Would America turn inwards again, as it had after the First World War? That was the great question of the immediate post-War years, at least for Europeans, and it was underlined by some of President Truman's early actions. The question was to be answered clearly in the negative. Within five years the United States had taken on the leadership of an alliance that included most of Western Europe, and was soon to be extended in effect to the Western Pacific. This came about largely because the Soviet Union insisted on having complete control of Eastern Europe, while the United States insisted that governments must be freely elected. Differences over Germany and Eastern Europe quickly broke up the wartime coalition and started the Cold War. But Asia played a part in the process too. The victory of the Chinese Communists over the Nationalists, coinciding as it did with Soviet acquisition of atomic weapons, turned growing concern about Communism in America into widespread fear, verging at times on hysteria. The charge that the Democrats had ‘lost’ China made it necessary for Truman to defend South Korea when it was attacked by the Communist North, and bring Asia to the centre of the Cold War.

The defeat of Germany and Japan left America by far the most powerful country in the world. The war effort had mobilised resources that had not been fully used during the 1930s, and had increased production by 50 per cent. The American share of total world production had risen from the quarter to a third. This feat had been achieved while five million men were under arms, a large proportion of them deployed overseas. Britain had played a critical part in the early stages of the war, but it was largely American armies that had completed the defeat of Germany, just as it was the American navy and air force that completed the defeat of Japan. With the cooperation of Britain and other allies, the United States had made two atomic bombs, which it used to obviate an invasion of Japan.

The treatment of Asians in the United States has been discussed a good deal, but not much in the context of America's relations with the countries they came from. When it is, the point that is often made is that relations with the home country have influenced attitudes towards Asian immigrants in America. It is not always acknowledged that the converse is also true — reactions to Asians in the United States have influenced American views of the countries they came from. That is not surprising: until recently, most Americans have had direct contact with Asia mainly through Asians living in the United States. The latest example of the influence of such contacts was the American reaction to the Tiananmen incident; but that is only the most recent in a history that goes back to the middle of the 19th century. And that in turn is part of the history of Asian migration, which goes back much further.

East Asia has long been a source of migration. The Americas were originally peopled from there, as was the South Pacific. The Chinese Empire was opposed to emigration: why should people who lived in the most civilised part of the world want to leave? But official disapproval did not always prevent Chinese from going overseas. As early as the 1st century BC, trade with Southeast Asia was leading to the establishment of Chinese communities in that area. They thrived on the positive attitude taken by the Tang and Sung dynasties towards contacts with the outside world, and suffered from the Ming reaction against foreign influence. Cheng Ho's naval expeditions early in the Ming period may have helped them, but they soon lost whatever they had gained in protection and prestige. When the Ming Emperor stopped the expeditions, he also forbade Chinese to go overseas without licences. Peking was still willing to receive tribute from rulers enlightened enough to offer it, and to respond generously in kind; but the Emperor did not usually accept responsibility for those who entered into this tributary relationship.

The Vietnam war was a critical episode in America's relations with Asia: perhaps it was the critical point, so far. There are at least three specific reasons for this judgement.

1. — The war was the culmination of the effort the United States had been making, ever since the Second World War, to stop the expansion of Communism in Asia.

2. — The ultimate withdrawal of American troops and aid demonstrated that there were limits to the price that Americans were prepared to pay to achieve this goal.

3. — The outpouring of American resources during the war made possible the fast economic growth that took place in Southeast as well as East Asia in the sixties, and ensured that Communism did not spread beyond Indochina.

The Domino Theory, as expounded by Eisehower and Dulles in the fifties, was not borne out by the event, but that was at least partly because of the effort made by the United States in Vietnam. In Asia, as in Europe, America succeeded in containing Communism. But in the process it lost its own unity.

