The most important challenge for Brunei in 2003 was resolving land and maritime border problems with its closest neighbour, Malaysia. Both sides tried to play down the issue but a flurry of meetings between the most senior leaders of the two countries attest to its gravity. A June meeting in Penang, Malaysia, between the Sultan and Malaysia’s Prime Minister, Dr Mahathir Mohamad, apparently focused on their competing national claims over oil-rich maritime territory. A visit by Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi to Brunei followed in early July. The Sultan went to Kuala Lumpur in August.

The maritime issue arises from Brunei offering exploration blocks to oil companies within its 200-km exclusive economic zone (EEZ), which Malaysia disputes, being prepared only to recognize Brunei’s continental shelf in waters up to 200 meters deep. The two countries have overlapping claims on the oil-rich areas at sea, and in early 2003 Malaysia sent its navy to chase away a Brunei-endorsed drilling team led by France’s oil company, Total. Instead, Malaysia offered the area to an American company, Murphy Oil, that had successfully drilled for a substantial amount of oil in the adjacent area outside Brunei’s declared EEZ. Under the protection of the Malaysian navy, Murphy Oil immediately started drilling in the area already allotted by Brunei to Total.

Two meetings between the Sultan and Mahathir have produced a temporary truce. Both sides agreed that all activities in the disputed area be halted until a solution was found to the problems. Malaysia has submitted an eight-point memorandum to Brunei. One of the reported options is to have a joint exploration of the area but ownership of the EEZ remains a thorny issue. Brunei, which depends for its future prosperity on oil and natural gas, would not easily give up its right to oil-rich maritime territory.

Regional Outlook was launched in 1992. Designed for the busy executive, professional, diplomat, journalist, and interested observer who face severe time constraints, this annual offers a succinct analysis of political and economic trends in the countries of Southeast Asia and the outlook for the forthcoming two years.

The year 2003 was a difficult one for countries in this part of the world. The SARS virus not only took lives but also dramatized how a non-conventional security threat could spread so easily and quickly. One blessing in this crisis was that it helped the countries in the region to work closely together to contain the virus. In contrast, the U.S. war in Iraq was a rather more contentious issue. When it came to finding common ground in ASEAN, there was none. Member states took very different positions, which only served to underscore the deep strategic differences lurking beneath the appearance of a united ASEAN. Terrorism continues to cast a long shadow. Indonesia, not quite recovered from the Bali bomb incident in October 2002, had another major terrorist attack in its capital Jakarta on 5 August 2003. All these resulted in a more complex and uncertain strategic environment.

Southeast Asia suffered a set-back on its road to economic recovery in 2003. Regional economies were particularly affected by the Iraq war and the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak. Nevertheless, the impact of SARS on the region has turned out to be less damaging than earlier anticipated. The epidemic which broke out in March 2003, was largely contained by July 2003. Although concerns continued to prevail that SARS might re-occur in the near future, the region's public health sector appeared to be better prepared to deal with the disease.

The relatively quick passing of these two major events as well as the economic recovery in the United States and Japan augur well for the region's economic outlook in 2004 and 2005.

On 21 May 1998 President Soeharto relinquished power after thirty-two years. The move was quite sudden, despite the fact that demands for his resignation — spearheaded mostly by university students, prominent intellectuals, and political activists — were echoed all over the country. It was a sudden end in the sense that, powerful as he was, the public did not think that he would step down without making significant efforts, politically as well as militarily, to defend his presidency. Even though the signs were there, and quite obviously indicating that he was losing his grip on what used to be his sources of support — consisting of the bureaucracy, Golkar, and the military — many believed that Soeharto would not give up easily. This was especially so at a time when the country was plunged into unprecedented crises, socio-economically as well as politically. The monetary crisis that hit Indonesia hard, starting with the devaluation of the rupiah in August 1997, was the main reason for the collapse of the country's economy. This was followed by bloodshed and enormous destruction in cities like Jakarta, Medan, Solo, Banyuwangi, Yogyakarta, Padang, and Surabaya. The circumstances did not seem right for Soeharto — who often suggested that being a soldier, he was not a man to run away from problems (in Javanese, tinggal glanggang colong playu) — to quit. But, realizing the fact that he was eventually alone — deserted by his very own confidants and supporters who had backed him until as late as March 1998, when he was unanimously re-elected for aseventh term — forced him to abdicate.

