The value of marriage and motherhood in the list of life goals among women appears to remain high in many countries (Poston and Trent, 1982; Polit, 1982). It is usually argued that such values need no demonstration in Asian, Latin American or African traditional cultures, but that it is the exposure to Western or “modern” values that undermines the importance of marriage and motherhood. Yet, contrary to popular notions, women in Western cultures are not necessarily inclined to shun marriage and motherhood. In her study, Mothers in Transition, Eakins reports that “there is an overwhelming mandate in the United States for women to become mothers regardless of trends in technology” (1983: 69). Reviewing studies on the subject, she found that “even childless women perceive children to be an essential component of marriage”, and for most American women it is evident that “motherhood has accompanied wifehood and vice versa”; therefore, on the issue of having children, “the only choices involved had to do with timing” (1963: 61-63).

These findings are confirmed by Thornton and Freedman (1983: 16) who, based on their analysis of population figures in the United states, declared that “Although parenthood has become more optional, there is no evidence of an embracement of childlessness. Substantial proportions of Americans continue to value parenthood, believe that childbearing should accompany marriage, and feel social pressure to have children”. In another study, Thornton and Freeman report that “marriage continues to be valued by the majority of young Americans.…More than 90 per cent expect to marry and there has been almost no decline in that proportion since 1960” although marriage appears to be more important for young women than young men (1986: 30).

International data on marriage and childbearing testify that both marriage and parenthood are very important goals in the life of the adult person in modern societies.

All six ASEAN countries have exhibited, to varying extents and over different time periods, high rates of economic growth during the last two and a half decades. With the exception of Brunei which only a year ago gained political independence and became a member of the regional grouping, the ASEAN countries launched their respective industrialization programmes during the early to mid-1960s to propel economic growth, restructure national economies, expand employment, and eventually raise the level of living.

In launching their industrialization programmes, the ASEAN countries adopted liberal economic policies, opening their doors to private foreign investors to accelerate the inflows of capital, technology and management know-how and to have access to far bigger and expanding markets overseas, particularly in the industrial countries. For various reasons, investors in the United States, the European Community and Japan found the ASEAN region quite attractive and expanded their manufacturing operations there.

To accelerate foreign investment and technology inflows, various incentive schemes were installed by the governments of the region, in addition to their sustained efforts to maintain political stability and attractive economic climates. Corporate income taxes were exempted for a period of five years or more and import-duty reductions/exemptions were introduced when pioneer/promoted firms were purchasing plant, machinery, equipment, or industrial materials from overseas. Low-interest loans were also provided by governmental or semigovernmental financial institutions to enable those firms to be more productive and competitive on the market. Additional incentives were later brought in to encourage greater inflows of foreign manufacturing investments and technologies and to promote R&D activities which were considered essential to their further industrialization.

Partly due to the relative factor endowments and partly to the import-substitution strategy of the ASEAN governments, manufacturing investments in the early phase of their industrialization programmes, both domestic and foreign, were mainly in the consumer goods sector, catering to the needs of the middle-to upper-income population.

The analysis of the process of technology transfer must be done within the larger context of a particular country's economic development. Given the pervasive economic interdependency between countries at different stages of development, attention must be directed to the impact of these evolving relationships on the process of technology transfer. In this study, therefore, the process of technology transfer is discussed as a key aspect of the process of industrialization, which is now developing rapidly in ASEAN, and also, within the larger context of growing interdependence between ASEAN and Japan.

Past Trends and Patterns

In recent history, the ASEAN region has stood out as a centre of economic growth. From 1971–82, the five original member countries experienced average rates of real GDP (gross domestic product) growth ranging from 5.7 to 9.0 per cent, an outstanding record by any comparison with the developed countries during the same period (Table 1).