The United States first became involved in Vietnam — or French Indochina, as it was then — near the end of the Second World War, when it was looking for help against Japan. Franklin Roosevelt was sympathetic to anti-colonial movements, and did not discourage the Office of Strategic Services from making contact with the Vietnamese resistance led by Ho Chi Minh. Ho was a long-time Communist, who had been sent out by Moscow in 1925 to organise the movement against the French, and the Japanese with whom they were collaborating. He got on well with the OSS people who worked with him: he professed an admiration for George Washington, as did Mao. But the relationship did not long survive the circumstances that gave rise to it. When Japan collapsed in 1945, the British helped the French to return to Indochina, and begin re-establishing their Empire.

The thirteen former British colonies in North America emerged from their war of independence weak in all but spirit. The war had impoverished them: it had actually ruined some of those who had initiated the revolution. The colonies were not fully united: the confederation that had been cobbled together to fight the British was loose, and not likely to make the new nation strong enough to stand on its own feet. America was still isolated — 3,000 miles from Europe, at the outer edge of the civilised world, alienated from Britain but not close to the shaky French monarchy. To offset these disadvantages Americans had some leaders of extraordinary political vision and skill — Washington and Franklin in the older generation, Jefferson, Hamilton, Madison, and Monroe among their juniors. Morale was high: they had succeeded in winning their independence from Britain, the most powerful country in Europe. Above all, Americans had vitality — ambition, imagination, drive. And not only their leaders. Breaking in a new land had given them a self-reliance and resilience that would stand them in good stead when they went out into the world. Their self-reliance owed more than a little to a Calvinist religious background, which gave them confidence in themselves, and in the righteousness of their causes.

One result of achieving independence was that Americans were freed from the restrictions imposed on them by Britain's Navigation Acts, which had played their part in causing the revolution. By the same token, Americans now lost the benefits of the British system of trade protection, such as they were. American ships were excluded from the West Indies, which had provided a large part of their trade before the war. New England was particularly hard hit, as it depended heavily on sea-borne trade. Its merchants and seafarers had to find new sources of income quickly. But it was their rivals in New York who first found a way As soon as the war was over, a group of merchants there got together and built a ship to send to China.

The collapse of the Soviet Union completed the latest of the periodic swings in American attitudes towards China. Freed from the Soviet threat, Americans felt less need of Asian allies. The United States could now afford to pursue its own interests, political and economic. Americans could go back to using China for domestic political purposes. And China could not do much about it, because economically it had become dependent upon America. The collapse of the Soviet Union worried Chinese leaders too. They saw that China would now have to bear the brunt of the American crusade for human rights and democracy. They knew that, to keep up a high rate of growth, China had to have access to the American market and American technology. But they also knew that the United States needed China's expanding market. This reinforced their national pride, and encouraged them to stand up to American pressure, on economic issues as well as on Taiwan.

The Tiananmen incident had aroused widespread public indignation in America, and reversed the growth of a more friendly attitude towards China. It also led to a demand for sanctions against China. This was voiced loudly by some of the Chinese who were in America studying: the cry was taken up by the media, and by American politicians, of both parties. President Bush felt obliged to respond. On 5 June 1989, he suspended military sales to, and military exchanges with China. After Teng had publicly endorsed the actions taken by the army in Tianamen Square, Bush announced a second set of sanctions, including the suspension of lending to China by international institutions, and of official exchanges at Cabinet level. The United States also encouraged its allies to follow suit: at the economic summit in Paris in July, even Japan agreed to suspend economic aid to China. At the same time, the President warned against an ‘emotional response’ to events in Peking, on the ground that disproportionate sanctions might lead to a total break in relations, and cause further hardship to the Chinese people. Having tried unsuccessfully to speak to Teng by telephone.