So, on that very day, he declared unilaterally his departure from the post he had occupied for more than three decades. And with such a “unilateral declaration” — a carefully chosen phrase which was deliberately intended to prevent certain legal or constitutional bearings — Vice-President B.J. Habibie ascended to the presidency.

The development of Indonesia's new Islamic intellectualism over the past two decades can be considered crisis-determined. Its general tone has been influenced and shaped by the debilitating situation of political Islam and the devastating repercussions this has had on its thinkers and activists. These unfavourable circumstances have emerged mainly, though not wholly, due to the poor political relationship between Islam and the state and the resulting socio-cultural and political synthesis of Islam within the framework of the state.

For reasons discussed below, the rise of this new Islamic intellectualism can be seen as representing a promising attempt to remedy the discouraging disjunction between Islam and the state. So far, these efforts have been primarily carried out through enunciations of new Islamic political thoughts and actions which are perceived to be more compatible with Indonesia's socio-cultural and religious heterogeneity.

These intellectual endeavours have been led by a new generation of Islamic thinkers and activists who, since the early 1970s, have sought to develop a new format for political Islam in which substance, rather than form, serves as the primary orientation. In the model which these new intellectuals espouse, the notion of “Islamic-ness” and “Indonesia ness”— two important elements which provide cultural as well as structural legitimacy to the construct of Indonesia's “national unitary state” — is harmoniously synthesized and integrated.

As indicated in their intellectual discourse, this agenda requires (1) re-examination of the theological or philosophical underpinnings of political Islam; (2) redefinition of the political objectives of Islam; and (3) reassessment of the ways by which those political ideals can be effectively realized.

The main tasks of this chapter and the following two chapters are as follows: chapter 3 will describe the pronouncements of the new Islamic intellectualism. The broad tenets of this idealism and activism can be categorized as revolving around three important areas: (1) theological/ religious renewal; (2) political/bureaucratic reform; and (3) social transformation.

In chapter 3 I described at length the general pronouncements of the new Islamic intellectualism. To better understand the nature of this intellectual movement, I examined the case in the light of its socio-political context. Wherever necessary, I also discussed — albeit briefly — the social origins of its key actors and precursors, particularly concerning their intellectual background. And finally, I also attempted to throw some light on — but did not fully illuminate — the kind of impact the new intellectualism has on the contemporary expression of Islamic political ideas and practices.

This and the following chapters address the latter issue more fully. Based on the variety of the intellectual preferences described above, I will explore the implications of the new intellectualism on the current expression of Indonesia's Islamic political thoughts and actions under three major themes: (1) reformulation of the theological or philosophical underpinning of political Islam; (2) redefinition of the political objectives of Islam; and (3) reassessment of the political approach of Islam. The first two of these themes will be treated in this chapter, while the third is given a chapter of its own. In my view, as will be demonstrated in the following discussion, it is in terms of these three interlocking themes that the significance of the intellectual transformation of Islamic political ideas and practices in today's Indonesian political Islam must be understood.

REFORMULATING THE THEOLOGICAL UNDERPINNING OF POLITICAL ISLAM

Recalling our earlier discussion in chapter 2, I suggested that the chief, though not the only, problem which had inhibited a viable synthesis between Islam and the state was the difficulty of finding a nationally acceptable linkage between them.

ISLAMIC STRATEGY IN THE PAST

Based on the previous discussion, it can be suggested that at some point the history of Indonesia's political Islam was characterized by two dominant features. To achieve their desired goals, the earlier leaders and activists of political Islam relied mostly on (1) non-integrative or partisan politics and (2) parliament as the only playing field.

