The 22 March 1992 election was held under the cover of military manipulation. In the first place, the election was promised by the military junta which seized power in a coup from Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan in 23 February 1991. Since the late 1970s the dominance of the military in politics has begun to decline and the influence of other social groups such as the business group has started to rise. The 1991 coup could be viewed as the military's attempt to seize back its power turf which was increasingly penetrated by the rise of business-oriented politicians, whom Chatichai represented. However, the military could no longer blatantly hold on to power without being democratic at least in form. Against this background, therefore, despite its pledge to have the March election, the military was — quite understandably — still concerned about its hold on political power. Subsequent events demonstrated this quite clearly.

The Pro-Military 1991 Constitution and Pro-Military Political Parties: The Military Reasserting in Politics

Prior to the March election, the military had invented various means to remain influential in politics. First of all, it planned to perpetuate its power through the writing of a new constitution. Clauses in the 1991 Constitution which enhanced the domination of the military included the following:

1. • the power of the military junta to appoint 270 senators for the Upper House;

2. • the appointed senators have as much power as elected members of the House of Representatives. The senators are allowed to vote in critical sessions, as when government decrees are up for approval. (The significance of this is that if decrees that are issued when Parliament is not in session are not eventually passed, the government has to resign.) Furthermore, senators are allowed to participate in a no-confidence motion;

3. • the president of the senate is automatically president of Parliament;

4. • a non-elected person can be appointed prime minister.

Question

At the beginning of your lecture you discussed the theme of global security to which, quite rightly, you gave a great deal of importance. You said that it was time to begin to move towards a system where force can be used multilaterally to maintain international peace and security. However, your comments regarding the Secretary-General of the United Nations suggest that you are not entirely in agreement with the UN's system of collective security. Is that the case, and do you have some other system in mind, which you could perhaps elaborate on?

Professor O'Neill

I am generally supportive of what Dr Boutros-Ghali is trying to do. I think the current situation centralizes his authority and the authority of those under him to an undesirable extent. I know from discussions with senior members of his staff in New York earlier this year just what a problem this is; with all of these things happening simultaneously in what we used to call Yugoslavia as well as Somalia, there is very little opportunity to think ahead. It is hard enough just to cope with the problems as they exist. To make the UN a really viable guarantor of world security, it has to think of itself more as the ultimate resort working closely through regional powers and regional linkages. And the way in which it is endeavouring to work with the European Community, in the case of Yugoslavia, is very helpful. This is a sign of things to come, and in this part of the world, obviously ASEAN is going to be very important. But it needs to be an ASEAN that looks out and wants to really solve the Cambodian problem, not an ASEAN that wants to push these sorts of things away.

When one looks at other parts of the world, particularly at Africa and the Middle East, one has to ask how can regional organizations that have any real strength be created. It is going to take a long time.

Introduction and purpose

This paper will make some observations and comments about the institutional mechanism for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in general, and the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) in particular, in the coming 10 to 15 years. The reader is asked for some understanding when the benefits from this exercise might not strike him/her as very great. The author, while having some knowledge about international organizations including ASEAN, is first of all a European Community (EC) specialist. The European Community is not exactly the right institutional example for ASEAN to follow: its much higher ambitions and supranational legal system make it inappropriate for a fruitful comparison (there are other reasons, as well). Nevertheless, there are interesting lessons or reminders for ASEAN in some of its institutional experience. I shall use them where appropriate.

The other reason for prudence is that the present author is an economist, not an institutional expert. Having had the great privilege of serving ASEAN as a member of the Group of Five (G-5), in the run-up to the Singapore summit, I shall draw from our report quite liberally. However, I shall go beyond it, too, in light of the new developments, especially AFTA.

The structure of the paper is as follows. Section II summarizes the G-5 proposals about the strengthening of the structure and mechanism of ASEAN, with special reference to the ASEAN Secretariat. This is followed by an overview of the institutional decisions of the Singapore summit.

With the basics of the institutional debate about ASEAN laid out, Section IV attempts to deepen it. It does this by addressing a critical paper of Chng Meng Kng in considerable detail and discussing at some length some of the decisions of the recent summit. Throughout Section IV, EC experiences are used whenever I thought they might be instructive. Section V takes a more distanced view and asks the more fundamental question of what “policy functions” ASEAN might be expected to fulfil in the 1990s. Eight policy functions are distinguished at four levels: national, intra-ASEAN, the dialogue partners level and global.

Most people seemed pleased with the results of the September election that has installed probably one of the most democratic governments in Thai political history. For the pro-democracy people, it was something they were fighting for during May. At least, some of their hopes have been fulfilled. But given the ups and downs in Thai politics, one important question remains: “How long will this euphoria last?”

