Until recently, many scholars have given primary attention in their analysis of conflict management in multi-racial societies to the role of national élites and sub-élites. And it has been assumed that in a severely divided society the national élites and sub-élites tend towards a consociational framework in preserving regime stability as well as democratic procedures. In a recent study of Malaysia, Case argues that the behaviour of the ruling Ãlites and the extent of consensual unity between them is crucial in managing socio-political and ethnic conflicts.

But, what if the ruling élites are not unified? What if they are divided, being from different ethnic communities and from different factions within the ruling bloc? In other words, how do rivalries within the dominant ruling élites affect their behaviour and the extent of consensual unity in a multi-racial society? In Malaysia, would the unambiguous Malay dominance after the 1969 racial riots be renegotiated towards the recovery of consociational frameworks or would the Malay dominance be strengthened and consolidated, if the national leadership were severely fragmented? Or would it eventually be replaced by another, possibly more severe, form of authoritarian rule?

During the years after independence when ethnic conflict was perceived as the main threat to regime stability in Malaysia, inter-ethnic élite cooperation was the most crucial element in the maintenance of the dominant Malay ruling élite's power. Accordingly, the UMNO-led Malay ruling élite opted for political compromise with other communal leaders in coalition government to maintain its legitimate influence over the political process. Although the Malaysian political system did not fully conform to all features of consociationalism mentioned by Lijphart, it nonetheless involved the articulation of the key ones for the first twelve years of independence (1957–69). In particular, the presence of interethnic élite co-operation in the Alliance government and sufficient rankand-file support made Malaysian politics consociational during the earlier period of independence. Given the intense ethnic and societal cleavages in Malaysia, much writing on consociationalism has been oriented towards exploring how the various ethnic leaders were able to reach some measure of consensus to preserve their political legitimacy.

Towards the end of the 1960s, the Alliance-type of consociational compromise, however, became increasingly unfeasible for maintaining regime stability as Malaysian ethnic society became more and more politicized. In particular, the Alliance's disastrous outcome in the 1969 general election which triggered the subsequent May 13 racial riots demonstrated that consociational inter-ethnic compromises were less effective for the Malay ruling élite as a means of maintaining its own political power. This was one of the most crucial reasons for the Malay ruling élite seeking an alternative mode of regime maintenance and shifting towards more hegemonic control, which led to the unambiguous UMNO-led Malay dominance of the 1970s and 1980s. During this period, changes took place in almost every field of Malaysian society, the political, social, economic, legal, and even ideological spheres.

As shown in the period 1987–90, the presence of substantial opposition within the dominant Malay community did not necessarily bring about greater political openness or democratic accountability in Malaysia. On the contrary, since the mid-1980s, deepening UMNO factionalism seemed to encourage the dominant Malay political élite to adopt a more assertive approach. The élite curtailed the political and civil liberties of its opponents, while provoking racial sentiment when politically expedient. As a result of the political challenge from UMNO dissidents, regaining Malay support became a priority for the Mahathir government. Under these circumstances the government could hardly exhibit greater sensitivity to the demands of non-Malay supporters, despite their growing political importance. A series of tactical appeasement gestures, before and during the 1990 general election, was also implemented in ways that avoided alienating Malay support. The situation during 1987–90 was such that the Mahathir government could not afford to appear to be making concessions to non-Malays which might incite Malay emotions.

Malaysia is generally described as a prime example of a society severely divided along ethnic lines and most observers agree that ethnic conflict has been, and still is, one of the most distinctive sources of political conflict. Malaysia, nonetheless, is one of the few plural societies that has achieved some measure of success in managing ethnic conflict and has enjoyed relative political stability since independence in 1957. Given this record, many studies of politics in Malaysia examine the development of political structures and processes which regulate conflict situations and achieve political stability. These approaches have analysed how ethnic-conflict management strategies have been applied to different situations but they have not given adequate attention as to how such strategies have changed to meet changing circumstances. This book examines how the ruling political élite in Malaysia, especially UMNO (United Malays National Organization) and Mahathir, has been able to maintain its political hegemony while achieving relative political stability in a severely fragmented society over the last few decades. In particular, this book is concerned with the link between a dynamic conflict structure and regime maintenance strategies in Malaysia.

The study assumes that the conflict structure challenging or undermining the maintenance of the regime in Malaysia has been changing since independence in 1957. And, the period of changing conflict configurations provides opportunities for a fresh look at the nature of the ruling political élite's regime maintenance strategies. An assumption throughout lies in the nature of power politics, that those who enjoy positions of power in the apparatus of the state are unlikely to give up their power willingly. Although the UMNO-led ruling élite has adapted to the changing expectations of Malaysian society, the single most important motive for regime change and regime maintenance has been to sustain its own political power.

