliberation considering that the value that is placed on non-intervention in ASEAN. There is a need not only for concerted and co-ordinated action but also for practical solutions to practical problems.

    In formulating a road map for the implementation of the ASEAN Security Community the following considerations are worthy of reiteration:

  • There is a need to be realistic in taking account of the urgency and relevance of the many proposals. Not all ASEAN members are at the same comfort level vis-à-vis the specific proposals. Time and patience are essential in getting a broad base of acceptance.

  • The more sensitive elements of the ASC (such as counter- terrorism, extradition, intrusive peacekeeping and peace building) should be formulated in a more delicate manner or they will not find acceptance among some ASEAN members.

  • The ASC road map should not be overloaded with initiatives. Also there is a greater need to consolidate existing norms (such as those enshrined in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), the Bangkok Declaration of 1967, Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) declaration and SEANWFZ treaty, etc.) than consider new ones.

  • Appendix I - Declaration of the ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II)

  • Book:
    Towards Realizing an ASEAN Community. A Brief Report on the ASEAN Community Roundtable
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    04 November 2017
    Print publication:
    19 November 2004, pp 49-62

  • Summary

    The Sultan of Brunei Darussalam, the Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Cambodia, the President of the Republic of Indonesia, the Prime Minister of the Lao People's Democratic Republic, the Prime Minister of Malaysia, the Prime Minister of the Union of Myanmar, the President of the Republic of the Philippines, the Prime Minister of the Republic of Singapore, the Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Thailand and the Prime Minister of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam;

    RECALLING the Declaration of ASEAN Concord adopted in this historic place of Bali, Indonesia in 1976, the Leaders of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) expressed satisfaction with the overall progress made in the region;

    NOTING in particular the expansion of ASEAN to ten countries in Southeast Asia, the deepening of regional economic integration and the impending accession to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) by States outside Southeast Asia;

    CONSCIOUS of the need to further consolidate and enhance the achievements of ASEAN as a dynamic, resilient, and cohesive regional association for the well being of its member states and people as well as the need to further strengthen the Association's guidelines in achieving a more coherent and clearer path for cooperation between and among them;

    REAFFIRMING their commitment to the principles enshrined in the ASEAN Declaration (Bangkok, 1967), the Declaration on Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (Kuala Lumpur, 1971), the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (Bali, 1976), the Declaration of ASEAN Concord (Bali, 1976), and the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (Bangkok, 1995);

    COGNIZANT that the future of ASEAN co-operation is guided by the ASEAN Vision 2020, the Hanoi Plan of Action (1999–2004), and its succeeding Plans of Action, the Initiative for ASEAN Integration (IAI), and the Roadmap for the Integration of ASEAN (RIA);

    CONFIRMING further that ASEAN Member Countries share primary responsibility for strengthening the economic and social stability in the region and ensuring their peaceful and progressive national development, and that they are determined to ensure their stability and security from external interference in any form or manner in order to preserve their national interest in accordance with the ideals and aspirations of their peoples;

    REAFFIRMING the fundamental importance of adhering to the principle of non-interference and consensus in ASEAN cooperation;

  • THE ASEAN COMMUNITY: INSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS

  • from Background Papers
    • By Hsu Locknie, Associate Professor at the Faculty of Law, National University of Singapore.
  • Book:
    Towards Realizing an ASEAN Community. A Brief Report on the ASEAN Community Roundtable
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    04 November 2017
    Print publication:
    19 November 2004, pp 36-48

  • Summary

    “Political tasks will be implemented through law”.

    Introduction

    As ASEAN moves towards a more integrated Community, it is timely to examine its institutional underpinnings, to understand what changes, if any, may be required to facilitate achievement of that goal.

    This discussion focuses on the question of what legal and institutional structures might be needed or useful in the promotion of the ASEAN Community, as envisaged in the Bali Concord II. In particular, it uses the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) as a reference point.