When one looks at the present situation in Thailand, one gets the impression that things are developing very fast, like the growth of the various groups to check the government and politicians. But a similar phenomenon had also occurred before, after the student uprising against the military dictatorship in 1973. And that sort of growth in public awareness and democracy did not last very long then. It was interrupted by the coup in 1976 — an interval of hardly two years of democracy. One would then put some doubts about a sustenance of the present democratic euphoria. If the brief period of democratic overture between 1973 and 1976 was interrupted by the 1976 coup, and the “fully fledged” democracy of 1988-91 by the 1991 coup, why should another coup not interrupt the present democratic cycle? This is not wishful thinking, for while political institutions and politicians remain unstable and, to some extent, unprincipled, the military continues to be relatively united and strong.

To this, one can only be reasonably optimistic that things would be better than in the past. One could only say that although the military is still dominant in Thai politics, the dynamics that have taken place since the 1980s have been very well in place, particularly when these dynamics are also a response to changes in the world political economic order. A “new world order” in which there have been more calls for greater democracy and human rights protection also had a great impact on Thailand. Although there was a coup in 1991 and a military suppression in 1992, the result was a stronger democracy.

I agree with most of the issues that were discussed in Seiji Naya and Pearl Imada's paper. What I would like to do in the spirit of the Roundtable is to add a different dimension to the discussion by comparing the recent AFTA agreement with the proposed North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). I have two broad comments to make. The first is the fact that the proposed NAFTA is much more comprehensive, both in terms of scope of coverage as well as details of the scheme. Briefly, what is actually is covered in NAFTA are:

1. 1. Rules of origin, discussed by the paper.

2. 2. Schedule of tariff reductions. In NAFTA, it is stated that the tariff reductions for most goods would be phased down in five or 10 equal annual stages, and that 65 per cent of U.S. industrial and agricultural exports will be eligible for duty-free treatment in Mexico immediately or within five years. For AFTA, there is, as Pearl has mentioned, some ambiguity regarding the schedule of tariff reductions.

3. 3. NAFTA also includes discussions on sanitary and phytosanitary measures, technical standards, safeguards, countervailing duties and so on. These are still rather vague in AFTA.

4. 4. NAFTA opens up markets in terms of government procurement, cross-border trade and services, investments as well as intellectual property, where it is stated that the principle of national treatment will be upheld within the NAFTA countries. For example, the Mexican market for telecommunications will be opened up to American companies. This is incorporated in the concept of AFTA-plus that Seiji mentioned, but it is not really discussed in the AFTA agreement itself.

5. 5. Institutional arrangements. In NAFTA, a trade commission comprising ministers will be established, as well as a Secretariat to serve the Commission and other bodies to provide administrative and technical support.

In the 1960s and 1970s, Singapore was one of the very few Third World countries to welcome multinational corporations (MNCs) to set up business. The conventional wisdom at that time, as explained in a torrent of academic literature, was that MNCs represented the power and wealth of the rich nations, the First World. Their purpose in investing in Third World countries was to exploit them.

This attitude had two consequences. First, governments in Third World countries discouraged MNCs from direct investment. Next, they grouped themselves into international alliances to confront the rich countries. The most famous of these groups came into being under the auspices of the United Nations in UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development). The purpose of UNCTAD in time became no less than the establishment of a New International Economic Order (NIEO) in which rich countries would share their wealth with poor countries in a more just world order. NIEO did not take root.

In the meantime, Third World countries which welcomed MNC direct investment prospered. Singapore was the first country in Southeast Asia to adopt this policy in the manufacturing, financial and tourist industries. Soon, MNCs spread their operations to our neighbours, first Malaysia, then Thailand and later Indonesia. All these countries have benefited from MNC operations. There are indications that some Third World countries which previously opposed MNC direct investment are changing their minds. For example, Vietnam, once the most militarist and xenophobic country in Southeast Asia, has opened its doors to MNCs.

This study traces the operations of MNCs in Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand. The data collection in field studies was done by two officers of the Singapore Economic Development Board, Mr Tan Juay Miang and Mr Suresh Natarajan. Their write-up was reviewed and edited by Mr Patrick Daniel.

Despite the rapid growth of Japan's economic role and influence, the exact shape of future economic, political and security relationships in Asia and the Western Pacific remains uncertain. Conflicting and incomplete data appear to support three different scenarios for Japan's role, and for the structure of regional economic, political and military ties during the next decade. These scenarios parallel, to a certain extent, other efforts at scenario building, but differ in their degree of emphasis on economics as the driving factor, and their focus on Asia and the Western side of the Pacific, rather than the Pacific rim.

Three possible alternative futures are discussed below, along with the conditions that would tend to favour their development. Other possibilities certainly could be imagined, but these are intended to be representative of the broad alternative futures that could follow from Japan's growing economic role and influence in the region.

Assumptions and variables

All of the scenarios involve a mix of factors, including actions by Japan and the United States and exogenous factors such as the prevailing global political and economic situation. An important underlying premise in all of the scenarios is that the current widespread perception of a reduced military threat from the former U.S.S.R. will continue into the foreseeable future and that Russia will remain for a long time a relatively negligible economic actor in Asia. The possibility of a JapanRussian rapprochement is within the parameters of the scenarios.