The year 1998 marks a significant change in Malaysian political history. After several years of leadership conflict speculation within UMNO, Anwar Ibrahim was abruptly dismissed from office, expelled from the party, imprisoned under the ISA, beaten while in custody and eventually charged in court on five counts of sodomy and five counts of corruption. These events happened with Machiavellian ruthlessness in September 1998. Anwar sensed his time as Mahathir's deputy was about to end, but even he did not anticipate Mahathir acting in “such a despicable and shameless manner”. Interestingly, Mahathir claimed in an interview that he had not read Machiavelli's prescription on how to be a successful politician. Anwar's abrupt dismissal and its aftermath, nonetheless, recall Machiavelli's famous dictum about cruelty, that a successful leader should not care about the infamy of cruelty in order to maintain power.

Since independence in 1957, ethnicity has been one of the prime sources of conflict in multi-ethnic Malaysian society and this conflict and its resolution have been a primary concern in the study of politics in Malaysia. This chapter provides a historical and political overview of the roots of ethnic relations in Malaysian society. To understand why “ethnic differences” became “ethnic contrast”, which in turn became “ethnic antagonism”, it is necessary to trace the colonial origins of communal-group contrast in Malaya. In doing so, this chapter examines the conditions under which, and the processes by which, ethnic identities and differences become activated and converted to political conflict.

This chapter is divided into four sections. The first summarizes the creation of a pluralist society in Malaysia. The second focuses on the specific question of the non-assimilation of the main ethnic communities in Malaysia and considers factors which have made the assimilation of the Malayan peoples difficult, despite their proximity within the same political unit. The third part is about the deepening of inter-ethnic conflict and why inter-ethnic relations deteriorated. In other words, what kinds of factors have catalysed the deepening of inter-ethnic conflict in Malaysia? The final section deals with the institutionalization of an ethnic-conflict configuration in Malaysia's modern political system.

The Origins of a Multi-Ethnic Malaysian Society

Numerous ethnic groups exist in Malaysia. Ethnic relations in Malaysia, however, generally revolve around the relations between the Malays and the non-Malays (including the Indians) in Peninsular Malaysia, or more specifically the complex Malay-Chinese relationship.

In 1955, when Malaya was still part of the British Empire, the colonial authorities held a general election as a step towards independence in 1957. That election was won by an alliance of three racially based parties headed by its Malay component, the United Malays National Organization (UMNO). Over the next decades, that alliance expanded to include other parties but its essential structure remains much the same — a dominant Malay party heading an alliance of parties representing smaller ethnic groups. The UMNO-dominated alliance won all but one seat in 1955 and has won overwhelming majorities in every election since then — usually occupying around 80 to 85 per cent of the seats in the national parliament and controlling almost all of the state governments. If, as Samuel Huntington has said, one of the marks of an institutionalized political party is adaptability in the face of changing circumstances, then UMNO and the Barisan Nasional (BN), as the alliance is now known, must be considered as very successful cases of institutionalization.

Malaysian society has undergone enormous change since the 1950s. The predominantly rural population of the 1950s has become increasingly urban. An economy based on the export of tin and rubber is now moving towards industrialization. An economy which was largely owned by foreigners is now largely in the hands of Malaysians. Malays, Chinese, and Indians who were concentrated in their own segments of a plural society are now all represented in the modern economy and have increasingly acquired a common “Malaysian” identity. And a society that appeared to be on the brink of national disintegration after racial rioting in 1969 has not witnessed major ethnic violence for more than thirty years. Most societies that have undergone the type of transformation experienced by Malaysia have also experienced considerable political upheaval and often drastic change in their political system. But in Malaysia the core framework of the political system has largely survived while adjustments have been implemented only gradually.

During the period 1957–69, the newly established Malaysian state opted for political compromise which meant by implication that Malays retained political prominence while the non-Malays, especially the Chinese, kept their strong economic position, even though the modern economy continued to be dominated by foreign capital. As described in the previous chapter, the component parties of the Alliance government had both incentive and capacity to engage in mutual compromise in order to avoid internal collapse and to maintain their legitimate influence over their segmental ethnic groups. It also appeared that the intensity and volume of communal demands were relatively moderate and negotiable to a large extent in such a mutual deterrence situation.