    Since the establishment of ASEAN in 1967, a large number of documents have been signed, and arrangements entered into, at various levels by the ASEAN governments, to promote peace, trade, investment, liberalization, co-operation and related goals. At the same time, the Secretariat, which is headed by a Secretary- General and was set up in 1976, has by now become a familiar feature. In 1992, the Secretary-General position was conferred the level of status of a Minister. Apart from the Secretariat, a number of other committees, sub-committees and working groups have also sprung up. In addition, there are specialized bodies which monitor work in the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) (the AFTA Council) and the ASEAN Investment Area (AIA) (the AIA Council). As the integration process deepens in the direction set by the Bali Concord II, it is questionable whether these documents, arrangements and structures suffice. This paper sets out some important process questions which ASEAN needs to ask to see how to deepen the integration process in a concrete fashion.

    Level of Integration and Institutional Needs

    A preliminary question that arises is what degree of economic integration the Bali Concord II aspires to in ASEAN. As has been pointed out that ASEAN did not at its birth intend for integration. Rather, the vision was one of regional co-operation. This has evidently changed through the years, as the Vision 2020 and Bali Concord II documents show.

    Even so, the level of integration can vary. At one end of the spectrum would be a network of states joined through free trade agreement arrangements (such as AFTA). At the other end, one finds more highly integrated arrangements, such as customs and monetary unions; the EU is an obvious instance of such a highly integrated union. The institutional implications would, accordingly, vary depending on the level of integration targeted.

  • Appendix II - Recommendations of the High-level Task Force on ASEAN Economic Integration (Annex to Bali Concord II)

  • Book:
    Towards Realizing an ASEAN Community. A Brief Report on the ASEAN Community Roundtable
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    04 November 2017
    Print publication:
    19 November 2004, pp 63-72

  • Summary

    INTRODUCTION

    The realization of a fully integrated economic community requires implementation of both liberalization and co-operation measures. The Task Force while focusing its recommendations relating to liberalization and facilitation measures in the area of trade in good, services and investment, acknowledges on the need to enhance co-operation and integration activities in other areas. These will involve among others, human resource development and capacity building; recognition of educational qualifications; closer consultations on macroeconomic and financial policies; trade financing measures; enhanced infrastructure and communications connectivity; development of electronic transactions through e-ASEAN; integrating industries across the region to promote regional sourcing; and enhancing private sector involvement.

    ASEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY

    As a step towards the realization of ASEAN Economic Community for trade in goods, services and investment, the HLTF took into account the experience of other Regional Trading Arrangements (RTAs), ASEAN's own experience, the development perspective in ASEAN and also the views contained in the following documents:

  • (i) ASEAN Vision 2020, the Hanoi Plan of Action (HPA), and RIA;

  • (ii) ASEAN Competitiveness Study;

  • (iii) ASEAN Economic Community: Concept Paper by ISEAS; and

  • (iv) ASEAN ISIS: Towards an ASEAN Economic Community

    • The HLTF is of the view that the elements of the AEC in the area of goods, services and investment have been elaborated in ASEAN Vision 2020, HPA and RIA, and recommends that the AEC should be:

  • (i) The end-goal of economic integration as outlined in the ASEAN Vision 2020;

  • (ii) Characterized as a single market and production base, with free flow of goods, services, investment and skilled labour, and freer flow of capital by 2020; and

  • (iii) Approached on a progressive basis with clear timelines by strengthening existing initiatives and building new initiatives to enhance economic integration.

    • RECOMMENDATIONS

    Recognizing that not all ASEAN member countries can meet the recommended deadlines, the HLTF recommends that flexibility be allowed in its implementation to enable those member countries that are ready to proceed first.

  • Foreword by K. Kesavapany

  • Book:
    Towards Realizing an ASEAN Community. A Brief Report on the ASEAN Community Roundtable
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    04 November 2017
    Print publication:
    19 November 2004, pp vii-viii

  • Summary

    At the Ninth ASEAN Summit in October 2003, ASEAN leaders agreed to establish an ASEAN Community by 2020 (Bali Concord II).

    This community encompasses three components or “pillars” namely:

  • The ASEAN Security Community (focusing on regional political and security co-operation)

  • The ASEAN Economic Community (focusing on regional economic integration)

  • The ASEAN Social-Cultural Community (focusing on regional socio-cultural co-operation)

    • The three components of the ASEAN Community are conceived as being “closely intertwined and mutually reinforcing”.