The average growth rates of the industrial sector in the ASEAN countries during the period 1971–82 were even higher, ranging from 7.6 to 11.9 per cent (Table 2). From 1975 to 1980, the share of industry in the GDP of ASEAN also increased dramatically (Table 3). This indicated the substantial contribution of industry, particularly manufacturing, to the overall progress of the ASEAN economies. It should also be noted that these advancements were achieved in spite of the instability in the world economy during this period, brought about by such events as the oil price increases in 1973–74 and in 1979–80 and the recession that followed in many industrialized countries.

The economic performance of the region was truly remarkable in view of the marked differences in the culture, endowments, characteristics, and industrial policies of the five countries. Singapore and Indonesia stand in extreme contrast to each other. One possesses a small, relatively skilled population with few natural resources. The other is equipped with vast natural resources, a large domestic market, and an agriculture-based population. Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand are between the two extremes, with strong dependence on exports of primary commodities but respectable efforts at developing light manufacturing industries.

Introduction

There has been much speculation that Thailand's economic structure and performance appear to be entering a transitional period. After a lapse of two years in 1982 and 1983, the Thai economy has recovered and performed well with a steady growth of 5-6 per cent per annum. The growth rate may pale in comparison with that of South Korea or Taiwan where double-digit growth rates are the norm, but within ASEAN, this growth rate is relatively high.

While Thailand's economic performance is noteworthy, its economic structure is not without problems. Production structure has in general tilted towards manufactured activities, but the industrial base remains weak. Light manufactured goods are produced in an increasing number, but local content has not improved. All this points to active production of finished products at the final stage. There appears to be a need to develop activities in the intermediate stage to broaden the base. The incentive system (expressed in terms of effective exchange rate) has improved in many ways. Policies on fiscal and monetary matters have been rationalized, and an appropriate exchange rate policy has been pursued. An export promotion regime has been adopted by the government, consistent with the export-led growth strategy of the country's development plans.

The strong export performance of Thailand in the last few years has benefited the economy in general, but there are still many who will question the wisdom of export orientation and who think that exports will soon reach a saturation point when all LDCs join the export bandwagon. However, as Bhagwati (1986) has pointed out, even if all LDCs are committed to exports, their overall share in the global trade is so insignificant that it is highly unlikely to have saturation of export markets.

The trading environment has turned sour with increasing incidents of tariff and non-tariff problems.

If N 1978, a study team led by Dr Goh Keng Swee (then A. Deputy Prime Minister) was appointed by the Prime Minister to study problems in the Ministry of Education, Singapore. The report submitted by the study team (often referred to as the Goh Report) analysed the weaknesses of the education system and recommended many major changes to it. These changes, particularly those related to the introduction of streaming, were controversial at the time and attracted much public debate. The education structure arising from the implementation of the Report's recommendations is usually referred to as the New Education System (NES).

Education and national development are closely related. Indeed, for many countries as for Singapore, social and economic changes often bring about substantial changes to the education system. To provide a better understanding of the impact of social and economic changes on the Singapore education system, this monograph first presents a brief history of the development of education in Singapore up to the release of the Goh Report. Bearing in mind that it was the perceived failure of the education system to meet the rapidly changing social and economic needs of the country that prompted its review, the problems facing the education system at the time are then discussed. This is followed by a description of the new education structure based on streaming according to ability, and the rationale for it. How the NES was actually implemented is discussed in Chapter 5. Public reaction to streaming and some of the subsequent refinements to the NES are outlined. The final chapters assess the impact of the NES in terms of the objectives spelt out for it in the Goh Report, concluding with a discussion of the possible future direction of the education system.

In an increasingly interdependent world, where major economic problems and their solutions interrelate with growing complexity and intensity, the economic fortunes and political stability of countries are becoming more and more intertwined. We are thus confronted with an ever-increasing globalization of dangers and challenges which call for domestic policies that transcend the parochial or even national items. Whether we like it or not, more and more of our problems will require a global solution.