Due to its presently clouded political future, China is treated generally as a constant even though it has the potential to make an important difference in the nature of intra-regional economic ties and the regional power balance. Under different assumptions, China has the potential to be (1) a quiet backwater with modest impact on economic and political patterns, as at present; (2) a dynamic new low cost producer and expanding market; or (3) a highly negative disrupter of regional stability.

Introduction

On 27–28 January 1992, Heads of State of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) met in Singapore for the Fourth ASEAN Summit and agreed to the creation of an ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) in 15 years. After more than 20 years of slow progress in ASEAN economic co-operation, the commitment to create AFTA is a tremendous step forward. The ASEAN Preferential Trading Arrangements (PTA), which has thus far been the main vehicle for its trade co-operation efforts, has contributed little to the promotion of intra-ASEAN exports. Likewise, its industrial co-operation programmes have had limited success.

Yet, the gradual process of moving toward substantial economic co-operation can be seen as a blessing in disguise. The slow pace of ASEAN economic co-operation in the past was necessary because of the large divergences in the trade policy regimes and levels of economic development of the member countries. ASEAN was wise to have methodically and gradually built up the integration environment, institutions, and channels of communication upon which future co-operation can flourish. A more rapid attempt at integration may have led ASEAN to the fate of most other Less Developed Countries' (LDCs) efforts: abandonment. For example, the Latin American Free Trade Area (LAFTA) abandoned their grandiose scheme of economic integration in favour of a slower pace similar to the early years of ASEAN co-operation. Market reforms and trade liberalization in the more inward-looking countries have reduced the disparities and allowed ASEAN to move forward more rapidly. To a large degree, the present commitment by ASEAN governments to form an ASEAN free trade area is now possible with the unilateral tariff reductions in the ASEAN countries, especially Indonesia and Thailand.

Although AFTA represents a clear determination to transcend past forms of economic co-operation, the lack of success of previous ASEAN economic agreements has led to scepticism about AFTA and doubts as to whether the vision can be turned into reality.

Women's participation in all spheres of human activities is neither a recent phenomenon nor does it exclusively happen through formal women's organizations. The significance and the extent of women's participation at home and in communities have often been overlooked in historical and sociological analyses. In Thailand, women have traditionally participated in social and cultural events, and they have demonstrated their political acumen during several social crises.

This chapter traces the historical growth of women's participation and their efforts to form organizations in Thai society. Part 1 elaborates on the natural growth of women's collective action not planned by a specific agency but shaped by historical, informal social ties and cultural institutions (March and Taqqu 1986). Part 2 contrasts this to the recent (post World War II) phase of planned development, when it was planned and implemented from outside by the government. And finally, Part 3 introduces some selected efforts of nongovernmental organizations which assist and encourage disadvantaged women to organize for self-help.

Part 1 Historical Growth of Women's Organizations

For convenience, we will discuss the evolution of women's organizations in three periods: before 1932, from 1932 to the 1960s, and the 1960s to the 1980s. The first period was under the absolute monarchy, when women participated in social functions mainly through informal family and friends’ connections (the primary groupings) and occasionally in an organized form. The second period was mostly under the nationalist campaign of military-led democracy, when the upper- and the upper-middle class women started to formally organize themselves and moved toward the secondary groupings beyond their family circles.

Moonlaniti Phuying, or the Foundation for Women (FFW), is the youngest among the five selected non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Its origin can be traced back to one of its first projects, the Women's Information Centre (WIC), which began in 1984 as an autonomous project operated initially from the borrowed premises of the Friends of Women (FOW). After one year, WIC rented an office for itself, and became an independent organization. Initially, the aim of WIC was to provide advice and counselling to women in the service sector and to those seeking ways to go abroad hoping to find a “better life” there. Two years later, the group expanded its activities to running a shelter for battered wives, preparing teaching modules for women in disadvantaged sectors, and carrying out research work. To put all these projects under one umbrella, the Foundation for Women (FFW) was registered in 1987. The WIC remains one of the main sub-divisions of FFW and is beginning to be known for its analytical strength, publications and critical independence.

Historical Evolution

The key person of FFW and WIC is Siriporn Skrobanek, a committed social worker and an activist scholar. Before forming WIC, Siriporn was one of the founders of FOW and also the Director of a separate project for children, called Baan Tarn Tawan (Sunflower Home), which continues to act as a rehabilitation home for malnourished babies, and provides aid to children and their mothers. Between 1981 to 1983, Siriporn left FOW to pursue a Master's Degree in Women's Studies at the Institute of Social Studies at The Hague. While doing her research on Transnational Sex-Exploitation of Thai Women, she interviewed a number of Thai prostitutes in West Germany, and acquired a better understanding of the dynamics of prostitution there. She felt compelled to share this knowledge with, and to assist, other Thai women, especially those wishing to seek their fortunes abroad. This sense of compulsion arose from Siriporn's own experiences in Germany about the prejudiced opinion of generalizing all Thai women as prostitutes, and the shocking knowledge of how badly Thai prostitutes were being treated.