    In line with the ASEAN Vision 2020 statement, the creation of an ASEAN Community would ensure closer, more comprehensive and mutually beneficial integration among ASEAN member states and their peoples. It would strengthen the basis for peace, stability, security, development and prosperity within the region as well as enhancing the regional coherence and competitiveness in the face of new challenges unleashed by globalization and the rise of new economic powerhouses in Asia.

    However, achieving the end goal of the ASEAN Community will be challenging given the region's cultural diversity, different levels of economic development and variations in strategic outlooks and external affiliations. Translating such diversities into “equitable development opportunity and prosperity” (to which the Bali Concord II also aspires) will not be an easy task.

    ASEAN has produced a plan of action on ASEAN Economic Integration, which is annexed to the Bali Concord II. To kick-start the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), the plan of action provides numerous policy recommendations to be implemented over the next 1 to 2 years.

    At the track-two level, research institutes/think-tanks such as ASEAN-ISIS, ISEAS and CSIS (Jakarta) have contributed concept papers on the AEC and the ASEAN Security Community (ASC).

    Against this backdrop, the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) organized the ASEAN Community Roundtable in Singapore on 4–5 June 2004. The main theme of the Roundtable was entitled “Towards Realizing an ASEAN Community”. This Roundtable provided the opportunity for scholars and experts on ASEAN to “brain-storm” in a more comprehensive and integrated manner, the different ideas and proposals underpinning the process of community building that ASEAN is embarking upon.

  • Session V - ASEAN Community: What are the Institutional Implications?

  • from THE ASEAN COMMUNITY ROUNDTABLE: Report compiled by Denis Hew, Chin Kin Wah and Lee Hock Guan
  • Book:
    Towards Realizing an ASEAN Community. A Brief Report on the ASEAN Community Roundtable
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    04 November 2017
    Print publication:
    19 November 2004, pp 18-24

  • Summary

    At the time ASEAN was formed in 1967, institutional structures were not considered very important by its member states. It was not surprising therefore that it took almost a decade before an ASEAN secretariat was established. Prior to its establishment in 1976, ASEAN affairs were handled essentially by national secretariats in each member state that co-ordinated the various activities outlined in the ASEAN Declaration of 1967. The coordination at national levels continued even after the ASEAN Secretariat was created and it was not until 1992 when the members decided to strengthen the institutional structure and function of the Secretariat. The primary reason for the decision to finally strengthen the Secretariat was the need to administer the creation of an ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA).

    The institutional restructuring of ASEAN was however predicated on clearly defined parameters.

  • First, regional institutions should not take on any supranational functions.

  • Second, sensitivity should be given to the roles played by the foreign ministers and ASEAN Director-Generals (and their national secretariats) in the development of ASEAN.

  • Third, ASEAN would move at a slow and incremental pace. Furthermore, any changes should be predictable and not require much financial resources.

    • Notwithstanding these parameters, ASEAN has indicated that it was prepared to move quickly when necessary as shown by the short deadlines adopted in implementing the measures outlined by the HLTF on moving ahead with economic integration.

    To make ASEAN more effective in responding to new challenges, including the need to expedite efforts towards economic integration, several changes to its institutional structures were suggested:

  • (i) Preparation of an annual report by the ASEAN Secretary- General to be given directly to the leaders instead of the ASEAN Standing Committee.

  • (ii) Giving ASEAN Ministers direct access to ASEAN Heads of Governments (HOGs) during the ASEAN Ministerial Meetings. This would enable HOGs to have direct access to recommendations and policy issues prepared by their ministers.

  • (iii) Establishing a committee of representatives from each member country, similar to the UN. Based in Jakarta, this committee would work closely with the ASEAN Secretariat and report to their respective national ministries or coordinating secretariats on relevant issues. This committee comprising ambassador-level representatives would cut down the huge number of existing ASEAN meetings that are organized throughout the year.

  • WHAT IS A COMMUNITY?