Global interdependence is not new to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. It has been one of the key features of its economic policy and of its external relations. The external orientation of ASEAN countries in general has earned for them growth rates which have been well above world averages since the late 1960s. This achievement, however, could hardly have taken place without OECD participation. The OECD countries, particularly the United States and Japan, have been a major source of foreign capital, technology, and trade for ASEAN countries.

Indeed, the future growth of ASEAN will hinge upon the nature of structural change and adjustment that occurs in the OECD and the Asian NICs. Changes in the international division of labour in accordance with shifting comparative advantages calls for structural adjustment in die developed economies, which would enable industries to be relocated and trade to be restructured.

Nature of Structural Adjustment

Structural adjustment — i.e., the shifting of factors of production to different uses in response to changes in technology, consumer preferences, and international competitiveness — is not just a principle for trade policy; it is an inevitable and necessary part of the process of economic growth. It may, however, be made more urgent as a result of external shocks or inappropriate domestic policies.

Growth has caused ASEAN's internal domestic market to rise 3.1 times in real terms during the past two decades. ASEAN's investment in real terms has expanded 6.3 times within a 20-year period as machinery and equipment had to be set in place and buildings had to be put up.

The Coming of Strong States in the Third World

Within Marxist theory, the phenomenon of a relatively independent authoritarian state actively engaged in capitalist development has been something unexpected. The classic Marxist analysis of the state held that the state was only the manager who looked after the interests of the bourgeoisie. The bourgeoisie or the private capitalist was always the key factor examined in these attempts to explain social processes in a capitalist social formation. How the bourgeoisie appropriates the surplus value and by what means were regarded as crucial variables. The state is only, more or less, the dependent variable of this social process. This view has given birth to a debate among Marxist social scientists. Skocpol, in her critical comments, has pointed out “the enduring sociological proclivity to absorb the state into the society” in Marxist theory of the state (1979, p. 28).

However, there has been an evolution of this classic Marxist theory. Marx himself started this evolution. In his concept of the Bonapartist state, he talked about a relatively autonomous state which acted against the immediate interests of the existing bourgeoisie. The state then emerged above the existing social classes. This is explained in terms of the strong demands of labour against the still weak bourgeoisie. Confronting labour's demands might have meant destroying the whole capitalist system. To save the system, the state was “forced” to act autonomously against the bourgeoisie. The Bonapartist state was, therefore, a relatively autonomous state vis-à-vis the capitalist class, which came forward to assure the long-term survival of the system. It was not a passive tool of the bourgeoisie.

The autonomous state has received little attention in neo-Marxist de-pendency theories, especially the early ones. The most important factor, according to these theories, is the bourgeoisie, in both the core and peripheral countries. Direct foreign investment, foreign aid and unequal exchange in international trade have been focused on by the dependency theorists in their attempts to understand the development of underdevelopment in the periphery. The state was seen always to act on the bourgeoisie's behalf. (See Baran 1968; and Frank 1967).

The research studies focused on the problem of identifying effective mechanisms for raising the levels of technology transfer and skills development in the ASEAN countries. This concern stemmed from the recognition that technology is a key factor in national development efforts, both in the West and in the East, and that sustained technological advancement is urgently needed in order for national economies to industrialize, and more broadly, to modernize.

Except for Singapore, all the other ASEAN nations are basically agricultural countries, relying in the main on the export of primary commodities for the earning of foreign exchange. However, given the fluctuating international demand for primary commodities, these countries have all embarked upon industrialization programmes with a view to reduce dependence on primary exports, and to increase income and employment opportunities of their expanding labour force.

Beginning from the early 1970s, the industrialization process in the whole of ASEAN was given a major boost when many multinational electronics firms decided to locate their offshore assembly operations in this region. Among the factors that led to this relocation were the stable political climate, generous investment incentives, relatively good infrastructure, low wages, a docile labour force, and subdued trade union activity.

