China rarely expressed concern about what happened to emigrants until the later years of the nineteenth century when the worst abuses of the coolie trade and foreign pressure led to the establishment of consulates. Up to then, it was widely assumed that only barbarians lived abroad. Internal migration was always an accepted policy expedient, to reduce population pressure or to sinicize frontier regions and thus defend borders. Individuals who went further afield were expendable: riff-raff and rebels — a negative opinion reconfirmed by the anti-dynastic movement in the first decade of this century, which also brought home the message that migrant communities might, in future, require much closer watching.

By that time, the Chinese Government had already come to appreciate grudgingly that wealth or experiences gained in the outside world might assist “self-strengthening”. In any case, the mistreatment of migrants and their eventual exclusion from North America and Australasia were galling admissions of the country's international impotence. But nothing else changed China's relationship with the so-called Overseas Chinese to the same extent as the 1911 Revolution and the rise of a strong sense of enthnocentric nationalism. Just as it is proper to criticize the “White Australia” policy, it is important to understand how — by linking culture and ethnicity with nationhood — Chinese migrants also built barriers of their own, particularly in Southeast Asia where the divide-and-rule policies of colonial governments likewise encouraged communalism.

Origins of Chinese Attitudes

An old riddle asks whether the original Great Wall of China was constructed to keep the Chinese in or the barbarians out. In reality, it did neither, for when China was strong, it expanded, annexing northern Korea and Vietnam as well as Tibet and the inner Asian frontier.

Responses from the thirty MNCs shortlisted for the detailed study indicated that labour supply and the training and development of manpower were critical factors in their investment decisions. All cited Singapore's superior work-force as one of their chief reasons for investing in Singapore. At the same time, however, they cited Singapore's shortage of labour, particularly at the operator level, as the reason why they had moved out some of their operations. Their main reason for choosing Malaysia and Thailand as the preferred new location was precisely the availability of a large pool of low-cost trainable workers.

Based on the responses from the thirty companies interviewed as well as additional research, this chapter reviews the labour supply situation in each of the three countries. It also covers the important but often neglected role of manpower training and development, particularly in technical disciplines. In addition, it surveys the quality of the work-force in each of the ASEAN-3 and their wages and benefits. The conclusions, presented at the end of the chapter, assess whether labour constitutes a competitive factor in the ASEAN-3, or whether the differences in labour resources have instead led to greater complementarity among them.

THE LABOUR SUPPLY SITUATION

Singapore

Following the strong recovery of the Singapore economy from the 1985/86 recession, companies have faced a tight labour market at all levels of the work-force — from production operators to post- graduate researchers. With a total work-force of only 1.25 million, demand for labour has outstripped supply, especially after the economy bounced back strongly from the 1.6 per cent decline in GDP in 1985 to 11 per cent growth in 1988.

The MNCs indicated that the most serious labour shortage in Singapore occurred at the operator level. Shortages at other levels exist but are not as critical.

Although Japan was admitted to the club of nations and regained its independence, the conclusion of the San Francisco peace treaty in 1951 did not fully settle the differences between Japan and its Asian neighbours. Most of the Southeast Asian nations withheld ratification of the peace treaty until the settlement of reparations, demanding across-the-board restitution of war losses. To restore friendly relations with them, therefore, Japan's positive action was of great necessity; hence war reparations, economic aid and trade.

During the 1950s, because it was difficult for Japan to rely on the China market Japanese policy-makers began to regard Southeast Asia as a raw materials supplier and a lucrative market for Japan's products. The region became the prime target for Japan's “economic diplomacy”, a policy initiated by Prime Minister Yoshida and carried out vigorously by successive administrations without due consideration of the voices of the Southeast Asian countries. Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi (1957–60) in particular finalized Japan's economic linkage with the region by resolving the reparations negotiations and, more importantly, by visiting the region in 1957 – the first prime minister to do so since World War II. Unlike Yoshida's enigmatic triangular relationship with strong U.S. support, or to put it bluntly “riding on the American Asian policy”, Kishi attempted to cultivate closer Japan”Southeast Asia relations with less dependence on Washington. To be sure, it was a successful re-entry, but not a smooth transition.

JAPAN's REPARATIONS POLICY AND SOUTHEAST ASIA

After acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration in August 1945, Japan was put under the control of the Allied Powers (or SCAP – Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers), which was led by General Douglas MacArthur until 11 April 1951 and by General Matthew Fidgway until 28 April 1952. Like other defeated countries, Japan invariably faced its reparations obligation, as the Potsdam Declaration stipulated: “Japan shall be permitted to maintain such industries as will sustain her economy and permit the exaction of just reparations in kind, but not those which would enable her to re-arm for war.