  • from Background Papers
    • By Amitav Acharya, Deputy Director and Head of Research, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.
  • Book:
    Towards Realizing an ASEAN Community. A Brief Report on the ASEAN Community Roundtable
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    04 November 2017
    Print publication:
    19 November 2004, pp 27-35

  • Summary

    In political science as in the real world of politics, the language of “community” evokes both appeal and apprehension. Leaders often use the language of community (or associated metaphors: family, brotherhood, kinship) to woo their constituents, legitimize their mode of governance and mobilize public support for specific policies. Some disparage the notion of community, which they see as a fig leaf for state dominance at the expense of individual autonomy. But if the concept sparks controversy at the domestic level, it arouses disbelief when applied to international relations. Realists, who dominate both the study and practice of international relations, view the international system as anarchic, in which states exist in perpetual fear and mistrust of each other, and where self-help trumps community-help. In constant pursuit of national security, their best hope is for co-existence, rather than collective fulfilment. Other scholars, admittedly less numerous, accept the possibility of community. They not only recognize the existence of community in international relations, but also claim that community-guided behaviour can reshape security perceptions and even create pacific relations among states.

    But what is community? A community has two key features. First, it implies a social, rather than purely instrumental, relationship. The key attributes of a community, to use American political scientist Ernst Haas’ words, are “trust, friendship, complementarity, and responsiveness” (Haas 1973, p. 116). Second, a community is not just a group of culturally similar people. While people in communities have cultural and physical attributes in common, they are also people who “display mutual responsiveness, confidence, and esteem, and who self-consciously self-identify” (Puchala 1984, pp. 186–87).

    In a classic formulation, Ferdinand Tonnies distinguishes between two kinds of social relationships. The first describes a kinship or a communal relationship (Gemeinschaft). The other refers to an organized, purposive association (Gesellsschaft). The two are different to the extent that a person cannot simply wake up one morning and decide to join a Gemeinschaft. He/she is either born into it or grows into it through an evolutionary process of adaptation and assimilation. Gesellschaft, on the other hand, connotes a voluntary association based on rational self-interest. The process of entering into a Gesellsschaft is akin to signing a contract, which is an instrumental and practical way of achieving one's goals.

  • 5 - Indonesian Muslims Enter a New Age

  • from The New Age
  • Edited by Virginia Hooker, Amin Saikal
  • Book:
    Islamic Perspectives on the New Millennium
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    21 October 2015
    Print publication:
    20 October 2004, pp 74-88

  • Summary

    The Holy Book teaches that all the faithful are brothers. It is also commanded that ishlāḥ (reconciliation) should always be sought among believers in disagreement as an aspect of devotion to Allah. These teachings about brotherhood are followed by an injunction about the first and foremost principle for the preservation of the brotherhood of Muslims (Ukhuwwah Islāmiyyah), namely, that among the faithful no one group should put down others. This primary principle is followed by several other injunctions explaining things which can destroy brotherhood, like insulting one another, referring to other believers by unpleasant names, being prejudiced, looking for faults in others, and bad-mouthing people (committing ghībah, that is, discussing the flaws of someone not present). This series of divine commandments about brotherhood is followed by an affirmation of the principle that all mankind are brothers, and that the division of mankind into different races and ethnic groups was meant to provide markers of self-identification (identity), which must be borne in a broader humanitarian environment with an attitude of absolute mutual respect. It is also stressed that a person's dignity and worth cannot be measured by external factors such as nationality or language, for dignity and worth consist in a truer philosophy of life, subsisting in man's deepest self, namely piety — and only Allah knows and can measure piety (Q. 49:10–13). Thus God alone has the right to measure and determine Someone's worth, whereas a man must appraise other men in the spirit of equality.

    If we consider aspects of Islam which could be the focus for reinterpretation, the noble spirit of humanitarianism (ḥabl min al-nās) should receive greater attention. It constitutes the second aspect of Islamic teachings after the spirit of godliness (ḥabl min-Allāh). This is, in fact, widely known among Muslims. So what is needed are substantiations, indicating the foundations in sacred sources (the Holy Book and Sunna) and reinvestigating a range of historical evidence, because no matter how exalted a teaching, what really influences society is its concrete realization in history, that is, in man's social and cultural life in the context of a particular place and time. So the approach to teachings as far as possible is not dogmatic, but analytical, even in the approach to understanding sacred sources.