In the past half-century or so, the United States has done a great deal for East Asia. By supplying ideas, money and markets, it has played a critical part in the transformation of that region from one of the poorest in the world to one of the most dynamic and prosperous. Freed from the threat of Soviet attack, the United States is now attempting something more. It is trying to give Asians the benefits of human rights and democracy. At the same time, it is trying to reduce its bilateral trade deficits with Asian countries by pressing them to open their markets. It hopes to achieve these goals peacefully. President Clinton says he wants an Asia-Pacific region that is ‘united, not divided’ (International Herald Tribune, 22 Nov 93). Yet he has put heavy pressure on a number of Asian governments, including both China and Japan. He supports the liberalisation of international trade, and succeeded in bringing the Uruguay Round to a successful conclusion. But he is using unilateral measures to force Asian countries to buy more from America. Are these policies calculated to bring about an Asia-Pacific that is ‘united, not divided’? Or are they more likely to bring the United States into confrontation with Asian countries, perhaps even into conflict?

The United States is reasserting its strength. A few years ago it looked as if America's power was beginning to decline. Like other great powers in the past, the United States had devoted so much of its resources and energies to defence that it had weakened its own economy and was in danger of losing its leadership of the world economy. In the mid-90s, that danger seems to have receded. America's productivity, which has always been higher than that of Germany or Japan, is now rising faster than theirs too. The American economy is growing at a rate of about three per cent a year. Unemployment has come down, as growth has created new jobs. Inflation is low; the Federal Reserve raised interest rates in time to prevent overheating. America's prosperity is highlighted by the stagnation of the Japanese economy.

Devastation and defeat, with the humiliation and hardships they involved, turned the Japanese against militarism, and the kind of regionalism that had gone with it. Their eyes moved again to the West, and particularly to America. Economic achievement presented itself as the only remaining way to catch up: the sort of effort that had gone into fighting the war was now devoted to rebuilding and developing the economy. The war in Korea provided the opportunity. It dramatised America's need for Japan's support in containing Communism, and sharply increased the demand for Japan's products. The economy began to grow fast, by exporting industrial products while restraining consumption at home. Dependence on America bred resentment, which led to riots in 1960, and the cancellation of a visit by President Eisenhower. But the Security Treaty was renewed, and came to be accepted as an essential part of the relationship with the United States. As Japanese goods penetrated the American market, protectionist pressures rose. The return of Okinawa failed to secure Japanese agreement to restrain textile exports, until President Nixon went to China, and then threatened to take unilateral action against Japan. The Japanese were harder hit by the Arab oil embargo. By exercising severe self-discipline they recovered quickly, and began to switch from heavy industries to those that were ‘knowledge-intensive’. By the 80s Japanese cars and computers were capturing American markets, and the United States' trade deficit with Japan was growing Public criticism of Japan was growing too: by 1989 it was seen as a bigger threat than the Soviet Union.

When the Peace Treaty restored Japan's formal independence in 1952, economic recovery was just getting under way The Dodge Mission had prepared the ground, by reducing inflation and increasing incentives, and the Korean War had stimulated demand, both internally and externally Production was growing, though it did not reach prewar levels until 1955 Even when American aid was no longer required, Japan continued to depend on the United States, for markets and for technology.

Japan was no longer alone in presenting America with an economic challenge. During the 60s and 70s two other Asian countries, South Korea and Taiwan, and two virtual city-states, Hong Kong and Singapore, followed the path Japan had taken — the path of export-led growth — and made rapid progress. They did not all do it the same way — each took its own course — but the four had a good deal in common with one another, and with Japan. All were small, at least by comparison with China, and none was well endowed with natural resources. All were close to China, but separate from it, and distinct in character. Each felt that it was under threat: the sense of insecurity enabled strong leaders to evoke great efforts, and great sacrifices, from their peoples. And all enjoyed strong American support. At least until 1970, they were seen as the front line in the struggle to contain Communism in Asia, and the United States helped them with ideas, money, and markets. Exporting manufactured products to America enabled them to achieve high rates of growth, and higher living standards for their peoples. It also made them dependent on the United States, and vulnerable to American protectionism. In the 80s growing trade deficits led the United States to press the Lesser Dragons, as they were sometimes called, to open up their markets to American exporters. All four were finding new opportunities in China, and getting more deeply involved there, but they still saw themselves more as competitors than as partners. American pressure was beginning to create a sense of common interest, while Japanese investment, and that of the Overseas Chinese was knitting their economies together. But regionalism had little attraction for the Lesser Dragons as long as the American market remained open.