During the decade of the 1970s and right through to the early eighties, the electronics industry attained impressive growth rates. As a result, its output as a percentage of total manufacturing output increased substantially and a significant proportion of manufacturing exports from ASEAN consisted of electronic products. The labour-intensiveness of the industry also led it to become one of the largest, if not the largest, single absorber of labour in the manufacturing sector in this region.

While the contribution of the electronics industry to growth and employment generation was impressive, its effectiveness in the transfer of technology and the upgrading of skills was more doubtful. Concerned that the manufacturing sector should continuously upgrade its technical skills, the ASEAN governments exhorted multinational corporations (MNCs) from technologically advanced countries such as Japan and the United States to devote attention to the development of the technological capacities in their host country staff.

The Background

There are 6.9 million Muslims in a population of 13.07 million in Malaysia. The rest are made up of Buddhists, Hindus, Christians, Sikhs, followers of Confucianism, Taoism, other traditional Chinese religions, various folk religions, and others. Nearly all Malays are Muslims. This means that the majority of the indigenous people are Muslims. The overwhelming majority of non-Malays are non-Muslims. Since 1957, when the country achieved independence, Islam has been the official religion of the Federation.

The position of Islam as the official religion is essentially a recognition of its premier status in the evolution of the Malaysian polity – a status which for a long time expressed itself mainly through the performance of Muslim prayers at official functions, the construction of mosques by the State, the holding of Qur'an-reading competitions, the organizing of the Haj (the annual pilgrimage to Mecca) through the agency of the government, and the like. It is against this backdrop that Islamic resurgence is taking place. Islamic resurgence – or the rising again of Islam – is a description of the endeavour to re-establish Islamic values, Islamic practices, Islamic institutions, Islamic laws, indeed Islam in its entirety, in the lives of Muslims everywhere. It is an attempt to re-create an Islamic social order guided by the Qur'an and the Sunnah (the Way of the Prophet).

Manifestations

The signs of Islamic resurgence are everywhere. The rapid diffusion of what is regarded as Islamic attire among a significant segment of the Muslim female population in urban areas, in particular, is but the most obvious of these signs. It is perhaps no exaggeration to say that a good 60 to 70 per cent of all Muslim females above adolescence wear such apparel. A number of Muslim males, too, put on what they perceive to be religiously sanctioned attire. Many of them also grow beards as their way of emulating the Prophet and his companions.

The World Economic and Trading System and the Malaysian Economy

Thanks to favourable raw material prices, Malaysia chalked up an average annual growth rate of 8 per cent (real) over the seventies. This growth was almost entirely financed from domestic savings inflated by the surpluses of the flourishing mineral and plantation sectors. The 1980s, in contrast, have brought forth a different set of circumstances. The collapse of the external sector, cut-backs in government spending, falling domestic and foreign investment, and capital flight, have all contributed to the present economic malaise.

By 1985, the economy had to react to a bewildering array of external and internal pressures: the full onslaught of an across-the-board export commodity price slump, followed by a sharp decline in virtually all domestic aggregate expenditure components. These factors combined to produce the first negative (-1 per cent) real gross domestic product growth recorded since Independence.

In contrast, 1986 may best be described as a period of gradual consolidation and stabilization at the margins. Efforts have intensified to reduce deficits on the public budget, and the current and capital accounts of the balance of payments, in an effort to bridge the resource gaps. Simultaneously, attempts were being made to significantly liberalize economic activity from government control. The annual growth rate estimate for 1986 was 1 per cent, attributed mainly to the higher output of palm oil, rubber, crude petroleum, electronics and textiles. As a result of the severe loss of income over the previous two years, aggregate domestic demand declined by 8.6 per cent in 1986.

Moreover, a plethora of cyclical and structural factors continue to impede the speed of progress towards recovery. Domestic private investment confidence has yet to recover. Real private investment fell by about 18.5 per cent between 1985 and 1986. Key commodity prices show some signs of firming, but gains made to date are still a long way off from the levels needed to increase export revenues significantly.