  • 6 - Financial Activism among Indonesian Muslims

  • from The Economy
  • Edited by Virginia Hooker, Amin Saikal
  • Book:
    Islamic Perspectives on the New Millennium
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    21 October 2015
    Print publication:
    20 October 2004, pp 91-112

  • Summary

    This chapter describes the dynamics of the Islamic perspective on the economy within the context of Indonesia. It argues that in modern times, particularly during the New Order period and the reformation afterwards, a significant number of Muslim intellectuals have been developing ideas on an Islamicinspired economic system, and some have been implemented together with the communities. Islamic economic discourse and activism are playing an important role in the economic recovery of Indonesia. It became one of the determinant factors in transforming the Muslims' creed and religiosity. This will also play a role in determining the type of relationship between religion (Islam) and state in Indonesia.

    The perspective shall be discerned by looking into the increasing awareness and activism of Indonesian Muslims in economic and business matters, both at the conceptual-ideal level and in their implementation programmes. It starts with a brief introduction on Islam in Indonesia and the general issue of Islamicity in this developing nation-state. This is followed by a discussion of the economic challenges and Islamic ideals, as well as the efforts to transform certain Islamic values and principles into the national legislation. Some of these ideals have been put into practice and some programmes have been implemented, and this will be the focus of the next section. Lastly, I deliberate on the prospects of the resurgent activism.

    ISLAMIC STATE OR ISLAMIC SOCIETY?

    Among the most controversial issues at stake for Muslims, and for researchers of Islam alike, is the seemingly simple question: “What is Islam?” Muslims may differ on the exact definition, let alone on the details, but they seem to agree that Islam means “submission to Allah”. One who submits to God (Allah) is a Muslim. One who does not is excluded from the community of the faithful. How far a Muslim submits himself or herself to the will of God depends on how he or she perceives the role and function of the religion in his or her life.

    Islam came to Southeast Asia quite late compared to the expansion of Islam in the Middle East, Central Asia, and North Africa. It was brought by Muslim traders whose religiosity was shaped more by Sufi inclination. The legal-normative stance came later, and with it came another wave of puritanism and a modernist movement.

  • 9 - The Experience of the Islamic Republic of Iran

  • from The Nation-State
  • Edited by Virginia Hooker, Amin Saikal
  • Book:
    Islamic Perspectives on the New Millennium
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    21 October 2015
    Print publication:
    20 October 2004, pp 150-158

  • Summary

    At the conceptual level, the universality of Islam and the plurality of nations seem irreconcilable. However, in practice one can find different ways and means to build bridges between the two. The main concern of this chapter is the compatibility of Islam and the nation-state, with particular attention given to the Iranian experience of an Islamic Republic.

    The chapter is in two parts. The first part will focus on the significance of Islam and its relevance to politics, the notion of the nation-state and its role in international relations, and the ways in which Islam has coped with the concept of the nation-state. The second part will focus on the experience of the Islamic Republic of Iran, its doctrine of combining the sovereignty of God with that of humanity, and the issue of the independence of the nation-state vis-à-vis the unity of the Islamic world. For this purpose, particular attention will be paid to the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

    THE SIGNIFICANCE OF ISLAM IN WORLD POLITICS

    Islam is a universal religion that invites humanity into the unity of God so that it can satisfy its material and spiritual needs. Hence, the unity of God has wide philosophical, social, and political dimensions. Islam also places strong emphasis on the unity of believers and urges them to refrain from conflict and discord. Communities of believers constitute the Islamic ummah, which has a meaning far beyond the definition of tribe, nation, or state. The unity of the Islamic ummah, per se, is a manifestation of society's belief in unity, whilst conflict and animosity are the natural result of following Satan. In fact, the invitation to “unity of God in belief, and the unity of believers in practice” can play an active political role in domestic as well as international affairs.

    From the Islamic perspective, religion and politics are not separate or independent arenas. According to one interpretation, politics is considered a part of religion, and religion completely overlaps politics. Even if one resists acceptance of such an interpretation, it is still hard to deny that Islam as a comprehensive religion provides a legitimate basis for politics. A quick consideration of the political and social developments that have taken place in the Islamic world in the last fifty years shows that a kind of “back to basics movement” is building.