South Korea

The war of 1950–53 left South Korea devastated and impoverished. Syngman Rhee was still in power, with the slogan ‘March North’. The United States entered into a security treaty with the Republic of Korea soon after the armistice, but the Senate made clear that it would come into effect only in the event of ‘external armed attack’.

Fighting broke out in Korea, when armed forces from the North invaded the South in June 1950. Once again, the United States was caught by surprise, but reacted promptly and forcefully. Americans found themselves stuck in another long and bloody war, this time without much hope of victory. Frustration embittered them, and deepened the hostility between the United States and China. But the war stimulated a great outpouring of American resources to those Asian countries that resisted Communism, and thus laid the foundation for fast economic growth in the region.

Until the war, American policy towards Korea had not been entirely consistent. Roosevelt favored international trusteeship, as he did for other colonies, and Stalin accepted the idea at Teheran in 1944. But as the atomic bomb was developed it became less important to get the Russians into the war with Japan, and Washington had growing doubts about a Soviet occupation of Korea. The United States had concentrated on Japan itself, and when the Japanese capitulated it had no troops in the peninsula. But it proposed that responsibility for the occupation of Korea be shared, with the Russians confining themselves to the area north of the 38th parallel. The Russians agreed, perhaps in the hope of getting a similar arrangement for Japan — though this was never a real possibility. Washington did not quickly give up the goal of cooperating with Moscow on Korea. The idea of trusteeship was reaffirmed by Byrnes and Molotov at their meeting in Moscow in December 1945. But the general MacArthur put in charge of the American zone of occupation, Hodge, was determined from the outset to keep it out of Communist hands. He encouraged the more conservative Koreans, of whom the veteran nationalist Syngman Rhee made himself leader, to stand up to the left-wingers, who were initially stronger Rhee increased his popularity by opposing trusteeship, and demanding early independence.

China was not dismembered by foreign powers: it merely disintegrated. Japan tried to take advantage of the collapse to establish its own ascendancy, but it ran into growing resistance, first from Chinese nationalism, and later from the United States. America refused to accept Japan's expansion at the expense of China. Its economic sanctions eventually led to war — the first war between America and an Asian power. America won, at some cost to itself, and more to others. Much of Asia was devastated. America tried to remake Japan in its own image, with partial success. But the stage was set for a Communist take-over in China.

Under the Manchu, provincial leaders had put down the Taiping and Nien rebellions, and had taken the initiative in modernizing the armed forces and the economy. In the process they took control over their own resources, and most of the Emperor's as well. After the dynasty was overthrown, one of them, Yuan Shihkai, became President of the new Republic. He quickly disposed of the parliament that had just been elected, and outlawed Sun Yatsen's Nationalist Party. But without the mystique of the Empire Yuan could not establish his authority over other provincial leaders, even when he had foreign support. And when he made himself emperor, he lost much of what support he had. After he died in 1916, another northern general became President: he tried to strengthen his position by helping Britain and France in their war with Germany. But he in turn was ousted, by a general still loyal to the Manchu, who put the boy Emperor Pu Yi back on the throne — until yet another general pushed him off again The parade went on. The forms of a national government were preserved: there was always a President recognized by the foreign powers. But Peking had lost what was left of its moral authority Provincial leaders, generals, and local strong men became a law unto themselves, and struggled for power. Without losing its nominal unity, China crumbled into a congeries of petty fiefdoms, often warring among themselves. Warlords ruled the land for the next decade.

Nixon and Kissinger had established a direct relationship with Mao and Chou, and had ended the 20-year confrontation between the United States and China. The Chinese leaders accepted the change because they were afraid of a Soviet attack on China and wanted American support. But the Americans also wanted better relations with the Russians: Nixon and Kissinger would not adopt the hard anti-Soviet line taken by the Chinese. Relations between Washington and Peking were not fully normalised until the Soviet-American Detente had broken down. Reagan's concern for Taiwan interrupted their development, but his crusade against what he called ‘the Evil Empire’ brought the two countries into line, until Gorbachev came to power in Moscow.