The partisan politics approach was directly related to the grouping of Islam as political forces (that is, Masyumi, later to be succeeded by Parmusi, Nahdlatul Ulama [NU], Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia [PSII], and Perti. What was then known as political Islam appeared to become the sole enterprise of Islamic parties. In other words, political Islam emerged to become an exclusive project and venture of these parties to envision and fulfil.

It is arguable that under such political groupings Islam gained relative clarity with respect to its formal and institutional role in politics. In fact, there had been a growing inclination to perceive the mere presence of these parties as evidence of the dynamism and vitality of political Islam. This made their existence seem to be theologically and politically imperative.

However, given the severity of the ideological polarization among the existing political parties, especially during the liberal as well as Guided Democracy periods, it became apparent that these political groupings had further religious political consequences. They posed some constraints to Islam as a single religious entity.

Since the unravelling of Western colonialism in the mid-twentieth century, Muslim countries (for example, Turkey, Egypt, Sudan, Morocco, Pakistan, Malaysia, and Algeria) have experienced difficulties in attempting to establish a viable synthesis between Islamic political movements and ideas and the state in their respective localities. In these countries the political relationship between Islam and the state has been characterized by severe tensions, if not hostilities. Given the preponderant position of Islam in these regions, that is, being the religion of the majority of their inhabitants, this is indeed a puzzling reality. As such it has attracted many students of political Islam to raise the question as to whether or not Islam is actually compatible with a modern political system, in which the idea of the nation state serves as a major ingredient.

In Indonesia Islam has long been at an impasse in terms of its political relationship with the state. The regimes of both Presidents Soekarno and Soeharto regarded political parties based on Islam as potential power contenders capable of undermining the nationalist basis of the state. Primarily because of this, both the regimes worked to contain and “domesticate” the Islamic parties. As a result, not only did the leaders and activists of political Islam fail to make Islam the state ideology and religion in 1945 (on the eve of Indonesia's independence) and again in the late 1950s (during the Constituent Assembly debates over Indonesia's constitutional future), but they also found themselves repeatedly labelled “minorities” or “outsiders”.

In a broader perspective the foregoing pages have sought to answer the question of whether or not Islam is actually compatible with a modern political system, with the idea of the nation state as its major element. Given the polyinterpretability of Islam, as suggested in the introduction of this volume, the answer to such an inquiry can be either affirmative or negative, depending on what kind of Islam is being put forward in the limelight of analytical investigation. Likewise, the problem of the political relationship between Islam and the state in Indonesia, through the course of its political history, is contingent upon what kind of Islamic political discourse is being developed.

By way of deconstructing the venture of the country's political Islam during the revolutionary (mid-1940s), liberal (mid-1950s), and early New Order (late 1960s) periods, this study shows that the formalistic or legalistic articulations of Islam, especially in terms of its political idealism and activism, played a crucial role in the evolution of a highly strained relationship between Islam and the state with regard to Islam's political role.

ACCOMMODATION BY THE STATE

As suggested in the preceding chapters, the idealism and activism of the earlier generation of political Muslims were characterized by formalism and legalism. The ultimate embodiment of their ideas and actions was their aspiration for the creation of an Islamic state, or a state based on Islamic ideology. Failure to accomplish this goal, partly due to the fact that not every Muslim shared the idea of Islamic statehood, led to an uneasy relationship between Islam and the Indonesian state.

The implications of this uneasy political relationship were far-reaching, culminating with shrinking access to the corridors of power and the declining stature of political Muslims, especially during the first twenty years of the New Order regime. Illustrative of the defeat of political Islam were the proscription of Masyumi (1960); the exclusion of its prominent figures in the leadership of the newly founded Parmusi (1968); the reduction of the number of Islamic political parties from four — Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Muslimin Indonesia (MI), Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia (PSII), and Persatuan Tarbiah Islam (Perti) — into a single Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP) (1973); plummeting representation in the parliament as well as in the Cabinet; and the denial of Islam as the basis of Islamic social and political organization (1985). Most distressing, political Islam had become a convenient target of ideological distrust, suspected for its adherence to anti-state ideology.