  • 1 - Islamic Perspectives on the New Millennium

  • Edited by Virginia Hooker, Amin Saikal
  • Book:
    Islamic Perspectives on the New Millennium
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    21 October 2015
    Print publication:
    20 October 2004, pp 1-16

  • Summary

    The suicide bombings in the United States of America on 11 September 2001, executed by terrorists claiming they acted in the name of Islam, set in train events whose repercussions will influence world politics for the foreseeable future. Although the perpetrators were denounced by Muslim leaders around the world as criminals whose acts were not condoned by Islam, many non-Muslims nevertheless believed that somehow Islam was to blame for the September 11 tragedy. The Islamic terrorist group known as Al-Qaeda claimed responsibility for the bombings and was targeted by Western leaders for retribution, but care was taken to emphasize that the punitive action would be directed against Al-Qaeda and its allies, not against Islam and Muslims in general. However, when the United States and its allies bombed Taliban forces in Afghanistan (2001) and then proceeded against Saddam Hussein without the sanction of the United Nations Security Council (2003), increasing numbers of ordinary Muslims became suspicious about the motives of the administration of President George W. Bush. Heightened surveillance of Muslims in many Western countries, more stringent immigration controls, tight security in public venues and centres of mass travel, and alarmist reports in many media outlets produced a sense of fear among ordinary people, both Muslims and non-Muslims. The early years of the twenty-first century have therefore been characterized by widespread anxiety and fear of violence, state intrusion into personal lives (in the name of public safety) and perceived discrimination against individuals on the basis of their place of origin or religion.

    The climate of fear which has grown and been fostered by the media, wherever it operates, is in sad contrast to the efforts of many intellectuals in the last decade of the twentieth century to find common ground between people of all faiths based on the universality of mankind. Possibly provoked by Samuel P. Huntington's controversial claim that “universal civilization” was the product of Western thought, there have been many responses from Muslim intellectuals who argued that it was Islamic civilization which became the first truly universal civilization. These intellectuals also promoted the concept of civilizational dialogue, recognizing that there are many religions and cultures and seeking a system of global ethics based on shared spiritual, moral, and ethical values.

  • 4 - Islam and Globalization: Arab World Perspectives

  • from The New Age
  • Edited by Virginia Hooker, Amin Saikal
  • Book:
    Islamic Perspectives on the New Millennium
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    21 October 2015
    Print publication:
    20 October 2004, pp 43-73

  • Summary

    It has become rather difficult to distinguish the dividing line at which American influence ends and globalization begins, whether globalization be simply a form of global Americanisation, or a genuinely independent phenomenon, although it tends to be viewed as American hegemony.

    (‘Abd al-‘Aziz al-Duri, 1999).

    As an Islamic movement … we call [among other things] for a global democratic front against tyranny and against the suppression of peoples' freedoms, in order to have a world in which liberty is sovereign, and in which free and equitable circulation (jawalan) of benefits and ideas is facilitated.

    (Rashid Ghannoushi, 1993).

    ISLAM AND THE DIVERSITY OF VOICES IN THE ARAB WORLD

    There is no doubt that globalization, with all of the ambiguities and disconnections that it involves, has become the new grand narrative of our times, particularly in the social sciences and in the media. In attempting to appraise “Islamic perspectives” within the regional context of the Middle East, I view the “Islamic factor” as one of several factors at work in the Arab world. My approach belongs to cultural-intellectual history and sociology, rather than religious studies, economics, or realpolitik concerns. I am aware of the unfortunate tendency of many Islamists and certain Western observers to speak of Islam as if it were a changeless, closed system, inherently “unique” and remotely different from Christianity, and to view Islamic societies as antithetical to the modern values that are associated with the West. Such presentations are epistemologically unsound and tend to hinder comprehension of our common human reality. Apart from anything else, we need to remind ourselves that there are several “Islams” in our world. Islam represents not only a “civilization” and a “culture of reference” in general, but also various regional, socio-economic, and ideological “cultures”. Both Islamic teachings and history can be, and have been, interpreted in diverse ways. Contemporary Islamic movements, even within the same country, do not all share the same attitudes to such crucial issues as “religion and politics”, the role of reason, the Islamic heritage, modernity, and the “other”. We need to remember that a century or so ago, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Muhammad ‘Abduh, and Rashid Rida, for example, though considered as one school of thought, actually differed in their approaches to the means and orientations of Islamic reform.

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