Trade and cultural relations between America and China grew rapidly in the mid-80s, when China was seen by some Americans to be ‘going capitalist’, but the new ties created new tensions. So did growing American concern about human rights. As the Soviet threat faded, these issues loomed larger, but American public attitudes towards China went on improving until 1989. The Tiananmen incident reversed the trend of the last twenty years, and opened another round of confrontation. It became clearer in retrospect that the American-Chinese partnership had been based on hostility to the Soviet Union: it was essentially an anti-Soviet coalition.

During the 60s China had kept its distance from both the Superpowers: it was equally hostile to the Soviet Union and the United States. Mao clearly did not want to depend on any foreign power. But he defeated his own purpose by launching the Cultural Revolution. That convulsion aroused Russian fears, and hopes, and led to the build-up of Soviet forces along the Chinese border. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia made Mao realize that those forces might be used against him, and he needed American support to avert the danger. By pushing radicalism so far, Mao had made himself dependent on the United States, and lost his freedom of action, even in internal affairs.

Is Asia on the way to becoming a trading bloc? The question is asked, sometimes anxiously, especially by those who are themselves involved in trading blocs. Some see it as inevitable that Asia will follow the course that was set by Europe and is now being explored by America. Others still hope to avoid a division of the world into three contending blocs, with the loss of opportunities for growth which that implies. Others again fear that the less competitive economies of Europe and North America may form a defensive alliance against the more competitive ones in Asia, and the East- West struggle may be revived in a different form. What are the prospects? Which way are Asian countries heading? And what is most likely to determine their future course?

During the last decade or so, regionalism has regained momentum in the West. After slowing down in the 70s, the European integration movement revived in the 80s, under the leadership of France and Germany. The Single European Act set the direction, and laid the legal foundation for a further round of integration, extending from the economic into the political field. All internal barriers to trade were to be removed by 1993 so as to create a Single European Market. This was to be followed by the introduction of a Single European Currency, after the creation of a European Union. These plans were not fully realized. The reunification of Germany, and the reluctance of German tax-payers to meet the cost, led to heavy Government borrowing, which pushed up interest rates and the value of the D-mark. This severely disrupted the Exchange Rate Mechanism, and drove Britain out of it. Some Germans had second thoughts about a Single European Currency over which the Bundesbank would have less control than it had over the D-mark. Economic integration was proving as difficult to achieve as ever. Internal barriers to trade still existed, and the goal of a single currency was receding into the future.

The relationship between America and East Asia is attracting attention all round the world: its future is one of the great issues of our time. The purpose of this book is to put it in a historical perspective — to see how the relationship has developed, and where it seems to be leading. It is based on a belief in the relevance of history — which is, after all, only an attempt to understand human experience in the past. If we cannot leam from experience, we may find ourselves repeating it.

In the past half century East Asia has been transformed, from one of the poorest and most turbulent parts of the world into one of the most rapidly developing, and one of the more peaceful. America has played a critical part in this transformation, by providing ideas, money and markets, as well as security. Now the terms of the relationship are changing. Asian countries are competing vigorously with America in the economic field. Their fast growth has given them the confidence to assert themselves, and to uphold the virtues of their own heritage Attempts by the United States to bring them into line with its own values and interests have provoked resistance. They have generated tension with one Asian country after another, and made them more conscious of what they have in common. Rancour and hostility have come to qualify relationships that were formerly characterised mainly by goodwill, or at least tolerance. America remains confident that the deep divisions within Asia will ensure continued need for America's military presence. That confidence may not always be as well founded as it has been in the past.

This book sets out to trace the evolution of America's relations with East Asia, and to see where past expenence has a bearing on present problems. It takes a long view: the aim is to set the present in the context of the past, and not just the recent past.