However, the relatively amicable ethnic relations were not built on strong foundations. As Mahathir Mohamad noted, racial harmony in the first decade of independence was “neither real nor deep-rooted” but was rather the “absence of open inter-racial strife”. Moreover, the absence of overt struggle was not necessarily “due to lack of desire or reasons for strife” but mostly “due to a lack of capacity to bring about open conflict.” The changed political environment in the second decade of independence, however, demonstrated that such mutual compromise (or avoidance) was no longer effective. Towards the end of the 1960s, the non-Malay communities became more vocal in their demands for greater political equality. To a greater extent, the Malays, especially a group of young Malay leaders, were worried that the Alliance regime's compromising approach would ultimately cause them to be marginalized in the political and economic sphere. Consequently, growing ethnic anxieties led to the breakdown of political order which took the form of the bloody racial riots in May 1969.

Many scholars of conflict resolution argue that intense ethnic conflicts in deeply fragmented societies are rarely resolved by orthodox democratic means such as pure majoritarianism, ordinary parliamentary opposition, political campaigning, and winning elections. Therefore, scholars have proposed the alternative “consociational” model, probably best defined by Lijphart in terms of “grand coalition”, “mutual veto”, “proportionality”, and “autonomy”. Lipjhart argues that through government by an élite cartel, a democracy with a fragmented political culture is stabilized. This model is used to deal with intense conflicts, both in the smaller developed European countries and the post-colonial plural societies of the Third World. This chapter explores the relevance of consociational conflict resolution for regime maintenance, to the first period of Malaysian ethnic politics, 1957–69.

The intense ethnic and societal cleavages in Malaysia have inclined many scholars to view consociational élite bargaining as the most useful theoretical approach to analysing regime maintenance in the Malaysian political system.

FAMILY BACKGROUND AND EDUCATION

Looking at my family background, some of which I discovered only recently, I can better understand my own unconventional behaviour. If I had been a true son of a village family and had gone on to become a civil servant, I doubt that I would ever have done the things that I have done. Some other gene must have been there, something else must have been passed down.

I came from a family of nine children, of whom two eventually went into private business, myself (number seven) and the youngest, Soegianto. My father would have been classified as a government official, but his career reveals some elements which may help to explain why two of his sons were later able to succeed in business. Growing up in a village close to Klaten (between Solo and Yogyakarta) at the end of the 19th century, he was one of the few who went to what is now called a teachers college (sekolah guru; Dutch kweekschool), which in those days was something special. His mentor was one of the founders not only of the nationalist study group Budi Utomo but also of the pioneer Indonesian life insurance company Bumiputera 1912. At the time my father graduated, the Dutch government was involved in the ‘pacification’ of the archipelago and needed many government officials to extend the administration. The only source was the sekolah guru — which for Indonesians were the only decent ones in existence. This teacher told my father to apply, because he was too restless for teaching and, besides, he would make more money. He was accepted, put in the service of the Opium Regie (the state opium monopoly) and posted to Buleleng in North Bali (the back door for smuggling opium into Java). Later he was transferred from Buleleng to Pangkalan Brandan in North Sumatra, where in the panglong (coastal timber-cutting settlements) there were many Chinese, all of whom smoked opium.

EARLY LIFE AND EDUCATION

I was born in Madiun, where I received my primary and junior high school education. On graduation from senior high school (Algemene Middelbare School, AMS) in Yogyakarta, I enrolled in civil engineering at the School of Engineering (Technische Hogeschool, TH) in Bandung. However, not long afterwards the Japanese occupied Indonesia, and I and most other Indonesian students dropped out of the TH, reluctant to study at what had become a Japanese-sponsored institute.

Convinced that the Japanese occupation would only be temporary, we set up an informal study group to prepare ourselves for independence. The group included some former cadets from the Dutch Military Academy in Bandung, including Nasution. As most of us were engineering students, each prepared himself to be proficient in a particular field of engineering. Wiweko, who later became the director-general of the national airline company, Garuda Indonesia, decided to study the iron and steel industry. I chose to work on economic planning, an area I had become interested in after reading an article in a Dutch engineering journal about the Gosplan (central planning) in the Soviet Union. I knew nothing about economics at the time, but I had developed some ideas about this subject.

I had a very happy family life, although we were from a lower middle- class family. My father was a technician at the Office of Public Works in Madiun. Growing up in Madiun, I became aware of Dutch colonial rule at an early age, and of the existence of social differences between us and the Dutch. We were also aware of Sukarno and his campaign for freedom, and became nationalists even in our early teens. In fact, there was already an atmosphere of revolt at that time.

During the revolution I went to Yogyakarta to resume my engineering studies at a Technical Institute which was later to become the Faculty of Engineering of Gadjah Mada University. I had decided to switch from civil to mechanical engineering, but unfortunately there were no mechanical engineers on the faculty, so I was stalled in my study, while others, including Sadli, were able to graduate as civil engineers.